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The research presented in this thesis examines the questions of (i) why the prevailing 
form of Islamic finance has tended to only textually comply with Sharia law while 
breaching principles underlying; and (ii) how Sharia governance could be 
standardised in order to ensure that Islamic finance reliably provides a genuinely 
Islamic alternative to conventional finance so as to engender market trust in the 
Islamic finance industry.  
The primary methodologies applied in this thesis are a text-based analysis and a 
qualitative interview study.  A thorough text-based analysis of the religious and 
academic thinking around Islamic finance serves as a useful starting point for the 
design of the qualitative semi-structured interviews of a sample of 20 academics with 
experience of Islamic finance in practice across three culturally distinct jurisdictions 
(namely, the UK, the Kingdom fo Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia). 
This paper finds that the existing models of Sharia governance across and within 
jurisdictions allow for a variety of interpretations, leading, in turn, to the inconsistent 
issuance of fatwas, thereby undermining the credibility of Islamic finance as 
genuinely compliant with Sharia principles. A lack of standardisation permits the 
coexistence of Sharia boards operating at different levels of Sharia supervision. This 
provides banks with the opportunity to seek to obtain a competitive financial 
advantage by utilising a less rigorous standard of Sharia governance. In order to 
counter the logics of neoliberal capitalism which result in banks ‘shopping around’ 
for favourable interpretations, this thesis concludes that Sharia governance should be 
part of an integrated and standardised system of Islamic corporate governance.  
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Chapter One: Research Overview and Introduction 
 
1.1 Statement of the problem to be addressed 
 
The justification for Islamic finance is that it provides a genuinely Islamic alternative 
to conventional finance. As will be explained below and in chapter three, Islamic 
finance has been criticised for inconsistent Sharia rulings, or fatwas. It has also been 
criticised for focusing on technical compliance rather than embracing the spirit of 
Sharia, resulting in products that have a tendency to resemble those offered by 
conventional financial institutions. As a consequence, Islamic finance is open to the 
criticism that it is not a reliable alternative to conventional finance. That criticism 
may adversely affect confidence in Islamic finance, which may slow its growth or 
even precipitate a crisis. While these criticisms have been identified and widely 
discussed in the literature, the problems of inconsistent Sharia rulings and dubious 
Islamic financial products remain, highlighting the need for a coherent, 
comprehensive and practical solution. This need for a solution to the problems in 
Islamic finance provides the rationale for this thesis, which aims to critically examine 
the problems of inconsistent and technical Sharia rulings, and to suggest how those 
problems may best be addressed to ensure that Islamic finance provides a reliable 
and genuinely Islamic alternative to conventional financial products and services. 
1.2 The research question 
 
One potential solution to the problem of inconsistent Sharia rulings is to standardise 
governance, but this simply begs the questions of what standardisation means and 
how best to organise and implement this standardisation in order to achieve the 
desired impact on Islamic finance. In particular, the solution should not simply focus 
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on standardisation, but must also address the question of how to ensure that Islamic 
finance is truly Islamic in spirit and not simply in form. The research question, which 
reflects both of those issues, is, therefore, as follows: how should Sharia governance 
be standardised in order to ensure that Islamic finance reliably provides a genuinely 
Islamic alternative to conventional finance? 
 
The research question can be divided into a number of component questions, all of 
which will be covered as part of this thesis. These questions are:  
1. What are the problems with Sharia governance in practice and what are the 
sources of these problems? 
2.  What are the possible solutions to the problems encountered in the current 
models of sharia governance? 




The research presented in this thesis analyses Islamic finance and the current 
approach to Sharia governance. It examines the relevance of institutional influences 
to the development of the current approach and the problems of: (i) inconsistent 
fatwas; and (ii) fatwas that deem products acceptable on the basis of formal or 
technical Sharia compliance only. Data was obtained from reliable published sources 
and from a qualitative interview study carried out by the researcher. Much of the 
analysis was focused on Islamic finance in general, but the KSA, the UK and 
Malaysia were used as concrete, specific examples of Islamic finance and Sharia 
governance in practice. The main reasons for choosing these countries are: all three 
have significant Islamic finance sectors; they reflect a range of cultural and religious 
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contexts with the KSA representing Islamic countries, Malaysia representing non-
Islamic states that have a Muslim majority population, and the UK representing 
countries with a minority Muslim population;1 and the KSA is the researcher's home 
country, while the host institution is based in the UK.  Other potential choices for 
fieldwork in future research include majority-Mulsim and Shariah law-governed 
jurisdictions such as Iran or Sudan. 
1.4 Originality 
 
The problem of inconsistent Sharia rulings is not a new issue and has been identified 
and discussed by other commentators.2 Despite consideration and some suggestions 
for a standardised approach,3 there has been a paucity of empirical work and the 
solutions have not been considered in sufficient depth. As such, the issue has yet to 
be satisfactorily resolved by the proposal of a detailed and workable solution. This 
deficiency forms the motivation for this thesis as well as providing the opportunity 
for making an original contribution to the debate. This original contribution will be 
realised through a deep engagement with the problem of Sharia non-compliance and 
the possible ways by which an acceptable level of standardisation of Sharia 
governance might be achieved.  
 
That deep engagement will be achieved by applying the perspective of new 
institutional theory to provide insights into both the causes of the problems addressed 
                                            
1 See the discussion in section 1.5.2. 
2 Hakimah Yaacob, Marjan Muhammad, Edib Smolo, 'International Convention for Islamic Finance: 
Towards Standardisation' (2011) International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance 
Research Paper No 29/2011; Hakimah Yaacob & Apnizan Abdullah,  'Standards Issuance for Islamic 
Finance in International Trade: Current Issues and Challenges Ahead' (2012) 65 Procedia - Social and 
Behavioral Sciences 492.  
3 Hakimah Yaacob, Marjan Muhammad, Edib Smolo, 'International Convention for Islamic Finance: 
Towards Standardisation' (2011) International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance 
Research Paper No 29/2011, 39. Hakimah Yaacob & Apnizan Abdullah,  'Standards Issuance for 
Islamic Finance in International Trade: Current Issues and Challenges Ahead' (2012) 65 Procedia - 
Social and Behavioral Sciences 492, 496. 
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by this thesis and their possible solutions. As will be discussed in the section on 
methodology, new institutional theory is a well established methodological approach. 
It has been used in the context of conventional finance,4 and to develop regulatory 
theory.5 It has not, however, been used to examine Islamic finance and Sharia 
governance. As such, in providing a novel perspective on Sharia governance and the 
risk of Sharia non-compliance, the use of new institutional theory further adds to the 
originality of the thesis.   
Finally, the research providing the foundations for the argument presented in this 
thesis includes a qualitative interview-based study. This will generate new 
information regarding the attitudes of Islamic finance professionals and academics 
towards the provision of Islamic finance in practice. When considered from an 
interpretative, institutional perspective, the insights gained from the interview 
responses will further enhance the originality of the text-based research. 
Thus, the primary novel contributions of this thesis are: 
 the application of new institutional theory to examine the different 
weaknesses observed in the current sharia governance models.  
 The adoption of a cross-cultural interview-based analysis encapsulating (i) 
views on Shariah doctrines on money; and (ii) the varied application of such 
doctrines in the UK, KSA, and Malaysia. 
1.5 Islamic finance: a background review  
1.5.1 A brief history of Islamic finance 
 
In its widest sense, the term "Islamic finance" can be used to refer to any transaction 
governed by Sharia principles, which of course could be traced back to the origins of 
                                            
4 Suhaib Riaz, 'The global financial crisis: an  institutional theory  analysis' (2009) 5 Critical 
Perspectives on International Business 26. 
5 Robert Baldwin, Julia Black, 'Really  Responsive Regulation' (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59. 
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Islam. As Lewis and Algaoud note, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), when acting as 
his wife's agent or mudarib, himself employed the profit-sharing approach of 
mudaraba.6 Modern interest in Islamic finance, however, began in 1941, with the 
publication of The economic problem of man and its Islamic solution. This was 
followed by 'early experiments with Islamic banking ... in Malaya in the mid 1940s',7 
the establishment in 1953 of the National Commercial Bank in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA), which was wholly governed by Sharia law, and by farmer credit 
unions established in Pakistan in the 1950s.8 Many commentators, however, give 
credit for the Mit Ghamr savings project established in Egypt in 1963 to the Islamic 
economist Ahmed al-Najjar. This was the first practical example of what is currently 
referred to as Islamic Finance.9  
 
The Mit Ghamr savings project was ended by the Egyptian Government in 1968, but 
in 1971 it was effectively incorporated in the Nasser Social Bank.10 At around the 
same time as the Mit Ghamr project began, in 1963, the Muslim Pilgrim Savings 
Corporation was established in Malaysia. In 1969, this became the Pilgrims 
Management and Fund Board, more commonly known as the Tabung Haji, which 
did not have the status of a bank, but nevertheless acted as an investment company 
governed by Sharia principles. Although limited in its role, this bank’s success 
'provided the main impetus for establishing Bank Islam Malaysia Berhard ... a fully-
                                            
6 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 4. 
7 Ibid, 5. 
8 Rodney Wilson, 'Islamic Banking and its Impact on the International Financial Scene', in Muazzam 
Ali (ed) European Perceptions of Islamic Banking (Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, 1996) 
99, 101,105. See also the National Commercial bank's website, available at: 
<http ://www.alahli.com/en-us/about-us/Pages/default.aspx>, accessed, 14 September 2016. 
9 Hussam Sultan, 'Islamic microfinance: between commercial viability and the higher objectives of 
shari'a', in S Nazim Ali (ed), Shari'a Compliant Microfinance (Routledge 2012) 46, 48. See also Ann 
Elizabeth Mayer, 'Islamic Banking and Credit Policies in the Sadat Era: The Social Origins of Islamic 
Banking in Egypt' (1985) 1(1) Arab Law Quarterly 32. 
10 Natalie Schoon, 'Islamic finance - a history' (August 2008) Financial Services Review 10, 11. 
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fledged Islamic commercial bank'.11 The Tabung Haji remains the controlling 
shareholder of the Bank, which began to function as Malaysia's first Islamic Bank in 
1983 following the introduction of the Islamic Banking Act 1983.12 
 
In 1970, the 2nd Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Karachi recommended a 
detailed investigation into the project that would result in the establishment of the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The project was then endorsed by a Declaration of 
Intent issued by the First Conference of Finance Ministers of Islamic Countries in 
1973. Subsequently, in 1975, the IDB was established in the Saudi Arabian city of 
Jeddah.13 Throughout the latter half of the 1970s, triggered by the growth of 'Arab oil 
wealth in the wake of the 1973-74 energy price rises' and given momentum by the 
IDB, 14 there was a 'major expansion in Islamic banking'.15 1975 saw the 
establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Then, 
in 1977 the Faisal Islamic Banks were set up in Egypt and the Sudan. The Kuwait 
Finance House was established during the same year, followed by the Jordan Islamic 
Bank in 1978 and the Bahrain Islamic Bank in 1979.16  
 
Subsequent to these small beginnings, other exclusively Islamic organisations were 
established, and conventional Western banks began to offer Islamic financial 
                                            
11 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 6. 
12 RAM Rating Services Berhad, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhard: Financial Institution Ratings (2010), 
2-3. 
13 See the Islamic Development Bank's website, available at: <http ://www.isdb.org>, accessed 14 
September 2016. 
14 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 7, 11. 
15 Rodney Wilson, 'Islamic Banking and its Impact on the International Financial Scene', in Muazzam 




products.17 By 1996 there were, 'well over 100 Islamic financial institutions ... 
operating around the world and ... managing an estimated 80 billion dollars'.18 This 
figure is likely to be an underestimate as Lewis and Algaoud note that the combined 
assets of reporting Islamic banks, which excludes institutions such as the IDB, 
amounted to US$148 billion in 1997.19 
 
The emergence of Islamic finance has been attributed to the 'decolonisation and the 
creation of new states with a majority Muslim population' that occurred in the second 
half of the 20th century.20 It was seen as an alternative to liberal capitalism, forming 
part of a way of life consistent with Sharia principles, therebyalso meeting the 
religious needs of the devout Muslims.21 Wilson notes, that during this latter half of 
the twentieth century: 
There was considerable dissatisfaction with conventional 
commercial banking in most Islamic countries, both on the part of 
Muslim scholars and intellectuals, and amongst the general public, 
who were aware of the Quranic position on interest.22  
This led to an increasing desire for a genuine Sharia compliant alternative based on 
risk and profit sharing participation.23 This approach involves “participation” in a 
transaction that is supported by real assets and uses the financing provided on the 
                                            
17 Natalie Schoon, 'Islamic Finance - an overview' (2008) 9 European Business Organization Law 
Review 621, 626. 
18 Muazzam Ali, 'Introduction', in Muazzam Ali (ed) European Perceptions of Islamic Banking 
(Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance 1996) 5. 
19 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 7. 
20 Filippo di Mauro, Pierluigi Caristi, Stephane Couderc, Angela Di Maria, Lauren Ho, Balijeet Kaur 
Grewal, Sergio Masciantonio, Steven Ongena, Sajjad Saher, Islamic Finance in Europe, Occasional 
Paper No 146, (European Central Bank 2013), 12. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Rodney Wilson, 'Islamic Banking and its Impact on the International Financial Scene', in Muazzam 
Ali (ed) European Perceptions of Islamic Banking (Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance 1996) 
99, 103. 
23 Ibid, 104. 
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basis that the profit (or loss) resulting from the investment subsequently made would 
be shared between the parties investing in that particular project through Islamic 
financing arrangements. 
 
As a relative latecomer into the global financial services market, Islamic Financial 
organisations are small compared to their non-Islamic counterparts. As Schoon notes, 
in 2008 the combined assets of 280 of the top 500 Islamic financial institutions 
amounted to US$540 billion dollars. This contrasts with the assets of HSBC, which 
were 'well in excess of $2 trillion'.24 Nevertheless, this once niche market is now a 
significant minority provider of financial services because of the growing use of 
Sharia compliant financial products by Muslims across the globe. The demand from 
the Muslim community, however, is only part of the picture as interest from the non-
Muslim communities has grown in recent years. Even before interest in Islamic 
finance was boosted by the 2007 global financial crisis,25 a 2005 editorial in 
Company Lawyer described the interest in Sharia governed commercial activity as 
'high fashion'.26 Between 2006-2010, the industry doubled in size and the industry 
was then valued at US$895 billion, a rise of 8.9% on the previous year.27 By the end 
of 2012, the industry was estimated to be worth US$1.6 trillion.28 In 2014 this had 
risen to an estimated US$1.81 trillion.29 Given the interest of non-Muslims and the 
                                            
24 Natalie Schoon, 'Islamic Finance - an overview' (2008) 9 European Business Organization Law 
Review 621, 626. 
25 Although often dated as 2008, the crisis began in 2007. See further, section 2.2.2.  
26 Editorial, 'Banking on Islam' (2005) 26 Company Lawyer 193. 
27 David Oakley, 'Growth survives the storms' The Future of Islamic Finance, Financial Times Special 
Report (December 14, 2010) 1. 
28 Filippo di Mauro et al, Islamic Finance in Europe, Occasional Paper No 146, (European Central 
Bank 2013), 9. 
29 Haroon Latif (auth), Hammaad Chaudry (ed), State of the Global Islamic Economy Report 
2015/2016 (Thomson Reuters 2015), 39 <http ://islamic-finance.zawya.com/ifg-
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scope for increased use within the Muslim community,30 Islamic Finance is likely to 
continue to expand. Indeed, if the projected potential growth of Islamic finance is 
fulfilled, the industry will be worth US$3.2 trillion by 2020.31 
 
The demand for Sharia compliant financial services is being embraced, both by 
Islamic countries and those secular countries with a significant Muslim community. 
Officials from both the United States Federal Reserve and the United Kingdom's 
(UK) Financial Conduct Authority have acknowledged the need to facilitate the 
provision of Islamic Finance out of respect for the religious beliefs of the Muslims 
living within their respective countries.32 In recognition of the interest in and demand 
for Islamic finance, many countries have made specific arrangements to facilitate the 
establishment of Islamic financial services. For example, some countries, including 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and Malaysia, have implemented specific tax 
arrangements.33 These efforts are motivated not just by the demand from the Muslim 
community, but also by the recognition that Islamic finance is now an 'integral part 
of [the  global financial system]', and is no longer only an insular service restricted to 
the devout Muslim.34 
1.5.2 The structural and motivational contexts of Islamic finance 
 
According to Lewis and Algaoud, the continuing development of Islamic finance has 
generally followed one of two forms. In some Muslim countries, such as Iran, Sudan, 
                                            
30 In 2010 it was estimated that Islamic finance was used by only 12% of the 1.6 billion Muslims 
globally : David Oakley, 'Growth survives the storms' December 14, 2010, The Future of Islamic 
Finance, Financial Times Special Report, 1, 2. 
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33 Filippo di Mauro et al, Islamic Finance in Europe, Occasional Paper No 146, (European Central 
Bank 2013), 25-29; Kevin Brown, 'Malaysia seeks end to slide in issuance' The Future of Islamic 
Finance, Financial Times Special Report (December 14, 2010) 4. 
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and Pakistan, the approach taken 'involves the restructuring of the whole financial 
system to accord with Islamic precepts'.35 In other countries, the approach has been 
to establish Islamic finance to operate alongside conventional banking. It is also 
worth noting that Islamic finance may be provided by wholly Islamic organisations 
on a national or international basis, or by conventional organisations with an Islamic 
finance 'window'.36 One might further distinguish three different religious and 
cultural contexts that provide the backdrop to the development of Islamic finance: 
Muslim countries (e.g. KSA); non-Muslim countries with a majority Muslim 
population (e.g. Malaysia);37 and non-Muslim countries with a minority Muslim 
population (e.g. England). Acknowledging these different forms and contexts will be 
important when considering the primary research question of how standardisation of 
Sharia governance might be implemented to benefit Islamic finance. 
 
As well as accounting for the structural context of the research, it is important to 
appreciate the motivational context. Understanding the reasons why Islamic finance 
has generated such interest, and continued to grow into a significant, if minority, 
force in national and global financial services will necessarily inform the approach to 
governance since regulation should reflect the interests of the major stakeholders. 
The motivations behind the rise in Islamic Finance will, therefore, be briefly 
explicated. 
 
The first, and main motivation, is the desire for Sharia compliant Islamic finance for 
religious or faith-based reasons. Visser comments that: 'The movement for ... an 
                                            
35 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 14. 
36 Ibid. 
37 61.3% of Malaysians are Muslim, see: Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Population Distribution 
and Basic Demographic Characteristic Report (2010), available at: 
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Islamic financial system ... is rooted in the experience of Muslims in what they, or at 
least some of them, felt in the past was an unfriendly non-Muslim environment'.38 
Within this broad faith-based motivation, Visser distinguishes between two different 
approaches: a radical, insular Islamisation growing out of the politics espoused by 
Maududi and Sayyid Qutb; and a more moderate approach of an Islamic financial 
system co-existing with conventional financial institutions in a more integrated 
way.39 However, as Visser comments, 'generally the world of Islamic finance itself 
gives the impression that the interest in earning money in a Sharia-compliant way is 
more prevalent than any hatred of critics'.40 Nevertheless, the more radical views 
could influence both Sharia-compliance fatwas and academic commentary on 
Islamic finance. 
 
The latter of the two faith-based approaches, championed by the Islamic economist 
Mohammad Siddiqi, sees Islamic finance as a much needed and more equitable 
alternative to that offered by conventional financial services.41 As such it overlaps 
and feeds into the second motivation, which lies in the interest and potential demand 
for ethical financial services. The initial motivation for this was prompted by:  
…the failure of economic development in the post-independent 
states of Asia and Africa in 1960s and 1970s [and] was attributed to 
flawed capitalist economic development strategies, which ignored 
the importance and centrality of human beings and their well-
being.42 
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Beyond its early political origins, the ethical motivation developed further with the 
growth of a more domestic interest in the private sector.43 
 
Based on the prohibition of riba (interest) and gambling, Siddiqi argues that Islamic 
finance offers an ethical approach that 'downsiz[es] individualism'44 and supports 'the 
cooperative nature of man's life requiring fairness and care for others'.45 For Siddiqi, 
Islamic banking and finance, a sub-culture of Islamic economics, has been a quest for 
infusing justice and morality into the "ordinary business of life"'.46 This ethical 
approach will be of interest to Muslim investors, particularly those who are devout. 
However, although 'concerned with a very different set of ethical criteria from 
Western "green" or ethical investors',47 the interest and demand for ethical Islamic 
finance is not restricted to Muslims, and there appears to be a secular market for it.48   
 
The third and final motivation came from the 2007 financial crisis.49 Wiebier and 
Salah note that:  
When the credit crisis struck, some in the Arab world were quick to 
suggest that Islamic finance methods were more resistant to the 
impact of the credit crisis than more conventional finance schemes. 
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This perhaps overly optimistic view was belied by the Dubai Debt 
Crisis of late 2009 ... Yet it is a fact that Islamic countries have (so 
far) weathered the credit crisis quite well.50 
This resistance is at least in part due to the specific characteristics of Islamic finance  
derived from Sharia principles and including: (i) a requirement for risk sharing; (ii) 
the requirement that financial transactions must be directly connected to real or 
tangible assets; (iii) the prohibition of trading debt for profit; and (iv) the prohibition 
of speculative and excessive risk taking that can be characterised as gambling.51 This 
is not to suggest that Islamic finance is without risk -  the risks associated with 
Islamic finance will be considered in subsequent chapters - but, that compliance with 
Sharia principles means that it is generally more risk-averse than conventional 
finance. Such 'socially responsible' financial services are likely to be of interest, not 
just to Muslims, but to anyone disenchanted by the more self-serving, greed 
motivated conventional financial sector.52 
1.5.3 Sharia governance and the call for standardisation 
 
As will be discussed in chapter three, the defining characteristic of Islamic finance is 
its compliance with the Sharia.53 The need for Islamic financial products to be 
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Sharia compliant creates the risk of Sharia non-compliance, which is managed by 
Sharia governance.54 The problem is that there are essentially two broad approaches 
to assessing Sharia compliance. First, compliance may be assessed on the basis of 
technical requirements, such as the formal prohibition of riba (interest). Second, 
compliance may be assessed by reference to the spirit of Sharia, which emphasises 
the philosophy of Islam, reflected in the Maqasid al-Sharia, which values money as 
an instrumental means to an end rather than as something of intrinsic value and 
prioritises social justice over profit. 
 
This division in the approach to Sharia compliance may result in inconsistent Sharia 
rulings and the release of products that are technically compliant, but which are 
constructed to resemble conventional financial products.55 Where technical 
compliance provides the yardstick, form is prioritised over substance, allowing 
contracts that circumvent the demands of Sharia.56 This may allow payments that are 
linked to interest rates and,57 while they may be characterised as the payments of 
profit, or as payments for services or for shouldering risk, behave like interest and 
highlight a divergence between Islamic finance in substantive theory and Islamic 
finance in formal practice.58 The danger of this focus on technical compliance, when 
coupled with inconsistent Sharia rulings, is that it creates the opportunity for fatwa 
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shopping.59 This allows financial institutions to shop around for a favourable ruling 
on a new financial product, thereby avoiding the constraints of more restrictive 
Sharia rulings that measure compliance against the spirit of Sharia. 
 
The coexistence of inconsistent approaches to Sharia governance, which facilitates 
inconsistent Sharia rulings and fatwa shopping, creates a reputational risk for Islamic 
finance and erodes consumer confidence in the credibility of Islamic finance as a 
reliable Islamic alternative to conventional finance.60 This danger has prompted the 
call for Sharia governance to be standardised,61 perhaps by establishing an 
international Sharia board.62 The problem of inconsistent Sharia rulings and the need 
for standardisation creates the context and justification for the research question 
addressed in this thesis. 
1.6 Methodology and methods 
1.6.1 The theoretical framework for the thesis 
 
Whether formal or informal, acknowledged or unacknowledged, all research is 
shaped by its theoretical framework, which provides the methodology and 
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epistemology of that research.63 The theoretical framework identifies the philosophy 
behind the inquiry, and the arguments formed in response to the research question 
connects theory to practice and defines the assumptions and biases that inform all 
such projects. Thus, by providing a particular 'lens' through which to view the issue 
at hand,64 the theoretical framework 'has implications for every decision made in the 
research process'.65 
 
The theoretical framework for this thesis is mixed. The primary frame is provided by 
new institutional theory, but this will be supplemented by theories of governance, 
regulation and the management of risk. In this section, the basics of these theoretical 
methods will be explained to allow a better understanding of the arguments that 
follow when considering the substantive issue of standardising Sharia governance of 
Islamic finance. Working definitions of certain concepts that will be relevant to the 
substantive analysis will also be provided. 
1.6.1.1 New institutional theory 
 
The decision to utilise new institutional theory is motivated by two factors. First, it 
provides a well established methodology for understanding 'organizational and 
political change', producing a more complete picture than 'rational-actor or 
functionalist accounts'.66 This should enable an understanding of the social and 
ideological tensions affecting the delivery and governance of Islamic finance. 
Second, conventional and Islamic financial institutions share many similar features 
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amenable to the analytical method of new institutional theory, for example the 
structural arrangement of financial services within a broad framework of both 
informal and formal institutions.67 While this theoretical methodology has been used 
to evaluate the non-Islamic or conventional financial industry,68 it has not so far been 
utilised for an analysis of the Islamic financial industry. Applying this methodology, 
therefore, will provide a fresh perspective that may reveal new insights. 
 
The essence of new institutional theory is that agents, including organisations, 'are 
embedded in broader environments and created and changed by environmental 
change', particularly in terms of legitimacy and culture.69 The process of change 
derives from Weber's concept of bureaucratisation, which has the effect of creating 
an ‘iron cage’ of homogenisation.70 Through this process of institutional 
isomorphism, organisations become 'imprisoned' within an institutional framework.71 
Moving on from Weber's argument that the competitive marketplace was the most 
important driving force of bureaucratisation, Dimaggio and Powell argue that: 
Bureaucratization and other forms of homogenisation emerge ... out 
of the structuration of organizational fields ... [which] in turn is 
effected largely by the state and the professions.72  
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The context of these 'highly structured organizational fields' interacts with the 
responses to 'uncertainty and constraint' of the individuals that work within them 
resulting in the process of isomorphism.73 
 
Dimaggio and Powell define their 'unit of analysis', which they label the 
'organizational field', as: 'those organizations that, in aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life'.74 This is determined empirically by reference to 
four elements: 
1. The level or extent of interaction between the organisations; 
2. The existence of 'sharply defined interorganizational structures of domination 
and patterns of coalition'; 
3. The 'informational load' that the organisations handle; and 
4. A sense of 'common enterprise'.75 
In other words, '[o]rganizational fields are clusters of organizations and occupations 
whose boundaries, identities and interactions are defined and stabilized by shared 
institutional logics'.76 These institutional logics are securely established rules that 
define the nature, limits and membership of the organizational field.77  
 
The decisions of the professionals working within these fields tend to create an 
environment that then acts as a constraint against future change and shifts from the 
early motivation of efficiency to one of legitimacy.78 This creates an iterative process 
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by which organisations within the field respond to each other in an isomorphic 
feedback loop. 
 
Isomorphism may be defined 'as a constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions'.79 In the context of the institution, the environment centres on interactions 
between organisations that 'compete not just for resources and customers, but for 
political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness'.80 
These interactions, which provide the driving force for institutional isomorphism, 
may be characterised as: 
1. 'coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of 
legitimacy': whenever organisations exist in a dependent relationship with 
other organisations they may be subject to coercive pressures to conform to 
the norms of those organisations on which they depend;  
2. 'mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty': 
organisations facing uncertainty tend to model their response on other 
organisations that appear to have managed the uncertainty successfully; this 
may occur intentionally or through the migration of key employees or the 
shared use of consulting or advisory services; and 
3. 'normative isomorphism, associated with professionalism': this derives from 
the need within a profession to create an identity based on norms and is 
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heavily influenced by formal university education, professional networks and 
professional bodies that register and train members.81  
In addition to the driving force of institutional isomorphism, organisations may also 
be subject to competitive isomorphism, which tends to be most relevant during the 
earlier stages of an emerging field and works through the economic natural selection 
of 'market competition, niche change, and fitness measures'.82 As the field matures, 
competitive isomorphism is largely, although not completely, supplanted by 
institutional isomorphism. 
 
The essence of isomorphism is that internal and external factors work within an 
organisational field to shape organisations in such a way that they tend to resemble 
each other in attitude, behaviour and norms. These factors primarily arise from 
dominance, legitimacy, prestige and success, whether real or perceived. They operate 
through authority or coercion, copying or mimicking behaviour, inducement,83 a 
shared educational and socio-cultural background, or the effects of socialisation.84 
The tendency towards similarity, then, arises because organisations are 'deeply and 
essentially embedded in wider institutional environments' that are caused by and 
reflect that wider institutional context.85 They are not discretely bounded wholly 
independent entities, autonomous in an individualistic sense. Rather they are 
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autonomous in the relational sense of being both constrained and dependent on, but 
enabled by, a network of relationships.86 
 
Any analysis from an institutional perspective must take into account that the 
existence and activity of organisations, and other relevant actors, are essentially 
shaped by institutional influences, both locally and more widely at the societal and 
global level. As Meyer et al comment, 'Actors and action are illuminated by 
universalistic lights'.87 They suggest that: 
An institutional analysis rests on two central themes. First, the 
rationalization of social activity stands in a reciprocal relation to 
the social construction of the actor's given ontological status in 
society. Second, the institutional rules undergoing rationalization 
and social ontology operate at a very general (now often 
worldwide) level, not simply at the level of local negotiation.88 
The implications of these two themes are: first, that a social activity can be shaped 
either by influencing the activity directly or indirectly through the social construction 
of the actors; second, that any change in the activity will affect the actor, which will, 
in turn, affect the activity in an ever decreasing feedback cycle that tends towards 
standardisation; third, that effective local changes, through common concerns and 
diffusion,89 can have a wider influence than might be initially anticipated; and fourth, 
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that organisations must be analysed within the global context of worldwide 
isomorphic pressures.90  
 
With those two themes in mind, a general model of the institution and 
institutionalisation may be defined, comprising of following four elements.91 
1. The organisation: These have 'identities, structures and activity patterns', all 
of which depend on and are shaped by the isomorphic influences of the wider 
environment. Each of these three aspects of the organisation are subject to 
both external influences and internal influences from the other aspects.92  
2. The causal mechanisms that connect the existence and nature of organisations 
to the rationalised wider environment. 
3. The rationalised wider environment: This operates through, for example, 
public rules and regulations, ideologies, religions and cultural values. The 
environment may be stratified into layers of influences and entities, such as 
the supranational or global society, the nation state, the regulators (regulators, 
legislators, judges) the experts (science and professions), the organisation. 
The organisation stratum, will be more influential in the 'absence of strong 
central regulation' and where organisations have similar identities and 
common form.93 The entities of the global society, such as the UN or World 
Bank system, are not agents in the sense of having self-interested goals. 
Rather they are 'loose ... communities with little sovereignty' with a 
'disinterested' advisory or regulatory 'posture ... managing ... [and] 
constructing]. the agreements and long-run interests of ... human beings, 
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national states, and organizations in light of more general natural and moral 
laws'.94 
4. The 'macrosociological processes' that operate within the wider environment 
to organise that environment into a rationalised unit that can then exert 
isomorphic pressure on the organisations. 
 
Having considered the isomorphic pressure of institutions on organisations, it should 
be noted that the influence is not a one-way street and institutions may also be 
subjected to functional, political and social pressure to change.95 As DiMaggio and 
Powell note: 
institutions are not only constraints on human agency; they are first 
and foremost products of human actions. Indeed, rules are typically 
constructed by a process of conflict and contestation.96 
Thus, institutions are established and shaped by human agents (elite institutional 
entrepreneurs) with the collective interest, resources and power to effect the required 
change in social structure. Thus, although the process has received less attention, it is 
nevertheless apparent that organisations, particularly those with significant 
resources,97 are capable of exerting influence on institutions just as institutions exert 
pressure on organisations.98 As Riaz comments, '[o]rganizations represent powerful 
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interests ... that have a bearing on the survival of the institutional framework in the 
domain of the organization's operation and influence'.99  
 
The tendency for organisations to influence institutional change is more likely where, 
because they are multi-disciplinary, 'they bridge organizational fields' and so 'come 
into contact with contradictory logics'.100 Similarly, 'less embedded organizations' 
that exist at the periphery of an organisational field are more likely to produce or 
facilitate change through 'institutional entrepreneurship'.101 Furthermore, a 
misalignment between the boundaries of influence of institutions and the activity of  
the organizational field provides an additional source of pressure for institutional 
change.102  
 
The interaction between the institution and the organisation does not stop here. The 
institutional changes caused by pressure from organisations may, in turn, exert a new 
influence on the organisational field that can affect the values and principles that 
constitute the nature and integrity of those organisations.103 In other words, the 
relationship between institutions and organisations, while not equal is nevertheless an 
iterative one, with influence and change working in both directions, within a 
stratified range of environments from local to global. 
1.6.1.2 The institution 
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Before examining risk, regulation and governance, the second theoretical axis of this 
analysis, it is first necessary to provide a working definition of the institution. This is 
important because, as Jepperson notes, the use of the term "institution" has been used 
with '[striking] variety and vagueness'.104 However, a number of features or attributes 
can be identified. First, an institution must be ordered or organised. Second, it should 
be so well established within the relevant societal context that it is essentially taken 
for granted.105 Third, an institution is a socially constructed representation of an 
entity that has an observable effect within the relevant social context,106 or as 
DiMaggio and Powell put it, institutions are cognitive 'macrolevel abstractions'.107 
Fourth, whether something is characterised as an institution depends on context, and 
the relevant level of analysis. Fifth, institutions arise and persist through relatively 
unreflective, recurrent behaviour shaped by the rules, scripts and identities that form 
their constituents and allow them to provide a social order and normative 
framework.108 Sixth, an institution is 'culturally' persistent and relatively resistant to 
change.109 
 
Jepperson defines an institution as: 'a social order or pattern' and a 'socially 
constructed, routine reproduced ... program or rule systems, [operating] as relative 
fixtures of constraining environments and  accompanied by taken for granted 
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accounts'.110 By creating 'identities and activity scripts', they can both constrain and 
empower organisations and other agents.111 For Meyer et al, an institution is a set of 
'cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to entities and activities, 
integrating them into the larger schemes'.112 For DiMaggio and Powell: 'Not norms 
and values but taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications are the stuff of 
which institutions are made'.113 For the purposes of this thesis then, an institution will 
be defined as: 
a socially constructed, context dependent, essentially taken for 
granted and relatively resistant system of cultural rules and 
behavioural scripts that establishes a social order and normative 
framework that both constrains and empowers societal agents.  
1.6.1.3 Risk, regulation and governance 
 
Another axis for analysis lies in an understanding of risk and the governance and 
regulation of that risk. Before considering governance and regulation, it is first 
necessary to set out an approach to risk and its relevance. Risk is not, in itself, a 
harm, but may be defined as the likelihood or probability of a particular harm, where 
harm may be characterised, following Feinberg, as a setback to interests.114 Thus, 
risk comprises two elements: the type or nature of the harm and the likelihood or 
probability that the harm will materialise. In other words, risk involves 'exposure and 
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uncertainty'.115 Both of these elements offer scope for risk management, with the aim 
of either reducing the likelihood that the harm will materialise or, if that fails, 
limiting the impact of the harm that ensues. In Islamic finance, risk (Mukhatarah) is 
perceived as as  ‘the situation that involves the probability of deviation from the path 
that leads to the expected or usual result’.116 Alternatively, it has been defined as ‘the 
likelihood of loss.’117 
 
It is the appreciation of risk and our ability to 'manage' it that 'defines the boundary 
between modern times and the past'.118 However, it is not just an appreciation of risk 
that characterises modern society: it is also the paradoxical explosion of risk that has 
accompanied human progress.119 '[R]isk is a modern concept',120 that 'inherently 
contains the concept of control'.121 But, while risk can be managed, the uncertainty 
and lack of knowledge that are also inherent to risk, also means that it cannot be 
completely controlled. This is particularly so for those risks that result directly from 
human activity, which includes the risk of financial crisis.122 However, recognising 
that risk cannot be completely controlled or eliminated does not reduce the value of 
effectively managing the risk. Indeed, it is the effective management, distribution 
and pricing of risk that gives rise to successful banking institutions. Whilst 
conventional banks primarily role is to accept and distribute risks, banks abiding by 
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Shariah principles are prohibited by the principles of qimar, maysir, and gharar from 
assuming excessive risks or engaging in speculation. It is instructive to consider this 
distinction when assessing the market practices of Islamic banks. 
 
Today, we live in a global risk society in which individuals and organisations both 
face and give rise to greater or lesser degrees of risk and specific groups that 
represent particular risks '[become] defined by this "risk"'.123 Risk is 'ubiquitous and 
thus grounds a politics of fear and a politics of prevention'124 with the relationship 
between the risk-taker and the risk-facers grounding both an individual and a social 
responsibility. These risks may be global in nature, transcending national and 
geographical boundaries, establishing dispersed and diverse '[cosmopolitan] risk 
communities', and requiring a reflectively selective appreciation of the lives and 
views of the less familiar 'other'.125 The impact of global risk is to transform these 
'others' into global neighbours that demand consideration when making 'risk 
decisions',126 and this necessarily impacts on the governance and regulation of risky 
activity, 'undermining the operative logic of the institutions of the nation-state and of 
industrial society'.127 Global issues require global solutions and even risks that are 
relatively localised, in an immediate sense, may have "knock-on" effects mediated, 
for example, by the contagions of illegitimacy, which are the inverse of the 
contagions of legitimacy phenomenon discussed earlier. 
However, this begs the question of whether risks can be effectively regulated and 
whether they should be regulated in the first place? 
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As to the normative question of whether risks should be regulated Beck proposes that 
untramelled risk and risk management allows the creation of structural social 
inequality between those who create the risks, and possess the power to divert that 
risk, and those who have the risk imposed upon them.128 This insight raises questions 
of responsibility, justice, trust, credibility, and legitimacy that must be addressed, 
alongside any attempt to manage risk, by regulatory or governance regimes. A failure 
to effectively manage global risks threatens the 'failure of institutions that derive 
their legitimacy from a declared mastery of danger'.129 As Mythen notes, 
'transboundary risks are capable of producing aftershocks that do not fall neatly 
within the dominion of nation states'.130 This undermines the effectiveness of 
national regulation, increases the public perception of uncertainty and insecurity, and 
challenges the legitimacy of local responses to global risks. The desire for this 
legitimacy provides a strong motivation for the regulation of risk. 
 
The need for global regulation and governance to achieve legitimacy through 
security requires transnational cooperation. This can occur through a retreat into a 
'fortress state' with cooperation offered through 'surveillance' and the external 
provision of power. The alternative, and preferable solution, is an 'open world state' 
that takes a relational approach to national self-determination and recognises a 
responsibility towards foreign 'others' regardless of national borders.131 It is this latter 
solution that is likely to offer a more complete, persisting and resilient solution 
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because, through dialogue and the acceptance of cultural and religious difference, it 
allows the construction of a more genuine global neighbourhood and reflects the risk 
relationship that unites us.132 
 
As to the positive aspect of the effectiveness of risk regulation at establishing its 
stated objectives, it bears emphasising that both the identification and 
characterisation of risks are normative and ideological as well as empirical acts.133 
Risks involve both objective and subjective elements and it is the subjective elements 
of risk perception and the impact or consequences of risk that are perhaps most open 
to competing moral accounts. In addressing risk and risk-management, it is important 
to bear this subjectivity in mind in order to ensure the trust, credibility, justice and 
legitimacy necessary to sustain an effective regulatory system. Furthermore, it should 
also be noted that the global nature of risk should not be misunderstood as a 
universal risk. A global risk is simply one that transcends national borders and not 
necessarily one that affects everyone, or at least affects everyone equally or 
significantly.134 It does, however, mean that the methodological perspective must 
engage with a cosmopolitan or transnational analysis that does not restrict the unit of 
analysis to the nation state, but includes de-nationalised spaces.135 The empirical 
questions must be addressed with a methodology that is conscious of the ‘global’ 
nature of risk. Accepting the need for a cosmopolitan analysis is not to diminish the 
persisting relevance of the nation state,136 but is to emphasise the need for a stratified 
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analysis engaging with the organisations and institutions at sub-national, national, 
regional and global levels. 
 
This thesis is concerned with risk created by human activity, in particular,  financial 
risk, and not with the likelihood of natural hazards. This is important because it 
provides an additional opportunity for governance and regulation by addressing the 
behaviour that creates the risk. This approach can be used in conjunction with 
strategies that aim to reduce the likelihood that the risk will materialise and the 
impact of the harm that results should those strategies fail. One such class of risk, 
which came to the fore with the 2007 financial crisis, is systemic risk. 
 
Systemic risk is the likelihood that a 'trigger event, such as economic shock or 
institutional failure ... [will cause] a chain of bad economic consequences - 
sometimes referred to as a domino effect'.137 This domino effect, or contagion,138 
results in the failure of a sufficient number of organisations (banks or other financial 
services companies) that it goes beyond the failure of individual entities and becomes 
a failure of the system itself.139 These systemic risks must be distinguished from the 
systematic risks of the normal swings inherent to the workings of the market.140 
Systemic risk should also be distinguished from global risk. A systemic financial risk 
may be a global risk, but may also be more localised to regions or even nations, 
depending on the financial architecture involved.  
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A final distinction is between systemic and individual risk, where individual risks are 
those restricted to a single entity, or limited number of individual entities, and do not 
threaten the system as whole. Depending on the nature of the harm, there can be a 
regulatory tension between systemic and individual risk. In the context of banks, for 
example, an individual organisation can lower the risk to its own security by 
diversifying risks, but if all banks take the same approach then this can lead to the 
risk of multiple failure, i.e. similar individual risk diversification strategy may 
increase the risk of systemic failure. As Beale et al note, this creates a regulatory 
dilemma between allowing individual banks to maximise their own stability and 
constraining that freedom in order to protect the system.141 This example illustrates a 
general truism, that, just as there is often a tension between the individual and 
society, so there is a often a tension between the individual and any collective, 
including specific systems. 
 
The danger posed by systemic risk, and a powerful motivation for regulation, is that 
the market participants tend to protect themselves, but not others or the system as a 
whole, against such a threat. Furthermore, because such risks are comparatively rare, 
they may be effectively sidelined and ignored by individual organisations.142 The 
other key regulatory issue is that systemic risks can be distinguished from other kinds 
of financial risk as being a threat to the very financial system itself,143 and indeed to 
the institutionalised rules and norms that support the system. This threat arguably 
justifies a normative concern that goes beyond economic efficiency and justifies 
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regulation on the basis of a wider public interest.144 Such regulation must focus on 
not just the individual organisation but on the organisation as part of the system and 
on the system itself.145 The extent of that regulation, then, should reflect the extent of 
the system and may require layers of regulation and governance engaging with the 
organisation, the nation, the region and the world. 
 
The relevance of risk to the theoretical framework of this thesis is that it provides 
both the motivation for the establishment of regulation as well as a pervasive 
discourse that may itself be seen as an institution but also threatens the existence and 
persistence of other institutions. For example, Rothstein et al distinguish societal risk 
from institutional risk, the latter representing those risks to the regulatory bodies 
themselves and to the 'legitimacy of their associated rules and methods'.146 In other 
words, the narrative of risk intersects with institutions and an institutional analysis, 
connecting the analytical entities and providing a lens through which to view the 
relationships and interactions between those entities. 
 
Levi-Faur suggests that: 'Like many other political concepts, regulation is hard to 
define, not least because it means different things to different people'.147 As a start 
towards a definition, Levi-Faur notes that it is 'a distinct type of policy' with 'opaque' 
costs, the most significant of which are the compliance costs faced by the regulated 
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parties.148 It is concerned with standard setting,149 rule making and possibly rule 
monitoring and enforcement, and is focused on risk management.150 Traditionally, 
regulation has been centred on the state and involves 'some form of "command and 
control"'.151 As a policy of rules designed to manage risk by controlling behaviour,152 
regulation is essentially normative and value laden. Its goals include, the correction 
of market failure, risk management and distribution, social justice and the prevention 
of the self destruction of the regulated systems.153 
 
Levi-Faur goes on to suggest that it might be better to accept a plurality of meanings 
rather than try to force a definition.154 This is fine for a discussion of regulation in 
general, but distinct contexts may require a more monistic approach. As such, the 
approach will be to build on the already identified features of regulation and consider 
some of the differing views before providing a definition for the specific purpose of 
this thesis. 
 
One regularly relied on definition of regulation defines the term as the'sustained and 
focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by the 
community'.155 This view of regulation focuses on the functioning of the 
administrative bodies tasked with implementing the regulatory rules and overseeing 
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those parties subject to regulation. It emphasises that regulation is both persistent and 
specific or targeted. It is, however, as Levi-Faur notes, a restrictive definition that 
excludes private, civil and self- regulation, as well as the regulation of activities not 
valued by the community.156 
 
Although accepting the pluralism of the conception of regulation, Levi-Faur defines 
it preferentially as:  
the ex ante bureaucratic legalization of prescriptive rules and the 
monitoring of and enforcement of these rules by social, business, 
and political actors on other social, business and political actors.157  
This very particular approach restricts regulation to the bureaucratic, so excluding 
any legal mechanism (legislature and judiciary). Scott, on the other hand, provides a 
much wider definition of regulation as:  
any process or set of processes by which norms are established, the 
behavior of those subject to the norms monitored or fed back into 
the regime, and for which there are mechanisms for holding the 
behavior of regulated actors within the acceptable limits of the 
regime.158 
 
Black notes that regulation is increasingly being conceived of as separate from the 
state, which opens the door for a 'wide range of different configurations of state, 
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market, community, associations and networks to deliver public policy goals'.159 But, 
although this 'decentred' regulation is consistent with the trend towards globalisation, 
it does, as she acknowledges, raise the question of the nature of regulation. This 
decentred approach relies on a five key arguments: (i) the complexity that arises from 
the variety of factors that interact to create the problems that require regulation; (ii) 
the fragmentation of knowledge and power that is dispersed amongst a number of 
different actors and not located solely with the state; (iii) that actors and systems 
change autonomously and are, at least to some extent, self-regulating, which can 
result in sometimes unpredictable consequences from attempts at external regulation; 
(iv) that there is a complex set of 'interactions and interdependencies' between the 
various actors involved in the process of regulation; and (v) the 'collapse of the 
public/private distinction'.160 
 
The consequence of this changing approach to regulation is the plurality of 
definitions noted earlier. To rationalise this, Black identifies three senses in which 
regulation may be defined: (i) functional, or what regulation does; (ii) essentialist, 
representing regulation through the identification of core attributes; and (iii) 
conventionalist or how the term is used with the relevant community. Opting for a 
functional approach she defines decentred regulation as: 
the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of 
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may 
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involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information gathering and 
behaviour modification.161 
 
For present purposes, the aim is to provide a useful definition of regulation that may 
be distinguished from the concept of governance so that both terms may be helpfully 
employed in the analytical and prescriptive discussion of Islamic finance and Sharia 
compliance. Before settling on the definition of regulation, then, it is first necessary 
to consider the meaning of governance and the more specific notion of corporate 
governance. A reasonable starting point is Wood's comparison of the two concepts, 
which is relevantly in the context of the financial sector.162 
 
For Wood, who seeks to argue that governance provides a more sustainable and 
effective approach:  
Regulation tells people what to do, while governance involves 
setting up structures, inside or outside organisations, so as to make 
it desirable for the organisations in the best service of their own 
interests to do what is thought also to be in the public interest ... 
governance is a particular type of regulation, one which focuses on 
structures rather than on either processes or outcomes.163 
There is a sense here that Wood is setting regulation up as a straw man in order to 
establish the supremacy of governance, but the final sentence of the quote provides a 
useful insight, which distinguishes governance as being specifically concerned with 
structures. Wood's definition of governance also provides a useful truism, that it is 
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likely to be more effective to incentivise agents than to simply instruct them. 
Creating structures that identify the organisation's interests with the public interest 
may be a better approach than a command and control approach to regulation. 
 
Dealing specifically with corporate governance, Chiu, on the one hand, frames 
regulation as public, external and concerned with risks and the social good. On the 
other hand, corporate governance under the agency model, which focuses on aligning 
managerial and shareholder interests, is 'inward-looking and serves private 
transactional interests'.164 In her brief editorial, Chiu expresses the view that, since 
the 2007 financial crisis, regulation has extended its influence into the corporate 
governance arena, suggesting perhaps a fluid interface in the relationship between 
the two approaches to managing behaviour. 
 
 
Solomon notes that: 'the term "new governance" [is used in much of the literature] to 
refer to a specific kind of regulatory approach, generally one with particular 
attributes such as benchmarking, transparency and democratic participation'. 
Solomon himself prefers to use the term to refer to a 'regulatory state of mind' akin to 
responsive regulation.165 This new approach is characterised by a blurring of 
traditional regulatory boundaries, including 'the roles of regulatory actors', the stages 
and modes of regulation, the structure, and function of regulatory processes.166 This 
does not alter the basic meaning and purpose of regulation, but does affect the 
structure and the process of regulation, creating more interactional, more 
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interdependent, and more iterative mechanics. The strict divisions between regulator 
and regulated, public and private, policy setting and implementation, become 
'blurred' under the 'new governance' method. 
 
The sense of the relationship between governance and regulation so far has been that 
governance is a particular type of, or approach towards, regulation. Braithwaite et al, 
however, see regulation as being a type of governance. Governance is concerned not 
just with regulation but also with provision and distribution, while regulation is 
'about steering the flow of events and behavior'.167 Certainly, governance, as 
etymologically related to government, is often used as a wider concept than 
regulation, involving all the roles of government. However, it is also used either as a 
synonym or a hyponym of regulation.  
 
For the sake of clarity, this terminological confusion will be resolved as follows. 
Because this thesis is not concerned with all of the broad roles of government, 
governance, as a bare term, will not be used. Instead, regulation will be used as the 
hierarchically top level or parent term. This parent term needs to be all-encompassing 
and, for the purposes of this thesis, Black's definition of regulation (see above) will 
be relied on. The term state regulation will be used to refer to the more traditional 
'command and control' or directive regulation established and run solely by the state. 
For the types of regulation that are more democratically interactive, relational, 
reflective and discursive, involve both public and private agents, and blur traditional 
boundaries, the term new governance will be used. 
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Before concluding this section, the concept of corporate governance needs 
explication. As Masdoor notes, there is a plethora of corporate governance theories, 
including the agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource 
dependency and transaction cost theories, and a variety of ethical theories.168 For 
present purposes, however, beyond acknowledging that there are a range of views 
regarding the nature and purpose of corporate governance, there is no need to explore 
these different theories. The aim here is to provide a more general explanation of 
corporate governance, which may then be further refined when considering the more 
substantive issue of Sharia compliance and governance in subsequent chapters. 
 
For Masdoor, corporate governance is a 'set of processes and structures for 
controlling and directing an organization. It constitutes a set of rules, which governs 
the relationship between management, shareholders and stakeholders'.169 For Blair, 
corporate governance is:  
the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that 
determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls 
them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and returns 
from the activities they undertake are allocated.170 
Both of these definitions can be narrowly construed to be concerned solely with the 
firm as an isolated entity, distinct from its social context. Thus, Shleifer and Vishny 
explain that: '[c]orporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of 
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finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment'.171 
Alternatively, corporate governance can be conceived more broadly as involving not 
just the relationship between the firm and its investors, but also between the firm, its 
investors, its employees, and the wider community.  
 
While corporate governance in its narrowest sense may be seen as a matter for the 
firm and its investors alone, a more expansive view admits of other interests and 
allows state involvement in the regulation of corporate governance arrangements. 
Bearing this in mind, Lashgari's view that '[c]orporate governance is concerned with 
managing the relationship among various corporate stakeholders',172 crucially 
depends on who counts as a stakeholder. The more central stakeholders are the 
shareholders, creditors, and employees. A wider net would include customers and an 
even wider net would catch any person affected by the firm's activities, including the 
community as a whole. 
 
In his foreword to the World Bank Group's Report on Corporate Governance, Sir 
Adrian Cadbury explained that: 
Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the balance 
between economic and social goals and between individual  and 
communal goals. The governance framework is there to encourage 
the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability 
for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly 
as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society. 
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The incentive to corporations and to those who own and manage to 
adopt internationally accepted governance standards will help them 
to achieve their corporate aims and to attract investment. the 
incentive for their adoption by states is that these standards will 
strengthen the economy and discourage fraud and 
mismanagement.173 
Corporate governance requires the coordinated management of the company to 
ensure compliance with both the law and the ethical standards set down in the 
relevant corporate governance framework. This will include rules reflecting the 
principles of: transparency; accountability; fairness and responsibility.174 
 
This ethical approach to corporate governance, that takes a relational, rather than 
individualistic, view of the firm, is reflected in the concept of corporate social 
responsibility.175 Corporate social responsibility extends beyond, but is grounded in, 
good corporate governance.176 It obliges companies to consider the interests of all 
those who might be affected by their activities, to behave in a way that does not 
unreasonably and unjustly prejudice those other interests, and generally to behave in 
a socially desirable way. This can include: economic responsibilities; legal 
responsibilities; ethical responsibilities; and discretionary responsibilities.177 As 
Dodd noted as long ago as 1932,  
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public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made and is today 
making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business 
corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as 
well as a profit making function.178 
 
Choudhury notes that this debate regarding the purpose of the firm, and hence the 
role of corporate governance, remains unresolved.179 For present purposes, there is 
no need to provide a solution. Since this thesis is specifically concerned with Islamic 
finance and its dependence on conformity with Sharia principles, which, as will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters, is explicitly concerned with social justice and 
responsibility, it makes sense to use the more expansive view of corporate 
governance that takes into account the interests of society and individuals 
specifically affected by the firm's activities. As such, this thesis will rely on Sir 
Adrian Cadbury's definition of corporate governance (see above). This is a wide 
definition that is inclusive rather than exclusive. It allows for a context-dependent 
approach to corporate governance that could allow the firm discretion to determine 
the relevant stakeholder interests depending on the circumstances.180 This discretion 
could of course be subject to external regulation. 
1.6.2 Research methods 
 
Two different methods were used to obtain the information necessary to answer the 
research question. These were the identification and retrieval of text-based 
information and the generation of information through an empirical, qualitative 
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interview-based study. These methods are two major approaches and it will be 
explained below. 
1.6.2.1 Text-Based Approach to legal and Socio-Cultural Meanings 
 
 
To understand the legal context and socio-cultural meanings of the Islamic finance 
terms and practices. This uses a top-down, text-based method, presuming that the 




The aims include (i) setting up the necessary conceptual vehicle for analysis; and (ii) 
establishing the essential distinctions for the production of appropriate interview 
questions.  
 
How Is the Information Gathered? 
 
Text-based sources included both primary and secondary material. Primary sources 
included: legislation; formal guidelines; publications by government or other public 
bodies; the Qu'ran, the Sunnah (records of oral teachings of Prophet Muhammad);  
conclusions reached through the application of Qiyas (a deductive analogical 
reasoning process for applying principles from the Hadith across contexts not 
directly considered in the Hadith); and information published by banks. Secondary 
sources included: peer-reviewed journal articles; books and book chapters; working 
or research papers; and newspapers. The information used was identified through the 
use of structured keyword searches. The keywords varied depending on the particular 
 57 
aspect of the question that was being addressed, but included: Islamic finance; 
Sharia(h) governance; Sharia(h) risk; Sharia(h) arbitrage; riba; risk; governance; 
regulation; United Kingdom; Saudi Arabia; Malaysia; new institutionalism/new 
institutional theory; and institutional logics. A range of databases were used, 
including: The University of Westminster library database; WorldCat; Westlaw; 
Heinonline; LexisNexis; Academic Search Complete; ArticleFirst; Applied Social 
Sciences Index and Abstracts; IngentaConnect; JSTOR; Project Muse; and ProQuest. 
These searches were supplemented by using the Social Science Research Network 
and the Bielefeld Academic Search Engine. For completeness, relevant references 
that were cited in one of the identified sources, but had not been identified through 
the search strategy, were also retrieved. Finally, Google Scholar and Google Books 
were used as an additional check to enhance the coverage and comprehensive nature 
of the search strategy.  
 
The sources identified as most relevant to the research question were retrieved and 
subject to a critical interpretative analysis applying the relevant methodological 
approach as discussed in the subsequent section of this chapter. That analysis was 
then used, in combination with the information generated by the empirical study, to 
construct a progression of arguments that culminate in the final answer to the 
research question and the conclusion of this thesis. Those arguments were 
subsequently reviewed and edited to account for any new information that had not 
been available when they were initially constructed.  
Having followed the steps in the first approach, we come naturally to the design and 
implementation of the second approach, focusing on interviews.  
1.6.2.2  Empirical Qualitative Interviews 
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This method was to enable the researcher to gain an understanding of the specific 
factors affecting the interviewees’ views of particular Islamic finance 
doctrines and other factors impacting their interpretation of Islamic finance.  
 
 
This section describes the interview approach which I had undertaken in order to 
design and implement appropriate steps to draw out the qualitative data required to 




To identfy and locate the individuals who would be most appropriate and 
authoritative in answering my research questions.   
 
Aims:  
- To make explicit what those questions are. 
- To set up questions that draw out appropriate answers related to the research 
questions. 
- Anticipate various type of responses given the interviewees positions, background, 
business or publich affiliation. 
 
How the Information is Gathered?  
 
The empirical study was designed to supplement the information retrieved from the 
text based analysis. The aim was to generate information reflecting the 
attitudes of professionals and academics involved in Islamic finance, its 
delivery and its governance. The study involved a qualitative semi-structured 
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interview designed to initiate and encourage discussion on a number of 
matters relevant to Sharia governance, Islamic finance and Sharia non-
compliance. The interview format was chosen over the alternative of a focus 
group because an interview study allows for the collection of individual data, 
rather than the collective data that is produced by a focus group.181 The 
decision to use a semi-structured interview, which relies on a set of pre-
drafted, open-ended questions, was based on the balance they offer between 
structure and flexibility, which makes them well suited to an inexperienced 
researcher. This balance of structure and flexibility allows the interviewer to 
easily manage the process, while allowing some freedom to iteratively react 
to the interviewees' responses.182 As such, it allows a deep engagement with 
the interviewee.183 Given the relatively subjective nature of the interpretations 
offered by various scholars on Islamic finance law, the researcher felt that 
any analysis that failed to take into account this diversity of perspectives in a 
descriptive, qualitative manner would be inadequate. 
 
The questions were divided into three sections: the development of Islamic finance; 
the current challenges facing Islamic finance regarding Sharia governance; and the 
possible solutions to those challenges. The interview framework was comprised of 
31 possible questions in total. Of these, 17 were selected as the primary questions for 
the interview, with the remaining 14 questions retained to further stimulate 
discussion if time permitted. The aim of the 17 primary questions was to prompt 
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discussion on particular issues. As such, the discussion of Islamic finance and its 
relationship with conventional finance, Sharia governance and the problem of Sharia 
non-compliance was the ultimate focus and the questions were only used as required 
to move the discussion along. 
 
Because the study involved human participants it was necessary to ensure that the 
study was designed and carried out consistently with the demands of research ethics. 
Formal ethical approval for the study was sought and obtained from the University of 
Westminster Research Ethics Committee. In addition to this, the research was 
designed and performed consistently with the requirements of the Data Protection 
Act 1998, the guidance provided by the Information Commissioner's Office,184 and 
the Guidelines for Conducting Ethical Socio-Economic Research produced by the 
RESPECT project.185 Of particular concern with interview studies are the privacy 
issues of consent, confidentiality, control of information and the risk of harm caused 
by the disclosure of information.186 As such, all participants were provided with 
detailed information about the study, their involvement,187 and their right to 
withdraw their participation.188 Consent for the interview and use of the information 
was sought before the participant was interviewed. To reduce any risk of harm from 
disclosure, the personal identities of the interviewees were anonymised, with 
participants referred to by role and a number assigned by the researcher. 
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The sampling strategy was purposive and managed in three stages.189  The first stage 
was to define the sampling pool, which restricted the inclusion criterion to a 
professional or academic in Islamic finance with experience of Islamic finance in one 
of the three relevant jurisdictions (see below). There was no exclusion criterion. The 
second stage was to determine the size of the sample. This was set at twenty 
interviewees. The reasons for this sample size were: to allow each participant an 
individual voice, while also having a sufficient number to allow the identification of 
generalised themes;190 this also ensured that the study would be practicably 
manageable as one element of the research for this PhD. The third stage was to 
determine the categories of participants. In order to get a balanced view of Islamic 
finance and its governance, three types of professional with relevant experience of 
the three jurisdictions were sought for inclusion in the study. These were: academics 
specialising in Islamic finance; Sharia scholars working in Islamic finance; and 
Islamic finance professionals/practitioners. 
The sample size was not small, with a total of 20 interviews being conducted over 
the course of the research. The reason for such a large sample was to ensure 
that a diversity of perspectives were adequately reflected in this research. 
Limiting the sample of interviewees would have run the risk of an excessive 
focus on only a few perspectives on Islamic finance. 
 
 
Three jurisdictions provided the focus for interviews: the UK, Malaysia, and the 
KSA. These three countries were chosen for three reasons. First, they all have 
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significant Islamic finance sectors, with:191 the UK being a leading provider of 
Islamic finance in the western world; Malaysia being a world leader in terms of both 
the industry and its regulatory structure; and the KSA being a significant provider of 
Islamic finance within the Middle East.  
 
Second, and importantly from an institutional perspective, the UK, Malaysia and the 
KSA represent the three broad religious and cultural contexts for Islamic finance. 
The KSA is a Muslim country where Sharia law and principles form part of the 
country's constitution. Malaysia is a country where Muslims form the majority of the 
population, while England is nominally Christian but effectively secular with a 
significant minority Muslim population. It is important to consider these different 
contexts primarily because those working in these countries will be exposed to 
different institutional environments, which may influence their attitudes to Islamic 
finance and Sharia governance. By including participants across a range of different 
institutional contexts, similar responses cannot be dismissed as specific to a 
particular institutional environment. Furthermore, where the response are different, 
an explanation may be found in the different institutional influences. 
 
Third, while it should be noted that other countries could have been chosen to fulfil 
the role as a representative of different institutional contexts, there are good 
pragmatic reasons for purposively selecting these three countries. First, too many 
countries would have required a far larger study than would have been practicable in 
the time frame of the PhD. As noted above, there are three broad institutional 
contexts relevant to the delivery of Islamic finance and it therefore makes sense to 
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draw the interviewees from three countries that represent those contexts. Second, all 
three countries were readily accessible to the researcher, with no problems of 
language. Finally, the KSA is the researcher's home country, which makes it of 
interest to the researcher. The UK is the nation hosting the PhD, which again makes 
it a sensible, pragmatic choice.  
 
In implementing the purposive sampling strategy, the interviewees were selected 
randomly from a list of the possible interviewees and then invited to partic ipate by 
mail or email. The list of possible interviews was compiled from internet searches for 
relevant professionals and academics working in the field of Islamic finance. The 
interviews were carried out between January 2015 and January 2016. All interviews 
were conducted in English or Arabic by the researcher in person, or by Skype. Each 
interview was allotted a period of one hour for completion. With the interviewees' 
permission, the interviews were recorded and then transcribed. Interviews in Arabic 
were translated into English as part of the transcription process.  
 
As a qualitative study, the intention was to identify 'patterns of interrelationship 
between many categories',192 which permits a nuanced approach to interpreting the 
articulation of complex ideas and concepts. The investigation was aimed at 
discovering the way in which professionals who work in the field of Islamic finance 
think about the Islamic nature of the industry and its relationship with conventional 
finance. To achieve this, the transcripts of the interview were subjected to an 
interpretative analysis designed to identify any emergent patterns evident in the 
responses of the interviewees. The method applied follows McCracken's five stages 
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of analysis, which was formulated in order to determine both: 'the categories, 
relationships, and assumptions that informs the respondent's view' and the 'patterns 
of inter-theme consistency and contradiction'.193 The five stages are:194 
1. Analysis of 'individual utterances' in isolation;  
2. The development of the observations identified in stage one, relating these 
observations back to the discourse contained in the transcript to identify 
relationships of similarity and contradiction;  
3. The categories, concepts and relationships are refined to identify patterns and 
themes; 
4. Analysis of the transcript and preceding analysis to tease out general themes 
and the hierarchical relationships between them; and 
5. a review of the stage four conclusions to bring them together to form a 
coherent thesis. 
These five stages of analysis were applied sequentially to each of the transcripts to 
tease out the common themes and any associated tensions present in the interview 
responses. 
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1.6.3 Applying the research methodology and methods to the research question 
 
The research methodology may be broadly categorised as socio-legal. The essence of 
socio-legal research is to utilise a combination of methodologies to examine law and 
regulation, not as an independent system, but as an integral part of society. As 
Schwartz explains, it relies on an interdisciplinary approach: 
using concepts and methods selectively drawn from any source 
within the law and the social sciences and beyond ... The premise 
of [Law & Society] is that no single discipline, in isolation from the 
others, delivers the kinds of questions or answers that can be 
generated by combining the methods, concepts, and data from 
several disciplines.195   
By appropriately combining these different approaches, the research question may be 
addressed in a way that captures the interaction between society and the law and 
regulation that governs behaviour within that society. 
 
As discussed above, the approach taken for the purposes of this thesis relied centrally 
on new institutional theory, supported by insights from risk and governance theories. 
In addition to these, a doctrinal approach was utilised in order to identify the relevant 
legal and regulatory approach adopted by each of the three jurisdictions that provided 
the empirical focus for this thesis. The point of using particular methodologies is to 
guide both the choice of methods and their application in answering the research 
question. 
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The research question behind this thesis is: how should Sharia governance be 
standardised in order to ensure that Islamic finance reliably provides a genuinely 
Islamic alternative to conventional finance? This question has a normative aspect that 
requires a judgment regarding the best way to regulate Islamic finance. This 
judgment in turn requires an understanding of Islamic finance, its goals and how it 
differs from conventional finance. The importance of understanding the differences 
between Islamic and conventional finance is to identify how far those differences 
create different regulatory requirements.  
 
The purpose of regulation is to encourage desirable behaviour and discourage, or 
prevent, undesirable behaviour. Because behaviour is considered desirable insofar as 
it serves the desirable goals of the regulated activity, this connects the regulatory 
requirements to those goals. Thus, there is an interaction between the behaviour of 
individuals and organisations within an organisational field, the goals that help to 
define the organisational field, and the regulation that further shapes the 
organisational field. This interaction is particularly well-suited to an analysis from 
the perspective of new institutional theory, which highlights the relevance of the 
institutional influences of the wider environment to the behaviour of individuals and 




While new institutional theory provided valuable insights into the current practice of 
Islamic finance, it was also useful for understanding both the impact of current 
regulatory practices and the options for future development. Here, new institutional 
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theory was applied alongside a reliance on risk and governance theories. This 
combination of approaches was particularly useful for appreciating the role that 
regulation and governance play in shaping the institutional logics that help to define 
Islamic finance as an organisational field distinct from conventional finance. 
Appreciating the institutional impact of governance and regulation allowed, as 
explained in chapter six, the proposal for reform to utilise regulation and governance 
as a positive force to shape Islamic finance and narrow the gap between its 
theoretical foundations in the Sharia and its delivery in a competitive capitalist 
environment. 
 
The relevance of new institutional theory may be best understood if the research 
question is deconstructed. In addressing the question of how  the regulation and 
governance of Islamic finance should best be standardised, a good starting point is to 
ask: what is the current state of Islamic finance and it's governance? This provides 
the focus for chapters two to five. The first purpose of chapters two and three is to 
explain the nature of Islamic finance as an organisational field distinct from 
conventional finance. The second purpose is to compare the delivery of Islamic 
finance to explore how well it maintains this theoretical distinction in practice. The 
key criticism lying behind the analysis is that Islamic finance is subject to 
inconsistent Sharia governance and a tendency to prioritise Sharia compliance in 
form over compliance in spirit. This is reflected in a reliance on Islamic financial 
products that resemble conventional financial products.  
 
Through the lens of new institutional theory, the development of Islamic finance is 
understood as a consequence of competitive and institutional isomorphism that 
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caused Islamic finance to diverge, under the influence of the political and economic 
institution of neoliberal capitalism, from its moral foundations in the Sharia. The 
question, then, is how far the regulation of Islamic finance, and Sharia governance in 
particular, has enabled the isomorphic influence of neoliberal capitalism. This is 
explored in chapter four, along with the question of how the governance of Islamic 
finance might be made more institutionally Islamic in nature. 
 
Chapter five is used to discuss the responses made by the interviewees to the 
interview questions. As noted above, the questions were focused on the three 
jurisdictions of the UK, Malaysia and the KSA. The first part of the chapter applies a 
socio-legal analysis to the current regulatory and governance approaches 
implemented in those jurisdictions. In the second part of the chapter, the interview 
responses are subject to a qualitative interpretative analysis in order to identify 
themes that confirm or contradict the institutional analysis of the text-based sources 
of information that were analysed in the preceding chapters.   
 
The interviews also engaged with the possible solutions to the deficiencies of the 
current system of Sharia governance. Again, the responses were subject to a 
qualitative interpretative analysis. The insights gained from the interviews were then 
fed into the critical consideration of how to reform the current approach to Sharia 
governance. This discussion relied on regulatory and governance theories and 
combined those perspectives with new institutionalism in order to develop a 
comprehensive system of regulation and governance aimed at enhancing the Islamic 
nature of Islamic finance and countering the worst elements of neoliberal capitalism.   
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1.7 Thesis structure and argument progression 
 
The argument presented in this thesis progresses through a number of stages, each of 
which builds on the previous stage to create a progressive argument that ends with 
the final conclusion. The starting point is an initial explication of the socio-political 
context of a global financial environment structured around capitalism and 
conventional finance. This is followed by an analysis of Islamic finance and its 
governance within that institutional environment. The focus is on Sharia governance 
and sets out the basic problem of a lack of standardisation that grounds the research 
question. Having set out the problem, the second stage involves an examination of 
the possible ways in which standardisation could be improved. The final stage is to 
compare the strengths and weaknesses of these different options in order to identify 
the most appropriate solution. This argument progression is presented in the 
subsequent six chapters. 
 
Chapter two focuses on providing an explanation of the socio-political context 
created by the global financial environment and necessarily impacting on the 
delivery and governance of Islamic finance. Chapter two aims to (i) explain the 
nature of the financial system, (ii) explain conventional banking in contrast to 
Islamic banking, and (iii)  understand the institutional influences on current 
conventional financial sectors, particularly in the context of neoliberal policy.  
 
In discussing the nature of Islamic finance and the features that distinguish it from 
conventional financial services, Chapter three aims to (i) explain the the relationship 
between Islamic finance and Sharia principles, (ii) to analyse how Islamic finance 
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Chapter four narrows the focus to consider the Sharia governance of Islamic 
financial services. The chapter aims to (i)contextualise Sharia governance through an 
analysis of risk and corporate governance in general, (ii) consider corporate 
governance from an Islamic perspective, and (iii) to analyse Sharia governance and 
the management of the risk of Sharia non-compliance.  
 
In particular, Chapter four explains the current approach, which relies essentially on 
Sharia supervisory boards, in many countries without central oversight. It is argued 
that a more holistic Islamic approach would be preferable but issues are raised in the 
form of the lack of adequately trained Sharia scholars and the potential for conflicts 
of interest and the delivery of inconsistent fatwas.  
 
Chapter five follows on from the analysis of Sharia governance in chapter four by 
explaining, in the first part of the chapter, the current institutional and legal 
frameworks for Sharia governance in the three specific jurisdictions of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Malaysia, and England. These three jurisdictions also 
provide the context for the qualitative research presented in part two of chapter five. 
In the second half of chapter five the analysis of  interview responses is set out and 
discussed, identifying the interviewees' attitudes to Islamic finance and Sharia 
governance and relating those attitudes to the issue of standardisation. That analysis 
identifies the tensions between the distinct themes that emerged from the interview.  
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In chapter six, and in response to the analysis presented in the previous chapters, the 
possible options for reforming Sharia governance are considered. The chapter begins 
with a discussion of how Sharia compliance should be governed. This leads into an 
analysis of three levels of regulation, which are: the level of the firm; the national 
level; and the international (including regional) level.  The options available for 
regulation and standardisation at each of these levels are considered, including the 
possible roles for hisbah, professional regulation for Sharia scholars, national or 
international Sharia boards and international standard setting bodies.  
 
In the concluding chapter, the preceding chapters are drawn together through a brief 
summary of the argument progression up to that point. This leads into the final part 
of the chapter, and the thesis, which provides a final conclusion to how Sharia 
governance should be reformed to achieve an acceptable level of standardisation and 
reinforce public confidence in Islamic financial services. 
1.8 Conclusion 
 
This introductory chapter has provided a historical and motivational backdrop for 
this thesis, which is focused on the issues of whether and how Sharia governance of 
Islamic finance should be standardised. The research question was set out and it was 
explained that the answer involved three stages: A descriptive analysis of Islamic 
finance and the current approach to Sharia governance; a comparison of the various 
possible responses; and the selection and defence of a particular solution. The 
originality of this research was explained as arising from: the deep engagement with 
the issue of Sharia risk and its governance; the methodological approach; and the 
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detailed solution to the problems of inconsistent fatwas that focus on technical 
compliance rather than on the spirit of Sharia.  
 
The theoretical framework grounding the research was explained. This framework 
consists of new institutional theory combined with a global approach to risk, a 
decentred approach to regulation and a relational, socially responsible approach to 
governance. Although these two methodological approaches are distinct, they 
intersect through the establishment of institutionalised responses to risk and the 
institutionalisation of the regulatory and governance solutions to controlling the 
behaviour of the regulated entities. For example, as Davis notes: 'corporate 
governance describes the institutional matrix that channels financial flows'.196 
 
Finally, the methods used to implement the theoretic framework were explained 
along with the connection between the methodological approaches and the different 
aspects of the question. The methods used were a text-based analysis of sources 
identified by structured keyword searches of bibliographic electronic databases, 
coupled with a qualitative semi-structured interview study of a range of professionals 
and academics from the world of Islamic finance. The information gained from both 
the interviews and the text-based sources was subject to a critical socio-legal 
analysis, relying primarily on new institutional theory, but also relying on insights 
from risk, regulation and governance theories. 
 
In the next chapter, the nature of conventional finance is explicated. This is 
compared, in chapter three, to Islamic finance, which includes a discussion of Islam 
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and the Sharia principles that govern all aspects of Islamic life. Following that, in 
chapter four, the current arrangements for Sharia Governance are examined. Then, 
chapter five deals with the empirical part of this project, analysing the opinions of 
Islamic finance professionals on the question of standardisation. Building on those 
opinions, in chapter six, the various options are set out and analysed before one 
particular solution is identified and justified. Finally, in chapter seven, the arguments 
are drawn together to provide a final conclusion. 
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Chapter Two: The Concept of a Financial System and the Institutional 
Influence of Capitalism on Conventional Finance 
 
In the introductory chapter the historical development of Islamic finance and the 
motivations that drove the demand fuelling its expansion were explained. This 
provided the background context for the research question, which asks how best to 
deal with the problem of the inconsistent rulings made by the governing Sharia 
boards regarding the Sharia compliance of Islamic financial products. Having set out 
the backdrop for this thesis, the theoretical framework of new institutional theory 
informed by the discourses of risk, governance and regulation was explained. Before 
going on to consider the crux of the issue of Sharia compliance in chapter four, the 
nature of Islamic finance, as distinct from conventional (non-Islamic) finance, will be 
examined in chapter three.   
 
In order to fully appreciate Islamic finance, it is necessary to understand its 
relationship with conventional finance. This in turn requires an understanding of 
financial systems in general and conventional financial systems in particular. In this 
chapter the concept of a financial system will be analysed, before the recent history 
of conventional financial systems is explored. It will be noted that conventional 
finance is a category heading subsuming a range of different types of conventional 
financial systems. It will also be noted that conventional financial systems are not 
static entities, but change over time depending on the institutions that iteratively 
interact with those systems to shape their nature. The second part of this chapter will 
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be focused on explicating the key institutional influence of capitalism and its impact 
on the nature of conventional financial systems.  
 
This analysis will provide a contrast to, and a context for, the development of Islamic 
finance and the particular issue of Sharia compliance. Following the exploration of 
conventional finance, the concept of Islamic finance itself will be examined in 
chapter three. This will lead into an explication of the institutional influences 
affecting the development of Islamic financial instruments. In particular, this will 
consider the interaction between conventional finance and Islamic finance, including 
the institutional impact of competition with conventional financial services within a 
capitalist environment. 
2.1 Finance and financial services 
2.1.1 The concept of a financial system: an introduction  
 
A concept is a notion or an idea about a thing. It is a way of thinking about and 
understanding a thing that allows us to identify examples of that entity and relate it 
other things. This permits a categorisation of things into hierarchies that help to 
define the similarities and the differences between things. For example, Labradors, 
are categorised as a type of dog and, for example, may be distinguished from the 
Siamese type of cat. Both, Labrador dogs and Siamese cats, however, are categorised 
as types of mammal. Dogs and cats are natural kind concepts, which means that their 
attributes are empirically determined. Since they are both types of mammal, they 
share many attributes, but there are also attributes that distinguish dogs from cats. 
These core attributes should be explicable by the theory that underlies the concept.197 
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While dogs and cats are natural kinds of concept, a financial system, as a product of 
human society, is a socially constructed concept. This means that the attributes are 
created rather than being empirically determined. It also means that, ontologically, 
the attributes may follow the theory whereas, with natural kind concepts, the theory 
follows the attributes as a way of understanding and explaining any particular 
consolidation of attributes into an identifiable entity. This is not to claim that the 
theory of financial systems preceded the establishment of all real examples, but, 
rather, that attributes can be altered, or replaced, by new attributes through the 
development of existing theories or the creation of new ones. Take Islamic finance, 
for example. As explained in chapter one, Islamic financial transactions are as old as 
Islam, but Islamic finance as a system, has its origins in the 1940s. The question 
then, is what are the distinct core attributes and explanatory theory that distinguish 
the Islamic financial system from the conventional concept of a financial system? 
 
As a starting point it should be noted that, although the Islamic financial system is 
distinguished from the conventional finance system, there is not just a single 
conventional system. Rather the design of financial systems varies and there are at 
least two broad types, and many variant token examples, of financial systems, that 
might be included under the general category heading of conventional financial 
systems. For example, Thakor notes that, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
financial markets played a greater role in the US financial system than in European 
and Japanese financial systems, which tended to rely more on financial 
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intermediaries such as banks.198 This highlights the distinction between a parent 
concept, child (types of) concepts and particular examples of a type. Thus, the 
financial systems of individual countries are examples, with attributes that can be 
empirically verified. Depending on its particular attributes, each of these financial 
systems can be characterised as a particular type of conventional financial system, 











Figure 1: Simplified Financial System Hierarchy 
 
The theories underlying these different types of financial systems are essentially 
variations on the basic explanatory theory of the concept of conventional financial 
systems. From the perspective of new institutional theory, the category, or parent, 
concept of conventional finance evolved because of the isomorphic influence of a 
dominant institution integral to the explanatory theory of that concept. The various 
types of child concept developed as a consequence of the secondary institutions 
                                            
198 Anjan V Thakor, 'The design of financial systems: An overview' (1996) 20 Journal of Banking and 
Finance 917, 919. 
 78 
operating in the different countries. This influence may directly affect the nature of 
the financial system, or it may be mediated through a variation of the dominant 
institution (see figure 2). In other words, the existence of different types of financial 
system is the result of different institutional influences, including the institution of 
regulation.199 This, of course, begs a number of questions regarding the nature 


















Figure 2: The Impact of Institutions on the Development of Financial Systems 
 
Before addressing those questions, it should be noted that the isomorphic influence 
of institutions is not simply one way.200 While institutions act on the various 
organisations within the organisational field to homogenise those entities into a 
unified system, this system may itself become sufficiently established to be 
                                            
199 Anjan V Thakor, 'The design of financial systems: An overview' (1996) 20 Journal of Banking and 
Finance 917, 940. 
200 See section 1.6.1.1. 
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characterised as an institution. If successful, the institutionalised financial system 
may in turn influence the institutions that shaped its initial development. This 
potentially creates an iterative, homogenising feedback cycle in which the success of 
a particular financial system legitimises and reinforces the institutions responsible for 
its existence and evolution. Equally, of course, a failure can undermine the 
legitimacy of the system and its institutional influences. 
2.1.2 The concept of a financial system: an overview 
 
As the term suggests, a financial system is fundamentally a system. Any system 
comprises a number of constituent element, but, borrowing from Aristotle, for any 
system 'the whole is something besides the parts'.201 While a system may be 
described in terms of its components, and while the constituent parts can be analysed 
in isolation,202 these parts operate synergistically in a way that can only be fully 
understood by considering the system as a whole.203 This requires an appreciation of 
'both the parts and the relations between them'.204 As such:  
A system may be defined as a set of elements standing in 
interrelation among themselves and with the environment.205 
Further to this, the Oxford Dictionaries define a systems as: 
A set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or an 
interconnected complex whole.206  
Perrodon provides a similar definition of a system as: 
                                            
201 Aristotle, WD Ross (trans), Metaphysics (350 BCE), Book VII, part 6, 
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a group of dynamically-interacting components organised to 
achieve a purpose.207 
These basic definitions of a system identify two distinct aspects that must be 
understood, although not necessarily with equal emphasis. The first, or internal 
aspect, is the structure of the system. The second, or external aspect, is the function 
of the system.208 Such an approach will enable financial systems to be distinguished 
from other types of system, and will allow the different kinds of financial system to 
be distinguished from one another. For present purposes, however, this is 
insufficient. In order to fully appreciate the nature and ongoing development of 
Islamic finance, as a system distinct from conventional finance, it is also necessary to 
understand the main influences that shape the two systems, which requires an 
analysis of the interaction between the systems and the institutions that act on them. 
 
A financial system is not a discrete concrete entity in the sense of a car, or a dog. At 
its most abstract, a financial system is a category concept, useful as a tool for 
characterising real systems that can be identified as such on the basis of the 
characteristics of the abstract concept. Thus, one can identify the UK, or US, or 
German  financial system on the basis of the structure and function that define them 
as distinct types of financial systems. Similarly, conventional financial systems and 
Islamic financial systems are abstract concepts that can be applied to characterise 
real systems. As will be discussed later, however, the situation is complicated by the 
coexistence of the two systems within individual countries, which raises the question 
of whether they exist as two discrete systems or as a mixed or hybrid system. The 
                                            
207 A Perrodon, 'Petroleum Systems: Models and Applications' (1992) 15 Journal of Petroleum 
Geology 319. 
208 Ludwig von Bertalanffy , 'The History and Status of General Systems Theory ' (1972) 15 The 
Academy of Management Journal 407, 420. 
 81 
situation is further complicated by the connections between national financial 
systems creating a global network.209 These complications are important, not least 
because of the possible implications for regulation, which is an issue that will be 
addressed in subsequent chapters. 
 
A financial system is a socio-cultural system.210 This is simply to say that such a 
system is a human construct shaped by the cultural influences of the social 
institutions within the particular community. As a social construct, financial systems 
are designed to meet the needs of the community and reflect the ideologies and 
conventions of that community. Even the very existence of a financial system is 
contingent on the conventions of money and property. To understand a particular 
financial system, one also needs to understand the meaning and value of money 
within that community. This will be returned to later, when considering the nature of 
conventional finance. 
 
As a social system, the roles that people play within the system comprise its basic 
units,211 although these roles may be aggregated into the units of functional 
organisations. The roles that comprise these basic units are determined by the 
purpose or function of the system as a whole. The types of unit, and the interaction 
between them, are coordinated by a particular world view, mediated through the 
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various key institutions, to create a system that should then reflect that world view. 
There are, therefore, three basic aspects of the system that must be considered: the 
function/purpose of the system; the relational units that comprise the structure of the 
system; and the institutional influences that shape the specific structure and function 
of the particular system. 
2.1.3 The purpose and function of a financial system 
 
In constructing the theory and core attributes of a socially constructed concept, it is 
necessary to consider how the concept is socially understood. This makes it 
important to consider how social commentators use it. Unless the concept is 
essentially contested, it is likely that there will be some variations in the 
understanding of the conception, but that the individual conceptions will overlap to 
identify a common understanding characterising the essence of the concept. Space 
precludes an exhaustive examination, but the following should suffice for present 
purposes.  
 
Allen states that:  
A financial system is a framework that facilitates financial 
transactions, and these transactions require an accepted form of 
money, something that can serve as a medium of exchange, a unit 
of account, a store of wealth, and a standard of deferred 
payment.212  
As the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report on 
The Role of Banks states: '[t]he financial sector plays an essential role in providing 
                                            
212 Larry  Allen, Global Financial System 1750-2000 (Reaktion books 2001), 10. 
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and channelling financing for investment'.213 Similarly, Allen and Gale explain that 
in developed countries:  
Financial systems are crucial for the allocation of resources in a 
modern economy. They channel household savings to the corporate 
sector and allocate investment funds among firms. They allow 
intertemporal smoothing of consumption by households and 
expenditure by firms. They allow both firms and households to 
share risks.214 
 
Rather than try to encapsulate the concept of a financial system in general terms, 
Neave isolates the principal specific roles of a financial system, which include:  
clearing and settling payments, pooling resources, acting as a store 
of value, transferring financial resources across regions and 
through time, managing and transferring risks, developing 
transaction information, and managing incentives.215 
Similarly, Allen notes that key functions of the financial system include: risk sharing 
(markets sharing risks equally, while households are exposed to lower risks in a 
bank-based system);216 provision of information; resource allocation; and the 
financing of new firms.217 More generally, Davies et. al note that there are three, 
'relatively timeless', main types of service offered by organisations within the 
financial system:  payment, settlement and transaction; intermediation; risk transfer; 
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and insurance.218 Of these, Corrigan emphasises the importance of the efficient 
channelling of savings and the provision of instruments and mechanisms for ensuring 
payments can be made with confidence.219 More specifically, Bain suggests that, in 
performing these services, the primary role of the financial system is to act as 
intermediary between lenders and borrowers. This allows it to perform the two 
crucial functions of facilitating payments and the efficient accumulation of capital for 
investment.220 In order to efficiently channel funds from savers to borrowers, the 
financial system performs the additional crucial function of transforming low value, 
liquid credit to higher value, but more illiquid debt.221 
 
Beyond these general and specific functions, a crucially important element of the 
design of a financial system is financial stability. Allen provides a brief sketch of the 
history of regulation and financial crises and suggests that the regulatory responses to 
the crises 'stifled the basic function of a financial system, which is the efficient 
allocation of resources'.222 This suggests that financial stability is both a function of 
external regulation and the financial system itself. Allen further notes that, while 
competition is generally seen as desirable, a competitive market might make 
financial intermediaries 'more susceptible to financial instability'.223 The 
International Monetary Fund has provided general guidelines on how financial 
stability is attained.  In brief, financial stability is made robust through (i) 
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strengthening the international financial architecture; (ii) enhanced surveillance of 
capital markets and assessments of external vulnerability; (iii) developing 
mechanisms for transparency; and (iv) establishing crisis resolution systems.224 
 
These views highlight that the purpose of the financial system may be conceived 
narrowly as a the facilitation of financial transactions. It makes the exchange of 
goods and services more efficient and has allowed the development of a more 
complex society in which the financial system is essential to the smooth functioning 
of that society.225 As Vitols notes:  
A crucial aspect of the industrialization process is the development 
of an autonomous financial system: that is, a set of specialized 
organizations and institutions dealing with the transfer of payments 
and mediating the flow of savings and investment.226  
This quote reveals a broader view of financial systems, which characterises it as a 
mechanism for connecting savers and borrowers, facilitating the movement of money 
between households and businesses. In other words, the financial system is 
essentially concerned with the flow of money within society. In order to efficiently 
perform this role, it provides a number of functions, noted above, that allow money 
to be saved, invested, borrowed, and traded.  
 
 
These narrow and broad views of a financial system characterise it as a self-
contained and isolated system. Thus, the financial system facilitates financial 
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transactions and 'mediat[es] the flow of savings and investment'. As suggested by the 
quote from Vitols, however, the financial system plays a crucial role in the wider 
economy. Sylla, for example, notes that in modern economic history there have, at 
different times, been three leading economies: the Dutch; the British; and the US. He 
goes on to explain that all three of these leading economies had '"Financial 
Revolutions" that encompassed putting into place ... six key components of a modern 
financial system before they went on to become economic leaders'.227 Based on this, 
and based on the development of the Japanese financial system, he explains the 
important role that a strong financial system plays in economic growth and 
development. This view is supported by empirical work showing that in the UK, the 
US, France, Germany and Japan economic growth followed growth and development 
of the financial system.228 The connection between the financial system and the 
wider economy represents the broadest view of a financial system, going beyond its 
role in the mediation of financial transactions and the flow of money, and 
characterising it as essential to the well-being of society as a whole. 
2.1.4 The structure of a financial system 
 
There are a number of different ways in which the structure of a financial system 
may be characterised. For example, Sylla relies on an historical enquiry to identify 
six essential elements of a modern financial system: 
... sound public finances and public debt management; stable 
monetary and payment arrangements; sound banking systems 
(more generally institutional lenders); an effective central bank; 
                                            
227 Richard Sylla, 'Financial Systems and Economic Modernization' (2002) 62 The Journal of 
Economic History 277, 281. 
228 The exception was Korea, where financial system growth followed economic growth: Bong-Soo 
Lee, 'Bank-based and market-based financial systems: Time-series evidence' (2012) 20 Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal 173. 
 87 
good securities market for debt, equity and money-market 
instruments; and sound insurance companies (more generally, 
institutional investors).229  
Taking a more narrow and contemporary view of financial systems, Neave identifies 
"institutions" and markets as two common elements.230 Allen goes even further and 
suggests that the  
fundamental unit in ... [the financial system] is the market, an 
economic crossroads intelligently harmonizing the wishes of 
groping buyers and sellers, maintaining a precarious balance 
between the hidden forces of supply and demand.231 
 
In principle, according to modern financial theory, which provided the basis for the 
development of financial systems since the 1950s, a financial system could be 
structured solely around efficient capital markets as the hub of a network connecting 
households and businesses. These efficient markets offer stock at a price that already 
provides a fair reflection of the rate of return, obviating the need for financial 
intermediaries.232 As Simon notes: '[i]n classical and neoclassical economic theory, 
markets are at the center of the stage'.233 However, as Allen rightly observes, this 
approach: 
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is based on an idealized view of the way in which markets operate. 
Transaction costs, asymmetric information and the market 
incompleteness associated with them are assumed away.234 
 
Currently, financial systems throughout the world rely, to a greater or lesser extent, 
on both markets and the organisations that function as financial intermediaries. It is 
precisely the balance between these two elements, and the emphasis placed on one or 
the other, that distinguish one national financial system from another.235 Broadly 
speaking, financial systems may be essentially market-based, such as in the UK and 
the US, or bank-based, such as in Germany, France and  Japan.236 
 
Taking the wide view of the financial system as an economic system, an alternative 
is to utilise a mechanistic approach. Following Gregory and Stuart, Nomani and 
Rahnema identify four characteristic mechanisms: decision-making; information 
provision and the coordination of financial transaction decisions; property rights; and 
material and moral incentives as regulators. On the basis of these mechanisms they 
identify two extreme categories of economic systems: a market economic system 
with decentralised decision-making, free market pricing, private property, and a 
reliance on 'private material incentives'; and a centrally planned command system 
with central decision-making, state regulated pricing, state ownership, use of both 
public and private material and moral incentives.237 
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A final option would be to take a more atomistic approach based on the structure of 
any socially constructed system. This connects structure and function,238 and builds 
on all of these other approaches to construct a more fully defined system comprised 
of three essential elements: the basic units or roles; the processes utilised by the basic 
units to fulfil their roles and the network of relationships that connect the units 
internally; and the system as a whole to other systems and agents externally. 
Understanding the interaction of the relevant networks is an important part of 
understanding the system as a whole.239  
 
The two roles that are fundamental and common to all financial systems are: 
financial intermediation, including 'payment settling and transaction services';240 and 
trading or investment. Other roles include: accounting and auditing; information 
provision; innovation; risk management; and governance. These roles are provided 
for by networks of individuals within organisations and by networks of the 
organisations themselves. These organisations can be categorised according to the 
type of fundamental role that they support. Thus, there are organisations that support 
the network of individuals necessary to fulfil the role of financial intermediation. 
This category includes banks (commercial, investment and universal), building 
societies, and insurance companies. Operating alongside these financial 
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intermediaries is the network of market trading, which includes the stock exchange, 
the foreign exchange market, the securities market, and the money market.241 
2.1.4.1 The roles played by financial intermediaries 
 
Financial intermediation is an aggregate term for a number of savings and investment 
roles essential to the functioning of the financial system. In general, they may be 
defined as: 'agents, or groups of agents, who are delegated the authority to invest in 
financial assets. In particular, they issue securities in order to buy other securities'.242 
Thus, they provide a service mediated through the creation of '"secondary" financial 
assets [used] to buy "primary" financial services'.243 This may include the exchange 
of financial assets for their own benefit or on behalf of customers, and the creation 
and sale of financial assets on behalf of customers.244 
 
Banks, as financial intermediaries are an important source of external funding for 
firms. Because such funding, unlike corporate bonds, is on the basis of a discrete 
relationship between the bank and the firm, banks can also play an important role in 
the corporate governance of the firm.245 Providing loans is one side of the nominal 
role of financial intermediaries. The loans are made possible by these organisations 
"borrowing" from other groups within the community. Banks, for example, take 
deposits from customers using a range of accounts (e.g. current and saving accounts) 
and services that provide the customer with some value. These include the facility of 
saving and safekeeping, the payment of interest on savings, and the provision of 
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money exchange mechanisms (cheques, credit/debit cards, digital transfer). Both the 
loan and borrowing activities that comprise the intermediation are debt contracts.246  
 
The advantage of operating through an intermediary is that the deposits can be 
pooled to reduce transaction costs and to allow greater efficiency and flexibility in 
providing loans that meet the needs of the community. In other words, the 
intermediary acts to transform the terms of the deposits made by lenders into loan 
instruments characterised by different structures and terms involving the 'maturity, 
risk and size of the claims'.247 For example, deposits tend to be highly liquid short 
arrangements with immediate or minimally restricted access to the funds. Loans, on 
the other hand, are less liquid with access to the money only on the terms of a pre-
arranged agreement. These loans do not appear to function as simply a passive 
provision of funds readily replaced by an alternative source. Rather, there is a 
relationship between the company borrowing the funds and the financial 
intermediary that can influence share prices, may allow some restructuring of debt, 
and can affect the firm's liquidity constraints.248 
 
In transforming the financial instruments (claims) best suited to organisations 
requiring capital to financial instruments best suited to savers or investors, financial 
intermediaries create financial assets. In all cases, these assets are different forms of 
debt. In the case of financial intermediaries within the monetary system, such as 
banks, these financial assets are a form of money.249 This endogenous form of 
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money,250 existing as a means of payment,251 is only temporary. As Rossi notes 
'money is created when a bank grants credit to one of its clients and is destroyed 
when this loan is reimbursed to the bank'.252 
 
Other roles played by financial intermediaries include: 253 
 the monitoring of borrowers, which  reduces the risk of moral hazard and is 
made efficient by diversification and the economy of scale;254  
 more efficient production of information, which is similarly a consequence 
of the scale of financial intermediaries, along with the development over time of 
a relationship between the intermediary and the borrowing firms. Such 
information tends to be utilised privately by the banks (to guide their own 
activities or to provide investment advice to customers), in comparison to the 
more public provision of information by the markets.255 This greater access to 
information reduces the risk of adverse selection where investment is made in 
higher risk projects;256 
 consumption smoothing, which is facilitated by the provision of differential 
rates of return and liquidity that allows a depositor to unexpectedly withdraw 
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funds on short notice while minimising, or insuring, against the total loss of any 
return; 
 the provision of liquidity, which is made possible by the use of claims or 
securities that function as a medium of exchange. It reflects the banks’ role 
within the system of payments and allows a buyer to purchase goods on the 
basis of a promise to pay, which can then be honoured when the buyer sells on 
the goods so purchased; 
 a commitment mechanism, which relies on the fragility of the bank deposit 
system. It requires the bank to protect the value of investment projects through a 
commitment to those projects in order to maintain the confidence of depositors 
and avoid a bank run; and 
 managing customer portfolios.257 
 
Allen and Santomera observe that many theories of financial intermediaries explain 
their existence as necessary to reduce the transaction costs and asymmetric 
information absent from the idealised Arrow-Debreu model of resource allocation, 
and the Modigliani-Miller theorem, in which financial markets function efficiently 
without the need for intermediation.258 These economic theories fail to reflect the 
history of financial systems in which banks have always existed and traditionally 
have played a far greater role than markets. They go on to note that financial systems 
in the more developed economies have recently transformed financial innovation, 
creating a range of new products and with financial markets becoming increasingly 
important. This increase in the importance of financial markets has been paralleled 
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by an expansion of new types of financial intermediaries, reducing the role of deposit 
taking and increasing reliance on securities.259 These changes have been 
accompanied by a reduction in transaction costs and easier access to information, but 
the demand for financial intermediation remains.  
 
After reviewing the data relating to markets and trading, Allen and Santomera note 
that the traditional distinction between markets and intermediaries has become 
blurred, with financial intermediaries taking a dominant role in financial markets and 
asset trading, using the newer markets in futures and options as a way of shifting and 
managing risk. The financial intermediaries offer firms looking to manage financial 
risk the value of reducing the costs of participating in market trading.260 Thus, 
additional roles are: 
 the reduction of participation costs; and 
 the shifting and management of financial risks.  
This risk management role includes 'intertemporal smoothing', which is achieved 
through the accumulation of assets when returns are high so that there is a reserve 
available for periods of low return. The effectiveness of this mechanism is reduced in 
mixed financial systems where markets compete more effectively for investments 
during the high return periods, limiting the size of the reserve that can be 
accumulated.261 Financial intermediaries are also able to reduce the risk through the 
diversification of investments, which is made possible by the pooling of funds.262 
2.1.4.2 The roles played by markets 
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A financial market facilitates the trading or exchange of financial assets.263 Although 
financial market transactions are mediated by brokers, they nevertheless provide a far 
more direct connection between those with an excess of capital and those seeking to 
raise capital. These brokers will reduce the cost of searching for suitable capital 
transfer partners, but not to the extent made possible by the use of financial 
intermediaries, who are also better able to reduce the risks of adverse selection and 
moral hazard.264 These risks, however, may be limited by the use of a clearinghouse 
(also known as central counterparties)265 to ensure that payments are made and 
contracts fulfilled.266 
Financial intermediation takes the following three forms: 
 credit transformation: Banks act as intermediaries by collecting deposits from 
credit-worthy savers (e.g. with credit ratings of AAA) and manage the 
transformation of that credit into borrower debt held by less creditworthy 
borrowers (e.g. with credit ratings of AA).  If a bank’s view is that there is a 
mismatch between the credit of the savers and the credit of the borrowers, it 
will avail itself of the spread between the rates it can charge to borrowers and 
pay to savers to remain profitable; 
 maturity transformation: Banks borrow or take deposits on an ostensibly 
short-term basis and provide funding for projects which promise returns on 
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projects in the long-term. Banks thereby transform debts with maturities of a 
few months into loans with maturities of many years, making a profit from 
the spread between interest rates owed to depositors and owed to the bank by 
long-term borrowers. 
 liquidity transformation: As depositors are given almost instant access to their 
savings, these are liquid obligations.  The loans made on the basis of these 
deposits, being longer-term loans associated with projects with longer 
gestation periods, are less liquid. The banking system operates on the belief 
that all savers will not simultaneously withdraw their funds (as would be the 
case in a ‘bank run’).  If such a run were to occur in the case of a liquidity 
shock, most savers would lose their deposits and the bank would enter 
insolvency. Under normal circumstances, however, the liquidity requirements 
of depositors align with the banks’ lending policies and the fractional reserves 




As well as reducing the transaction costs of searching for a suitable trading party, 
markets also reduce information costs by promoting the above transformations. The 
prices of the financial assets for trade derive from the information held by all of the 
participants, which means that individual traders do not have to personally collect all 
of the information themselves. Beyond the reduction of transaction costs, the markets 
play two further roles. First, through the process of price discovery, they determine 
the price, or return, on a financial asset. Second, they offer liquidity by allowing 
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owners to sell their financial assets without needing to wait until the instrument 
matures.267 
 
The core functions of the market are provided by a number of organisations 
identified as financial market infrastructures (FMIs).268 These FMIs may be 
collectively defined as: 
the channel through which virtually all financial transactions are 
cleared, settled and recorded. They allow consumers and firms to 
safely and efficiently purchase goods and services, make financial 
investments and transfer funds.269 
A more technical definition is: 
a multilateral system among participating financial institutions, 
including the operator of the system, used for the purposes of 
recording, clearing, or settling payments, securities, derivatives or 
other transactions.270 
 
They essentially consist of a collective organisation of participating financial entities 
that, through the multilateral relationships bounded by the system, cooperate to 
improve the efficiency and manage the risks of market activity. Thus, they are 
constituted by: 
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sets of rules, contracts, processes and operational arrangements for 
managing, reducing and allocating risk arising from transactions 
between market participants.271 
They may be operated by a public central bank, or privately organised by profit or 
non-profit making bodies. They include: exchanges and other trading systems; 
payment systems; central securities depositories; securities settlement systems; and 
central counterparties.272 The organisations that function as part of these systems, 
provide and coordinate services vital to the stability of the financial system as a 
whole.273  
2.1.4.3 Participants and financial instruments 
 
Within the system, providing or making use of the services and functions, there are 
five types of participant: savers; borrowers (including investors); financial 
intermediaries; brokers and advisers; and regulators.274 The savers and borrowers, 
who provide and utilise the funds, justify the existence of the financial 
intermediaries, the brokers and advisers. The role of the financial intermediaries is to 
provide effective and efficient mechanisms for meeting the needs of both groups of 
end users. In forming an indirect connection between the saver and the borrower, 
these intermediaries, which include the banks, convert deposits of money in the form 
most convenient to the saver into loans that are designed to be in a form suitable for 
the borrower. In so doing, the financial intermediaries utilise the economies of scale 
and scope that would not be available with a direct connection between the saver and 
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the borrower. For example, pooling funds for a large number of short term deposit 
and current accounts allows longer term loans to be offered while still preserving the 
liquidity required by the savers. 
 
To the end users, financial intermediaries are useful beyond their ability to pool 
funds. Financial transactions carry a cost to the parties. This arises from the 
uncertainty, and complexity of the transaction, compounded by the informational 
asymmetry that is likely to exist within the imperfect financial markets. By bringing 
relevant expertise, bargaining power and a single governance structure, these 
imbalances can be more effectively managed and the transaction costs reduced.275 
 
At the centre of the interaction between the saver, the borrower and the financial 
intermediaries are the financial instruments that provide the substance of the 
transactions. As Bain notes, '[t]hese are mostly more or less sophisticated forms of 
IOUs or claims - they are an asset of one party and a liability of another'.276 These 
financial instruments are characterised by three key variables: risk; liquidity (the 
speed and ease of accessing the monetary value of the product); and the certainty or 
stability of the real-value of the product in the face of inflation.277 In the conventional 
finance system, deposits and short-term loans are generally seen as low risk products 
that rely on the repayment of capital with interest, have high liquidity (the longer the 
loan, the lower the liquidity), and low certainty of value in real terms. Company 
shares, on the other hand are higher risk, but also carry a greater likelihood of gain, 
have high liquidity, and are better than deposits at preserving or increasing the real 
value of the product when inflation is allowed for. 
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2.1.4.4 Financial innovation 
 
Financial innovation, which may be characterised as unpredicted, dramatic 
developments rather than gradual, foreseen changes,278 generates new financial 
products and the strategies to use them.279 The process engages the financial system 
as a whole and has been increasingly prevalent since the 1960s.280 Writing in 1986, 
Miller characterised the previous twenty years as something of a revolution.281 This 
surge in activity has seven main causes: economic volatility; technological advances 
allowing faster and more efficient communication; distribution of global wealth; 
better educated and increasingly sophisticated professionals; competition between 
financial organisations; the regulatory approach;282 and the tax structure.283  
 
These causes may be characterised as providing either motivation or opportunity.284  
For example, competition and economic volatility provides motivation for innovation 
to capitalise on, or to reduce the risks of rapid changes in interest or exchange rates. 
Tax laws, and changes in these laws, also provide a motivation to reduce the tax 
burden and so increase profits. A relaxation of, or a gap in regulation, more 
sophisticated financial professionals, and advances in computer technologies, on the 
other hand,  provide opportunity for innovation. These ultimate causes are perhaps 
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mediated through more direct causes such as an ongoing pressure to lessen a firm's 
financial constraints and optimise profits. These constraints may arise externally 
from government regulation and the demands of the market, but may also arise 
internally through target setting and governance.285  
 
Consistently with the driving force of innovation resting in competition,286 in a study 
of financial innovation between 1990 and 2002, Lerner found that smaller, less 
profitable firms tend to innovate more, enjoying an increase in profitability as a 
consequence. The other type of firm that tends to innovate is the older, less leveraged 
firm situated in areas of high financial innovation.287 This suggests that the 
isomorphic mimicry of successful strategies within the competitive environment is 
an important factor in determining the involvement of a firm in the process of 
innovation. From this competitive perspective, financial innovation may be useful for 
a number of reasons, including: an increase in the range and choice of financial 
instruments; improved liquidity; the encouragement of direc t investment, e.g. 
through the development of securities; the provision of alternative funding sources; a 
reduction in cost; and a reduced reliance on banks.288 The impact of financial 
innovation, however, is not always positive. 
 
While many innovations can be useful, the pressure to continue to innovate may 
encourage excessive risk taking (see later). Furthermore, financial innovations may: 
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increase uncertainty regarding monetary policy; contribute to the volatility of asset 
prices; reduce liquidity when it is most needed by stressed firms; encourage 
commercial banks to engage in investment banking activity, with possible conflicts 
of interest (see later); affect the accuracy of pricing due to inexperience with the new 
products; affect the ability to regulate effectively; and may concentrate risks in the 
few financial organisations that underwrite the new instruments.289 
2.1.4.5 The relationships of the financial system 
 
A key aspect of any system is the relationships that help to define its nature and 
extent. These relationships may be internal or external to the system. Internal 
relationships may be co-operative, competitive or regulatory, and include the 
cooperative relationships between the saver, the financial intermediary, the market 
and the borrowers, the cooperative relationships between the financial intermediaries, 
the markets and the FMIs, and - in a capitalist environment - the competitive 
relationships between organisations seeking to maximise profit. External 
relationships include those between the financial system, the government as policy 
maker and the wider economy, those between the financial system and the legal 
system, and those between different national financial systems and the global 
financial system. In systems with a central bank (see below), the central banks 
straddle the boundary of the financial system with both internal and external 
relationships. Space precludes a fuller discussion of these relationships which are 
perhaps best represented diagrammatically (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Financial System Relationships 
 
2.1.5 The basic concept of a financial system  
 
At this juncture, it is worth consolidating the discussion so far in order to start 
constructing the concept of a financial system (see figure 4). The structure of a 
concept comprises three elements: an underlying theory that provides explanatory 
force for the core attributes; the core attributes that serve to identify the concept; and 
the peripheral attributes that widen the variety of distinct token examples existing 
under the umbrella of the broad category concept. The first step in this process is 
isolating the explanatory theory from the previous discussion.  
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Figure 4: The Concept of a Financial System 
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I noted earlier that the financial system is a socio-cultural entity. Such a system is 
comprised of inter-dependent units, which were identified as the roles determined, 
and required, by the purpose of the system. This suggests that the theory of such a 
system must be centred on its core purpose. Based on this, the underlying theory of 
the concept of a financial system is: 
A complex socio-cultural system comprising a relational network 
of interdependent roles coordinated to facilitate the flow of money 
within the community served by that system. 
 
The core attributes of the concept, which may be identified from the previous 
discussion, include: the purpose or rationale for the system, which is to generate 
profit and economic growth by facilitating the flow of money; the actors involved as 
users or providers of the services and products; the functions of the system, which 
include the safekeeping of money, the management of risk, information and 
transaction costs; the provision of liquidity and the innovation of new products and 
services; the internal and external relationships of the system, including those with 
the community and the system of regulation; and the stability of the system. 
 
Peripheral attributes, by their nature, are not essential to the concept of a financial 
system. They may, or may not, exist without affecting the characterisation of the 
entity as a financial system. Although not crucial to the concept, they may 
nevertheless engage with important functions in practice. It is, therefore, worth 
mentioning at least a few of these elements. It was noted earlier that the financial 
system could be analysed in isolation, or as part of a wider economic system. These 
different approaches identify the peripheral attribute of secondary purpose, with 
 106 
possible values including: economic growth; and societal well-being. Another 
important peripheral attribute is regulation. For present purposes, only a brief 
explanation is provided, sufficient to explain its role as a peripheral attribute.290 
 
Regulation provides oversight to reduce the risk of unethical or illegal activity, such 
as fraud, insider trading, money laundering, negligent practices. This is essential to, 
'sustain systemic stability'; 'maintain the safety and soundness of financial 
institutions'; and to protect the interests of the consumer and other participants in the 
financial system.291 Given the importance of the financial services to the economy, 
regulation is also important to protect the interests of the state as a whole.292 The 
need for effective regulation, both national and global,293 was most recently 
illustrated by the global financial crisis of 2007,294 which required, for example, the 
UK government to step in to prevent certain banks, such as the Royal Bank of 
Scotland, from collapsing.295 Regulation can be both internal and external to the 
individual organisations. Internal regulation is achieved through corporate 
governance. External regulation is provided by public or private regulatory bodies 
backed by statutory law and is justified by the need to support internal regulation; to 
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protect the public against 'monopolistic exploitation'; to protect less powerful and 
less well informed individuals or organisations; and to provide systemic stability. 296 
2.1.6 Central banks and their roles within a financial system 
 
Although not essential to the core concept of a financial system, central banks 
currently play a crucial role in most modern financial systems. They are relatively 
new entities. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were just 18 central 
banks, but by the end of that century there were 172.297 The number continues to rise, 
with currently 190 national central banks listed on the Central Bank News website.298 
Historically, some central banks, such as the Bank of Prussia, were created to allow 
the sovereign to exploit the economy, but others, such as the Reichsbank and the 
Banca d'Italia, were created to improve the payments system for the benefit of the 
community.299 Today, central banks are very different from their ancestors and play a 
number of roles that may be seen as straddling the boundary between the financial 
system and the wider economy.300 
 
Singleton notes that: 
The narrowest definition of a central bank is a bank at which other 
banks hold deposits and use them for the settlement of interbank 
payments. However, all central banks have additional functions, 
several of which are of at least equal importance.301 
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These include:302 
 Issuing legal tender banknotes and coins; 
 Formulating and implementing monetary policy, including the setting of 
discount interest rates; the purchase and sale of securities; the availability of 
loans to commercial banks; and administrative measures such as imposing limits 
on commercial interest rates; 
 Government banking and agency services, including the management of the 
public debt;  
 Maintaining financial system integrity, including acting as a lender of last 
resort and as a prudential regulator; 
 Managing national reserves and exchange rate policies; 
 Promoting economic development; 
 Advising on economic policy; and 
 Cooperating in the management and regulation of global finance. 
 
Arguably, the most important current role of a central bank is to maintain financial 
stability, or at least to do what it can to counter the inherent fragility of financial 
systems arising from 'liquidity transformation'.303 This is necessary to maintain the 
confidence of the community, which is essential to reduc ing the risk of a financial 
crisis and preserving the effectiveness of the system.304 It requires appropriate 
monetary policy, the prudent supervision of financial organisations, and rational use 
of funds in its role as lender-of-last-resort to support those solvent organisations 
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through periods of illiquidity without incentivising excessive risk-taking.305 Through 
effective monetary policy, the central bank can manage inflation and price 
stability.306 Through macroprudential supervision,307 the provision of emergency 
liquidity and regulatory participation in the payments system, the central bank 
provides a 'safety net' against the potential loss entailed by the unavoidably risky 
activity of any financial system.308 Although monetary policy and the setting of 
interest rates may be managed by a central bank, the 'essence of central banking', as 
Goodhart notes,  is its 'essential role of liquidity management'.309 
2.1.7 Conventional Banks 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the primary, although not exclusive, focus is on the 
banks. There are three reasons for this. First, a restrictive focus will allow sufficient 
depth of analysis. Second, banks play a 'pivotal' role in the financial services system 
and carry a greater risk of systemic failure from the contagion effect that 
accompanies bank runs.310 Third, the development of Islamic finance, and the 
accompanying literature, is centred on Islamic banks. Because the later analysis will 
be centred on banks, it is worth explaining their nature and function in more detail.  
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Banks are organisations with a number of different financial roles. Their primary 
roles are to accept money from depositors, pool the funds, and lend money to 
borrowers. Under s 2 of the UK Banking Act 2009, a bank is an institution with the 
legal permission afforded by Part 4A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
'to carry on the regulated activity of accepting deposits'.311 This latter Act does not 
define a bank, but includes a number of threshold conditions that must be met for the 
institution to be granted permission to function as a bank. Banks may be 
characterised as commercial banks, 'whose main business is deposit-taking and 
making loans', and investment banks, 'whose main business is securities 
underwriting, M&A advisory,312 asset management and securities trading'.313 The 
distinction, however, has not always been clear cut in practice with large 
organisations (universal banks) often carrying out both roles. Furthermore, banks 
characterised as commercial in nature may still carry out investment activities. 
 
Through the pooling of funds, banks are able to convert short term deposits into 
longer term loans, which is known as maturity transformation. In other words, banks 
act as financial intermediaries facilitating the movement of money between those 
who have a surplus and those with a deficit.314 They also have the important role of 
providing payment facilities, which gives banks a central position in the financial 
system.315 Functionally, then, banks may be defined as organisations that offer 'three 
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basic services: lending facilities, saving facilities and payment services'.316 
Furthermore, through a process of lending and recycling money, banks go beyond 
the role of financial intermediaries and create money.317 This process, which 
accounts for about 97% of the 'broad money' in circulation,318 is limited by 
'prudential regulation' and the monetary policy of the central bank.319 
 
The conventional financial market relies on the payment of interest and banks 
generate income by charging more interest on loans than the interest they pay out to 
depositors. This may be supplemented by bank fees, the sale of a variety of financial 
products including insurance and mutual funds, and the trading of securities, which 
are documents representing an interest in something of value such as shares, bonds, 
debts.320 Securitisation involves the pooling of loans (e.g. mortgages, car-purchase 
loans, student loans), which are then sold on to an administrator (commercial or 
investment bank subsidiary). The administrator creates a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) to hold the loans and then issues securities against the loans. The securities are 
then usually sold to an underwriter (e.g. investment bank), which sells them on to the 
final investor (see figure 6 and the discussion of shadow banking, below).321 
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For the most part, the banks, and the financial system generally, functions relatively 
smoothly. Like any commercial business, however, banking is associated with a 
number of risks, such as liquidity risks (the risk of a bank being affected by a cash 
flow shortfall), credit risks (the risk of a borrower defaulting), and operational risks 
(the risk of loss caused by a failure of the mechanics of the banking system).322 If 
these risks materialise, then a bank may fail and, because of the interconnectedess of 
banking and the financial system, this failure may spread in a way that has been 
described as a 'contagion'.323 A bank failure, if it occurs, is likely to be caused or 
exacerbated by a loss of trust and confidence in the bank. This, in turn, may cause 
depositors and investors to seek to liquidate their assets (the bank's liabilities), which 
may gain sufficient momentum to amount to a bank run.324 This risk of failure, and 
the systemic risk inherent to the financial system highlight the need for, and justify, 
regulation. Having explained the basics of financial systems, the analysis turns now 
to the institutional influences that shape conventional finance.  
2.2 The institutional influences shaping conventional financial services325 
 
Through an iterative isomorphic process,326 the way in which the organisations and 
actors within any system behave is dependent upon the dominant institutions that 
inform and constrain that behaviour. In chapter one, an institution was defined as a: 
socially constructed ... essentially taken-for-granted and relatively 
resistant system of cultural rules and behavioural scripts that 
establishes a social order and normative framework. 
                                            
322 For formal definitions of these risks and further discussion of the risks facing Islamic banks see 
section 4.2. 
323 Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale, 'Financial Contagion' (2000) 108 Journal of Political Economy, 1. 
324 Jeanne Gobat, 'What is a Bank?', March 2012, Finance and Development 39. 
325 Note that the point of this account, including the discussion of the financial crisis, is not to provide 
a complete and detailed analysis, which is beyond the scope of this work, but to sketch an impression 
for the purpose of more fully  understanding the different approach of Islamic finance.  
326 See the discussion in section 1.6.1.1. 
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These institutions influence behaviour through self-regulatory mechanisms that 
impose transactional costs on behaviour that deviates from the institutional norms.327 
The costs include an increased risk in an economic context, greater thought in a 
cognitive context, and loss of legitimacy and its associated benefits in a social 
context.328 The conventional financial system, which is itself an institution with its 
own cultural rules and behavioural scripts, will be influenced by a number of other 
institutions, including professionalism,329 and the legal and regulatory systems.330 Of 
the institutions affecting the conventional financial system, perhaps the most 
important institutionalised discourse331 is capitalism, which may be broadly defined 
as '[a]n economic and political system in which a country's trade and industry are 
controlled for profit ...'.332  
2.2.1 The pre-crisis position and the emergence of neoliberal capitalism as an 
institutional influence 
 
The aim of this part of the chapter is to determine the influence of capitalism on the 
development of conventional financial systems. The discussion in this section will 
consider financial systems from the latter part of the twentieth century, leading up to 
the 2007 financial crisis. The crisis itself, and the causes, will then be analysed in the 
subsequent section. The analysis begins by considering the broad distinction between 
bank-based and market based financial systems, using the US and the UK as 
                                            
327 Nelson Phillips, Thomas B Lawrence, Cynthia Hardy, 'Discourse and Institutions' (2004) 29 
Academy of Management Review 635, 637-638.  
328 Nelson Phillips, Thomas B Lawrence, Cynthia Hardy, 'Interorganizational collaboration and the 
dynamics of institutional fields' (2000) 37 Journal of Management Studies 23, 28. 
329 Michael Lounsbury , 'Institutional Transformation of Status Mobility : The Professionalization of 
the Field of Finance' (2002) 45 Academy of Management Journal 255. 
330 The influence of law and regulation will be addressed in subsequent chapters. 
331 For the relationship  between discourse and institutions see: Nelson Phillips, Thomas B Lawrence, 
Cynthia Hardy, 'Discourse and Institutions' (2004) 29 Academy of Management Review 635. 
332 Oxford Dictionaries (2014), available at: 
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examples of market based systems and France and Germany as examples of bank 
based systems.  
 
From the start it should be noted, that in the context of financing businesses between 
1970-1985, Mayer found that 'banks are the dominant source of external finance' 
regardless of whether the financial system is bank or market based. In France, 
Germany, Italy and Japan, bank finance accounted for around 40%, while in the UK 
and the US the figure is nearer 20%.333 In the UK this falls to 8% when deposits are 
'nett[ed] off'.334 Rather than rely on bank finance, the UK tended to rely on trade 
credit, utilising retentions and ploughing earnings back into the businesses. The US, 
on the other hand, was more reliant on the bond market. Mayer also notes that the 
source of external funding varied depending on the size of the firm, with small to 
medium size UK firms being far more reliant on bank funding than the larger 
firms.335 Mayer goes on to argue that these differences were not explicable on the 
basis of the Modigliani and Miller proposition that the source of industry financing is 
a matter of indifference. Nor could they be explained on the basis of transaction costs 
or favourable taxation. Rather, he suggests that the differences can be partly 
explained on the basis of asymmetric information and risk, but, that the reliance on 
bank financing is best explained by 'their ability to intervene and take control at 
comparatively low cost'.336 
 
                                            
333 Colin Mayer, 'Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development' in R Glenn 
Hubbard (ed) Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance and Investment (University of Chicago 
Press 1990). 
 
334 Colin Mayer, 'Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development' in R Glenn 
Hubbard (ed) Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance and Investment (University of Chicago 
Press 1990) 307, 313. 
335 Ibid, 317. 
336 Ibid, 326. 
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While Mayer's analysis reflects the situation in the late 1970s to early 1980s, the 
differences in the use of the financial system for funding are not static. Rajan and 
Zingales, for example, found that, in 1913, France's reliance on stock market funding 
was just under twice that of the US when measured as a fraction of GDP (0.78/0.39), 
by 1980 the ratio was more than reversed (0.09/0.46) and by 1999 the two countries 
had largely converged (1.17/1.52).337 These differences, and the changes with time, 
they suggest, are not fully explicable by differences in structure, or in the legal 
systems of the countries. Rather, they argue, these partial explanations need to be 
supported by a theory centred on the political factors influencing the development of 
the financial system and the wider economy. Their argument will be critically 
summarised in the following paragraphs.  
 
Rajan and Zingales note that, in general, financial systems across a range of 
countries, including the UK, the US, France and Germany, were more functionally 
developed in 1913 than in the 1940s. The depression of these financial systems 
continued until the 1970s-1980s, which period provided a turning point for a 
recovery with the most marked increase in the functional development of the 
financial system occurring through the 1980s and 1990s.338 In setting the foundations 
for explaining the changes in the financial systems throughout the twentieth century, 
Rajan and Zingales postulated that the development of a financial system increases 
competition by facilitating the emergence of new ventures and businesses, which 
may, on balance, work against the interests of well-established companies. They go 
on to show that financial underdevelopment is often accompanied by bureaucratic 
                                            
337 Raghuram G Rajan, Luigi Zingales, 'The great reversals: the politics of financial development in 
the twentieth century' (2003) 69 Journal of Financial Economics 5, 7. 
338 Ibid, 17. 
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barriers to new entrants 'suggest[ing] a common purpose'.339 The political power held 
by the well-established firms is such that financial development is possible only with 
their cooperation or with a dramatic change in the country's politics.  
 
In periods of political stability, Rajan and Zingales argue, the key determinants are 
the degree of foreign cross-border competition and capital flow. Cross-border trade 
and capital flows combined are likely to create a demand for financial development 
from the well-established and powerful domestic firms. As competition increases, so 
do the demands for information and the risks of investing. Furthermore, the more 
liberal the trade and capital flows, the less opportunity there is for the government to 
intervene to provide subsidised loans to favoured domestic firms. These factors lead 
to an increased need for external funding and an interest in the development of the 
domestic financial system. This process creates a positive feedback loop: the 
availability of foreign credit and competition from foreign firms increases 
competition; this increase in competition creates a demand for external finance and 
the need for a better developed financial system; a better developed financial system 
creates the opportunity for new and riskier entrants; this increases competition and  
reinforces the demand for a better developed financial system.  
 
Rajan and Zingales acknowledge the problems of providing objective data to support 
this process, but give the development of the French financial system, initiated in 
1983 as an example of a system that has maintained a competitive edge in the context 
of free trade within the European Community. They further point to globalisation and 
the free flow of capital as providing political motivation for otherwise resistant 
                                            
339 Ibid, 21. 
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countries to allow capital flows across their own borders, thereby creating the 
conditions that fuel the demand for a more developed financial system. This opening 
up began with the US in the mid 1970s, the UK in 1980 and  subsequently European 
countries such as France and Germany in the later part of the 1980s. Their hypothesis 
that the development of financial systems is most marked when there is open trade 
and cross border capital flow is supported by the evidence they present from 1913 
and the late 1990s. In between these periods, from the Great Depression of the 1930s 
until the end of the Bretton Woods agreement, countries were relatively closed to 
cross border flows, which is reflected in under developed financial systems. The 
question is, for the purposes of the present discussion, what caused the change in 
policy that resulted in the development of financial systems in the latter parts of the 
twentieth century. 
 
Although international trade expanded in the years after the Second World War, 
cross border capital flow was restricted to allow the finances of the various 
governments to recover and to enable them to provide the demanded welfare 
insurance. This effectively restricted the development of financial markets. Free flow 
of capital began to return with the end of the Bretton Woods Agreement triggered in 
1971 by the US disconnecting the dollar from the gold exchange standard making the 
dollar a fiat currency.340 By 1990, the control of cross border capital flow had been 
removed in the US and throughout western Europe. 
 
Rajan and Zingales finally note that the development of financial systems appears to 
be influenced by a number of factors, including the legal system, culture and 
                                            
340 Michael D Bordo, 'The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview' in 
Michael D Bordo, Barry  Eichengreen (eds), A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons 
for International Monetary Reform (NBER 1993) 3, 74. 
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religion. Rather than acting directly, however, these institutions act to modify the 
impact of the political influence that private interest groups are able to wield. As 
already discussed, private interest groups, in the form of powerful, well-established 
companies and financial firms are likely to push for the development of the financial 
system when faced with the increased competition that follows open trade and cross 
border capital flows. The positive feedback loop of competition and development of 
the financial system is consistent with the process of competitive isomorphism. As 
discussed in chapter one, competitive isomorphism tends to precede, and then 
accompany, the institutional processes of normative and mimetic isomorphism. 
 
Rajan and Zingales' account provides a reasonable explanation for the mechanics of 
the changes in financial systems through the twentieth century. Their narrative, 
however, fails to explain the liberalisation of, in particular, cross border capital 
flows. For this, one must look to the political developments and change in policies 
that opened up the flow of capital and fostered competition. Space precludes a full 
analysis of the financial developments that led up to the 2007 financial crisis and the 
ideological policies that facilitated the process. While other developments may be 
referred to, the discussion will focus on shadow banking as a precursor to that crisis. 
The aim is to illustrate the relationship between the institution of capitalism, whether 
direct or indirect through regulation and professionalism, and the development of this 
parallel, but connected, system. As part of this, the analysis will highlight the effect 
of neoliberalism on capitalist ideologies, the mimetic and normative isomorphism 
that facilitated the rapid growth and legitimisation of risky financial products, the 
iterative reinforcement of the ideological policies by the success of those 
innovations, and the contagion of illegitimacy that follows an aggregate failure of an 
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organisation or the products it sells.341 The analysis begins with the nature of 
capitalism and the development of neoliberal capitalism before turning to the impact 
of that ideology on conventional financial systems. 
2.2.1.1 Capitalism and neoliberal capitalism 
 
Capitalism is identified, in its idealised form, with a free market economy, but it 'has 
never existed in pure form'.342 Nevertheless, the pure idea of capitalism forms the 
basis for the variations on the theme that have become institutionalised or argued for 
by reformists and commentators.343 Thus, Milton Friedman defines the role of 
'competitive capitalism' as 'the organization of the bulk of economic activity through 
private enterprise operating in a free market'.344 Capitalism is also closely identified 
with a liberal philosophy,345 which prioritises the freedom of the individual 
conceptualised as autonomous within a loosely aggregated and minimally governed 
society. 
 
The version of capitalism that arises from combined influences of liberalism and a 
free market philosophy is neoliberal capitalism. Although different varieties of 
capitalism may be identified,346 it is neoliberalism, at least since replacing welfare 
and managerial capitalism in the 1970s through Thatcher in the UK and Regan in the 
                                            
341 See the discussion in: Suhaib Riaz, 'The global financial crisis: an New institutional theory 
analysis' (2009) 5 Critical Perspectives on International Business 26. 
342 John C Weaver, 'The Meaning of Capitalism' (1946) 5 American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 402. 
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European; Mediterranean; Asian) identified in: Bruno Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism 
(Oxford University Press 2003), 13.  
344 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition (University  of Chicago 
Press 2002), 4. 
345 Ibid, 5. 
346 Peter A Hall, David Soskice, 'Introduction', in Hall PA, Soskice D (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: 
The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press 2001) 1, 8-9; 
Bruno Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism (Oxford University Press 2003) 14. 
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US,347 that has provided the dominant discourse.348 Harvey explains neoliberalism 
as: 
a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-
being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial 
freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by 
private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets 
and free trade.349 
In other words, neoliberalism preaches the 'unbridled pursuit of self-interest' as the 
most efficient approach to the market and ultimately economic prosperity.350 The 
politics of neoliberal capitalism conceptualises wealth as a value, prioritises 
individualism, rewards competitive success and creates an environment that 
encourages innovation and risk taking.351 Thus, its agenda includes privatisation, 
deregulation, tax incentives to stimulate investments, and a belief in competition and  
'the importance of the profit motive'.352 
 
Countering the neoliberal agenda are those who argue that financial markets need 
regulatory oversight to provide formal structure to the financial system and to 
minimise the likelihood of excessive risk taking resulting in speculative boom and 
                                            
347 Ronald Dore, William Lazonick, Mary O'Sullivan, 'Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth 
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bust scenarios. From the 1970s, however, the social circumstances were such that the 
neoliberal advocates saw their policies adopted with significant changes to the 
system of regulation facilitating the development of new financial products that 
ultimately resulted in the 2007 global financial crisis.353 Particularly noteworthy are: 
(i) the reform of banking regulation allowing the development of what is currently 
referred to as "shadow banking"; (ii) the lack of regulation for the over-the-counter, 
asset-backed securities markets; and (iii) the approach of credit rating agencies 
whose 'extremely rosy assessments' of these financial products lulled investors into a 
false sense of security.354 Before considering the development of shadow banking 
and the events that led up to the 2007 crisis, the institutionalisation of neoliberal 
capitalism in the US will be discussed. As a caveat to this discussion, it should be 
borne in mind that politics in practice rarely, if ever, represents a pure ideology. 
Rather, the process of institutionalisation of neoliberal capitalism is one of ongoing 
conflict with competing ideologies that may, for historical and political reasons, 
coexist in the practices and structures of the state.355 
2.2.1.2 The institutionalism of neoliberal capitalism 
 
In the 1970s, the developed world was in the middle of a deep recession coupling 
high inflation with economic stagnation, commonly referred to by the concatenated 
term "stagflation". In the US, taxation, the regulatory structure, and the costs of 
labour had reduced net profits from 13.7% in 1966 to 8.7% in 1973 and 7.6% in 
1979. The response to this was a concerted 'political mobilization' by the "capitalist 
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class", with a massive growth in organised corporate political action committees and 
lobbying networks, including the influential Business Roundtable. The impact of this 
unified effort resulted in a 'transformation of US economic policy between 1974 and 
1981'.356  
 
As an institution, managerial capitalism coexisted with unionised welfare 
capitalism357 in the context of the “monster” of adversarial relations between the 
workforce (and unions) and their employers that was blamed for the stagflation. 
Following the problems of employment insecurity for non-managerial workers that 
escalated during the Great Depression, and facilitated by the Wagner-Connery 
National Labor Relations Act 1935, unions had grown in size and power.358 In the 
period between the end of the second World War and the 1960s, the Committee for 
Economic Development (CED), involving businessmen and officials from the 
Commerce Department, promulgated a Keynesian economic approach and 
emphasised the need for businesses to act responsibly to help maintain economic 
stability. The policies of the CED were opposed by the National Association of 
Manufacturers, who preferred liberal individualism and free markets to collective 
decision-making and government intervention. The CED policies dominated until the 
1970s, when they hit the wall of stagflation and the more effective competition of the 
Business Roundtable, formed in 1972 (see below).359  
                                            
356 Patrick J Akard, 'Corporate Mobilization and Political Power: The Transformation of US Economic 
Policy  in the 1970s' (1992) 57 American Sociological Review 597, 597-602. 
357 See, Michael K Brown, 'Bargaining for Social Rights: Unions and the Reemergence of Welfare 
Capitalism. 1945-1952' (Winter, 1997-1998) 112 Political Science Quarterly 645. See also the 
discussion of the role that business interests played in the shap ing of the Social Security Act 1935, in: 
Jill S Quadagno, 'Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935' (1984) 49 American 
Sociological Review 632. 
358 William H Becker, 'Managerial Capitalism and Public Policy ' (1992) 21 Business and Economic 
History 247, 252. 
359 Todd Schiefling, 'Defense against Recession: US Business Mobilisation, 1950-1970' (2013) 119 
American Journal of Sociology 1, 2-9. 
 123 
 
During the first twenty or so years after the Second World War, US corporations 
continued to dominate the market, but during the 1960s and 1970s that dominance 
declined in the face of international competition from, in particular, Japan.360 This 
was coupled with a trend to reward managers with company stock, turning them into 
'substantial owners' and increasing the pressure for improvements in 'short-run 
market performance' rather than a more long-term strategy of sustained innovation. 
This pressure was exacerbated by the organisational shift towards conglomerates, 
with conglomerate bosses more concerned with 'individual aggrandizement' than the 
long-term success of the corporations.361 Taken together, the stagnation in growth 
and productivity, the high wages, the costs of workers' welfare benefits and the 
power of the unions, and an organisational structure that favoured short term profit 
and individual wealth maximisation, all provided the capitalist classes with the 
motivation to organise and push for political change, which came in the form of 
neoliberalism.  
 
Brown notes that, although 'business did come to accept ... [fringe benefits] as part of 
the wage contract and collective bargaining', it is 'doubtful that business fully 
accepted the labor ideology of welfare capitalism'.362 This suggests that corporations, 
their managers and owners, were faced with what they would perceive as a 
contradiction of values. While the corporations remained competitive and successful, 
the existing institutionalised political ideology survived and continued to shape 
behaviour. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, when the US corporations started to 
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fare less well in a society burdened with high inflation and a stagnant economy, such 
a conflict was always more likely to trigger or reinforce other motivations for 
institutional change.363  
 
As Greenwood explains, given the right combination of circumstances even well-
embedded agents able to mobilise sufficient resources may utilise them to promote 
an alternative vision and push for a change to the institution.364 The stagflation of the 
1970s provided an 'exogenous jolt' that pushed the conflict over the edge and 
motivated corporate and other interested agents to cooperate to alter the institution of 
unionised welfare and managerial capitalism. This jolt was enhanced by the 
boundary bridging, boundary misalignment, and increased competition that followed 
the globalising effect of liberal cross-border capital flows accompanying the end of 
the Bretton Woods Agreement. It was the combined efforts of these parties, 
organised into bodies such as the US Chamber of Commerce365 and the Business 
Roundtable,366 that constructed a neoliberal economic rationality, helped to spread 
that rationality through the process of mimetic isomorphism to shape corporate 
decision-making and 'develop mutual understandings of profitiable strategies'.367 In 
effect, they acted as elite institutional entrepreneurs to push back the norms of 
unionised welfare, managerial capitalism and Keynesian economics allowing the 
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insurgence of the neoliberal ideal (see figure 5).368 As Akard noted, '"[s]tagflation" 
undermined the Keynesian principles underlying postwar economic policy and upset 
the political balance between capital, labor, and the state that was predicated on 
continuous economic growth'.369 This triggered a push for a change in the policies 
constituting the existing ideological institution with the socio-economic 
circumstances uniting capitalist interests to rally against existing and proposed 
government policies that, in their view, misdirected resources towards welfare 
causing inflation and a damaging shortage of capital for investment. The result was 
that: 
by the early 1980s, US policy favoured greater reliance on market 
allocation of resources, a reduction of taxes and nondefense 
government expenditures, and a rollback of recently-enacted 
regulations affecting industry.370  
 
The relevance of neoliberalism to government policies and the dominant ideological 
institution of capitalism was bolstered by the election of Ronald Reagan as US 
President in 1981, marking the beginning of a sustained shift away from welfare 
policies to macroeconomic market-based policies focusing on reducing inflation and 
the promotion of business interests.371 The neoliberal policies of Reaganism were 
matched in the UK by those of Margaret Thatcher, elected as prime minister in 1979. 
Similar, if less extreme, policies were also adopted in nations, such as Canada, New 
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Zealand, France and Germany, traditionally used to a more social politics. Under the 
banner of the Washington Consensus,372 and through the mechanism of fiscal control 
implemented by bodies such as the World bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
neoliberal policies were propagated transnationally. Thus, Brenner and Theodore 
comment that:  
By the mid-1980s, in the wake of this dramatic U-turn of policy 
agendas throughout the world, neoliberalism had become the 
















Figure 5: The Neoliberalisation of the US Market in the 1970s 
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The process of institutionalising neoliberal capitalism was, as Susan George 
explained, well-orchestrated, highly organised and generously funded. Building on 
the economic philosophy of Von Hayek and Friedman of the University of Chicago, 
they 'created a huge international network ... to develop, package and push their ideas 
and doctrine relentlessly' to create a 'cultural hegemony' that 'made neo-liberalism 
seem as if it were a natural and normal condition of humankind'.374 Through this 
process, the norms and behavioural scripts of neoliberal capitalism rapidly acquired 
the characteristics of an institution, influencing the minds and guiding the actions of 
agents who unquestioningly incorporated the doctrine's tenets into their own beliefs.  
 
Facilitated by the increasing professionalisation of financial services with the 'new 
professionals ... [acting as] important emissaries of the emergent market logic',375 the 
institutionalisation of neoliberal capitalism impacted on financial systems throughout 
the world of conventional finance. It is traditional practice to characterise financial 
systems as either bank-based or market-based. The isomorphic effect of the new 
neoliberal norms and behavioural scripts have, since the 1990s, resulted in a blurring  
of the distinctions with commercial banks taking on more investment roles and 
mixed systems becoming increasingly apparent.376 Writing in 2003, some four years 
before the global financial crisis of 2007, Amable explained: 
There are no signs of a complete conversion of Continental 
financial systems to a market-based system, but there are signs that 
the systems are changing ... [possibly] towards a hybrid system ... 
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[with] a general trend towards securitization ... changes in the 
regulative frameworks of the banking industry and the soar of 
financial markets.377 
In part, at least, this may be a result of the globalisation agenda that accompanied 
neoliberalism and extended the presence of global commodities, capital and currency 
markets.378 It appears, therefore, that, through the processes of competitive and 
institutional isomorphism, the recent development of conventional finance has been 
shaped by neoliberal capitalism. As an institutionalised discourse, neoliberal 
capitalism remains the dominant institutional influence on conventional finance. 
2.2.1.3 Capitalism and money 
 
Before considering the impact of neoliberal capitalism on shadow banking and the 
innovative development of the financial system, the capitalist conception of money 
will be briefly discussed. This is important because the conception of money is 
integral to the norms and behavioural scripts constitutive of the institution of 
capitalism and its neoliberal child. The way in which we perceive money reflects the 
way in which we see ourselves and our relation to others and society more widely.379 
This, in turn, is influenced by the norms and behavioural scripts of the institutions 
that provide the cultural context for our lives. 
 
 A traditional, but limited, view of money is to see it simply as a relatively 
insignificant medium of exchange in a complex system of barter embodied by the 
                                            
377 Ibid, 254 (focus on France and Germany). 
378 Neil Brenner, Nik Theodore, 'Cities and the Geographies of "Actually  Existing Neoliberalism"' 
(2002) 34 Antipode 349, 364, 
379 See: Robert Perinbanayagam, 'The Coinage of the Self: Money, Signs and the Social Self', in 
Norman K Denzin (ed) Blue Ribbon Papers: Interactionism: The Emerging Landscape (Emerald 
Books 2011) 107, 127-128. 
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market.380 Thus, Keynes states that '[m]oney is only important for what it will 
procure'.381 This thin view of money is reflected in the 'old saying that everyone 
knows what money is except economists'.382  As Baker and Jimerson explain: 
'[money] is not as colorless, neutral, fungible and objective as economists contend. 
Money is shaped by objective social relations (social structure) and cognitive 
classifications and evocative meanings (culture)'.383 For capitalists, and neoliberal 
capitalists in particular, money is a 'special form of private property' that dominates 
the capitalist economy providing the raison d'être for the production of goods, 
'subordinat[ing]' any community benefit to an incidental value.384  Money constitutes 
far more than a neutral token and is as ideologically laden as the system that provides 
the institutional framework for its production and use.385  
 
Rather than simply representing the value of things, money in a capitalist system 'is a 
means by which value is established'.386 Furthermore, as Ingham explains, the 
banking system's creation of money as credit goes beyond storing and transferring 
value and provides a means of creating value.387 In so doing, money establishes, 
maintains, and transforms social relations of trust and confidence allowing economic 
actors to engage in  de-personalised speculative activity that, in the absence of ready 
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credit-money, would not be available to them.388 Money, as a capitalist conception, 
transcends the absence of any intrinsic value in the paper (or metal) token. Rather 
than simply representing the value of a promise-to-pay, money is an independent 
source of power,389 which explains the value intrinsic to the concept of money and 
creates an illusion of intrinsic value in tokens of money.  Although the true value of 
money is instrumental and lies in the social relationships of power that it enables,390 
the illusion of intrinsic value enables the attitude that money is an end in itself. 
 
For Lau and Smithin, money is crucial to both the substantive and formal rationality 
of capitalism. Substantively, capitalism is embodied by a 'relentless drive for 
profit'.391 As Keynes comments: '[t]he firm ... has no object in the world except to 
end up with more money than it started with'.392 This motivation, to the exclusion of 
all others, is emphasised by Milton Friedman, one of the fathers of neoliberal 
capitalism, who stated that:  
there is one and only one social responsibility of business ... to 
increase its profits ... in open and free competition.393 
Formally, the success or failure of capitalist endeavours is measured in monetary 
terms. It is this drive for profit combined with an exclusively monetary valuation that 
imbues money with the illusion of intrinsic value. In the institution of capitalism, 
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money is synonymous with success. Indeed, the success of neoliberal capitalism as 
an institution is illustrated by the rise, from 49.9% in 1971 to 74.7% in 1991, in the 
proportion of new US university students who indicated that money was the primary 
reason for entering higher education.394 As Dillard notes: 'Money is unlike any other 
asset because it is the socially recognised form of private wealth'.395 If being 
successful is a goal, or intrinsically valuable end, then so too is money. This is 
exemplified by the whole concept of a rate of interest and the consequential existence 
of an "investing class",396 whose role is to make money out of money, rather than 
from labour and the provision of goods or services. The explication of conventional 
finance turns now to consider the development of shadow banking. 
2.2.1.4 Shadow Banking 
 
The shadow banking system,397 which had its origins in US government sponsored 
enterprises such as the Federal Home Loan Bank System (1932), Fannie Mae (1938) 
and Freddie Mac (1970), has grown substantially over the past 30 years.398 This has 
been facilitated by the financial deregulation consistent with the neoliberal capitalist 
ideology that drove government financial policy in most Western countries, but 
particularly the US,399 and the UK. Weiss explains: 
Even more than the historical record effectively demonstrates, the 
global financial meltdown is itself a textbook story of the state's 
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disentwinement from financial regulation ... the United States 
"threw away a critical core of the regulatory rule book" - 
effectively disentwining itself from the financial market and in the 
process fostering a giant shadow banking sector.400 
She attributes this process to three deregulatory acts: The 1999 repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act, legitimising the concept of financial holding companies,401 and 
removing the separation between commercial and investment banks, so opening 
access to deposit savings for risky investments; legislation in 2000 that 'exempted 
derivatives from regulation';402 and, in 2004, the informal removal of 'the prudential 
requirement for investment banks originating mortgages to maintain adequate capital 
reserves'.403 
 
Interestingly, Weiss, who seeks to argue against the existence of a neoliberal state, 
goes on to claim that: 'according to the more astute observers, this was no "neoliberal 
experiment" gone haywire'. In support of this, she points to the words of Simon 
Johnson, 'former chief economist at the IMF and one of the most respected analysts 
of the crisis'. She states that he 'has noted that the deregulatory motives were 
anything but ideological'. It was not about market fundamentalism, but, in Johnson's 
words, about '"[a] whole generation of policy makers ... mesmerised by Wall Street 
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(eds) Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond (Palgrave-MacMillan 
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... Washington insiders already believed that large financial institutions and free-
flowing capital markets were crucial to America's position in the world"'.404 This 
argument is disingenuous. Policy is inevitably ideological and simply claiming it was 
not ideologically driven does not make it so. Even the quote included here 
demonstrates the ideology of neoliberal capitalism in the belief in the power and 
value of 'free-flowing capital markets'. This is not to say that Weiss is wrong to argue 
that there has never been a neoliberal state, but that is not the point here. The point 
here is the more limited claim that the financial policies allowing the emergence of 
shadow banking were neoliberal in origin.  
 
It should also be noted that the institutionalised form of any ideology is unlikely to 
be academically pure. Rather, it will involve a complex mix of norms and policies, 
not all of which will appear to be consistent. As such, neoliberal financial policies 
can coexist in practice alongside more interventionist neoconservative policies.405 
Harvey, for example, accepts the pragmatics of ideologies in practical politics when 
he explains what he takes neoliberalism to mean: 
My view is that it refers to a class project that coalesced in the 
crisis of the 1970s. Masked by a lot of rhetoric about individual 
freedom ... and the virtues of privatisation, the free market and free 
trade, it legitimised draconian policies designed to restore and 
consolidate capitalist class power ... 
One of the basic pragmatic principles that emerged in the 1980s ... 
was that state power should protect financial institutions at all 
                                            
404 Linda Weiss, 'The Myth of the Neoliberal State', in Chang Kyung-Sup, Ben Fine, Linda Weiss 
(eds) Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond (Palgrave-MacMillan 
2012) 27, 36-37. 
405 Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore, Neil Brenner, 'Neoliberalism Resurgent? Market Rule after the Great 
Recession' (2012) 111 The South Atlantic Quarterly 265, 269-273. 
 134 
costs. This ... flew in the face of the non-interventionism that 
neoliberal theory prescribed ... Put crudely, the policy was privatise 
profits and socialise risks.406 
In other words, the neoliberal capitalism institutionalised in practice is not the simple 
application of pure neoliberal principles. Markets should be deregulated to permit the 
pursuit of profit, but the crucial importance of the financial system to the well-being 
of the state meant that the state would always be prepared to step in. 
 
As a consequence of the relentless pursuit of profit, a central institutional norm of 
neoliberalism:  
Strange new markets arose, pioneered within what became known 
as the "shadow banking" system, permitting investment in credit 
swaps, currency derivatives, and the like. The futures market 
embraced everything from trading in pollution rights to betting on 
the weather.407  
The problem created by shadow banking is the increased threat to financial stability 
created by a system that exists outside the regulation of the standard financial 
system. It was this shadow banking system (which is subject to limited regulation)  
that, as a now well-recognised source of systemic risk, is at least partially to blame 
for the 2007 financial crisis.408 Indeed the term itself only came in to widespread use 
with the onset of the crisis itself.409 
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global financial crisis'  (2013) 32 Journal of International Money and Finance 579, 580; Oliver 
Kessler, Benjamin Wilhelm, 'Financialization and the Three Utopias of Shadow Banking' (2013) 17 
Competition and Change 248.  
409 FSB, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation (FSB 2011), 1. 
 135 
Bakk-Simon et al explain that defining the concept of shadow banking 'is not 
straightforward'. It involves activities 'undertaken in the less regulated segment of the 
financial system', which has two main dangers: a reliance on short-term, uninsured 
funds 'makes it susceptible to modern-type "bank runs" and the related liquidity risks 
without the safety nets available to regulated banking systems'; and regulatory 
arbitrage.410 Both of these can negatively impact on the fragility of the regulated 
sector through contagion or because of the connections between the organisations in 
the two sectors. They settle on a functional definition of shadow banking as: 
activities related to credit intermediation, liquidity and maturity 
transformation that takes place outside the regulated banking 
system.411 
 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international body established in 2009 and 
endorsed by the G20 governments to 'monitor and make recommendations about the 
global financial system',412 similarly defines shadow banking as:  
credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the 
regular banking system.413 
It then explained a two-stage, policy-motivated, functional approach that initially 
includes all non-bank credit intermediation. This is then narrowed to those 
intermediaries: (i) who show indications of regulatory arbitrage; or (ii) that, through 
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their activities, pose an increased systemic risk.414 For Pozsar et al, the key is that: 
'[s]hadow banks are financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and 
liquidity transformation without access to central bank liquidity or public sector 
credit guarantees'.415  
 
These broad definitions include finance companies, money market funds (MMF),416 
the repo markets,417 some hedge funds, and special-purpose vehicles within the 
shadow finance sector. The activities typically involve maturity transformation, in 
which short-term liabilities are used to fund long-term assets. Within the shadow 
banking system, financial intermediation often involves a chain of intermediation 
between the investor and the final borrower.418 This chain may begin with the 
pooling and structuring of loans into asset-backed securities (ABS).419 These may be 
further pooled into collateralised debt obligations (CDOs).420 Both of these financial 
instruments are created by broker-dealers' ABS syndicate desks, while intermediation 
is performed by limited purpose finance companies, structured investment vehicles, 
conduits and credit hedge funds. These may be funded by, inter alia, repo 
agreements, asset backed commercial paper (ABCP)421 bonds422 and medium term 
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notes.423 These activities, in turn, are funded by wholesale funding markets through 
money market intermediaries whether subject to intense or limited regulation.424 The 
aim is to repackage illiquid loans into money-like financial instruments that serve to 
increase the liquidity and transform ('polish') the credit rating of the original loans. 
As a general rule, the poorer the credit quality of the originating loans, the longer the 
chain of intermediation required to repackage them.425 Through this chain, shadow 
banking uses a model of loan financing referred to as 'originate-to-distribute', rather 
than the traditional model of 'originate-to-hold'.   
 
Shadow banking grew out of the competition within the regulated banking system 
and between banks and non-banks. In order to remain competitive and profitable, 
banks sought to avoid both the impact of 'interest rate ceilings on demand 
deposits',426 and the effect of deposit insurance caps on their ability to provide safe, 
short term high value investments. They also turned to shadow banking to create 'off-
balance-sheet entities to host some of the banks' assets and, thereby, reduce their 
regulatory capital requirements' (see figure 6).427 As McCulley explains: 
The allure of shadow banking ... is unambiguous: There is no better 
way for bankers to maximally leverage the inherent banking model 
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(of borrowing cheap and lending rich) than by becoming ... shadow 





















Figure 6 The Relationship Between Shadow Banking and Regulated Banking 
 
In other words, shadow banking grew out of the isomorphic drive to squeeze every 
last drop of profit from available funding. While the emergency credit provided by 
deposit insurance and central banks as lenders of last resort provided a safety net for 
regulated banks, it was at least partly the need to avoid the associated prudential 
regulations aimed at reducing the moral hazard accompanying the use of such a 
safety net that led to the growth of shadow banking as a profit-making machine. Such 
was its success that, at its peak, the shadow banking system had gross liabilities of 
about $20 trillion, an amount far larger than the liabilities of regulated banking.429 
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The push to maximise profits is driven by the behavioural scripts and norms of 
capitalism and facilitated by the laissez-faire culture indicative of the neoliberal 
capitalist approach to free market enterprise. If left unchecked by regulatory 
oversight, such a competitive drive will inevitably lead to a spiral of increasingly 
creative and risky investment practices in order to maintain an advantage and profit 
margins over one's competitors. Successful risk-taking, coupled with a confidence in 
the persistence of existing economic stability,430 mimetically spreads risk-taking 
investment behaviour, particular when the real risk is underestimated. While 
confidence remains intact, the reward of risk-taking reinforces the behaviour, 
encouraging ever riskier behaviour.431 The danger of this comes from the equally 
inevitable loss of confidence that triggers a run on deposits (see below).432  
 
This process was identified with capitalist economies by Minsky as part of his 
financial instability hypothesis. Bankers, he noted, are profit-seeking entrepreneurs 
driven to innovate in order to maximise financial returns. During periods of success 
and high profitability, investment behaviour moves, in search of ever increasing 
profits, from more stable investments to less stable speculative investments.433 Over 
time, speculative investments become Ponzi investments, which in turn lose value 
resulting in shortfalls of liquidity and the pressure to sell assets. This cyclical 
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behaviour is inherent to a capitalist system and requires a prudent framework of 
regulation and intervention to maintain overall stability.434 
 
As noted above, the shadow banking system uses short term financial instruments 
(e.g. Repo and ABCP) to provide the funding necessary for managing the securities 
issued on the back of long term loans, and so perform a similar role to regulated 
banks by transforming short term liquid funding into longer term illiquid loans. As 
with the regulated banking system, this creates a system made fragile by the risk of 
bank runs as depositors seek to reclaim their funds (especially Repo and ABCP 
markets). Unlike the regulated system, shadow banking lacks access to emergency 
funding to meet liquidity demands leaving their fragility exposed. As predicted by 
Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, the ultimate consequence is that, in order to 
meet the demand for money, shadow banking firms can only respond by selling off 
assets. This can create a crisis of funding for the shadow banking system as occurred 
during the 2007 crisis.435  
2.2.2 The financial crisis of 2007 and the aftermath  
(see figure 7 for a simplified overview) 
The growth and spread of neoliberal capitalism arguably peaked with the events that 
culminated in the 2007 financial crisis.436 As noted earlier, the influence of this form 
of capitalism may be seen in the shift from bank-based to more market-based or 
hybrid models, It can also be seen in the change in banking practices. Historically, 
banks have been 'the main deposit-taking institutions and principal suppliers of loans 
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in the economy'.437 In the years leading up to the 2007 global financial crisis, 
however,  'the banking model ... evolved, becoming increasingly dominated by 
wholesale markets and in particular derivatives, to the detriment of the more 

























Figure 7: Neoliberalism, Isomorphism and the Financial crisis 
 
The institutionalisation of the neoliberal capitalist discourse facilitated the 
development of  a high risk 'aggressive investment-oriented culture' that was savings 
averse, but accepting of high debt and large mortgages.439 The early success of such 
an approach, initially in the US and UK, influenced first other Western countries and 
then emerging markets and transition countries to adopt similar strategies.440 Over 
time, however, financial pressure grew on the ordinary consumer and the financial 
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system became increasingly fragile as organisations adopted riskier strategies and 
chased ever increasing profits.441 Eventually the bubble burst in August 2007 when 
the subprime mortgage market collapsed, following a 'shock' to house prices.442 The 
ABSs built on these mortgages plummeted in value triggering a contagious lack of 
confidence in other financial instruments and markets,443 including the ABCP market 
used by MMFs. This initial stress on the system was compounded by the collapse of 
the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The consequent default on ABCPs 
triggered a run on MMFs, only stemmed by the intervention of the US Treasury.444 
The damage, however, was done and the crisis of legitimacy that originated in the 
shadow banking system spread contagiously by association to the regulated 
system.445 As McCulley noted:  
The rise of [shadow banking] ... drove one of the biggest lending 
booms in history, and its collapse resulted in one of the most 
crushing financial crises we have ever seen.446 
 
The origins of the subprime mortgage collapse can be traced back to the Roosevelt 
administration's policy of private home ownership enabled by the New Deal which 
was put into effect over the course of the 1930s in response to the Great 
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Depression.447 As part of this approach, federal deposit insurance was introduced to 
reassure savers that they would be compensated for losses caused by defaulting 
borrowers. The Federal Housing Administration encouraged long term mortgages 
and in 1938 the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was 
established to issue bonds that would fund the purchase of mortgages from the 
privately owned and heavily regulated local Savings and Loans. These changes 
meant that 'the US government was effectively underwriting the mortgage market' 
causing a 20% increase in home ownership (up to 60% by 1960), and an associated 
rise in mortgage debt.448 
 
The process of extending private home ownership continued and was extended to 
include African-Americans with the growth of civil rights in the 1960s. In 1968, 
Fannie Mae was divided in two and privatised as a government sponsored enterprise 
(GSE). This created organisations with political influence, but a conflicting dual 
mission with the public policy goals of affordable housing losing out to the risky 
strategies required to maximise profits for shareholders, a strategy that would 
ultimately prove the undoing of the GSE and require it to be bailed out and taken into 
government conservatorship before the crisis had fully unfolded.449 A new 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) was created to provide 
mortgages for poor borrowers, while Fannie Mae was allowed to buy both 
conventional and government sponsored mortgages. In 1970, the Federal Home Loan 
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Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) was established to inject competition into the 
market with the aim of lowering mortgages and widening access.450 
 
While house prices outgrew inflation, the policy was successful. This all changed in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s as stagflation hit home. The Savings and Loans 
companies, which were the backbone of private mortgages, were hit hard by this 
inflation, exacerbated by the deposit cap of Regulation Q that pushed investors to the 
more lucrative MMFs. The US government neoliberal response was tax breaks and 
deregulation, freeing the Savings and Loans companies to utilise a wider range of 
investment and funding opportunities, while retaining the security of deposit 
insurance. This created a moral hazard and encouraged both excessive risk taking 
and misfeance resulting in a prolonged crisis for the Savings and Loans companies, 
which had to sell-off their mortgages to remain solvent. They were bought up by 
ambitious traders such as Lewis Ranieri at Salomon Brothers, and repackaged in 
large bundles as collateral for new securities known as collateralised mortgage 
obligations. This was, as Ferguson comments, 'the dawn of a new era in American 
finance'.451  
 
The advantage of these securities were that many of the mortgages were backed by 
government insurance, which gave them a higher credit rating and encouraged a 
growth in the use of these securities such that by 2007 about 56% of the US home 
mortgage market was securitised. The success of private home ownership, and the 
money that could be made from mortgages, together with the pressure to remain 
competitive and continue to increase profits led to the mortgage market expanding to 
                                            
450 Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (Allen Lane 2008), 250-
252. 
451 Ibid, 260. 
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include borrowers who previously would have been considered too high a credit risk. 
Facilitated by the American Dream Downpayment Act 2003, which made it easier 
for low-income families to buy a house, the subprime mortgage market blossomed. 
With variable interest rates and a fragile reliance on job security, these mortgages 
were effectively a ticking time-bomb, that would ultimately explode in August 2007.  
 
The overconfidence gained from a prolonged period of economic stability, fuelled by 
a facilitatory monetary policy, resulted in widespread use of aggressively profit-
motivated predatory practices (including fraud) and products, such as inflated 
appraisals, opaque charges, high loan-to-value mortgages, low-documentation loans, 
mortgages with teaser rates and "ninja" loans.452 With these mortgages sold on, 
bundled together into securities and repackaged as CDOs, risky loans were 
transformed into apparently risk free investments backed by the profit-motivated 
credit agencies who were only too ready to legitimise these products by awarding 
triple-A ratings.453 Many of the CDOs were overpriced and, when coupled with a 
reversal of monetary policy and gradually increasing interest rates,454 the end of low-
interest teaser periods, job redundancies and falling house prices,455 the result was 
the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, which, domino-like, triggered the 
financial crisis.456  
                                            
452 Financial Crisis Inquiry  Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), 88-93, 109-110, 
160ff. Josef Ackermann, 'The subprime crisis and its consequences' (2008) 4 Journal of Financial 
Stability 329, 330. Teaser rates are discounted interest rates the induce a borrower to take out a 
mortgage, but revert to a standard interest rate at the end of the discounted period. Ninja mortgages 
are offered to those with "no income, no job, no assets". 
453 Financial Crisis Inquiry  Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), xxv. 
454 Josef Ackermann, 'The subprime crisis and its consequences' (2008) 4 Journal of Financial 
Stability 329, 330. 
455 Anthony Sanders, 'The subprime crisis and its role in the financial crisis' (2008) 17 Journal of 
Housing Economics 254, 257-260. 
456 Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (Allen Lane 2008), 260-
271. 
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2.2.2.1 Institutional isomorphism and the financial crisis 
 
The impact of the subprime mortgage crash was compounded by the practices of 
large financial conglomerates and universal banks who packaged, repackaged, and 
retained CDOs in off-balance conduits and warehouses. Rather than distributing the 
risk, they effectively  'pursued an "originate to not really distribute" strategy, due to 
their overwhelming desire to complete more transactions and earn more fees'.457 This 
was compounded by the creation of 'synthetic CDOs - composed not of real 
mortgage securities but just of bets on other products'.458 Synthetic CDOs are 
perhaps the ultimate neoliberal capitalist financial instrument. Investors taking a 
short position are betting that the market will fail. This is the ultimate expression of 
self-interested individual financial gain, with little if any concern for the stability of 
the financial system and the consequential well-being of the community. It is the 
paradigm expression of the capitalist profit motive unchecked by the ethical scripts 
of other institutions such as regulation or religion.    
 
The initial success of products like mortgage backed securities, CDOs, and over-the-
counter derivatives, and the belief that risk could be distributed so efficiently that 
they became effectively risk free, became embedded in the institutional scripts of the 
financial system. These scripts were legitimised by the 'public endorsement' of the 
investors and the equally profit hungry credit rating agencies. The widespread and 
increasing use of these financial products by banks and other financial organisations 
reflected a process of isomorphism (see figure 8) that, along with the short term 
profit to be made from giving favourable ratings, appeared to have a significant 
                                            
457 Arthur E Wilmarth Jr, 'The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the 
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis' (2009) 41 Connecticut Law Review 963, 970-971. 
458 Financial Crisis Inquiry  Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), 8. 
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impact on securing the endorsement that came from the credit rating agencies.459 
This endorsement in turn legitimised the products facilitating the isomorphism as 
other firms were encouraged to follow suit. This cycle of isomorphism and 
legitimisation was reinforced by 'regulatory endorsement' signalled by the default 
acquiescence of the regulators, who did little to curb the predatory behaviour even 
when there was evidence of misfeasance.460 
 


















Figure 8: Financial Innovation and Isomorphism 
 
The apparently unlimited wealth to be made resulted in a spiral of mimetic and 
competitive isomorphism that iteratively reinforced risky behaviour and saw 
                                            
459 Financial Crisis Inquiry  Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), 118ff, 149, 
206ff. The downgrading of credit ratings from July  2007 onwards had the opposite effect on 
legitimacy (242ff). 
460 For a study demonstrating the connection between legitimisation and isomorphism see: David L 
Deephouse, 'Does Isomorphism Legitimate?' (1996) 39 The Academy of Management Journal 1024. 
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corporate governance concerns brushed aside.461 Belief in these products became so 
unquestioning that their use continued to grow even after the housing market had 
begun its slump.462  As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted: '[t]he CDO 
machine had become self-fueling'.463 Then, when the housing bubble burst, just as 
success had legitimised products and practices, so the failure of sub-prime mortgages 
and the CDOs based on them resulted in a contagion of illegitimacy that spread 
across markets and countries. In sum, the neoliberal capitalist norms of a free market, 
coupled with the behavioural script of competitive profit seeking were at least 
significant causal factors in the financial bubble that subsequently burst, resulting in 
the 2007 crisis and its consequences. 
2.2.2.2 The aftermath of the financial crisis 
 
In the US, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission conducted a formal examination 
of the crisis. The Commission summarised its findings, focusing primarily on the 
immediate cause: 
it was the collapse of the housing bubble - fueled by low interest 
rates, easy and available credit, scant regulation, and toxic 
mortgages - that was the spark that ignited a string of events, which 
led to a full-blown crisis in the fall of 2008. Trillions of dollars in 
risky mortgages has become embedded throughout the financial 
system, as mortgage-related securities were packaged, repackaged, 
and sold to investors around the world. When the bubble burst, 
hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in mortgages and 
mortgage-related securities shook markets as well as financial 
                                            
461 Financial Crisis Inquiry  Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), 11-22, 157. 
462 See the recounting of the events in: Financial Crisis Inquiry  Commission, The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report (2011), especially  chapters 9 and 10. 
463 Financial Crisis Inquiry  Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), 188. 
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institutions that had significant exposures to those mortgages and 
had borrowed heavily against them. This happened not just in the 
United States but around the world.464 
Tellingly, they also noted that: 'the vulnerabilities that created the potential for crisis 
were years in the making'. These vulnerabilities, as discussed above, were the result 
of the neoliberal capitalist policies of encouraging private home ownership with the 
consequential change in culture that saw houses as investments rather than homes,465 
rewarding aggressively competitive profit seeking and growth of the financial sector, 
deregulation and the belief in the power and efficiency of a relatively unfettered 
market.466 As the Commission noted, the failings could not be laid solely at the door 
of individual greed, but were essentially the responsibility of public leaders and the 
collectively embraced national policies that facilitated the behaviour resulting in the 
crisis.467 
 
The 2007 crisis has highlighted the dangers of the neoliberal approach to the 
financial system and required significant government intervention, including the 
effective nationalisation - if temporary - of the banks most critically affected (such as 
the Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK). US, UK and European governments and 
central banks provided nearly $9 trillion of financial support for the financial system 
through emergency liquidity, capital, asset purchase and guarantees.468 Even Alan 
Greenspan, the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, admitted that the 
                                            
464 Ibid, xvi. 
465 Ibid, 5-6. 
466 See, eg, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 1994; the Economic 
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act 1996; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley  Act 1999; the 
absence of regulation for over-the-counter derivatives.  
467 Financial Crisis Inquiry  Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011),  xxiii. 
468 Arthur E Wilmarth Jr, 'The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the 
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis' (2009) 41 Connecticut Law Review 963, 968. 
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crisis exposed flaws in the neoliberal free market approach.469 The consequences of 
the crisis has prompted calls for a change in ideology, and while the institutionalised 
discourse will remain a variety of capitalism it is likely to move towards a more 
social or managerial version.470 This will involve greater, and more strictly applied, 
regulation471 and a change to the organisational structure of the financial system so 
that the market investment practices undertaken by banks are separated from the 
deposit, loans and payment services.472 Of course, how far we pull back from 
neoliberalism will vary from country to country and remains to be seen. It also 
remains to be seen how long such changes will last before a more liberal approach 
creeps back in. 
 
Regardless of how the system develops, as a fundamentally capitalist institution it 
will remain essentially motivated by profit and dependent on debt, interest, risk 
taking, innovation. Money will continue to be perceived as intrinsically valuable and 
success measured by wealth with a more or less individualistic conception of the 
autonomous agent living in an aggressively competitive Darwinian society.473 This is 
evidenced in the acceptance of the value of the originate-to-distribute model of 
finance, along with the endorsement of the efficiency of the shadow banking system, 
albeit in a more regulated environment with restricted opportunity for regulatory 
                                            
469 Andrew Clark, Jill Treanor, 'Greenspan - I was wrong about the economy. Sort of' (24 October 
2008) The Guardian, available at <http ://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/24/economics-
creditcrunch-federal-reserve-greenspan> accessed 11 December 2014. 
470 Kevin Rudd, 'The Global Financial Crisis'. (2009) February , The Monthly 20, 26. 
471 See, for example Basel III. The collection of documents that set out the Basel III requirements are 
available at: <http ://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm>, accessed 30 July 2014. 
472 See, for example, the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, ch 33. 
473 Roger Friedland, Robert R Alford, 'Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional 
Contradictions', in Powell WW, DiMaggio PJ (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1991) 232, 240. 
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arbitrage and access to emergency liquidity.474 Imposing structural changes and more 
stringent regulation will influence behaviour by altering the cultural rules and the 
scripts reflecting what is considered acceptable. Reconceiving the discourse 
associated with the institution of capitalism may also contribute to this influence and 
change behaviour to reduce the risk of future crises. An institutional change of this 
nature, involving a 'reinterpretation' of capitalism will depend on a number of actors, 
including government, the regulatory institution and the firms that operate within the 
financial system.475  
 
Such a change may arise in the form of 'shared' or 'inclusive' capitalism. Shared 
capitalism refers to 'a diverse set of compensation practices through which worker 
pay or wealth depends on the performance of the firm or work group'.476 Although 
shared capitalism is not a new concept, the failure of neoliberal capitalism may give 
it a new impetus. Shared capitalism, which is sometimes also referred to as inclusive 
capitalism, is not about wealth redistribution but about increasing productivity and 
wealth production.477 As such it does not affect the cultural attitudes to debt, interest 
and profit, but it does encourage a more cooperative shared decision making 
approach478 that may constrain the worst excesses of risky innovation. 
 
                                            
474 Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, Hayley Boesky, 'Shadow Banking' (2010) Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No 458, 5-6. 
475 Peter A Hall, Katheleen Thelen, 'Institutional change in varieties of capitalism' (2009) 7 Socio-
Economic Review 7, 16, 19. 
476 Richard B Freeman, Joseph R Blasi, Douglas L Kruse, 'Introduction', in Kruse DL, Freeman RB, 
Blasi JR (eds), Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and 
Broad-based Stock Options (University of Chicago Press 2010) 1, 4. 
477 David Madland, Karla Walter, Growing the Wealth: How Government Encourages Broad-Based 
Inclusive Capitalism (Center for American Progress 2013), 2. 
478 David Madland, Karla Walter, Growing the Wealth: How Government Encourages Broad-Based 
Inclusive Capitalism (Center for American Progress 2013) 37; Richard B Freeman, Joseph R Blasi, 
Douglas L Kruse, 'Introduction', in Kruse DL, Freeman RB, Blasi JR (eds), Shared Capitalism at 
Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options (University of 
Chicago Press 2010) 1. 
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Inclusive capitalism has also been adopted as the term to refer to an approach quite 
distinct from shared capitalism. It has been described as: 'a basic social contract 
comprised of relative equality of outcomes; equality of opportunity; and fairness 
across generation'.479 The values behind this form of capitalism include trust, fairness 
and a respect for others reflected in a 'sense of society'. For Mark Carney, the 
governor of the Bank of England: 
unchecked market fundamentalism can devour the social capital 
essential for the long-term dynamism of capitalism itself. To 
counteract this tendency, individuals and their firms must have a 
sense of their responsibilities for the broader system.480 
The need for this was the unchecked market fundamentalism, characterised by light 
regulation and a belief in the invisible hand mechanism of competitive free markets. 
Again, this form of capitalism will still be characterised by profit, debt, risk taking 
and high rewards for success. However, the risks associated with neoliberal 
capitalism would be tempered by developing a new set of cultural rules and 
behavioural scripts designed to increase 'social capital' by, inter alia, stricter 
regulation, reformed compensation481 and a greater emphasis on professionalism and 
societal obligations.482 
 
                                            
479 Mark Carney (Governor of the Bank of England), 'Inclusive Capitalism: creating a sense of the 
systemic', Speech given at the Conference on Inclusive Capitalism, London, 27 May 2014 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx>, accessed 30 July 2014. 
480 Mark Carney (Governor of the Bank of England), 'Inclusive Capitalism: creating a sense of the 
systemic', Speech given at the Conference on Inclusive Capitalism, London, 27 May 2014. 
481 It has, for example, been announced that the Bank of England plans to extend the time limit to 7 
years on requiring repayment of bank bonus payments: BBC News, 'New banker rules "could hurt 
London as financial centre', 30 July  2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28556906>, accessed 
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new regulatory framework for individuals (2014), FCA CP14/13PRA CP14/14. 
482 Mark Carney (Governor of the Bank of England), 'Inclusive Capitalism: creating a sense of the 
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The legislative, policy and regulatory changes that are gradually being implemented 
following the crisis are aimed at managing the institutional discourse of capitalism 
and its influence on behaviour within the financial system and the banking sector in 
particular.483 In the UK, for example, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards recommended a five themed approach to: improve individual 
responsibility; reform governance in the banking system; create more diverse 
banking markets with higher standards; to reinforce the responsibility of regulators; 
and to specify governmental responsibilities.484 How far such policies will affect the 
financial system, and the long term implications of any changes, will take time to 
become apparent. Regardless of these changes, the importance of profit, debt and 
interest remain. Indeed, although recommending changes to improve the regulation 
of banking in the UK, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking nevertheless 
emphasised that: '[t]he UK should do what is necessary to secure London's position 
as a pre-eminent and well-regulated financial centre'. The importance of 
competitiveness remains, but there is a shift towards a longer term view of success 
coupled with the message that effective regulation will attract new business.485 As 
such, the innovation and risk taking necessary to sustain economic growth are likely 
to be constrained, but will still be an important part of the culture associated with 
capitalism. The worst excesses of neoliberal capitalism are being countered, but the 
essential institution of capitalism will be preserved and continue to exert isomorphic 
                                            
483 For example, the increased capital requirements of Basel III and, in the US the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act 2006, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010. 
For a discussion of the latter US Act see, Anne M Khademian, 'The Financial Crisis: a Retrospective 
(November/December 2011) Public Administration Review 841. 
484 Parliamentary  Commission on Banking Standards, Changing banking for good, Volume 1: 
Summary, and Conclusions and recommendations (Report, HL Paper 27-1, HC 175-1, 2013), 8. This 
is to build on the changes already begun, such as the creation, under the Financial Services Act 2012, 
of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority as replacements for the 
Financial Services Authority. 
485 Parliamentary  Commission on Banking Standards, Changing banking for good, Volume 1: 
Summary, and Conclusions and recommendations (Report, HL Paper 27-1, HC 175-1, 2013), 21-22. 
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pressure on conventional financial systems. Indeed, some commentators argue that 
neoliberalism will survive as part of a hybrid form of capitalism.486   
2.2.3 Other institutional influences 
 
Before bringing this chapter to a close, two further institutional influences should, at 
least, be mentioned. The first of these is regulation, which acts to both facilitate and 
constrain the influence of the other institutional influences. Consideration of this 
institution will be left until chapter four, where the issue of Sharia governance is 
examined. The second is the institution of a traditional religion, which may act to 
counter the unethical pursuit of money.487 It is arguable that one of the problems of 
contemporary secular western society is that traditional religion, as in institution, has 
declined in influence and no longer provides an effective counter to the institution of 
capitalism and the values of consumerism. Loy goes so far as to argue that, from the 
functionalist perspective of 'teaching us what the world is, and what our role in the 
world is', that the market is a religion, with economics its theology.488 Because 
traditional religion, as an institution, is explicitly more central to Islamic finance, its 
relevance will be explored in detail in chapter three.  
2.3 Conclusion 
 
The aims of this chapter were to provide a context and contrast for Islamic finance. 
These have been achieved by: first, explicating the concept of a financial system; and 
second, by examining conventional financial systems from the 1970s through to the 
                                            
486 Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore, Neil Brenner, 'Neoliberalism Resurgent? Market Rule after the Great 
Recession' (2012) 111 The South Atlantic Quarterly 265, 274. 
487 Thomas Li-Ping Tang, 'Theory  of Monetary Intelligence: Money Attitudes - Religious Values, 
Making Money, Making Ethical Decisions, and Making the Grade' (2014) Journal of Business Ethics, 
published online, DOI 10.1007/s10551-014-2411-5. 
488 David R Loy, 'The Religion of the Market' (1997) 65 Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
275. 
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2007 global financial crisis and its aftermath. Following the approach of a number of 
commentators, it was suggested that the underlying theory of the concept explains a 
financial system as: 
A complex socio-cultural system comprising a relational network 
of interdependent roles coordinated to facilitate the flow of money 
within the community served by that system. 
This system, which involves both markets and financial intermediaries, provides for 
a number of functions, such as deposit-holding, payment processing, loans, trading, 
risk management, information provision and financial innovation. As a subset, 
conventional financial systems are shaped by the institutional norms and behavioural 
scripts of capitalism. 
 
Since the problems caused by "stagflation" in the 1970s, neoliberal capitalist 
economic policies have become institutionalised, particularly in the US and the UK. 
With the emphasis on private home ownership, deregulation of the market, increased 
competitiveness and the aggressive pursuit of profit, financial innovation flourished 
and the markets grew. New financial products - such as subprime mortgages bundled 
into CDOs, over-the-counter derivatives, and synthetic-CDOs - proliferated, 
accompanied by the growth of the shadow banking system which is subject to limited 
regulation. Early successes saw the products and processes spread through mimetic 
and competitive isomorphism, legitimised by the acquiescent inaction of regulators, 
profit hungry investors and the equally profit hungry credit rating agencies. The 
bubble burst in 2007, spread contagiously throughout the world, and required 
massive government intervention to limit its impact. 
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Although the response to the crisis should temper the worst excesses of neoliberal 
capitalism, conventional financial systems remain driven by competition between 
autonomous individuals with profit and wealth the primary goals. Because of its 
power to shape social relationships, money is treated as if it is intrinsically valuable 
and an end in itself. Other goals are valuable only insofar as they are necessary to 
support the financial system in its pursuit of profit. It is the institution of capitalism, 
and the conventional financial system it shapes, that provides the contrast necessary 
to fully understand the distinctiveness of Islamic finance. Since it must often coexist 
alongside, and perhaps in competition with, conventional finance, capitalism also 
provides a context for Islamic finance. As explained in chapter one, the growth of 
Islamic finance really began in the mid-1970s, at a time when neoliberal capitalism 
was on the rise. Islamic finance has matured in a global capitalist environment 
comprised of aggressive and competitive, profit-chasing financial practices that came 
crashing down in 2007 with the global financial crisis. Given this context, the 
question is how the neoliberal capitalist scripts and norms have affected Islamic 
finance. This question, and the broader issue of the nature of Islamic finance, will be 
considered in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three: Islamic Finance: its Nature and Institutional Context 
 
Chapter two examined the concept of a financial system and considered the nature 
and institutional influences of conventional finance. In particular the impact of 
capitalism as the dominant institution shaping the development of conventional 
financial systems was explored. Although there are different conceptions of 
capitalism, neoliberal capitalism has been the most influential form over the 30 years 
leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007. While this version of capitalism may 
not have existed in its purest form, it nevertheless represents an extreme view of 
capitalism, reliant on a free market unencumbered by regulation. Driven by 
efficiency through competition, with profit as the prime motive and wealth as the 
dominant value, the experience of neoliberal capitalism was one of a vicious spiral of 
profit-chasing, risk-taking behaviour that eventually resulted in the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, and the subsequent global economic crisis. 
 
This recent chapter in financial history began in the 1970s, and provided the global 
context for the development of Islamic finance, which, as noted in chapter one, really 
took off in the mid 1970s. It is the nature of Islamic finance, and its dominant 
institutional influence of Islam, that forms the focus of this chapter. The aim is to 
provide a general explanation of the concept of Islamic finance and the shaping 
influence of Islam situated within the competitive context of capitalist driven 
conventional finance. This explication will then provide the background for 
subsequent chapters and a more specific focus on Sharia non-compliance, Sharia 
governance and regulation. 
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3.1 Islamic finance as a type of financial system 
 
As noted in chapter one, the term "Islamic finance" may be applied to any financial 
transaction intended to be Sharia compliant or halal, meaning permissible. For the 
purposes of this thesis, however, the term will be used to refer to the modern 
organised services offering Sharia compliant products that began to develop in the 
1940s, but experienced a huge impetus in the 1970s with the establishment of the 
IDB, the Dubai Islamic Bank and the Faisal Islamic Banks. These Islamic banks 'go 
beyond pure financial intermediation of the traditional sort, and have direct 
participation in business and investments with profit-and-loss-sharing along equity 
lines'.489 The profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) principle, which forms part of the 
foundation of Islamic finance,490 is not explicit in the Qur'an. Rather it is developed 
through the Sharia as an interpretation of the distinction between trade or business, 
which is acceptable, and usury or riba, which is not. 
 
The concept of riba will be considered in more detail in section 3.3.1. For now it is 
sufficient to note that riba, which may be broadly equated with interest, is forbidden 
by the Qur'an and hence by Sharia. For example, in chapter two, verse 275 of the 
Qur'an it states: 
Those who swallow usury cannot arise except as he arises whom 
the devil prostrates by (his) touch. That is because they say, 
Trading is only like usury. And Allah has allowed trading and 
forbidden usury.491 
                                            
489 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 76. 
490 Ibid, 1. 
491 English translation of the Qu'ran by Maulana Muhammad Ali (2002) 
<http ://www.muslim.org/english-quran/quran.htm>, accessed 07 September 2016. The word usury is 
the given translation of the Arabic word riba, and is commonly  interpreted as including all interest: 
see the discussion of riba later in the chapter. 
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This prohibition of riba lies at the heart of Islamic finance. It is required by the 
obligation to comply with the Qur'an and the Sharia, which is primarily expressed 
through the requirement for Sharia-compliant certification by a Sharia board.492 It 
provides an overt characteristic, or attribute, of Islamic finance distinguishing it from 
conventional finance, which relies on interest as an incentive for investment.  
 
While the prohibition of riba is a central characteristic of Islamic finance, it is really 
the fundamental need to comply with the tenets of Islam and Sharia that identifies 
Islamic finance as distinct from conventional finance.493 Applying the theory-based 
approach to concepts, as discussed in chapter two, the role of Islam forms part of the 
theory underlying the concept of Islamic finance and explaining its attributes. In 
chapter two, the theory underlying the concept of a financial system was set out. 
Relying on that, the basic theory of Islamic finance is (see figure 9): 
A complex socio-cultural system comprising a relational network 
of interdependent roles, guided by the tenets of Islam and 
coordinated to facilitate the flow of money in a way that is 
consistent with Sharia. 
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Press 2006), 7-8. 
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Figure 9: Islamic Finance 
 
The prohibition of riba  is one of the main pillars of Islamic finance. However, 
despite its importance, it is Islam and Sharia more broadly, rather than riba per se, 
that are crucial to the existence of Islamic finance and its identity as distinct from 
other forms of finance. Instead of contributing to the explanatory theory of Islamic 
finance, the prohibition of riba is an expression of that theory. The prohibition of 
riba is merely an attribute of Islamic finance, albeit a core attribute. Although 
Islamic finance may sometimes be equated with the prohibition of riba, a financial 
system is not Islamic because riba is prohibited, rather riba is prohibited because the 
financial system is Islamic. 
 
Consistent with this, the prohibition of riba is not the sole Sharia principle 
influencing Islamic finance. Other important attributes include the prohibition of 
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investment in forbidden (haram) goods and services, the avoidance of gambling 
(maysir) and uncertainty (gharar).494 Islamic finance is also concerned with 
promoting economic development and adopts an equitable approach based on the 
Islamic conception of justice (adl) that requires a fair distribution of wealth and 
opportunity,495 including the opportunity to participate in the economy. This 
equitable approach is consistent with the prohibition of riba, particularly the more 
exploitative form of interest that constitutes usury. It grounds the PLS mechanism 
that allows financial services to be characterised as trade rather than riba. It is also 
expressed through zakat, which is an obligation to contribute a proportion of one's 
profit to charity. It is, however, the prohibition of riba that is the most visible Sharia 
principle defining a financial service as Islamic. 
 
The prohibition of riba does not preclude a return on investments. It does, however, 
prevent a rate of return that is guaranteed regardless of the success or failure of the 
venture in which the money has been invested. Profit is acceptable, but only where it 
is associated with the possibility or risk of loss. Islam encourages such 
entrepreneurship, provided it is honest and fair.496 In chapter 45, verse 12, for 
example, the Qur'an tells us that Allah gave us the sea so that we could sail in ships 
to 'seek of his bounty'. Similarly, in chapter 15, verses 19-21, the Qur'an explains 
that Allah provided the earth as a 'means of subsistence'.497  
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Islamic Economic Studies 31, 32; Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance, (John Wiley  
2007), 9; Zamir Iqbal, Abbas Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice, 
(2nd edition, e-book, John Wiley  & Sons 2011), chapter one. 
496 Solahuddin Abdul Hamid, Che Zarrina Sa'ari, 'Reconstructing Entrepreneur's Development Based 
on al-Qur'an and al-Hadith' (2011) 2 International journal of Business and Social Science 110. 
497 English translation of the Qu'ran by Maulana Muhammad Ali (2002). 
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Tellingly, in chapter 53, verses 39-41, the Qur'an states:498 
And that man can have nothing but what he strives for: And that his 
striving will soon be seen. Then he will be rewarded for it with the 
fullest reward. 
This passage clearly emphasises that things must be worked for, which hints at 
Allah's condemnation of riba as an undeserved gain not obtained through fair and 
honest endeavour. It is fair to earn a profit if one works for it, or if one invests in 
another person's work while bearing a liability for loss. Thus, Algaoud and Lewis 
quote the Hanafi jurist, Al-Kasani, who stated: 'The rule, in our view, is that 
entitlement to profit is either due to wealth (mal) or work ('amal) or by  bearing a 
liability for loss (daman)'.499 These are not three independent mechanisms, however, 
as Al Kasani goes on to explain that 'profit is an increase in wealth', and such an 
increase is only halal where it has grown through investment that carries a liability 
for loss. In other words, wealth must be combined with entrepreneurship in a way 
that allows profit to be gained either from work or from the liability for loss, or some 
combination of the two.500 In such schemes the investor of capital risks financial loss, 
the investor of labour risks losing the value of the work invested.501 
 
If capitalism is the core institution of conventional finance (see chapter two), then 
Islam, embodied in the Qur'an, the sunna and the Sharia, is the core institution of 
Islamic finance. Just as capitalism provides the structure, symbolism, normative 
guide and behavioural scripts for conventional finance, so Islam provides the 
                                            
498 Ibid. 
499 Latifa M Algaoud, Mervyn K Lewis, 'Islamic critique of conventional financing', in M Kabir 
Hassan, Mervyn K Lewis (eds), (Edward Elgar 2997) Handbook of Islamic Banking 38, 46. 
500 Muhammad Junaid Sharif, Muhammad Ijaz, 'Classical Jurists Perspective of Entitlement of Profit 
in Mudarabah: how and Who Really  Deserves?' (2013)18  Al-Qalam 58, 59. 
501 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 40. 
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structure, symbolism, normative rules and behavioural scripts for Islamic Finance. 
These are, of course, not the sole institutional influences and the relevance of 
professionalism was noted earlier. Further to this, Friedland and Alford, for example, 
identify the 'central institutions of the contemporary capitalist West [as the] capitalist 
market, [the] bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christian 
religion'.502 These institutions provide alternative, and possibly contradictory, 
institutional logics503 that may be exploited by '[i]ndividuals and organizations [to] 
transform the institutional relations of society'.504 For Islamic finance, however, 
particularly in a Muslim country, the institution of Islam provides a pervasive and 
ubiquitous influence that should operate to limit the potential for institutional 
contradictions that are perhaps more prevalent in the organisational field of 
conventional finance.  
 
The relative purity of the institutional influence within a Muslim country makes it 
important to understand the Sharia principles that govern the provision of Islamic 
finance. The Sharia is, as noted above, the defining influence in Islamic finance 
whether the service is situated in a Muslim or non-Muslim country. In non-Muslim 
countries, however, the provision of Islamic finance will inevitably be subject to 
competing institutional logics, including the bureaucratic state, democracy and the 
competitive influences of capitalism. Even organisations primarily based in a Muslim 
                                            
502 Roger Friedland, Robert R Alford, 'Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional 
Contradictions', in Powell WW, DiMaggio PJ (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1991) 232. 
503 Institutional logics may be defined as: 'the socially  constructed, historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules' through which institutions influence individuals and 
organisations. They are comprised of symbolic, normative and structural elements: see, Patricia H 
Thornton, William Ocasio, 'Institutional Logics', in Greenwood R, Oliver C, Suddaby R, Sahlin-
Andersson K (eds), The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (Sage Publications Ltd 
2008) 99, 101. 
504 Roger Friedland, Robert R Alford, 'Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional 
Contradictions' in Powell, WW, DiMaggio PJ (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1991) 232. 
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country, will be subject to these conflicting logics if they engage with the global 
market. This issue of conflicting institutional logics may be further magnified by the 
'structural overlap' of competing logics505 found in the case of Islamic financial 
services provided by a conventional bank, which will be more familiar with the 
capitalist western institutions than with the institutional logics of Islam. 
 
Islamic finance may be provided in a number of different contexts, which embody 
distinct combinations of institutional logics that, when combined with alternative 
forms of rationality,506 may result in different interpretations of the institutional 
symbols and practices.507 This, in turn, may affect the way in which Sharia is 
interpreted and applied to the development of new financial products or services. In 
chapter one a number of distinct contexts were identified, including: Muslim 
countries with a fully Islamic financial system; Muslim countries where Islamic 
finance operates alongside conventional finance; non-Muslim countries with a 
predominantly Muslim population; non-Muslim countries with a minority Muslim 
population; and the global market. As noted above, it is also important to appreciate 
that Islamic finance may be provided by Islamic or conventional organisations. 
Finally, a distinction may be made between those banks that are halal, offering 
financial products technically within the letter of Sharia law, and those organisations 
that accept 'an explicit socio-economic responsibility' reflecting the true spirit of the 
Qur'an.508 
                                            
505 Patricia H Thornton, William Ocasio, 'Institutional Logics' in Greenwood, R, Oliver, C, Suddaby, 
R, Sahlin-Andersson, K (eds) The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (Sage 
Publications Ltd 2008) 99, 116. 
506 Barbara Townley, 'The Role of Competing Rationalities in Institutional Change' (2002) 45 
Academy of Management Journal 163, 175-177. 
507 Roger Friedland, Robert R Alford, 'Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional 
Contradictions', in Powell WW, DiMaggio PJ (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1991) 232, 254. 
508 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 91. 
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In all of these contexts, Islam provides the central institutional influence for the 
Islamic financial system, although it will, as discussed, be subject to context-
dependent competing logics. Because it is such a fundamental influence, a deep 
understanding of Islamic finance requires at least some familiarity with Islam, Sharia 
and what it means to be a Muslim. This will be discussed in the next section, 
followed by a more detailed examination of the Sharia principles relevant to Islamic 
finance. After considering the relevant Sharia principles, an introduction to Islamic 
banks and Islamic financial products will be provided. As part of this discussion, the 
impact of the competing influences, as adverted to above, will also be analysed. In 
particular, the influence of capitalism on the development of Islamic finance and the 
obligation to comply with Sharia will be examined. The issue is whether the need to 
coexist with conventional finance in the context of a competitive capitalist economy 
influences Islamic financial innovation and contributes to the risk of Sharia non-
compliance. 
3.2 Islam and being a Muslim 
 
This section will consider what it means to be Muslim. This is not a discussion that 
generalises the experiences of real Muslims. Nor is it an examination of life as a 
Muslim for specific individuals. Rather, this explication of being a Muslim is 
intended to reflect the institutional discourse of Islam. It is, in other words, the 
idealisation of Islam that provides the normative rules and behavioural scripts that 
should form the aspirational influence guiding the faithful Muslim.  
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3.2.1 Islamic epistemology and ontology 
 
As an institution, Islam instils a characteristic epistemology and ontology that define 
the way in which Muslims understand the world and their place in it (figure 10).509 
Islamic epistemology is constituted by revealed knowledge and acquired knowledge. 
Allah is the ultimate source of all knowledge, with revealed knowledge  representing 
the most direct and immediate word of God, as found in the Qur'an and the sunna 
(see below). Acquired knowledge derives from the interaction between the 
environment and human understanding. Islamic ontology recognises both those 
things that can be perceived by human senses and those things that are hidden from 
humans and understood solely through revealed knowledge.510 Ultimately, Allah 
created all things, both the seen and the unseen, and Allah is the source of all 
knowledge (Tawhid). Allah is the only truth,511 in its pure objective sense.512 As 
stated in the Qur'an:513 
He is Allah and there is no God beside him, the Knower of the 
unseen and the seen ... 
He is Allah, the Creator, the Maker, the Fashioner. 
The Knower of the unseen, so He makes his secrets known to none, 
except a messenger whom he chooses. 
That is because Allah, He is the Truth ... 
                                            
509 Islamic ontology and epistemology are presented as clearly  distinct concepts, although it may be 
argued that the 'separation between reality and knowledge is a peculiarly  Western binary ': Ali Raza 
Mir, 'Multip licity of Knowledge Forms: Lessons from Islamic Epistemology ' (1999) 16 The American 
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 99, 105.   
510 Abdullahi Barise 'Social Work with Muslims: Insights from the Teachings of Islam' (2005) 6 
Critical Social Work, <http ://www1.uwindsor.ca/criticalsocialwork/social-work-with-muslims-
insights-from-the-teachings-of-islam> accessed 26 January  2015. 
511 The Holy Qur'an, chapter 4, verses 105; chapter 6, verses 114-115, English translation of the 
Qu'ran by Maulana Muhammad Ali (2002). 
512 Naail Mohammed Kamil, 'Ontology and Epistemology in Management Research: An Islamic 
Perspective' (2011) 7 Postmodern Openings 67, 69. 
513 The Holy Qur'an, chapter 59, verses 22, 24; chapter 72, verses 26-27; chapter 22, verse 6, English 












Figure 10: Islamic Epistemology and Ontology 
 
While, in this part of the thesis, Islam will be considered in an idealised form, it 
should be noted that Islamic epistemology and ontology will be affected by the 
situational context of the particular community so that, in practice, there will be 
many variations of the idealised form. This will be particularly so with regard to 
acquired knowledge. Acquired knowledge allows for a subjective epistemology, 
which is formalised within the institution of Islam through the recognised methods of 
interpretation such as Ijma (consensus), Qiya (analogy), and Ijtihad (personal 
reflection and reasoning) (see below).514 This subjective epistemology, however, is 
constrained by the objective epistemology of revealed knowledge. Thus, Islam is 
centred on a critical realist ontology that posits the existence of things independent of 
                                            
514 Naail Mohammed Kamil, 'Ontology and Epistemology in Management Research: An Islamic 
Perspective' (2011) 7 Postmodern Openings 67, 70. 
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human cognition, but recognises the subjective nature of human experience that 
constructs a perceived and interpreted version.515 
3.2.2 The nature of Islam 
 
A good starting point for this brief exposition is with the literal meaning of Islam, 
which may be defined as "submission" or "surrender" to God.516 This submission or 
surrender should be total. As Mawdudi states: 
The main characteristic of Islamic ideology is that it does not 
acknowledge a conflict; not even a slight separation between 
spiritual and mundane life. It does not confine itself merely to 
purifying the spiritual and the moral life of man in the limited sense 
of the word. Its scope extends to the entire aspects of life.517 
Similarly, Haneef explains that: 
Islam is not a mere belief system, an ideology or a religion in the 
usual sense in which these words are understood. Rather it is a total 
way of life, a complete system governing all aspects of man's 
existence, both individual and collective.518 
A Muslim's life may not be compartmentalised into religious or secular activity. 
Rather, Islamic values should pervade all of his or her activities, whether in the 
context of the family, the community or the commercial. 
 
                                            
515 Naail Mohammed Kamil, 'Ontology and Epistemology in Management Research: An Islamic 
Perspective' (2011) 7 Postmodern Openings 67, 71. 
516 Suzanne Haneef, What Everyone Should Know About Islam and Muslims (14th ed, Library of 
Islam 1996), viii. 
517  AA Mawdudi, Islamic Way of Life (Scribe Digital 2012), 3.  Mawdudi may also be spelt as 
Maududi. 
518 Suzanne Haneef, What Everyone Should Know About Islam and Muslims (14th ed, Library of 
Islam 1996), 3-5. See also, Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 
2001), 16. 
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At the centre of the Islamic faith is the belief in the sole, omnipotent deity of Allah, 
whose word was communicated through his Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and made 
explicit in the Qur'an.519 It is through the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and the Qur'an 
that Allah set down the rules that govern Muslim life. The Qur'an is the purest form 
of revealed knowledge, literally representing God's word as the immediate 
inspiration for Sharia, both as a way of life and as law. The Qur'an, then, is the most 
fundamental source of Islam, specifying 'the moral, philosophical, social, political 
and economic basis' for any Islamic community.520 The second main source is the 
sunna, which literally means 'ancestral precedent' or 'custom of the tribe' and derives 
from 'the teachings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) ... as transmitted 
by the relators of authentic tradition'.521 As Rahman notes, however, sunna is not 
simply behaviour, practice or custom, but includes only such behaviour that is 
essentially morally normative.522 The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), while not a divine 
being, is nevertheless so unique and worthy of reverence as Allah's chosen 
messenger, that his life, his actions and his words, as represented in the sunna, are an 
example for all Muslims to follow. Thus, in chapter 33, verse 21, the Qur'an states: 
'[c]ertainly you have in the Messenger of Allah an excellent exemplar for him who 
hopes in Allah ...'.523 In following the example of the prophet, Islam requires 
Muslims to embody the principles of Islam and the Sharia in all elements of their 
lives. Thus, the principles of Islam and the Sharia create an isomorphic pressure 
shaping the behaviour of devout Muslims. 
 
                                            
519 Suzanne Haneef, What Everyone Should Know About Islam and Muslims (14th ed, Library of 
Islam 1996), viii. 
520 Farhad Nomani, Ali Rahnema, Islamic Economic Systems (Zed Books Ltd 1994), 2. 
521 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 3. 
522 Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Methodology in History (3rd reprint, Islamic Research Institute 1995), 1. 
523 English translation of the Qu'ran by Maulana Muhammad Ali (2002). 
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The law and moral code used to govern and comprehensively guide the life of 
Muslims is known as the Sharia, which means, "the path to follow". It is distilled  
primarily from the Qur'an and the sunna, as collected in the hadith (the 'authentic 
tradition'), and representing the words and acts of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). It 
goes further than a conventional legal system and provides not just obligatory rules, 
but also indicates the aspirational, the permissible (halal) and the forbidden (haram). 
It reflects Allah's will as revealed through the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and covers 
social, ethical, civil and criminal aspects of life.524  
 
Apart from the Qur'an and the sunna,  there are three techniques of analysis and 
interpretation that guide the deduction and application of Sharia in practice. These 
methods, which comprise a significant source of Islamic jurisprudence, are used to 
determine the proper way of dealing with those things not directly covered in the 
Qur'an or sunna.525 They are: the Ijma or consensus opinion (ijtihad) of Islamic 
scholars; qiyas or reasoning by analogy,526 which 'constitutes a speculative proof ... 
based on fallible human reasoning';527 and ijtihad or interpretation through private 
reflection and reasoning,528 which may be literal or purposive.529 Currently, three 
types of ijtihad are utilised: classical ijtihad, which relies on literal reading and strict 
application of usul-al-fiqh (jurisprudential principles); 'eclectic' ijtihad, which is 
                                            
524 Ahmed, Zaki Yamani, 'The Eternal Shari'a' (1979) 12 International Law and Politics 205; Mervyn 
K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 16, 20-25. 
525 Irshad Abdal-Haqq, 'Islamic Law: an Overview of Its Origin and Elements' (1996) 1 Journal of 
Islamic Law 1, 9. 
526 J Mark Halstead, 'Islamic values: a distinctive framework for moral education?' (2007) 36 Journal 
of Moral Education 283, 285. 
527 Mohammad Omar Farooq, 'Analogical Reasoning (Qiyas) and the Commodification of Women: 
Applying Commercial Concepts to the Marital Relationship  in Islamic Law' (2011) 3 Islam and 
Civilisational Renewal 155, 160. 
528 Samiul Hasan, 'Islamic Jurisprudence: Sources and Traditions Creating Diversity  in Human 
Relationships' in Samiul Hasan (ed) The Muslin World in the 21st Century (Springer 2012) 23, 26. 
529 Nazeem MI Goolam, 'Ijtihad and its Significance for Islamic Legal Interpretation' (2006) Michigan 
State Law Review 1443, 1450. 
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problematically idiosyncratic and used to justify an individual scholar's opinion; and 
'context-based' itjihad, which is a relatively modern approach to understanding issues 
taking into account the situational context.530 These methods of producing acquired 
knowledge admit further opportunity for diversity through the role of istihsan  and 
maslahah (justifying one solution over another on the grounds of public interest)531 
and  the incorporation of local customs (urf) and customary laws (adat). These 
variations are always subject to the constraints of the revealed knowledge and 
tawhid.532 
 
Central to the behavioural scripts of the Islamic institution is its conception of what it 
is to be human. The Muslim person, as created by Allah, is a complex being with a 
physical body, emotions, free will, and an immortal soul that survives the death of 
the physical being. Each constituent element has needs to be satisfied and these 
needs, and hence the elements of the person, are harmonised by living according to 
Allah's law.533 A faithful life that follows the Qur'an and complies with Sharia will 
be one of balance and contentment and will carry that person through to their 
deserved place in the Hereafter. After death, the good and faithful will be rewarded 
and abide in 'Gardens of perpetuity'.534 The guilty and unfaithful, however, will 
'despair' in the 'chastisement of hell'.535  
 
                                            
530 A Saeed, O Salah, 'Development of sukuk: pragmatic and idealistic approaches to sukuk structure' 
(2014) 29 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 41, 42. 
531 Irshad Abdal-Haqq, 'Islamic Law: an Overview of Its Origin and Elements' (1996) 1 Journal of 
Islamic Law 1, 33; Nazeem MI Goolam, 'Ijtihad and its Significance for Islamic Legal Interpretation' 
(2006) Michigan State Law Review 1443, 1444. 
532 Samiul Hasan, 'Islamic Jurisprudence: Sources and Traditions Creating Diversity  in Human 
Relationships' in Samiul Hasan (ed) The Muslin World in the 21st Century (Springer 2012) 23, 27. 
533 Suzanne Haneef, What Everyone Should Know About Islam and Muslims (14th ed, Library of 
Islam 1996) 11-12. 
534 The Holy Qur'an, chapter 98, verses 7-8. See also, chapter 43 verses 69-73: English translation of 
the Qu'ran by Maulana Muhammad Ali (2002). 
535 Ibid, verses 74-75. 
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Because Allah endowed humans with intellect and free will,536 each Muslim must 
decide how to live his or her life. As it states in the Qur'an: 
Surely Allah changes not the condition of a people, until they 
change their own condition.537 
The foundation of this decision is whether to accept Allah as the sole and true master 
or to follow other paths. Haneef explains: 
The greatest and most fundamental choice which every human 
being is called upon to make is to decide who is his Lord, for 
whom he lives his life, to whom is his goal, and who he worships, 
serves and obeys. Indeed, Islam emphatically proclaims, the choice 
is between only two possible ways: to be in bondage to human 
ideas and notions and desires, or to consciously and voluntarily 
commit oneself to be bound by the standards, criteria and laws of 
God alone.538 
There are, then, no half measures in Islam. One is either a Muslim and faithful to 
Allah, or one is not. While Muslims are still human, and subject to temptation and 
imperfect reasoning, Islam is clear that faithful Muslims have an obligation to 
comply with the normative rules and behavioural scripts provided by Allah through 
his Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). While there is scope for interpretation, there is no 
picking or choosing to suit oneself and no compartmentalising of life. Being a 
Muslim is a way of life, and Allah's laws and guidance are comprehensive.  
 
                                            
536 Shadiya Baqutayan, 'The Innovation of Human Nature in Islam' (2012) 2 International Journal of 
Social Sciences and Education 162. 
537 The Holy Qur'an, chapter 13, verses 11: English translation of the Qu'ran by  Maulana Muhammad 
Ali (2002). 
538 Suzanne Haneef, What Everyone Should Know About Islam and Muslims (14th ed, Library of 
Islam 1996), 17. 
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Although Allah blessed humans with free will, and the capacity to choose, if a person 
accepts Islam then he or she also accepts that the word of God, as it is found in the 
Qur'an and the sunna, ontologically exists as an objective truth. As Halstead notes, 
'what is considered halal (permitted) and haram (forbidden) in Islam is understood in 
terms of what God defines as right and good'.539 As revealed knowledge, these 
sources of law and morality are pure truth and are not open to question. A devout 
Muslim is obliged to behave consistently with these moral truths. Subjective 
pluralism arises, however, because the teachings of the Qur'an and the sunna must be 
applied to situations not directly or explicitly covered. This can only be 
accomplished by the use of the interpretative techniques noted above.  
 
The importance of this, for the purposes of this thesis, is the intention that lies behind 
Islam, as a religious way of life. This intention is for Islam and the Sharia to behave 
as an institutionalised guide for the life of a Muslim. The norms, beliefs, values and 
rules comprise the taken-for-granted institutional logics that shape the actions and 
decisions of Muslims in all aspects of the life. In so doing, the institutional logics of 
Islam create normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures on devout Muslims to 
follow the example of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as embodied in the behaviour 
of respected Muslim scholars as exemplars of "successful" Muslims. Thus, as Haneef 
explains, one of the goals of Islam is to instil in every Muslim an Islamic 
personality,540 reminiscent of the ethics of virtue, but consistent with Islam and the  
Qur'an.   
 
                                            
539 J Mark Halstead, 'Islamic values: a distinctive framework for moral education?' (2007) 36 Journal 
of Moral Education 283. 
540 Suzanne Haneef, What Everyone Should Know About Islam and Muslims (14th ed, Library of 
Islam 1996), 73. 
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As in Islam, the focus of virtue ethics 'is on the virtuous individual and on those 
inner traits, dispositions, and motives that qualify her as being virtuous'.541 Virtue 
ethics asks: 'What kind of person is it best to be?'.542 Under the Aristotelian approach, 
'the virtuous individual is someone who, without relying on rules, is sensitive and 
intelligent enough to perceive what is noble or right as it varies from circumstance to 
circumstance'.543 Under this approach, the behaviour of a virtuous person acquires a 
legitimacy that flows from the recognition of the virtuous nature. The legitimacy that 
accompanies virtue creates a mimetic isomorphic pressure that influences others to 
follow their example and behave similarly. Through this mimetic isomorphism they 
develop the same innate sense of right and wrong that reflects the taken-for-granted 
norms and scripts of the institutional influences that shape the nature of virtue and 
the identification of a particular trait as virtuous. 
 
Central to the divine law are the virtues of justice ('adl), compassion (ihsan), balance 
(mizan) and moderation (la israf).544 Other Islamic virtues include: taqwa or a 
'consciousness' of God; iman, or a deep faith in God; sincerity; responsibility; 
integrity; honesty, truthfulness and fairness;545 self-discipline; humility, patience and 
gratitude; courage; dignity and honour; purity; kindness, charitableness and 
generosity; consideration of others; a sense of relation to all other Muslims; 
                                            
541 Michael Slote, 'Virtue Ethics', in Marcia W Baron, Philip  Pettit, Michael Slote (eds) Three Methods 
of Ethics (Blackwell 1997) 175, 177. 
542 George Sher, 'Ethics, Character, and Action', in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D Miller, Jeffrey Paul 
(eds) Virtue and Vice (Cambridge University Press 1998) 1. 
543 Michael Slote, 'Virtue Ethics', in Marcia W Baron, Philip  Pettit, Michael Slote (eds) Three Methods 
of Ethics (Blackwell 1997) 175, 178. 
544 Masudul Alam Choudhury, 'Islam versus liberalism: contrasting epistemological inquiries' (2008) 
35 International Journal of Social Economics 239, 245. 
545 The Holy Qur'an, chapter 4, verse 135. 
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willingness to work ('And that man can have nothing but what he strives for');546 and 
a love of knowledge.547 As Asad explains: 
The devout Muslim seeks to cultivate virtue and repudiate vice by a 
constant awareness of her/his own earthly finitude, trying to 
achieve the state of equilibrium that the Qur'an calls an-nafs 
almutma'inna, 'the self at peace'.548 
 
Along with developing the Islamic virtues, a faithful Muslim is guided by the Qur'an 
and the sunna, which detail those harmful things that are forbidden or haram. If it is 
not haram, then it is halal, or permissible. There are, however, things that are 
permissible and desirable, as well as those things that are permissible, but 
undesirable. There are also certain obligations (fard).549 For example, moral 
obligations include: being honest and truthful; being just; respect for the property of 
others. Desirable behaviour includes working and creativeness. Undesirable 
behaviour includes the hoarding of money, which should be kept in circulation and it 
is haram to gain wealth by gambling, exploitation or demands for payment of 
interest on loans or debts. Economic practices that cause harm are also forbidden.550 
This creates a moral system that goes beyond a binary right or wrong to allow for the 
characterisation of behaviour as permissible, but either desirable or undesirable. As 
will become apparent in chapter six, the distinction between the desirable, or tayyib, 
and the undesirable, but permissible is relevant to the distinction between compliance 
with the Sharia in spirit and a merely technical or formal compliance. As such, 
                                            
546 The Holy Qur'an, chapter 53 verse 39. 
547 Suzanne Haneef, What Everyone Should Know About Islam and Muslims (14th ed, Library of 
Islam 1996), 74-97. 
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tayyib is a useful concept for the holistically Islamic system of governance and 
regulation proposed in this thesis. 
3.2.3 Contrasting the values of Islam and neoliberal capitalism 
 
The Islamic character, Islamic morals and Islamic laws, as found in the Qur'an, the 
sunna, and as expressed through the Sharia, promote an attitude very different to  
capitalism. While personal wealth  and the freedom to pursue a profit is not 
forbidden, Islamic social ontology characterises the individual as part of a greater 
whole, founded on a collective life,551 and consisting of the community of Muslims. 
The Islamic emphasis on justice, moderation, faith, charity and the prohibition of 
exploitative economic practices, along with the sense of a Muslim community, all 
tend to encourage an equalisation of wealth rather than wealth maximisation.552 
Rather than prioritising wealth as a measure of success, Islam - and hence Islamic 
economics - emphasise falah (self improvement and well-being through following 
the teachings of Allah and the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)).553  As Chapra notes, 'two 
of the most important constituents of [the vision of Islam] ... are socio-economic 
justice and the well-being of all God's creatures'.554 Similarly, Arif argues that: 'the 
philosophical foundations of Islam result in a world view based on soc io-economic 
justice'.555 Furthermore, Islam provides a moral code that is absent from capitalism. 
                                            
551 Elizabeth Shakaman Hurd, 'Political Islam and Foreign Policy  in Europe and the United States' 
(2007) 3 Foreign Policy Analysis 345, 351. 
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Commercial and economic activity are as much subject to Islamic morality as any 
other part of life.556 
 
Capitalism relies on the rationalities of efficiency, wealth maximisation and the 
belief that the market provides sufficient regulation. Neoliberal capitalism, in 
particular, combines the capitalist value of wealth with the liberal ontology of the 
autonomous individual competitively co-existing in a community of similarly 
autonomous individuals whose cooperation is predicated on self-interest. In contrast 
to the faith-based, family and community oriented Islamic ontology, the ontology of 
neoliberal capitalism relies on the secular,557 hyper-rational, autonomous 
individual.558 The 'moral, ethical and social vacuum'559 created by the neoliberal 
capitalist agenda of wealth-maximisation and competitive individualism is evident in 
the financial crises and other scandals that have peppered the recent history of 
conventional finance. The limits of this approach are evidenced in the recognition 
that external regulation is required.  
 
The institution of Islam is inherently moral and brings with it the self regulation of 
Muslim fidelity. This is not to suggest that Islamic finance should not be subject to 
regulation. Indeed, Muslims are just as fallible as anyone and capable of misguided 
behaviour, bad decision making and acting on inappropriate motivations. The point 
is, however, that while the discourse of capitalism requires tempering by external 
moral guides, and is subject to competing religious and social institutions, Islam 
                                            
556 Clinton Bennett, 'Islam' in Jean Holm, John Bowker (eds), Making Moral Decisions (Continuum 
1994) 95, 104. 
557 Elizabeth Shakaman Hurd, 'Political Islam and Foreign Policy  in Europe and the United States' 
(2007) 3 Foreign Policy Analysis 345, 351. 
558 Ken Jowitt, 'After Leninism: The New World Disorder' (1991) 2 Journal of Democracy 11, 15-17. 
559 Masudul Alam Choudhury, 'Islam versus liberalism: contrasting epistemological inquiries' (2008) 
35 International Journal of Social Economics 239, 254. 
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provides a unified institutional logic. This shifts the emphasis required for effective 
regulation from the need to counter the institutional influence of neoliberal 
capitalism by imposing a rationalised secular system of ethics to the need to 
standardise and reinforce the institutional influence of Islam. This will be returned to 
in chapter four.  
3.2.3.1 Islam in the face of neoliberal capitalism 
 
This conception of life as a Muslim, backed by the inevitability of judgment and 
reward or punishment in the afterlife, provides a powerful institutional force guiding 
the faithful. It is, however, complicated by the differing interpretations of the 
obligations imposed by Islam. It may also be further complicated by the influences of 
competing institutions, such as capitalism, liberalism and other Western values.560 
These may affect Muslims both as individuals and as communities, and this may be 
more likely in non-Muslim countries or in the context of globalisation.561  
 
Writing in 2012, Crow muses: 
We may now be experiencing a generational moment in which 
Islam could conceivably offer a genuine alternative to the ongoing 
marketisation of societies ... Yet this moment might well be passing 
Muslims by. Are they instead being herded into a passive embrace 
                                            
560 Nazeem MI Goolam, 'Ijtihad and its Significance for Islamic Legal Interpretation' (2006) Michigan 
State Law Review 1443, 1464. 
561 Masudul Alam Choudhury, 'Islam versus liberalism: contrasting epistemological inquiries' (2008) 
35 International Journal of Social Economics 239, 252-253. Globalisation, since the mid 1970s at 
least, involves, as Choudhury notes, the spread of neoliberal ideas, including the rationality of free 
market economics. 
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of the consumer society directed by the elite cliques at the helm of 
global neo-liberal capitalism?562 
This reflects the concern that the behavioural norms and scripts that embody the 
institutional logics of capitalism in general, and neoliberal capitalism in particular, 
are successfully competing with the institutional norms of Islam. For example, in 
considering the influence of capitalism in Egypt, Asad notes the impact of the 
hegemony of the free market and the conception of 'agency as individual self-
empowerment' and suggests: 
There is clearly a conflict between the disciplines of secular state 
and modern market and those of the Islamic tradition ...563 
The danger of this is that neoliberal capitalist values become embedded alongside 
Islamic norms with both influences forming the institutional logics of Islamic 
finance. These potentially conflicting scripts may then be rationalised by Islamic 
finance professionals to produce financial products and services that cosmetically 
appear to be Sharia consistent, but will be essentially grounded in neoliberal 
capitalism. In other words, they will be structurally and symbolically564 Islamic, but 
functionally capitalist.  
 
The importance of appreciating the differing ontologies, and consequentially the 
differing values, lies in understanding the differing approaches of conventional and 
Islamic finance. Equally, the importance of the globalised neoliberal capitalist 
context for Islamic finance is the recognition of the potential for the two institutions 
to compete and conflict in the process of financial innovation and the development of 
                                            
562 Karim D Crow, 'In Search of "Islamic Lifesty le"' (2012) 3 Islam and Civilisational Review 654, 
655. 
563 Talal Asad, 'Agency and Pain: an Exploration' (2000) 1 Culture and Religion 29, 51. 
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new Islamic financial products and services. The gap between revealed and acquired 
knowledge raises the possibility that neoliberal capitalism may exert an influence on 
both the development of new financial products and the subsequent analysis carried 
out by the Sharia board to determine Sharia compliance. This will be considered 
further below.  
3.2.4 Sharia 
 
Etymologically, Sharia means the way or 'path to follow'.565 In chapter 45, verse 18, 
the Qur'an states: '[t]hen We made thee follow a course in the Affair, so follow it, 
and follow not the low desires of those who know not'. Thus, Allah provided, 
through his Messenger, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), a way of life, or Sharia, for 
Muslims to follow. It is based upon the Maqasid al-Sharia, or the objectives of 
Sharia, which aim to promote the well-being and self-improvement essential to 
Falah.566 In this regard, the Maqasid seek to protect the physical, mental and 
spiritual health of Muslims, as well as promote the Islamic virtues.567 
 
This conception of Sharia is wide and, as Rohe has noted, it may be understood more 
restrictively as the 'legal rules regulating personal status, family and inheritance and 
corporal punishment'.568 Yamani also identifies two distinct conceptions of Sharia. 
After noting that the Sharia is 'the all embracing legal system that regulates the lives 
                                            
565 Ahmed Zaki Yamani, 'The Eternal Shari'a' (1979) 12 New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics 205. 
566 See text at n 563. 
567  Shadiya Baqutayan, 'The Innovation of Human Nature in Islam' (2012) 2 International Journal of 
Social Sciences and Education 162,170. 
568 Mathias Rohe, 'Application of Shari'a Rules in Europe - Scope and Limits' (2004) 44 Die Welt des 
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of Muslims everywhere', he explains that there are broad and narrow 
interpretations.569 For Yamani, the broad sense of Sharia is: 
everything that has been written by Muslim jurists throughout the 
centuries, whether dealing with contemporaneous issues of the time 
or with the anticipation of future ones. The jurists derived their 
principles from the Quran ... from the sunna ... from other sources 
of shari'a such as ijma ... and from public interest considerations. 
Looked upon in this wide scope, the shari'a constitutes a great 
juristic tradition, the value of which depends upon the individual 
jurist himself, his era, or even the particular problem confronting 
him. 
The narrow sense of Sharia is: 
confined to the undoubted principles of the Quran, to what is true 
and valid of the sunna and the consensus of the community 
represented by its scholars and learned men during a certain period 
and regarding a particular problem, provided there was such 
consensus. 
In its narrow sense, the Sharia reflects revealed knowledge and has an absolute 
binding authority. In its broad sense, it reflects acquired knowledge and is of 
'scholastic value'. In this latter sense, it is context specific and not binding.570 
 
Nielsen also identifies the dichotomy of Sharia, noting that: 'at its simplest ... the 
Shari'a expresses God's will for human behaviour'. This 'immutable' form is then 
                                            
569 Ahmed Zaki Yamani, 'The Eternal Shari'a' (1979) 12 New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics 205. 
570 Ahmed Zaki Yamani, 'The Eternal Shari'a' (1979) 12 New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics 206. 
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subject to 'Fiqh ... the process of human interpretation ... the extrapolation of the 
immutable Shari'a into the rules of everyday living'.571 This dichotomy is one source 
of divergence and disagreement about what is Sharia compliant and it gives rise to 
three questions:572 
1. 'Where is the demarcation line between immutable Shari'a and human 
interpretation?' 
2. 'How do the intellectual interpretation and the impact of the community 
implied in ijtihad and ijma relate to the textual sources?' 
3. 'Who has the authority to engage in fiqh?' 
 
The divergence and disagreement over Sharia is compounded by the existence of 
distinct schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Madhhab).573 Although there are many 
Madhhab,  there are five main schools, the Shi'ite school of Ja'fari and the Sunni 
schools of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali.574 The opportunity for diverse 
interpretations, through allegiance to different schools of jurisprudence: 'leads to at 
times radically different Islamic economic systems and policies ... rooted in 
differences of opinion on what can and should be included and utilised as legitimate 
sources of Islamic jurisprudence'.575 This divergence could be further facilitated by 
the traditional Islamic practice of ijtihad,576 which requires Sharia scholars to 
                                            
571 Jorgen S Nielsen, 'Shari'a Between Renewal and Tradition', in Jorgen S Nielsen, Lisbet 
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produce their fatwas through a process of individual or personal reasoning.577 This 
scope for interpretation allows a system that can be developed to fit the needs of a 
particular society at a particular time, based on the immutable general principles of 
the Sharia as made relevant to the concrete circumstances by an unbiased selection 
of principles from the Madhhab and 'considerations of public interest and the 
communal welfare'.578  
 
Thus, Sharia is a legal system that goes beyond the remit of conventional systems of 
law to deal with both religious matters and all aspects of human action, interaction 
and transaction. In part, then, Sharia is a fixed, immutable system of principles found 
in the Qur'an and the sunna. In part, the Sharia is also a pluralistic system open to 
interpretation and development consistently with the fiqh techniques of ijma, qiyas 
and ijtihad. This latter element of Sharia law allows the development of rules and 
principles that are appropriate for the specific context of that time and that place.579 
This makes Sharia a flexible, 'self-renewing system, a system for every age and 
every place'.580 As Masmoudi comments: '[t]rue Shariah is a set of guiding principles 
to protect the individual and the society and not just a set of rules that are fixed in 
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time'.581 While this means that the Sharia may interpreted to suit the context of its 
application, it also leaves that interpretation open to the conflicting influence of 
institutional logics external to Islam. 
 
Before moving on to consider the specific application of Sharia to Islamic financial 
services, it should be noted that the development and application of Sharia is 
complicated by the dichotomies that exists between secularists and Islamists, and 
between moderates and extremists.582 Filali-Ansary identifies a:  
divide between fundamentalism or Islamism on the one hand 
(which is not so much literalist as it is simply premodern in an 
epistemological sense), and on the other hand those scholars (some 
of whom may be called modern and others of whom lean towards 
traditionalism) who agree on the intrinsic limitations of the human 
mind, the inaccessibility of absolute truth, and the need for more 
historically accurate readings of textual traditions.583 
Each of the three groups represented here - the fundamentalists, the traditionalists 
and the modernists - seek to reform Islam from distinctly different perspectives or 
views about the way the world is.584 Thus, while fundamental Islamists emphasise 
the immutability of Sharia, enlightened 'liberal' Muslim scholars emphasise the 
                                            
581 Radwan A Masmoudi, 'Struggles Behind Words: Shariah, Sunnism, and Jihad' (2001) 21 SAIS 
Review of International Affairs 19, 21. 
582 Ibid, 20. 
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relevance of 'necessarily situated and thus relative [human knowledge]' that makes at 
least elements of Sharia situational and context dependent.585 
 
In conclusion of this brief explication of Sharia, it seems reasonable to say that, 
beyond the explicit principles in the Qur'an, there is no single Sharia,586 but a 
diversity of related interpretations that are dependent on both historical and 
geographical context. Thus: 'The rules of sharia are not unambiguously laid down in 
the law, but rather they are formulated in scholarly explorations'.587 The scope for 
divergent opinion is just as applicable to Islamic finance as other areas of life, but 
raises particular issues for governance, Sharia compliance, the risk of Sharia non-
compliance and the possible loss of confidence in Islamic financial services. In the 
next section, the principles of Sharia and Islam that are more specifically relevant to 
Islamic finance will be addressed. 
3.3 Islamic and Sharia principles applicable to financial services 
 
The Qur'an contains around 500 'legal' injunctions, of which 20 deal with economic 
matters.588 Additional detail on these may be found in the hadith, but the Qur'an is 
the most important source of the relevant principles. Also important is the Ijma or 
consensus opinion of Islamic scholars, which applies to the practical application of 
sharia. It is particularly relevant for Islamic finance because:  
models of Islamic banking are not mentioned in the Qur'an or in 
the hadith, although the basic principles which govern the system 
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are. Consequently the development of Islamic banking has been 
based to a large degree on the consensus of modern Muslim 
scholars and jurisprudents.589  
These sources, as discussed above, are supported by qiyas and ijtihad.  
 
Before considering the specific Islamic economic principles, it should be noted that a 
distinction may be drawn between two conceptions of Islamic finance. The first, and 
dominant, conception is of a financial system compliant with the Sharia principles 
discussed below. The second conception of Islamic finance, or Islamic economics, is 
of a socially just, equitable and moral system that goes beyond basic compliance 
and,590 based on the idea of Islam as a "family" of Muslims, is also concerned w ith 
the 'needs and welfare of all', with the just distribution of wealth and with economic 
development.591 The focus of this thesis is on Sharia compliance and so the 
explanation that follows will centre on the narrower conception of Islamic finance. 
As will be discussed, however, there is a tension between a formalistic approach of 
technical compliance and compliance that is measured more by the spirit of Sharia 
than by its technicalities. 
 
Islam and the Qur'an permit private property, wealth, and a competitive market,592 
but the market is embedded in the social, moral and religious context of Sharia.593 
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Wealth is held on trust for Allah and is subject always to the Qur'an, the sunna and 
the Sharia.594 Flaunting one's wealth, or hoarding it, for example, are unacceptable. 
Similarly, pursuing wealth as an end in itself is frowned upon.595 Rather, the wealthy 
Muslim owes an obligation of support to the less well-off, first to his family and then 
to the wider community.596 This concern reflects the importance placed on social 
justice and well-being by the Qur'an,597 but the demands of social justice are open to 
interpretation and this can provide another source of divergence in economic policies 
that may impact on the characterisation of a financial service or product as Sharia 
compliant.598  
 
El-Gamal notes that: 
the talented jurist Ibn Taymiyya ... famously stated that two 
prohibitions can explain the distinctions between contracts that are 
deemed valid or invalid: those of riba and gharar.599 
Hourani identifies the prohibition of riba; PLS; and the prohibition gharar as the 
three 'benchmark principles of Islamic finance.600 Lewis and Algaoud, go further and 
identify five basic Islamic principles that must be followed in the provision of 
financial services:601 
1. prohibition of riba; 
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2. the importance of almsgiving or zakat (or zakah); 
3. prohibition of goods or services contrary to Islamic values (haram); 
4. avoidance of maysir (gambling) and gharar (uncertainty); and 
5. provision of Takaful (insurance). 
Monger and Rawashdeh, also rely on 'five tenets', which they suggest: 'help explain 
major differences' between Islamic and conventional finance. Unsurprisingly, the 
prohibition of interest is the first of these. Like Lewis and Algaoud, they also 
highlight the prohibition of 'uncertainty or speculation', and haram goods and 
services. They do, however, also include two additional tenets, which are: 
 the matching of risk and reward through PLS; and 
 the prohibition of making money from money without some intermediary 
"real" commercial transaction, such as the provision of a service or the 
ownership of goods.602 
 
While also noting the prohibition of riba and speculative investments, Siebel and 
Imady instead emphasise the importance of 'brotherhood and solidarity' expressed 
through the PLS mechanism that joins the business partners to share in both the risks 
and the profits of any venture.603 Visser similarly emphasises the importance of the 
general principles of Tawheed and brotherhood as the basis of Islamic social justice. 
He also notes the sin of excess, which prohibits hoarding and the accumulation of 
excessive wealth, before highlighting the specific duty of zakat and prohibitions on 
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Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law 179, 181. 
 189 
riba, maysir, gharar and haram goods and services.604 Siddiqi also emphasises the 
importance of justice (and equity), but includes growth alongside justice as the two 
principles underlying Islamic economic provisions. He goes on to explain that: 
the conception of growth in Islam is ... broader and more 
comprehensive than the narrowly conceived "economic growth" in 
capitalism. As implied by the verses of Quran (2:151 &3:164) ... it 
refers to an all rounded human personality.605 
This growth is integral to the Islamic goal of falah (see above). 
 
To these tenets and principles may be added the requirement, under Islam, for 
trading to be fair, honest and based on the open availability of adequate 
information.606 For example, in the Qur'an, chapter 26, verses 181-183, it states: 
Give full measure and be not of those who diminish And weigh 
with a true balance. And wrong not men of their dues, and act not 
corruptly in the earth, making mischief. 
Furthermore, the whole of chapter 83 is dedicated to condemning those who fail in 
their duty and who cheat or defraud others. 
From this, it can be seen that Islamic finance is normative, based on underlying 
general Islamic principles of community-based justice as well as more specific and 
technical rules and principles that provide Islamic finance with its characteristic 
outward appearance. While both are important, there is a danger that the focus will 
fixate on the technical at the expense of, in particular, the principle of justice (adl). 
Focusing on the specific financial principles may facilitate the development of 
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financial products that comply with Sharia in form, but not necessarily in spirit. This 
allows the institution of capitalism to encroach on Islamic finance resulting in an 
isomorphic effect that preserves technical distinctions but facilitates the convergence 




Of the relevant Islamic rules and principles, it is the prohibition of riba that is 
perhaps most identified as a unique feature of the narrow conception of Islamic 
finance.607 It is also the most controversial principle. Riba literally means "excess" or 
"addition" and,608 in the context of financial transactions, is defined as 'what is over 
and above the principal'.609 It is variably equated to all forms of interest or to 
particular types of interest characterised as exploitative.610 The debate engages with 
the meaning of usury, which is perhaps the closest semantic translation of the term, 
riba. Traditionally, usury applied to all forms of interest, but this is now seen as 
'archaic' and the more modern meaning of the term is restricted to 'unconscionable or 
exorbitant' rates of interest.611 Thus, those who argue against the interpretation of 
riba as interest, claim that the intention behind the prohibition of riba in the Qur'an 
is to prevent the exploitation of a debtor by unscrupulous lenders and this is of no 
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relevance to the interest-based practices of conventional banks.612 Those that argue in 
favour of equating riba to all interest see the charging of interest itself as wrong for a 
number of reasons, including concerns of justice and its corrupting impact on both 
society and individual human personality.613 
 
Pressley and Sessions provide a summary of the arguments in favour of 
characterising the prohibition of riba as applying to all forms of interest: 
1. Saving money is simply an '[abstention] from consumption'. Doing nothing 
does not justify a reward. 
2. Similarly, simply lending money is insufficient to justify a reward. 
3. Any increase in capital must come through enterprise and risk. To receive a 
return on a loan it must contribute to such a risky enterprise and the return 
should reflect the proportion that the loan contributes to the overall 
endeavour, 
4. The return on a loan should be determined by the success of the project, the 
'risk and work effort supplied'. 
5. 'The lender becomes a partner in the business or project, sharing in the 
provision of enterprise'.614 
The consequence of these arguments may be summarised as follows. Any return on a 
loan is not fixed, but is dependent on the successfully productive use of the loan as 
part of a risky enterprise. Both the lender and the borrower have a claim to share in 
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any profits or loss, with the share determined by the proportionate investment in the 
enterprise.615  
3.3.1.1 Riba and the Islamic conception of money 
 
The points made by Pressley and Sessions may be further supported by the Islamic 
conception of money as solely a means to an end and not an end in itself. As 
Choudhury notes: '[m]oney cannot be commodified as in the ... model of the liberal 
order ... The only return on money is from the real economic activities that carry the 
blessings of being in the good and productive things of life'.616 Justice Mufti Umani 
quotes the twelfth century (CE) Islamic philosopher Imam Al-Ghazali, who 
explained that Allah created money, not to have intrinsic value, but as a means to 
ensure fairness in acquiring commodities and services.617 Based on an analysis of the 
Qur'an, Choudhury similarly describes money as a device for 'assigning exchange 
values to real goods and services transacted in an ethicized market mechanism'.618   
 
The consequence of this is that: 
the one who is using money in a manner contrary to its basic 
purpose is, in fact, disregarding the blessings of Allah. 
Consequently, whoever hoards money is doing injustice to and is 
defeating its actual purpose ... And whoever effects the transactions 
of interest on money, is in fact, discarding the blessing of Allah, 
and is committing injustice, because money is created for some 
                                            
615 Ibid, 586-587. 
616 Masudul Alam Choudhury, 'Islam versus liberalism: contrasting epistemological inquiries' (2008) 
35 International Journal of Social Economics 239, 257. 
617 See also, Irfan Shahid, 'Rational for the Prohibition of Interest in Islamic Economics' 
(September/December 2013) New Horizon 14. 
618 Masadul Alam Choudhury, Money in Islam: A Study in Islamic Political Economy (Routledge 
1997), 12. 
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other things, not for itself ... if it is allowed for him to trade in 
money itself, money will become his ultimate goal, and will remain 
detained with him like hoarded money.619 
Thus, money is 'a medium of trade and not an object of trade itself'. Charging interest 
on a loan involves no other object of trade and so makes money the object, and is 
therefore forbidden by the Qur'an.620 
 
To the Muslim, the value of money is derivative on the commodities and services 
that it may be exchanged for.621 In contrast to money from a capitalist perspective, it 
is not a measure of success, which is determined not by wealth, but by reference to 
falah or well-being and self-improvement. In a capitalist system, profit, as measured 
by money, is the driving force, with the presumption that the competitive struggle for 
wealth through a free market is the most efficient means of encouraging economic 
growth and indirectly improving social welfare. In Islam, profit as a motivation is, or 
should be, secondary to and derivative from social welfare. Money, although capable 
of private ownership, is a public good and carries with it a public obligation to the 
less well off.622 Hart explains that: 
Money in capitalist societies stands for alienation, detachment, 
impersonal society, the outside ... money is the principal source of 
                                            
619 Al-Ghazali, Ihya'ul'uloom, v.4, (Beirut 1997) 348, as quoted by Justice Mufti Muhammad Taqi 
Usmani, 'Present Financial Crisis: Causes and Remedies From Islamic Perspective' (2010) 
<http ://www.muftitaqiusmani.com/index.php> accessed 13 September 2016. Justice Mufti Usmani is 
a leading Sharia scholar in the field of Islamic finance, sitting on a number of Sharia boards. 
620 Justice Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani, 'Present Financial Crisis: Causes and Remedies From 
Islamic Perspective' (2010) <http ://www.muftitaqiusmani.com/index.php> accessed 13 September 
2016. 
621 Islam allows that commodities may have a time value, which legitimises credit sales: Abu Umar 
Faruq Ahmad, M Kabir Hassan, 'The Time Value of Money Concept in Islamic Finance' 23 (2006) 
The American journal of Islamic Social Sciences 66, 75-77. 
622 For a table setting out the distinctions between the conceptions of Money under Islamic and 
capitalists systems see: Iraj Toutounchian, Islamic Money and Banking: Integrating Money in Capital 
Theory (ebook, John Wiley  2009), table 1.3. 
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our vulnerability in society and the main practical symbol allowing 
each of us to make an impersonal world meaningful ... money is the 
God of capitalist society.623 
By contrast, under Islam, money is 'not ... an asset in its right', but 'a means of 
exchange and a numeraire'624 that serves to connect those within the community, 
providing a means for helping to distribute Allah's bounty. 
 
The consequence of this view is that, unlike capitalism, which encourages a direct 
profit motive, Islam does not allow money to generate money.625 Wealth can only 
grow through production, trade for commodities and service (labour). Under Islam, 
money is only seen as capital with a time value when engaged in the "real" or 
productive economy of purchasing goods and services or investing in business where 
the chance of profit and the risk of loss is shared with the entrepreneur.626 Riba, as an 
excess, ex-ante pre-determined time value simply accrued in the absence of 
production, trade or service, is not permitted.627 
3.3.1.2 Riba: interest or usury? 
 
On the distinction between usury and interest, Justice Mufti Umani argued that 
drawing such a distinction '[opens] the gate for [an] ever-growing universe of debt-
based financial transactions that have no connection with [the] real economy' and 
generates a gap between 'real' money and the 'virtual' money created by debt. Here, 
                                            
623 Keith Hart, 'Money: one anthropologist's view' in James G Carrier (ed) A Handbook of Economic 
Anthropology (Edward Elgar 2005) 160, 167. 
624 Hans Visser, Islamic Finance: Principles and Practice (Edward Elgar 2009), 25. 
625 Abu Umar Faraq Ahmad, M Kabir Hassan, 'Riba and Islamic Banking' (2007) 3 Journal of Islamic 
Economics, Banking and Finance 1 17. 
626 Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad, M Kabir Hassan, 'The Time Value of Money Concept in Islamic Finance' 
23 (2006) The American journal of Islamic Social Sciences 66, 71-73; Erdem Bafra, 'Prohibition of 
"Riba" Over against Time Value of Money in Islamic Banking' (2014) 2 Izmir Review of Social 
Sciences 75, 80. 
627 Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad, M Kabir Hassan, 'The Time Value of Money Concept in Islamic Finance' 
23 (2006) The American journal of Islamic Social Sciences 66, 86 
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Umani again turns for support to Imam Al-Ghazali, who argued that riba was 
prohibited because it creates a disjunction between wealth and the 'real economic 
activities ... [of] industry and construction'.628 A similar point is made by Lewis and 
Algaoud, relying on Muhammad Razi,629 that interest provides income without 
industry or effort and serves to slow the progress and prosperity of society.630 
 
In 2001, it was noted that the debate over whether riba equates just to usury or to all 
forms of interest appears to have largely been determined in favour of the latter 
approach.631 This view continues to persist, with the majority of Islamic scholars 
maintaining that riba includes all forms of interest.632 Not all, however, would agree 
with this characterisation of riba as all forms of interest, particularly where the focus 
is on the spirit of the Sharia, rather than the functional mechanics of the financial 
product. El-Gamal, for example, argues that: 
even the most conservative contemporary jurists do not consider all 
forms of what economists and regulators call interest to be 
forbidden riba. A simple examination of riba-free Islamic financial 
methods such as mark-up credit sales (murabaha) and lease (ijara) 
financing shows that those modes of financing are not "interest-
free"... Conversely, the prohibition of riba al-fadl illustrates 
                                            
628 Justice Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani, 'Present Financial Crisis: Causes and Remedies From 
Islamic Perspective' (2010) <http ://www.muftitaqiusmani.com/index.php> accessed 13 September 
2016. 
629 Muhammad Razi, Mafatih al-Ghayb (al-Matba'ah al-Misriyah al-'Amiriyah 1862). 
630 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 38. 
631 Ibid, 2. 
632 Muhammad Ayub, 'Qur'an, Hadith and Riba Connotation' (2012) 2 Journal of Islamic Business 
and Management 1, 3; Erdem Bafra, 'Prohibition of "Riba" Over against Time Value of Money in 
Islamic Banking' (2014) 2 Izmir Review of Social Sciences 75, 77. 
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definitively that there are forms of forbidden riba (illegitimate 
increase in exchange) that do not include interest.633 
Similarly, Fadel notes that: 'It is now generally recognized, at least among scholars, 
that Islamic law permits numerous transactions which at the very least incorporate 
implicit interest in their structure'.634 And, Fazlur Rahman has argued that the 
meaning of riba is context dependent and the spirit behind riba is to prohibit 
exorbitant but not all forms of interest.635  
 
The criticism of the dominant approach to riba as interest raises two related issues. 
First, should riba be restricted to those forms of exploitative interest that might be 
characterised as usury or should it apply to all interest? If, as the dominant view 
maintains, riba includes all forms of interest then the application of the prohibition in 
practice appears to focus on compliance only in form, but not spirit. One possible 
solution to this is to accept the dominant view that riba equates to all forms of 
interest, but then to characterise some forms of riba as prohibited in order to prevent 
sliding down a slippery slope into the more categorically harmful forms of riba. Such 
a distinction could then be used in conjunction with the principle of need or 
necessity, which allows a Muslim to do something that would otherwise be forbidden 
where it is necessary for well-being. In the context of a competitive and global 
market economy, this could legitimise interest-bearing loans as necessary for the 
flourishing of modern enterprise.636 A second approach, found in the work of El-
                                            
633 Mahmoud A El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (Cambridge University 
Press 2006), 51-52. Riba al-fadl prohibits the exchange of goods for goods of the same genus in 
different quantities. 
634 Mohammad H Fadel, 'Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary  Thoughts' (2008) 
25 Wisconsin International Law Journal 655, 656. 
635 Fazlur G Rahman, 'Riba and Interest', (1964) 3 Islamic Studies 1-41. 
636 This was the approach taken by Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri, who drafted the Egyptian Civil Code: 
see, Mohammad H Fadel, 'Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary  Thoughts' (2008) 
25 Wisconsin International Law Journal 655, 681-685. 
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Gamal, is to identify the basis for the prohibition as the function of protecting 
individual welfare through the promotion of a fair price. Here the focus would not be 
on the precise form of the return, but on whether that return was fair.637 
 
That the issues regarding the true meaning and extent of riba remain ongoing is 
illustrated by the prolonged series of legal cases on the matter in Pakistan. Despite a 
number of decisions by both Pakistan's Supreme Court's Shariat Appellate Bench and 
the Federal Shariat Court (FSC), the issue has not been finally resolved. The FSC, 
which in 1991 held that the riba prohibition applied to all forms of interest,638 was 
due to rehear the issue on March 24 2014,639 but the case was de-listed as no judges 
were available.640 Prior to that, the Supreme Court, in the Khaki case in 1999,641 
defined riba expansively to 'include any element of interest'.642 This, however, was 
set aside by the Supreme Court in 2002 and returned for consideration to the FSC.  
 
Perhaps the source of the disagreements over riba derives from its non-specific 
prohibition in the Qur'an.643 The passages prohibiting riba do so in general terms 
                                            
637 Mahmoud A El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (Cambridge University 
Press 2006), 49-57. 
638 Akhtar Hamid, 'Addendum on Recent Devleopments', in Effros RC (ed), Current Legal Issues 
Affecting Central Banks, vol 1 (IMF 1992) 420, 427-428; 115/90 Shariat Petitions and three Shariat 
Suo Moto Notice Cases, Dr Mahmood-ur-Rahman v Federation of Pakistan, 1991 SSM No 2, 3, 4/I. 
Summary available at: <http://www.federalshariatcourt.gov.pk/8.html>, accessed 07 September 2016. 
639 Hasnaat Malik, 'Shariat court to take up 22-year-old Riba case on March 24', The Express Tribune 
(Pakistan 2 March 2014) <http://tribune.com.pk/story/677902/shariat-court-to-take-up-22-year-old-
riba-case-on-march-24/> accessed 07 September 2016. 
640 'Judge absent: Snag delays FSC hearing on Riba', The Express Tribune (Pakistan 24 March 2014) 
<http ://tribune.com.pk/story/686201/judges-absent-snag-delays-fsc-hearing-on-riba/> accessed 07 
September 2016. 
641 Dr M Aslam Khaki v Syed Muhammad Hashim (2000) 1 SLR 73. 
642 Tariq Hassan, 'Eliminating Riba: The Holy  Alliance between Law and Economics in Pakistan' in, 
Proceedings of the Fifth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance: Islamic Finance: Dynamics 
and Development (Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. 2000, 2011), 69-73, 
Appendix 1 
<http ://ifpprogram.com/login/view_pdf/?file=Eliminating%20Riba.pdf&type=Project_Publication> 
accessed 07 September 2016. 
643 Mahmoud A El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (Cambridge University 
Press 2006), 27. 
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and, barring riba al-jahiliyya,644 with no examples to guide interpretation. This 
allows greater scope for divergent views on the nature of riba and the type of 
products that are acceptable. Much of the disagreement over what constitutes riba, 
then, flows from what Fadel terms the 'ex-ante riba-based restrictions on contracts', 
with 'some schools of jurisprudence - principally the Zahiris - refus[ing] to extend 
the application of these restrictions to transactions other than those specified in the 
relevant statements of the Prophet'.645 Additional disagreements developed in relation 
to riba al-fadl (riba of excess) and riba of "delay".646 
3.3.1.3 Riba and the institutional logic of Islam 
 
As part of the institutional logic of Islam, the controversy and ongoing disagreements 
over riba creates a tension that perhaps makes the confidence in Islamic finance 
fragile and vulnerable to an external shock. Although in practice there is a pragmatic 
agreement that riba applies to all forms of interest, the criticism that interest is 
implicit in some "Sharia compliant" Islamic financial products creates a potential 
catalyst that might accelerate a crisis of confidence. This is compounded by the 
associated complaint that the fetish with form over substance risks 'accomplishing 
nothing other than imposing dead weight costs in the form of increased transaction 
costs', with the prohibition of riba exploited 'for the gain of the private financial 
sector'.647 Such a risk may be reduced by a strong system of governance, with a 
coherent and standardised approach, that can provide an additional source of 
                                            
644 Riba al-jahiliyya refers to the practice of charging a mark-up on a loan that the debtor was unable 
to repay on time: Holy  Qur'an chapter 2, verse 280. 
645 Mohammad H Fadel, 'Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary  Thoughts' (2008) 
25 Wisconsin International Law Journal 655, 660. The Zahiri school is a minority Sunni school that 
rejects the use of analogy: See, Ignaz Goldziher, The Zahiris: Their Doctrine and History (Wolfgang 
Behn (trans), Brill 1971). 
646 Mohammad H Fadel, 'Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary  Thoughts' (2008) 
25 Wisconsin International Law Journal 655, 661-666. 
647 Ibid, 702. 
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confidence for the consumer. The relevance of governance and regulation will be 
further considered in the subsequent chapters.  
3.3.2 Gharar 
 
In addition to prohibiting riba, Sharia also forbids transactions that involve excessive 
gharar, which refers to uncertainty, speculation or excessive risk and the closely 
related maysir/maisir, which refers to transactions based on chance (effectively 
gambling).648 Lewis and Algaoud point to ahadith for support and explain: 'In 
business terms, gharar means to undertake a venture blindly without sufficient 
knowledge or to undertake an excessively risky transaction'.649 Al-Saati also notes 
the prohibition of gharar in the Hadith. He further argues that, although gharar is not 
explicitly forbidden in the Qur'an, al-batil (vanity or falsehood) is condemned and, 
in the context of the relevant verses, this has been interpreted as including gharar 
transactions. Chapter four, verse 161 of the Qur'an, for example, condemns the false 
'devouring' of property in transactions.650  
 
Gharar focuses specifically, but not exclusively, on the certainty of existence of the 
object of the transaction.651 It may be characterised as the 'unknown or doubtful', or 
as ignorance of, or uncertainty regarding, the existence of the subject matter.652 It 
does not completely preclude either risk or uncertainty, but there is disagreement 
                                            
648 See: The Holy Qur'an, chapter 5, verse 90. See also: James M Garner, 'A Critical Perspective on 
the Princip les of Islamic Finance Focusing on Sharia Compliance and Arbitrage' (2013) 1 Leeds 
Journal of Law and Criminology 69. 
649 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 30. 
650 See also, the Holy Qur'an, chapter 2, verse 188. 
651 F Vogel, S Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return, vol 16 
(Arab and Islamic Law Series, 1st ed, Kluwer Law International 1998) 89. 
652 Abdul-Rahim Al-Saati, 'The Permissible Gharar (Risk) in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence (2003) 
16 Islamic Economics 3, 6. 
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regarding the precise degree of uncertainty required.653 It does, however, prohibit 'the 
sale of nonexistent or uncertain objects, even if the relative risk is very low'.654  
 
In essence, because transactions are inherently risky, determining whether a 
transaction involves excessive gharar requires a cost-benefit type of analysis.655 The 
prohibition is a matter of degree and, for example, precludes trading in futures, short 
selling and many types of insurance.656 However, because it requires judgment 
regarding the degree of risk or uncertainty, the concept of gharar is open to 
interpretation in its application to particular products, which provides another 
opportunity for divergent opinion, lack of certainty and an associated loss of 
confidence. As Garner has commented, there is 'an element of flexibility within the 
prohibition of Gharar that is not present within Riba. This flexibility has allowed for 
a greater diversity of Islamic financial products to arise through innovation'.657 
3.3.3 Takaful 
 
While many forms of insurance are characterised as gharar or maysir, and so 
forbidden by Sharia,  cooperative insurance, or Takaful, is nevertheless permitted.658 
Rather than focus on insurance as an individual issue, Takaful, as a 'collective model' 
of social insurance, shifts the viewpoint to centre on the benefit to the community. 
Under this system, community resources are pooled to provide insurance for any 
                                            
653 Ibid. 
654 Hania Masud, 'Takaful: An Innovative Approach to Insurance and Islamic Finance' (2011) 32 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1133, 1140. Masud gives the examples of an 
uncaught fish or an unborn calf. 
655 Mahmoud A El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (Cambridge University 
Press 2006), 59. 
656 Mervyn K Lewis, Latifa M Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001), 30. 
657 James M Garner, 'A Critical Perspective on the Princip les of Islamic Finance Focusing on Sharia 
Compliance and Arbitrage' (2013) 1 Leeds Journal of Law and Criminology 69, 74. 
658 Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, 'The Economic Philosophy of Islam', in Khurshid Ahmad (ed), Ahmad 
Imam Shafaq Hashemi (trans), Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (author), First Principles of Islamic 
Economics (The Islamic Foundation 2011) 188. 
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member of the community in times of need. In other words, 'members [of the 
community scheme] ... protect each other from loss'.659 Although it might be more 
accurate to characterise some forms of Takaful as requiring mushama, or 
contribution, the basis of all forms of Takaful is found in the concept of tabarru', 
meaning gift, with each participant willingly accepting the obligation to assist other 
participants in times of need or peril.660 It derives its legitimacy from both the Qur'an 
and the hadith. Bekkin identifies the relevant section of the Qur'an as chapter five, 
verse two, which states that people should 'help one another in righteousness'.661 He 
goes on to note that, in the hadith, the Prophet praised those who dealt with hardship 
by communally sharing their belongings.662 
3.3.4 Prohibitions 
 
Islam also imposes constraints on investments in particular kinds of commercial 
enterprises. It is, for example, forbidden, or haram, to invest in businesses that deal 
with haram commodities, such as alcohol and pork meat, or with haram services, 




Finally, Sharia requires the payment of zakat/zakah, which is a levy on all income, 
fixed in practice at 2.5% and determined after the assets have been held for a year. 
                                            
659 Hania Masud, 'Takaful: An Innovative Approach to Insurance and Islamic Finance' (2011) 32 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1133, 1142. 
660 Renat I Bekkin, 'Islamic Insurance: National Features and Legal Regulation' (2007) 21 Arab Law 
Quarterly 109, 113-114. 
661 Ibid, 109-110. See also: Mohd Ma'sum Billah, 'Sources of Law Affecting Takaful (Islamic 
Insurance)' (2001) 4 International Journal of Islamic Finance 24. 
662 Renat I Bekkin, 'Islamic Insurance: National Features and Legal Regulation' (2007) 21 Arab Law 
Quarterly 109, 110. 
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There are many references to the levy in the Qur'an,664 and the philosophy behind 
zakat, is that wealth is held on trust for Allah and meant for the benefit of all. 
Property and wealth are capable of individual ownership, but both have an essentially 
social aspect that creates a duty to others.665 While Allah allows an uneven 
distribution of wealth, those that have more than they need are required to help 
alleviate the needs of the poor. It is obligatory, but only where payment would not 
cause hardship. In other words, it is a levy on excess wealth, and payment serves to 
"purify" the Muslim's remaining wealth.666  
3.4 Islamic banks and financial organisations 
 
The role of banks within the Islamic financial system is similar to the role played by 
their conventional counterparts, with Islamic banks 'resembl[ing] ... universal 
bank[s]' by engaging with both commercial and investment activities.667 Islamic and 
conventional banks operate by administrating the payments system within the 
economy, providing credit and acting as financial intermediaries, addressing the 
imperfect nature of the financial markets. Much of their business is involved with 
offering 'basic retail and commercial business services'.668 Islamic financial 
organisations, however, may be distinguished from conventional financial 
organisations by the different institutional influences that guide their behaviour. As 
already noted, for the conventional financial system, the main influences  are the 
sometimes competing institutions of the 'capitalist market, [the] bureaucratic state, 
                                            
664 For example, see: The Holy Qur'an, chapter 6, verse 141; chapter 17, verse 26; chapter 22, verses 
41, 78.  
665 Masudul Alam Choudhury, 'Islam versus liberalism: contrasting epistemological inquiries' (2008) 
35 International Journal of Social Economics 239, 258. 
666 Mosab I Tabash, Ray S Dhankar, 'The Relevance of Islamic Finance Princip les in Economic 
Growth' (2014) 3 International Journal of Emerging Research in Management and Technology 49, 
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23 Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance 11, 14. 
667 Hjh Siti Faridah Abd Jabbar, 'Islamic finance: fundamental princip les and key financial institutions' 
(2009) 30 Company Lawyer 23, 25. 
668 Ibid, 26. 
 203 
democracy, nuclear family, and Christian religion'.669 For the organisational field of 
Islamic finance, however, the dominant institution is Islam. As a consequence, while 
'the conventional finance system focuses primarily on the financial aspects of 
transactions, the Islamic system places equal emphasis on the ethical, moral, social 
and religious dimensions'.670 
 
It is this institution of Islam that provides the basis for the definition of Islamic 
financial organisations as 'those that are based, in their objective and operations, on 
Koranic principles'.671 It is the duty of every Muslim to live according to the 
principles of the Qur'an and this applies as much in business as in any other aspect of 
a faithful life. This obligation applies both to individual Muslims and to Islamic 
business organisations.672 Thus, Islamic banks and other financial institutions must 
conform with the principles discussed previously. In so doing, they engage in 'equity-
orientated' transactions based on a non-exploitative partnership,673 with the sharing of 
profit, risk and loss. While the Islamic paradigm is the PLS partnership, non-PLS 
models are permissible as long as they involve the sharing of risk.674 Furthermore, all 
transactions must have some connection with a material endeavour and cannot solely 
involve money disconnected from enterprise.675 
 
                                            
669 Roger Friedland, Robert R Alford, 'Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional 
Contradictions' in Powell, WW, DiMaggio PJ (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1991) 232. 
670 Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad, M Kabir Hassan, 'Riba and Islamic Banking'  (2007) 3 Journal of Islamic 
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671 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh University Press 2000) 5. 
672 Rahmad Hakim, Elvan Syaputra, 'Business as Al-Amanah and the Responsibilities of Islamic 
Business Managers' (2012) 6 La Riba 199, 200-201. 
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Despite the controversy and ongoing debate over the meaning of riba, the 
development of Islamic finance and Islamic banks is most strongly influenced by 
'neo-revivalist' thinking, which treats all interest as riba, and hence haram.676 
Although riba is forbidden, this does not preclude the lender from getting a return on 
a loan or investment, but the basis for this it to share in the risk of the endeavour.677 
Thus, the investor shares in either the profit, if the endeavour is successful, or the 
loss, if it is not.678 The advantage of a PLS approach, over an interest-based 
approach, is that the focus shifts from creditworthiness of the borrower to the 
soundness of the entrepreneur's project.679 Furthermore, the partnership basis of an 
Islamic bank's involvement in financial transactions, when coupled with the principle 
of Maslahah,680 an Islamic juristic device used to promote the public good of welfare 
or well-being, means that: '[Islamic] banks must not be solely oriented towards 
profit, rather they must seek to promote ... social welfare'.681 In this regard, where 
zakat is not already collected by the state then the Islamic bank has an obligation to 
establish a zakat fund for collecting and redistributing to the needy.682 
 
While Islamic banks in principle are quite different in character from their 
conventional counterparts, it has been noted that 'Islamic scholars have developed 
products that resemble conventional banking products, replacing interest rate 
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payments and discounting with fees and contingent payment structures'.683 Khan 
examined Islamic finance and found that it was not as Islamic in practice as it was 
portrayed in principle, with much of the business involving less risky non-PLS 
products684 that implicitly rely on 'interest-based financing'.685  The focus has 
arguably been centred too much on Sharia compliance more in form than in spirit, 
narrowing any gap that might have existed between Islamic and conventional banks. 
Chong and Liu, for example, found that in Malaysia the PLS model accounted for 
only 0.5% of the bank's investments (assets), although it was more prominent on the 
deposit side (70%).686 Chong and Liu also found that, even though the deposits were 
structured on an interest-free model, the 'investment rates are closely linked to 
conventional deposit rates', suggesting compliance in theory (or form), but not in 
substance, with mudarabah deposits (see below) behaving more like debt than equity 
devices.687 
 
Chong and Liu suggest that this similarity to conventional interest-based financial 
practice is a result of competition within the banking sector.688 Islamic banks in 
Malaysia coexist alongside conventional banks and must compete with them for 
business. The influence of the institution of the capitalist market in the dual banking 
system, suggests that the coexistence of the two systems brings the institutional 
influence of Islam into conflict with the institutional influence of capitalism and 
raises the question of whether the context in which Islamic banking operates affects 
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the characterisation of products, services and practices as Sharia compliant. Islamic 
banking may be provided by distinct Islamic organisations, by Islamic subsidiaries of 
conventional banks, by Islamic banking windows within conventional banks, or as a 
hybrid Islamic/conventional bank. These organisations may operate within an 
Islamic jurisdiction, a non-Islamic jurisdiction, or a mixed jurisdiction, such as 
Malaysia.689 Furthermore, Islamic banks can operate within country that only permits 
Islamic banking or in those that allow both Islamic and conventional banking. Chong 
and Liu's study, raises the possibility that, in certain contexts, divergence of opinion 
regarding Sharia compliance may be influenced by the institution of capitalism 
through the perceived need to compete economically with conventional banking 
services.690 This influence may have a practical impact on the design of new 
financial products through competitive and institutional isomorphism, which may 
explain the tendency to model Islamic financial products on conventional 
counterparts.691 
 
Before moving on to consider Islamic financial products, the other key distinguishing 
feature of Islamic banks and financial organisations should be noted. Sharia 
advisory/supervisory boards play a central role in Sharia governance.692 Their role is 
to ensure that the products, services and practices of the financial organisation are 
indeed Sharia compliant. How they function, and how well they perform their role, 
will be considered further in the subsequent chapter. 
                                            
689 Zulkifli Hasan, 'Regulatory Framework of Shari'ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC 
Countries and the UK' (2010) 3 Koyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 82. 
690 See also, Dahlia El-Hawary, Wafik Grais, Zamir Iqbal, 'Regulating Islamic financial institutions: 
The nature of the regulated' (2004)World Bank Policy  Research Working Paper 3227, 3; Mervyn K 
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3.5 Islamic financial products 
 
The defining characteristic of Islamic finance is, as discussed above, that all 
practices, services and products must be Sharia consistent. This means that they must 
be free of riba and gharar and must avoid investment in haram commodities. 
Although Sharia consistent products meet a need within Muslim communities for 
halal financial services, there is also a pressure to be competitive with conventional 
financial services.  Thus, it has been noted that: 'For almost all conventional financial 
products there is nearly always an analogous Islamic finance product'.693 In this 
section, the main products offered by Islamic banks and other financial organisations 
will be defined. This will help to give a fuller understanding of Islamic finance and 
clarify the key products that will be referred to throughout this thesis.. 
 
The mudaraba and musharaka are considered to be the 'twin pillars of Islamic 
banking'.694 Both of these are based on the PLS principle that is central to the 
philosophy of Islamic financing. Under a mudaraba contract, one party finances a 
second party to undertake an entrepreneurial venture. The financier, or rabb al-mal, 
is a silent partner or mudarib.695 Rather than imposing the financial risk on the 
borrower, as in the case of interest-based contracts, the financial risk of a mudaraba 
contract lies with the lender.696 Risk sharing is a fundamental element of Islamic 
                                            
693 Alsadek H Gait, Andrew C Worthington, 'A Primer on Islamic Finance: Definitions, Sources, 
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finance and,697 although not sharing the financial risk, the mudarib risks losing the 
time and effort of the labour invested in the venture.698   
 
These mudaraba contracts may be utilised by the bank in a two tiered system. In the 
first tier, the depositor acts as the financier, while the bank takes the role of the 
entrepreneur. In the second tier, the bank becomes the financier and the borrower 
takes the entrepreneurial role.699 This arrangement allows the bank to effect its role 
as a financial intermediary by engaging in mudaraba contracts that connect 
depositors to the borrowers through the bank, which acts as the common partner. The 
alternative to this, which is more commonly utilised by Islamic banks, is to accept 
deposits on the basis of mudaraba, but then use alternative contracts, such as 
musharaka, murabaha,  and ijara as the basis for providing funds to entrepreneurs.700  
 
Although it is sometimes claimed that the legal basis for the mudaraba may be found 
in the Qur'an,701 for example at chapter 73, verse 20,702 the Qur'an, only legitimises 
entrepreneurial activity and not the particular form of the mudaraba.703 It has also 
been claimed that a legal basis may be found in the sunna and hadith,704 but this too 
has been disputed by Aziz et al, who conclude that mudaraba contracts have no 
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Asian Social Science 1236, 1238. 
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'legitimate base' and so are unlawful.705 This is a surprising conclusion and unlikely 
to be correct. While Aziz et al may have shown that the precise form of the 
mudaraba contract receives no direct support in the Qur'an or the hadith, neither is it 
prohibited. As Khan and Mirakhor state:  
Islam permits a wide freedom in establishing contracts, assuming 
the contract[s] are not in violation of the Shari'ah, and approves any 
agreement based on the consent of the parties involved, so long as 
the shares of each are contingent on uncertain gains.706 
 
The musharaka contracts are based on the equity participation of multiple parties in 
an active partnership. All parties having a delegable managerial responsibility and 
share the profit and loss on the basis of their contribution,707 which includes both 
financial and labour investments. The share of the profit is determined on the basis of 
agreed ratios, which will depend on both on initial contributions as well as 
subsequent labour investment. Any financial loss is shared on the basis of just the 
initial contribution.708 This approach means that the amount of return cannot be fixed 
in advance, but must be related to the success of the venture. Any attempt to fix the 
return by linking it directly to the contribution, without taking account of the profit or 
loss, would invalidate the partnership. There is, however, disagreement between 
                                            
705 Farooq Aziz, Mahwish Anjam, Syed Muhammad Fahim, Faisal Saleem, 'Mudarabah in Islamic 
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707 Noraziah Che Arshad, Abdul Ghafar Ismail, 'Shariah parameters for Musharakah Contract: A 
comment' (2010) 1 International Journal of Business and Social Science 145, 147. 
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jurists as to whether the parties can consent to varying the share of the profit or 
whether it must equate precisely to the share of the contribution.709 
 
The legal acceptability of such partnerships is said to derive from the acceptability of 
property sharing found in the Qur'an's explanation of the rules of inheritance 
(chapter four, verse 12). This analogous reasoning is supported by the hadith, the 
lack of any prohibition in Sharia and the public interest benefits of allowing such 
financial partnerships.710 Even though the form of partnership is generally accepted, 
there are disagreements over the specifics. All partners must make a contribution to 
the capital, and some jurists accept that this may include a contribution of assets 
other than money, such as cars or other distinguishable commodities. Most jurists, 
however, restrict the acceptable contribution to fungible monies. Some (e.g. Hanafis) 
allow the contribution of different types of currency such as gold and silver, or 
different currencies. Other jurists (e.g. Shafi'i) go further and argue that true 
partnership requires a contribution of the same indistinguishable asset, such as 
identical currency, which allows a complete mixing and redistribution of the 
capital.711 
 
Apart for these two PLS transactions, Islamic banks also rely on "mark-up" 
arrangements that may be described as 'synthetic [debt-based] loans'.712 Under these 
schemes, the bank buys an asset and then resells or leases the asset to the customer 
with an agreed mark-up, which is intended to reflect the bank's labour investment 
                                            
709 Noraziah Che Arshad, Abdul Ghafar Ismail, 'Shariah parameters for Musharakah Contract: A 
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and the risk it accepts in property ownership. Under, the murabaha contract, which 
in practice is more commonly used than the PLS mudaraba,713 the bank buys the 
goods (appointing the customer as an agent to make the actual purchase)714 and 
resells with the mark-up affording a profit. This is seen as acceptable since the 
transactions always involve money for goods and never money for money, which 
would be prohibited as riba. It may be argued that the mark-up is interest by any 
other name. Richardson, for example, claims it 'appears to be a blatant contradiction 
to the prohibition of interest and could be criticised for not fulfilling the mission of 
Islamic banks'.715 Ariff, however, argues that it can be distinguished from riba 
because the bank takes on the responsibility and risks of ownership during the period 
between the purchase and resale on to the customer.716 
 
A similar transaction is bai'muajjal, which utilises the purchase and resale 
mechanism, but allows deferred payment. As Ariff explains, 'it is considered lawful 
in fiqh (jurisprudence) to charge a higher price for a good if payments are to be made 
at a later date' because the transaction is characterised as a trade rather than a loan.717 
Related to the purchase-resale mechanism is the purchase and lease transaction, or 
ijara, which may includes the option for the customer to buy the goods or property 
by instalment.718 Other transactions may include beneficent, zero-return, loans 
(Quard al-Hasanah); a manufacturing contract with payment linked to the progress 
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of the job (istisna');719 purchase with a deferred date of delivery (Bai'Salam or 
Bai'Salaf); transactions with a service charge, such as a consultation (Jo'alah);720  
 
Particularly controversial products include tawarruq and bay' al-'inah, both of which 
are open to the criticism that they misuse the technical forms of acceptable Islamic 
financial techniques to create a product that is essentially designed to function as the 
equivalent of an interest-bearing loan.721 Tawarruq  involves the purchase of a 
commodity from  financial institution. The commodity is immediately sold on to a 
third party and the financial institution is reimbursed with profit over a fixed 
period.722 Bay' al-'inah, used in Malaysian financial markets, involves a credit sale of 
an asset, which is then immediately repurchased for a lower cash price. The 
difference in credit and cash price provides a profit to the financial institution. It 
relies on an acceptable technique of allowing deferred payment for the purchase of 
an asset that is then sold on for a profit by the trader. The problem with bay' al-'inah 
is that the asset itself is essentially irrelevant, with neither party having any real 
intention to use it in trade. The sole intention is to provide a loan with a fixed-return 
that is equivalent to interest, but can technically avoid being labelled as riba.723 
 
Takaful, the Islamic type of insurance that relies on a social co-operative approach, 
has already been discussed. Another financial instrument worth mentioning at this 
point is the sukuk, which are Islamic securities. These are sometimes referred to as 
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Islamic bonds, but, as Saeed and Salah note, 'sukuk have elements that might 
resemble both shares and bonds, depending on the applicable underlying Islamic 
financial contracts and structures'.724 The key distinction between sukuk and bonds is 
that:  
a bond is a contractual debt obligation whereby the issuer is 
contractually obliged to pay bondholders ... interest and principle. 
In contrast ... Sukuk holders each hold an undivided beneficial 
ownership in the underlying assets and a share in the revenues 
generated by the Sukuk assets as well as a share in the proceeds 
upon realization of the Sukuk assets.725 
 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) has defined a sukuk as: 
 ... certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in 
ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the 
ownership of) the assets of particular projects or special investment 
activity ...726 
The structure of the different varieties of sukuk, depend on the nature of the 
underlying type of contract. They may be based on a single type of transaction, for 
example a mudaraba, musharaka (equity based), or ijara contract; or they may be 
hybrid in nature, based on, e.g.  ijara, istisna' and murabaha contracts.727 
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While these sukuk provide an important opportunity for Muslims to 'share in the 
profits of large enterprises',728 equity-based sukuk have been criticised for being 
designed to resemble conventional financial securities,729 with a return that is 
effectively interest-based, and an unacceptable disconnection between the invested 
money and "real" or tangible assets.730 The criticism was followed by the AAOIFI 
issuing a resolution on sukuk, in which they instructed, inter alia, that profit 
shortfalls should be managed by the establishment of a reserve account rather than by 
interest free loans, and that repurchasing assets at nominal value at maturity was 
unacceptable.731 Since the resolution, the use of equity-based sukuk declined and the 
market is currently dominated by the ijara-based sukuk structure.732 
 
The final product that should be mentioned is the Islamic finance version of the 
deposit bank account. The wadiah, meaning custody, allows banks to hold deposits 
on trust and invest them as they see fit. The depositor is guaranteed repayment on 
demand, but is not entitled to any return on the deposit. It is common practice, 
however, for the bank to periodically "gift" the depositor a sum of money as a 
competitive alternative to the payment of interest.733 
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As has already been noted, one of the criticisms of Islamic banking is that, because 
they are 'less attractive ... than financial products that more closely resemble 
conventional interest-bearing debt',734 use of the paradigmatically Islamic PLS 
arrangements is dwarfed by the use of murabaha and ijara contracts.735 These 
transactions may be criticised for a design that appears to provide a fixed rate of 
return for the bank, which is seen as interest by a different name.736 However, they 
remain widely accepted in practice as justified under Sharia, primarily on the basis 
that the bank takes on the risks of temporary ownership and possession.737  
 
Although these types of transactions may be acceptable, it is arguable that the 
emphasis needs to be returned to PLS to maintain the 'credibility' of Islamic finance 
as a distinct and more equitable service than conventional finance.738 Furthermore, 
they pose a greater risk to the confidence that Islamic finance is genuinely Sharia 
compliant. As Siddiqi comments: 'It would be a caricature of Islamic finance if ... 
murabaha was used as a trick to do what conventional finance is doing, i.e. lending 
on the basis of interest'.739 Such a criticism may be levelled at the controversial 
practice of tawarruq, which uses a murabaha contract to allow customer to avoid 
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liquidity issues when buying and selling commodities.740 Furthermore, relying on 
interest-based benchmarks, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), as 
the means for calculating the mark-up in murabaha contracts can undermine 
credibility and confuse customers as to what is acceptable.741 
 
The reliance on debt-based, or asset-based, transactions, over PLS, is understandable 
from a pragmatic perspective. This sees PLS as the ideal, but acknowledges that 
debt-based transactions are less financially risky and commercially more viable. 
From the realist's point of view, an emphasis on these transactions is inevitable 
because they allow Islamic finance to be competitive with conventional finance.742 
The danger with seeking to compete on financial terms with conventional finance, 
however, is that the core institution of Islam will come into conflict with the 
institution of the capitalist market. Indeed, this danger has already been realised and 
may be found in the gap that has been identified between the profit-based 
motivations of managers of Islamic banks and the more faith-based motivations of 
Sharia scholars who seek to ensure Sharia compliance.743 As Choudhury has noted: 
Modern Taqlid of Muslims is marked by a reliance without deep 
questioning, on the bastion of neo-liberal thinking with only a 
palliative of Islam in it. This attitude has entered lock stock and 
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barrels [into] the body framework of Islamic economics and 
finance as a fashion of the present times.744 
The result of this conflict may be the presentation of effectively interest-based 
products as Sharia-compliant, which in turn may undermine the credibility of Islamic 
finance.  
3.5.1 Islamic financial products, conflicting institutional influences and 
isomorphism 
 
Financial products, if they are to be characterised as Islamic, must be compliant with 
the principles and rules of Islam and Sharia. The risk is that situating Islamic finance 
in the global financial context necessarily exposes the institutional logics of Islam to 
those of neoliberal capitalism. As Asutay notes: 'The realities of financial markets, 
which prioritise economic incentives rather than religious behavioural norms ... has 
forced [Islamic finance] to become part of the international financial system by 
adopting the commercial banking model'.745 The context dependent pressures of 
Islamic finance are exacerbated by the historical development of Islamic finance, 
which had its origins in the marriage of classical Islamic jurisprudence with modern 
finance. As El-Gamal comments: 
Islamic finance is not constructively built from classical 
jurisprudence. Rather, Islamic alternatives or modifications are 
sought whenever the latter is deemed forbidden.746 
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This means that from its very origins, Islamic finance has developed as a constraint 
of capitalist financial theory and practice,747 with 'much of its discourse ... located 
within the jargon and dialectic of the mainstream neoclassical paradigm'.748 Coupled 
with a legally formalistic approach,749 this perhaps explains the identification of 
Islamic finance with the prohibition of riba. Focusing on the technical form of 
finance, rather than on its substantive justice or its relevance to welfare,750 allows for 
more definitive rules that makes Islamic finance more readily governed. However, 
the joint origins of Islamic jurisprudence and modern finance, together with the 
sidelining of non-technical Islamic values, provides easy access for capitalist values 
to remain overly influential. This is facilitated by the epistemology of acquired 
knowledge and the Islamic methods of interpretation. These rely on both subjective 
individual analysis as well as consensus, and provide a mechanism for the institution 
of neoliberal capitalism to influence the application of Sharia to novel financial 
products and services. The first, and main, issue, then, is whether Islamic financial 
products have tended to isomorphically mimic conventional financial products. 
Related to this, the second, and subsidiary, issue is whether the uptake of these 
financial products and services also demonstrates an isomorphism that helps to 
legitimise those products and services. 
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I have noted above the prominence given to debt and asset-based products over the 
more paradigmatically Islamic PLS products and service. This is particularly 
problematic when the LIBOR is used as the mechanism for determining a fair rate of 
return Such an approach may at least be criticised as being inconsistent with the 
spirit of Sharia. The controversial practice of tawarruq was singled out, but the 
criticism may be applied more generally to any financial innovation that manipulates 
Sharia compliant components to create a product that effectively mimics 
conventional financial products and provides a rate of return that is interest by any 
other name. As Zaman and Asutay comment: 
Rather [than realizing the original goals of Islamic economic 
theory], the [Islamic banking and finance] industry seems to have 
grown as part of the conventional financial sector in the global 
capitalist economy.751 
 
Zarka suggests that:  
Islamic economics is an interdisciplinary branch of knowledge. It 
derives some of its basic ingredients from ... the science of 
traditional economics. Some other ... are derived from Islamic 
Shari'ah and the Fiqh related to it.752 
If this model of Islamic economics is accepted, then it is easy to see how the 
dominant conventional economic theories could influence the development of 
Islamic finance.  
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From an educational perspective, the professionals involved in Islamic finance will 
have been exposed to conventional economic theory,753 which would allow 
neoliberal capitalist values to influence the development of Islamic financial 
products and services from within the institution of the Islamic financial system 
itself.754 As Haneef explains in describing his experience of studying economics in 
Malaysia: 
As an undergraduate student at the International Islamic University 
Malaysia, my experience in studying economics was quite unique 
in the sense that while being exposed to mainstream neoclassical 
economics, there was an explicit mention that economics was to be 
taught in a comparative and critical manner. At the same time, due 
to events of the late 1970s and early 1980s, developing Islamic 
economics was one of the goals in a few Muslim countries, 
including Malaysia. I discovered that there was also a mainstream 
school among those writing on Islamic economics, modeled along 
neoclassical lines, working almost within the boundaries of 
neoclassical theory, with some adjustments to incorporate 
teachings/norms/values that reflected certain requirements of 
Islam.755 
                                            
753 Abdulkader Cassim Mahomedy, 'Islamic economics: still in search of an identity' (2013) 40 
International Journal of Social Economics 556, 560. 
754 See, Mehmet Asutay, 'Conceptualisation of the Second Best Solution in overcoming the Social 
Failure of Islamic Banking and Finance: Examining the Overpowering of HomoIslamicus and 
Homoeconomicus' (2007) 15 IIUM Journal of Economics and Management 167, 168-169. 
755 Mohamed Aslam Haneef, 'Can There Be an Economics Based on Religion? The Case of Islamic 
Economics' (2005) Issue 34 Post-autistic Economics Review 
<http ://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue34/Haneef34.htm>  accessed 28 January  2015. 
 221 
This experience suggests that Islamic finance was, and is, being taught as a 
modification of neoclassical conventional economics.756 Such an approach 
necessarily exposes future Islamic finance professionals to the norms and values of 
capitalism, even if only implicitly through conventional economic theory. 
 
This educational influence is reinforced by the external influence of the institution of 
capitalism, particularly given the globalisation of conventional finance and neoliberal 
capitalism that began following the demise of Bretton Woods (see chapter two). This 
latter institutional logic, as noted above, produces a competitively driven mimetic 
isomorphic pressure on Islamic financial innovation that, when coupled with the 
legitimisation of conventional economic norms through the educational experience of 
Islamic finance professionals,757 creates an institutional logic that facilitates the 
convergence of Islamic and conventional financial products.758 As Islamic finance 
continues to develop and mature as an organisational field, these two influences 
combine to provide an institutional logic that embeds capitalist norms alongside the 
Islamic values that allow the financial system to be characterised as Islamic. The 
danger of this developmental chronology, which has materialised at least to some 
extent, is that Islamic structures simply provide window dressing for the neoliberal 
capitalist content of hastily developed Islamic financial products.759 
 
                                            
756 Haneef and Furqani argue that 'bold' changes are needed in educational curricula to allow the 
Islamisation of economics to create a distinct discip line with a deep Islamic identity : Mohamed Aslam 
Haneef, Hafas Furqani, 'Contemporary Islamic Economics: The Missing Dimension of Genuine 
Islamization' (2009) 19 Thoughts in Economics 29, 47. 
757 Muhammad Hanif, 'Economic substance or legal form: an evaluation of Islamic finance practice' 
(2106) 9 International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 277, 292. 
758 See section 1.6.1.1 for a discussion of competitive, mimetic and normative isomorphism 
759 Abdulkader Cassim Mahomedy, 'Islamic economics: still in search of an identity' (2013) 40 
International Journal of Social Economics 556, 565. 
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The impact of the conflicting interaction between Islam and capitalism on Islamic 
financial professionals is amplified by similar institutional influences affecting the 
behaviour and demands of the Muslim as a consumer.760 There is a strong 
consumerist drive from young Muslims, particularly in Muslim minority countries 
such as the UK and mixed culture countries such as Malaysia, wanting to enjoy the 
same products and services as their western counterparts. This demand, facilitated by 
the capitalist market ethos of the modern middle-class Muslim,761 remains 
conditional on 'the halal stamp of approval'.762 The risk of this Sharia constrained 
consumerism is that the demand will reinforce the already conflicting logics of 
Islamic finance and result in an isomorphic feedback loop in which there is pressure 
to innovate new products and services that offer the same advantages as conventional 
financial products, while retaining a structure that remains technically Sharia 
compliant.  
 
The current consumerism of affluent Muslims continues a trend that began in the 
1970s with the growth in Islamic finance on the back of the oil boom. Rather than 
focusing on the social goals of the early pioneers of Islamic finance, the interest of 
the oil-enriched entrepreneurs and policy makers was directed more towards a 
politically acceptable,763 profit motivated, competitive Islamic alternative to 
conventional finance. As Hegazy explains: 
IFI's objective at this stage shifted from attempting to solve the 
social and economic problems of Muslims to offering a lawful or 
                                            
760 Karim D Crow, 'In Search of "Islamic Lifesty le"' (2012) 3 Islam and Civilisational Review 654, 
662-667, 671. 
761 Vali Nasr, Forces of Fortune (Free Press 2009), 22-23. 
762 Economist Intelligence Unit, The Sharia-Conscious Consumer Driving Demand (Kuwait Finance 
House 2012), 8-9. 
763 Haider A Hamoudi, 'The Impossible, Highly  Desired Islamic Bank' (2014) 5 William and Mary 
Business Law Review 105, 153-156. 
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permissible (halal) platform for financial products capable of 
attracting the savings of the more affluent Muslims. The challenge 
IFIs faced at this stage was to find an IFI model that could offer 
halal financial products while maintaining, as much as possible, the 
prevailing structures and tools of conventional finance.764 
 
In part, at least, the direction of Islamic finance towards a technically Sharia 
compliant version of conventional finance was also facilitated by the Islamic banks' 
early flirtation with the PLS mudaraba contract. As Warde notes: 
The first Islamic banks plunged into mudaraba with great 
enthusiasm and virtually no experience. The result was, to put it 
mildly, disappointing, and as a result, virtually all institutions 
decided to steer clear from profit-and-loss sharing , and focus 
instead on sale-based, or mark-up transactions.765 
In other words, the profit-motivated pressure on Islamic banks resulted in a 
competitively driven isomorphic effect with Islamic financial products imitating the 
substance of conventional products while retaining the form of Sharia compliant 
instruments.766  
 
This approach, which uses formal legal analysis to Islamicise conventional financial 
products, is facilitated by the contextually situated development of Islamic finance 
                                            
764 Walid S Hegazy, 'Contemporary Islamic Finance from Socioeconomic Idealism to Pure Legalism' 
(2007) 7 Chicago Journal of International Law 581, 590. As an influential example, Hegazy points to: 
Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, al-Bank alla Rabawi fi al-Islam (Maktabat Jami' al-Naqi al-'Ammah 
1969). 
765 Ibrahim Warde, 'The Relevance of Contemporary  Islamic Finance' (2009) 2 Berkeley Journal of 
Middle Eastern & Islamic Law 159, 166. 
766 Muhammad Hanif, 'Economic substance or legal form: an evaluation of Islamic finance practice' 
(2106) 9 International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 277, 278, 
291-292. 
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and the educational background of the professionals involved in the innovation of 
Islamic financial products. Thus, as the theoretically sole institutional influence, 
Islamic Sharia must effect its normative and behavioural scripts in the face of the 
competitive influence of capitalist markets, the normative scripts of professionals 
trained in conventional economic theory and the legitimising scripts of domestic 
legal regulation and commercial practice,767 which will often be informed essentially 
by neoliberal capitalist values. As Hamoudi explains in relation to US regulatory 
laws: 'banks are not supposed to operate under profit and loss sharing principles'.768 
 
The combined effect of these competitive, legitimising and normative scripts create 
an environment that encourages a mimetic isomorphism (figure 11). Consider, for 
example, Lavoie and Moghul's observation on Islamic financial innovation in the 
US: 
the design of Islamic financial structures generally begins with a 
conventional paradigm in mind. Sometimes a conventional product 
- or more accurately its economics and functional utility - is sought 
by the Islamic investor. Hence it is with such a financial structure 
that the process of design begins. Goals, products, and evaluation 
metrics are identified within a conventional paradigm and mostly 
by persons largely, if not purely, trained in conventional 
subjects.769 
                                            
767 McKean James Evans, 'The Future of Conflict Between Islamic and Western Financial Systems: 
Profit, Princip le and Pragmatism' (2010) 71 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 819, 832-834. 
768 Haider A Hamoudi, 'The Impossible, Highly  Desired Islamic Bank' (2014) 5 William and Mary 
Business Law Review 105, 121. As an example he points to the general prohibition on banks owning 
real estate, which makes Islamic home financing problematic unless bank ownership  of the home is 
essentially  nominal, in a transaction that 'is "functionally  equivalent" to a secured loan (at 123). 
769 David R Lavoie, Umar F Moghul, 'Redistributive Pedagogy: A Case Study in Islamic Finance 



























Figure 11: Islamic Financial Products and Isomorphism 
 
Designs, legitimised by their certification as Sharia compliant, that provide 
competitive returns mimicking conventional financial products are likely to be the 
most successful products.770 This success will reinforce those products, resulting in 
competitive pressure to innovate similar products.771 This will lead to a structural 
isomorphism driven by the need for the legitimisation that follows certification as 
Sharia compliant. It will also, however, result in a functional isomorphism, through 
which Islamic financial products increasingly resemble conventional financial 
products.772 The subsequent danger for the credibility of Islamic finance, is that a 
                                            
770 It is no surprise that some mixed countries, such as Malaysia, and minority countries such as the 
UK, are seen as more permissive when it comes to determining Sharia compliance, than are Muslim 
countries such as Saudi Arabia: Oliver Agha, 'Islamic Finance in the Gulf: A Practitioner's 
perspective' (2008) 1 Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law 179, 187-188. 
771 See Richardson's comment that: 'The task of the Muslim scholar is not simply to distil and apply 
Islamic teachings. They are also required to ensure the economic viability  of these concepts': Edana 
Richardson, 'The Shari'ah Prohibition of Interest' (2008) 11 Trinity College Law Review 78, 100. 
772 See, Haider Ala Hamoudi, 'Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On Form and Function in Islamic 
Finance' (2007) 7 Chicago Journal of International Law 605, 616-618. 
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respected Islamic authority will then question a previously accepted product, which 
may then be deemed non-compliant.773 This retrospective rescinding of approval may 
threaten to undermine confidence in other products that might be seen as similarly 
vulnerable.774 Such a loss of confidence, which may be exacerbated by the limits on 




The discourse of Islamic economics is more socially oriented than that of 
conventional economics, which focuses more on efficiency and rational 
individualism. The institutional influence of Islam infuses the organisational field of 
Islamic finance with a moral purpose. It permits a competitive market, but only one 
that is consistent with Sharia law and principles. By contrast, the conventional 
financial system is predominantly influenced by a capitalist ideology. Prior to the 
2007 financial crisis this was an extreme neoliberal version, but since then the 
approach has been moderated, with the increasing influence of a constraining 
regulatory institutional logic. Since being a Muslim is a complete way of life, in 
principle the institution of Islam should provide a pure influence on Islamic finance. 
However, Islamic finance must often coexist and compete with conventional finance, 
                                            
773 Oliver Agha, 'Islamic Finance in the Gulf: A Practitioner's perspective' (2008) 1 Berkeley Journal 
of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law 179, 189. Agha points to the impact of Sheikh Taqi Usmani's 
memo on problematic sukuk structures. 
774 'The risk of unexpected rule changes is one of the central and most widely  discussed obstacles to 
expanding Islamic finance into the mainstream and non-Muslim population': Holly  E Robbins, 'Soul 
Searching and Profit Seeking: Reconciling the Competing Goals of Islamic Finance' (2010) 88 Texas 
Law Review 1125, 1135. 
775 This is a particular issue for non-Islamic countries, which do not see Sharia as a national law for 
choice of law purposes: Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2004] EWCA 
Civ 19; [2004] 1 WLR 1784, [40]. See also: Holly  E Robbins, 'Soul Searching and Profit Seeking: 
Reconciling the Competing Goals of Islamic Finance' (2010) 88 Texas Law Review 1125, 1137. 
776 The dramatic drop (66%) in the sukuk market in 2008, has been attributed, in significant part, to 
Usmani's criticisms (see n 258, above): Syed Imad-ud Din Asad, 'An overview of the sukuk market', 
March 2009, Investor's Business & Financial Journal 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/17277901/An-Overview-of-the-Sukuk-Market>, accessed 13 
September 2016. 
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to a greater or lesser degree, and this juxtaposition sets up the possibility for the 
purity of Islam to be discoloured by the muddy waters of capitalism.  
 
The dangers of capitalist influences affecting Islamic finance are amplified by the 
development of new debt-based products and by the divergence of opinion that exists 
amongst Islamic scholars. The risk is that products passed as Sharia compliant may 
later be rejected as non-compliant. Rejection of a single product previously certified 
as halal can raise doubts over other products and this is compounded by the criticism 
that technically compliant products are nevertheless inconsistent with the spirit of 
Sharia.777 Through the process of contagion, this might consequently undermine 
confidence in Islamic finance as a system, distinguishable from conventional finance 
and offering Muslims and others, a genuine halal alternative. The risk of this 
systemic failure may be minimised by a strong system of governance and regulation 
and it is this topic that provides the focus for chapter three. 
                                            
777 Mohammad Akram Laldin, Hafas Furqani, 'The Objective of Shari'ah in Islamic Finance: 
Identify ing the Ends and the Means' (April/June 2013) New Horizon 26. 
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Chapter Four: Islamic Finance, Risk and  Sharia Governance 
 
In chapter two, the concept of a financial system was analysed and its function was 
identified as being: to facilitate the flow of money within the community. Despite this 
singular function, the financial system is subject to a number of goals or aims that 
may sometimes conflict. Depending on one's role within the system and the 
perspective that comes from that role, from one's position within the community and 
from self-interest, these goals may include: the economic development and growth of 
the community; the development of the financial system; the growth of particular 
individual organisations within the system; personal success and wealth; a socially 
just distribution of wealth, or at least opportunity.  
 
Where these goals conflict a tension arises that must be resolved in favour of one or 
other of the competing aims. The resolution of these tensions will largely be 
determined by the institutional framework that provides the normative rules and 
behavioural scripts that guide the acts and decisions of the individual actors. As 
discussed in chapter two, the institutional influence of neoliberal capitalism drove the 
risky behaviour that resulted in the sub-prime mortgage collapse, which in turn 
triggered the global financial crisis. Similarly, in chapter three, it was argued that the 
conflicting institutional influences of Islam and neoliberal capitalism, when situated 
in the competitive milieu of global finance, has created isomorphic pressures that 
have driven the development of new Islamic financial products. The consequence of 
these competitive and mimetic isomorphic influences is a convergence of Islamic 
financial products with their conventional counterparts and the criticism that Islamic 
finance is Sharia compliant only in form, but not in spirit. 
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Both the global financial crisis and the homogenisation of Islamic and conventional 
financial products highlight the problem of the risks that arise out of the tensions that 
are both generated and resolved largely through the institutional influences that 
provide the behavioural framework and decisional heuristics for life within the 
community. These risks may be managed by dismantling, modifying or replacing 
undesirable institutional influences. For example, as discussed in chapter two, one 
response to the global financial crisis was the call for change in the type of 
capitalism, with the aim of shifting the norms from the market fundamentalism of 
neoliberal capitalism to a more socially just variety of capitalism. An alternative and 
supplemental approach, is to constrain the undesirable consequences of a particular 
institution and guide the resolution of institutional tensions or conflicting goals 
through governance and regulation. 
 
In this chapter, the governance and regulation of Islamic finance will be critically 
analysed. The analysis has three aims. First, is to provide some context for the 
analysis of Sharia governance. This context includes both the risks characteristically 
faced by Islamic finance, as well as the development of corporate governance as a 
theoretical and practical approach to managing risk and the activity of the firm's 
managers. As part of this analysis, the institutional logics that shape the corporate 
governance approaches and, hence, subsequently influence corporate managerial 
behaviour, will be critically examined. Second, is to consider the ideal Islamic 
approach to corporate governance, and hence to Sharia governance. Third, is to 
specifically consider the management of the risk of Sharia non-compliance through 
Sharia governance. At this stage, the analysis will not be specific to any particular 
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firm or jurisdiction. It will, instead, consider the main problems with the current 
general approach to Sharia governance. A key issue for Sharia governance is that it 
must function within the competitive environment of the more firmly established 
western capitalist approaches to corporate governance. Thus, the chapter will also 
include a discussion of the interaction between capitalist and Islamic logics, which is 
a crucial aspect of the analysis of Sharia governance. 
  
The analysis will start with a consideration of risk, governance and regulation 
generally, before explaining the risks that are particularly characteristic of Islamic 
finance. Corporate governance from a western perspective, will then be discussed. 
This will include an analysis of the institutional logics that drive the theoretical 
models and their application in practice. These initial sections provide the context for 
the subsequent, narrower focus on the governance of Islamic finance and Sharia risk. 
Initially, an ideal Islamic approach to corporate governance will be considered, 
before the approach to Sharia governance in practice is examined. The chapter is 
then brought to a conclusion by an analysis of the impact of the competing 
institutional logics of Islam and capitalism. 
4.1 Corporate governance and the management of risk 
4.1.1 The institution of risk 
 
In chapter one it was noted that the social structure of the world may be characterised 
on the basis of risk. Within this structure there are those who create particular risks 
and those who subsequently face the risks so created. These risks may be global or 
local, systemic or limited to individual entities. The nature of the risk serves to define 
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those that create and face the risk.778 It also informs the approach to managing the 
risk, which is the main focus of this chapter and the thesis as a whole.  
 
While risk itself is not an institution, the socio-political discourse that developed in 
response to the increase in risk and awareness of risk has established an institution of 
risk that shapes attitudes, risk-taking behaviour and risk management priorities.779 As 
such it provides a 'cognitive framework' that enables individuals to engage 
effectively with their environment.780 These environments, however, are context 
dependent and individuals operating within specific contexts are affected, not just by 
a single institution, but by a convergence of institutions unique to the relevant 
organisational field. The different combination of institutional influences will result 
in different biases affecting the identification, assessment and management of risk.781  
 
The institutional logics of risk in the organisational field of western financial 
institutions will be affected by the norms and scripts of neoliberalism, capitalism, 
classical western economic theory and the legal system that both enables and 
regulates the provision of financial services. This is likely to result in an approach to 
risk that prioritises a mathematical cost-benefit analysis that conceptualises all types 
of harm in monetary terms and is predicated on the taken-for-granted goal of 
optimising profit. This presupposes money as the sole medium of '"social exchange"', 
favours utility over other measures of justice and oversimplifies the connection 
                                            
778 Ulrich Beck, 'Critical Theory of World Risk Society : A Cosmopolitan Vision' (2009) 16 
Constellations, 3. 
779 See the characterisation of an institution in section 1.6.1.2. 
780 J Rogers Hollingsworth, 'Doing institutional analysis: implications for the study of innovations' 
(2000) 7 Review of International Political Economy 595, 603. 
781 Howard C Kunreuther, Eryl V Ley, 'Overview' in Howard C Kunreuther, Eryl V Ley (eds), The 
Risk Analysis Controversy: An Institutional Perspective (Springer-Verlag 1982) 3, 5. 
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between ends and means, 'ignoring ... [the] "irrational"' non-economic consequences 
of the harm caused when a risk materialises.782  
 
Given that Islamic finance has never fully divorced itself from western economic 
theory, there is likely to be at least some overlap in the equivalent institutional logics 
of risk. The institutional influence of Islam, however, is also likely to have exerted 
significant influence on the development of the institution of risk in the 
organisational field of Islamic financial institutions. The effect of Islam will be 
tempered by the influence of capitalism on Islamic finance as well as the influence of 
international bodies such as the World Bank and regulatory agreements such as the 
Basel accords.783 Nevertheless, the relevance of Islam on Islamic finance is clear, at 
least in form, on the requirement for Sharia compliance. This obligation creates the 
unique risk of Sharia non-compliance, which identifies Islamic finance and 
distinguishes it from conventional finance.  
 
One of the primary motivations of conventional finance is profit, although this may 
be tempered by social values such as the maintenance of reputation for trustworthy 
dealing. Islamic finance, however, should be primarily driven by the duty to provide 
for the religious needs of the Muslim community, with profit simply being of 
                                            
782 Volker Ronge, 'Risks and the Waning of Compromise in Politics' in Howard C Kunreuther, Eryl V 
Ley (eds), The Risk Analysis Controversy: An Institutional Perspective (Springer-Verlag 1982) 115, 
116. For a current example of this type of approach, see the Thomas Cook debacle. The firm of travel 
operators initially  responded to the tragic death of two children from carbon monoxide poisoning by 
taking a self-interested, legally  and economically  "rational" approach. The public response to this 
approach subsequently saw the firm take measures to appear more compassionate. The cynic might 
suggest that this remains driven by an economically  rational concern for long term profit 
maximisation since the firm faced a threat of public boycott. See Kamal Ahmed, 'Thomas Cook chief 
executive apologises to family  over Corfu tragedy ' (Online, 20 May 2015) BBC News 
<http ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32809439> accessed 13 September 2016; Anon, 'Thomas Cook 
boss apologises over Corfu gas deaths' (Online, 20 May 2015) BBC News 
<http ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-32809770> accessed 13 September 2016. 
783 For a discussion of the interaction between western economic theory , capitalism and Islamic 
finance, see section 3.5.1. 
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instrumental importance for the viability of the Islamic financial organisation. The 
risk of Sharia non-compliance is not primarily a threat to the balance sheet, but to the 
religious integrity of both the organisation and those Muslim professionals 
responsible for providing Sharia-compliant products. When Sharia risk materialises, 
particularly where it arises from a capitalist driven interest in profit, this threatens to 
destroy confidence in the Islamic finance institution. Where the risk is seen to arise 
from an institutionally embedded capitalist profit motive exacerbated by the short-
term entrepreneurial view of risk,784 confidence in Islamic finance as a whole may be 
undermined. The significance of Islamic finance goes far beyond the profit that may 
be generated and engages with Muslim identity. This is compounded by the 
realisation that risk management is not just about the scientific actuality of risk, but 
also about the social perception of risk.785 As such, a failure of Islamic finance 
cannot simply be solved by financial measures and prevention is undoubtedly better 
than cure. In order to maintain confidence in Islamic finance, an effective system of 
governance to ensure Sharia compliance is essential.786 
4.1.2 Risk and corporate governance 
 
As discussed in chapter one, risk may be defined as the probability of a particular 
harm.787 Since harm is undesirable, risk is also seen as undesirable. The problem is 
that some risk is unavoidable and, in order to achieve our goals, it is necessary to 
balance the risk of harm against the gain that will likely accrue. Where the risk and 
possibility of gain coincide, then it is for the individual to decide whether the risk is 
                                            
784 Michael Thompson, Aaron Widavsky, 'A Proposal to Create a Cultural Theory  of Risk' in Howard 
C Kunreuther, Eryl V Ley (eds), The Risk Analysis Controversy: An Institutional Perspective 
(Springer-Verlag 1982) 145, 155. 
785 Ibid, 147-148. 
786 Abdurrahman Raden Aji Haqqi, 'Shariah Governance in Islamic Financial Institution: An 
Appraisal' (2014) 11 US-China Law Review 112, 118. 
787 This is a general conception of risk rather than a technical financial definition: Glyn A Holton, 
'Defining Risk' (2004) 60 Financial Analysts Journal 19. 
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worth taking. Where the gain and risk do not so neatly coincide the issue becomes 
more problematic. While the principle of autonomy may justify the self-imposition 
of a risk, it does not justify imposing risks on others. In the context of a modern 
society, however, it is impossible to avoid at least some separation between the risk 
creators and the risk facers. In this context, risky behaviour may well be justifiable 
for the good of society. Entrepreneurship may create risk, but if the risk is well 
managed, it will lead to economic growth that can benefit all. The caveat expressed 
here is that risk needs to be managed and, given that those facing the risk may have 
little or no control over the risk, it is prudent to oversee and manage the risky 
behaviour of those who stand to gain. In the context of financial institutions, this 
need is met through regulation and corporate governance. 
 
In managing risky behaviour, regulatory frameworks must engage with the 
responsibility of the autonomous agent within a complex system. While specific 
agents, individually or collectively, may be identified as causally responsible for a 
particular risk, whether the risk materialises will depend on whether a number of  
necessary causal factors within that complex system combine to produce a set of 
causal elements sufficient to allow the harm to occur.788 It is, of course, the harm, 
rather than the risk per se, that risk management seeks to prevent. This may be 
achieved by a regulatory framework aimed at preventing individual risky behaviour, 
but it is unlikely that human error - or even intentional risk taking - can ever be fully 
eliminated. Thus, it is also important to take a systems based approach to reduce the 
opportunity for a risk triggered by human activity to materialise as the potential 
                                            
788 Thomas B Sheridan, 'Risk, Human Error, and System Resilience: Fundamental Ideas' (2008) 50 
Human Factors 418, 421. 
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harmful consequence of that activity.789 The aim being to ensure a safe resilient 
system that reduces risk to an "acceptable" level.790  
 
The lower level of acceptability will be determined by government policy and 
national laws, but this does not preclude organisations, individually or collectively, 
from setting a higher standard with a lower level of acceptability. In both cases, what 
is considered acceptable is likely to be determined by the interaction of the various 
institutional discourses that define the culture of the community. Neoliberal 
capitalism will tend to encourage a more individual approach to risk that prioritises 
efficiency over the avoidance of harm and allows individuals the liberty to engage in 
risky behaviour, but holds them responsible for any harm that ensues. A more 
socially just approach, such as the ideal of Islam, would prioritise risk avoidance 
over efficiency. Insofar as Islamic finance is motivated by the capitalist goal of 
efficient short term production of profit, there is a potential for risk management 
protections to be compromised.791 This highlights the tension between efficiency and 
risk that must be managed by effective governance.  
 
Before turning to consider the theoretical and actual approaches to governance, it is 
first important to appreciate the nature of the risks that must be managed. Although 
the primary focus of this thesis is on Sharia risk, the most relevant of the other risks 
faced by Islamic banking will be outlined, as these will all impact on the approach to 
governance. This, in turn, is likely to have at least an indirect influence on Sharia 
                                            
789 Nancy G Leveson, 'Applying systems thinking to analyse and learn from events' (2011) 49 Safety 
Science 55. 
790 Thomas B Sheridan, 'Risk, Human Error, and System Resilience: Fundamental Ideas' (2008) 50 
Human Factors 418, 419, 423. 
791 Thomas B Sheridan, 'Risk, Human Error, and System Resilience: Fundamental Ideas' (2008) 50 
Human Factors 418, 423. 
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governance, in part through the development of institutional logics and cultural 
attitudes to risk and risk management. Furthermore, the other risks faced by Islamic 
banks provide a source of pressure that compounds the competitive isomorphic effect 
of conventional finance and the profit motive of capitalist scripts. All of these 
encourage innovative risk taking with a consequential increase in the risk of 
divergent Sharia judgments and the possibility of Sharia non-compliance. As the 
Basel Committee noted with regard to credit risk, market risk (see below for 
definitions), effective governance requires a comprehensive approach to risk 
management since the risks faced by banks tend to be interrelated.792 The 
relationship between these risks means that attempts to manage one risk are likely to 
also impact on other risks.793 For example, if the risk of Sharia non-compliance 
materialises this increases reputational risk, fiduciary risk, legal risk and withdrawal 
risk.794 Furthermore, effective financial risk management as a way of avoiding harm 
and as a measure of efficient use of resources is normatively required by Sharia,795 
which provides a direct connection between financial risks and the risk of Sharia 
non-compliance. 
4.2 Particular risks of Islamic finance 
 
To begin with, it should be noted that: 'By its very nature, Islamic banking is a risky 
business compared with conventional banking, for risk-sharing forms the very basis 
                                            
792 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for the Management of Credit Risk (2000), 1. 
<http ://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs75.pdf> accessed 26 May 2015. 
793 Karim Ginena, Shari'ah risk and corporate governance of Islamic banks' (2014) 14 Corporate 
Governance 86, 90-92. 
794 Chapra and Ahmed found that 85.6% of depositors in Bahrain, 94.6% in Sudan and 66.8% in 
Bangladesh would withdraw funds as a consequence of Sharia non-compliance: M Umer Chapra, 
Habib Ahmed, 'Corporate Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions' (2002) Islamic Development 
Bank Islamic Research and Training Institute, Occasional Paper No 6, 120. 
795 Azlin Alisa Ahmad, Salmy Edwati Yaacob, 'The Princip le of Risk Management: Sharia 
Perspectives' (2012) 8 Journal of Applied Sciences Research 3335, 3335, 3341. 
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of all Islamic financial transactions'.796 PLS shifts risk to investment depositors, but 
this risk reduction is more than offset by an increase in risk on the asset side and 
from the more complex administrative demands of Islamic financial services.797 
Beyond this, there are a number of risks that are unique, or particularly relevant, to 
Islamic finance, creating a distinctive risk profile. In this section, the main risks that 
form this profile will be introduced. 
 
Certain risks, such as Sharia compliance risk, are unique to Islamic finance. Other 
risks, that serve to form part of a distinctive risk profile, are not unique but operate 
differently in Islamic finance because of the distinct structure of its products and 
services.798 The following risks are characteristic: Sharia non-compliance risk; 
liquidity risk; credit risk; displaced commercial risk; and operational risk.799 
4.2.1 Sharia non-compliance risk and Sharia arbitrage 
 
The most uniquely identifying risks of Islamic finance are the risk of Sharia non-
compliance and the related risk of Sharia arbitrage. Sharia non-compliance is the 
risk that a product or service that is not halal will nevertheless be certified as Sharia 
compliant. It arises, at least in part, from the diversity of opinion amongst Sharia 
scholars or jurists regarding the compliance of particular transactions,800 but it may 
also arise from individual failure, failure in the processes and system of Sharia 
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799 Ibid, 15-41. 
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governance, or external governance and regulatory failure.801 Sharia arbtirage is a 
particular form of regulatory arbitrage that can feed into the risk of Sharia non-
compliance. This may occur when '[c]onventional financial products are used as 
building blocks for the re-engineered Islamic products approved by jurists', which 
may be achieved by using a special purpose vehicle to separate the Islamic finance 
customers from the interest-based line of credit provided by the parent bank.802  
 
This risk of Sharia arbitrage is particularly relevant to the nature and purpose of 
Islamic finance because it involves financial products that are Sharia consistent in 
form only and not in spirit (see the discussion of this in chapter three). Using 
innovative combinations of conventional financial building blocks it is aimed at 
allowing Islamic finance to retain the profitable advantages of conventional finance 
while technically satisfying Sharia requirements. Sharia, however, as a spiritual way 
of life, is not simply about being technically consistent. Following form may be 
satisfy the ritual of religion, but it does nothing to achieve the Maqasid al-Sharia 
such as adl and falah. Appreciating the distinction between formal and substantial 
consistence with Sharia highlights the potential for differential judgments on Sharia 
consistency that goes beyond any variation in strictly technical interpretations of, for 
example, the meaning of riba. It also highlights the relevance of the institutional 
discourses influencing both the Islamic financial professionals responsible for 
developing new products, and the Sharia board members who must certify the 
product as Sharia compliant. Where the logics of neoliberal capitalism and 
conventional finance exert a powerful influence then the logics of Sharia may be 
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subverted, becoming technicalities for circumvention rather than constraints of 
spiritual importance. In such a situation the risk of divergent judgements on Sharia 
compliance is amplified and the need for strong and consistent Sharia governance 
emphasised. 
4.2.2 Liquidity risk 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) explained liquidity 
as:  
the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet 
obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable 
losses.803 
Liquidity risk is defined as the risk which is the outcome of a seller inability to 
quickly dispose an asset at an approriate market value or price. 
In the financial sector, it 'represents a bank's ability to accommodate the redemption 
of deposits and other liabilities and to cover the demand for funding in the loan and 
investment portfolio'.804 Banks are 'inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk', 
particularly funding liquidity risk, which the Basel Committee defined as: 
the risk that the firm will not be able to meet efficiently both 
expected and unexpected current and future cash flow and 
collateral needs without affecting either daily operations or the 
financial condition of the firm.805 
 
                                            
803 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision (2008), 1 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf> accessed 26 May 2015. 
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805 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision (2008), 1 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf> accessed 26 May 2015. 
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Liquidity risk is of specific relevance to Islamic financial organisations because the 
prohibition of riba means that they are unable to utilise the conventional money 
market.806 Because of the limited access to halal money; the need for asset-backed 
securities and the limited number of market participants; the characteristics of 
Islamic financial products; and a high proportion of current demand deposit 
accounts, van Greuning and Iqbal explain that 'liquidity risk is one of the most 
critical risks facing Islamic banks'.807 This is exacerbated by the lack of any 
'independent inter-Islamic bank money market'.808 
4.2.3 Credit risk 
 
The Basel Committee defined credit risk as: 
the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet 
its obligations in accordance with agreed terms.809 
In other words, it refers to the chance that a debtor will not repay the money owed 
consistently with the agreement, which can create liquidity issues. This is another 
risk faced by both conventional and Islamic financial organisations. Islamic financial 
organisations, however, face particular credit risks because of the unique nature of 
their financial products and services. These include credit risks associated with 
murabaha, where the bank delivers the asset, but does not receive payment. Or 
where the client refuses to accept the asset. With istisna or Bai'Salam contracts, the 
goods may not be supplied on time, or may be of a lower quality than agreed. With 
mudaraba contracts, credit risk may also arise because of the difficulty of monitoring 
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the mudarib (agent). These risks are exacerbated by the prohibition of riba, which 
precludes additional charges for late settlement.810  
For completeness, it bears noting that, relatedly, ‘market risk’ refers to the r isk of 
losses “in on and off-balance sheet positions arising from adverse movements in 
market prices”.811 It relates to risk from all positions held by banks (not solely in 
lender-borrower relationships) including commodity and foreign exchange risk 
poisitions that may be severely affected by market shocks and create liquidity crises.  
This in turn amplifies credit risk. 
4.2.4 Displaced commercial risk 
 
Displaced commercial risk arises where the financial organisation is 'under market 
pressure to pay a return that exceeds the rate that has been earned on assets financed 
by [account holders] ... when the return on assets is under-performing as compared 
with competitors' rates'.812 The pressure on Islamic banks arises from floating 
customers willing to change banks to find a competitive rate of return for their 
investments and deposits. This creates a problem for the banks where the PLS 
schemes fail to perform as well as conventional interest-based products leaving the 
bank in the position of having to make up the shortfall or lose the customer.813 To 
manage the problem, Islamic banks may decide to forgo their share of any profits, at 
the expense of the shareholders, but in favour of the depositors. This, however, can 
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'lead to insolvency risk in extreme cases'.814 In response to the risk, it has become 
standard practice to maintain a reserve fund as a buffer against poor performance. 
 
Displaced commercial risk is an interesting risk because it only exists where there is 
a competitive pressure to maintain a consistent return for depositors and investors 
regardless of the performance of the financial product. The risk of a lower return, or 
even a loss, is intrinsic to the concept of profit and loss sharing. The capitalist 
pressure to compete with conventional finance, however, means that lower profits 
and losses may not be passed on to the customer where it would result in a lower rate 
of return. The use of a reserve fund smoothes out the peaks and troughs of 
performance, but where a product under-performs to a greater extent, or for a longer 
period, than anticipated, then the bank must bear the loss. This creates a liquidity risk 
and, insofar as it uncouples the rate of return from performance, it arguably creates a 
risk of Sharia noncompliance. 
4.2.5 Operational risk 
 
Operational risk was defined by the Basel Committee as: 'the risk of direct or indirect 
loss resulting from failed internal processes, people and systems or from external 
events'.815 It is a risk that is common to both conventional and Islamic financial 
systems, but the complexity added by the need for Sharia compliance, including the 
lack of standardised product, heightens the risk of operational failures.816 
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4.2.6 Incentive risk 
 
In addition, Islamic finance faces the risk of adverse selection (incentive risk). The 
absence of any collateral requirement of mudaraba contracts may attract higher risk 
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, those entrepreneurs with a lower chance of success may 
be attracted to PLS contracts to minimise losses, while those with a better chance of 
success may prefer interest-based conventional financing to maximise profits.  Thus, 
'Islamic banks receive a disproportionately large share of the bad risks'.817  
4.2.7 Other risks 
 
Other risks include: withdrawal risk, which typically arises from the pressure to 
withdraw money during periods of low return; fiduciary risk, which may arise from 
an inability to comply with the Sharia requirements of a contract, or from a low rate 
of return; reputational risk, which is the danger that a firm's irresponsible activity 
will come to light and negatively impact on the reputation of the firm with the 
possibility that such reputational harm will spread throughout the industry; 
governance risk, which refers to the risk of poor governance resulting from a weak 
'institutional environment';818 legal risks, which are exacerbated by the legal 
uncertainty created by inconsistent opinions on Sharia-compliance,819 are 
particularly relevant in common law and civil law countries where there is no 
mechanism for enforcing Islamic contracts.820  
4.3 Corporate governance 
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Having explained the particular risks that must be managed, the focus turns to the 
governance of financial institutions. Beginning with general discussion, that  focus 
will then narrow to specifically consider Sharia governance, which aims to manage 
the risk of Sharia non-compliance. In chapter one, the definition of corporate 
governance was discussed. For the purposes of the thesis, the definition was fixed on 
Sir Adrian Cadbury's explanation that: 
Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the balance 
between economic and social goals and between individual and 
communal goals. The governance framework is there to encourage 
the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability 
for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly 
as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society.821 
In order to understand how to apply this conception of corporate governance, it is 
necessary to appreciate the development of the concept and its theoretical bases. 
                                            
821 Magdi R Iskander, Nadereh Chamlou, Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation 
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4.3.1 A brief history of corporate governance 
 
The governance of corporations has been a concern for 'as long as the corporate form 
has allowed conflicts between investors and managers'.822 Although commercial 
corporations began appearing from the late fourteenth century,823 it was not until 
1960 that the term "corporate governance" was first used by Richard Eells to refer to 
'the structure and functioning of the corporate polity".824 Modern approaches to 
corporate governance, however, have their origins in the US in the 1970s. In the mid 
1970s, the US federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) included 
corporate governance as part of its 'official reform agenda' aimed at combating the 
extensive bribery and corruption that had been identif ied.825 In 1976, Jensen and 
Meckling, published a landmark paper that modelled the problems of agency 
resulting from a separation of ownership and managerial control.826 It 'spawned a 
voluminous body of research', initially focused on the US.827 
 
By the 1990s, corporate governance was a well established term and concept within 
both academic and regulatory discourse and in 1991 its regulatory agenda crossed the 
Atlantic with the establishment in the UK of the Cadbury Committee on the 
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Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.828 The Committee was formed in 
response to 'some unexpected failures of major companies and by criticisms of the 
lack of effective board accountability'.829 The code subsequently published by the 
Cadbury Committee became a global model for corporate governance and triggered 
'a wave of official and semi-official codes around the world'.830 US approaches to 
corporate governance have also been globally influential, particularly as a 
consequence of the success of its economy in the 1990s and the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 revealing weak corporate governance structures. In 1998, the international 
OECD created the Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance, which published a 
set of Principles in 1999.831 By the end of the 20th century, 'corporate governance 
had clearly "arrived"' as an ongoing global concern.832 
 
The interest in corporate governance grew in response to the separation between 
financial ownership and managerial control. The need for corporate governance was 
emphasised by the failure of organisations such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), which 'resulted from weak oversight of a complex, 
multinational organisation whose business structures played one regulator off against 
others'.833 The failure of the BCCI occurred in the context of an increasingly 
globalised market, which is a natural consequence of capitalism, and particularly 
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neoliberal capitalist policies.834 The global market provided the BCCI the 
opportunity to develop a complex structure 'designed to evade regulation', which 
facilitated the illegal activity and financial accounting manipulation that ultimately 
resulted in the bank's closure.835 The initial rise of the BCCI is a testament to national 
policies that enable a light touch regulatory approach aimed at encouraging inward 
currency movement and characterised by conflicts of interest.836 Its ultimate demise 
is testament to the power that nation-states retain within a global market to 
effectively regulate transnational corporations.  
 
The subsequent failures of corporations, such as Enron in 2001, again raised global 
concerns with corporate governance, resulting in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the 
US and a revision of the corporate governance code in the UK, with the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) and the London Stock Exchange's UK Listing Authority 
reformed as government agencies. Concerns were then again raised following the 
2007 global financial crisis resulting, in the UK, in a review of financial services 
governance and the updated UK Corporate Governance Code.837  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 has since been supplemented by the Dodds-Frank Act 
2010, which was enacted in response to the 2007 financial crisis. Together they 
reflect an approach that relies on litigation after the event and relies essential on state 
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rather than market regulation.838 The focus of the US approach, which operates 
through the SEC, is on monitoring, disclosure of misconduct and punishment.839 This 
'[t]op-down corporate governance' policy, which may be a necessary response to the 
market failures witnessed in the 2007 financial crisis, is limited by its ex-post 
reactive nature that may 'have formalized and sanitized the share-holder manager 
relationship, but ha[s] arguably done very little to improve... [its] underlying 
quality'.840 With both shareholders and managers accusing each other of short-sighted 
self-interest,841 this formal approach is unlikely to be sufficient without additional 
efforts to address the institutional norms and scripts governing behaviour within the 
commercial corporate context. 
 
While the UK approach to corporate governance may share a common theoretical 
basis with the US (see below), it currently implements a very different scheme in 
practice. Backed by the "enlightened shareholder" hard law of the Company Act 
2006,842 the UK adopts a soft law and ex ante "comply or explain" approach based on 
the principles contained in the UK Corporate Governance Code.843 The focus is more 
on informational asymmetry between the board and the shareholders than with share 
pricing, trading and market regulation.844 The new code was drafted to address the 
failings in corporate governance exposed by the 2007 financial crisis. Supported by 
the UK Stewardship Code (2012), it explicitly aims to 'alter the "tone"' of corporate 
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governance,845 with the emphasis on 'following the spirit of the Code as well as its 
letter'.846  
4.3.2 The theories and  institutional logics of corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance may be achieved through a combination of internal (e.g. 
monitoring and equity-based incentives)847 and external mechanisms (e.g. legal and 
market regulation, and the threat of takeovers).848 These may be shaped and 
supported by voluntary or mandatory codes of practice.849 Nordberg and McNulty 
explain that: 'Codes provide the texts of corporate governance' and these texts help to 
shape both 'social context and behaviour'. Thus: 
the choice of terms, the phrasing, metaphors and figures of speech 
frame the debate, focusing our attention on a part of the landscape, 
helping us to concentrate on certain aspects while eliminating or 
hiding other form view. Language thus gives shape to the 
discussion and sets boundaries. Seminal texts set the terms of the 
debate, the logic.850 
While this may be a reasonable explanation of the relevance of corporate governance 
codes, it begs the equally interesting and important question of the institutional origin 
of these seminal texts and code. As McConvill observes:  
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Naturally it is the case that before everything else must be the 
norms, as the norms have provided the foundation upon which the 
guidelines and reports have subsequently been developed and 
revised, and by which mandatory rules setting in place formal 
benchmarks for corporate governance best practice could be 
enacted.851 
 
It was noted above that the modern approaches to corporate governance began in the 
mid 1970s and developed to maturity over the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
This coincides with the rise of neoliberal capitalism, particularly in the US and UK 
where theoretical approaches to corporate governance combined to construct what is 
commonly referred to as the Anglo-American model.852  
4.3.2.1 The Anglo-American shareholder model and transaction cost economics 
 
The Anglo-American shareholder model is predicated on the narrow view that: 
'Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment'.853 This view 
in turn reflects the agency model of the corporation, centred on the distinction 
between the interests of the managers (agents) and the shareholders (principals).854 
Under the agency model, the principal trusts the agent to work in his or her interest, 
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but acknowledges that the agent may abuse this trust for personal gain. Even where 
the agent is trustworthy, he or she may not share the principal's attitude to risk.855 
 
The agency model, which by the early 1990s had superseded a more corporate 
logic,856  shares the ontological presumptions of neoliberal capitalism, in which 
humans are characterised as a rational, self-interested, profit-motivated agents. The 
focus on the shareholder as the sole principal is equally consistent with the liberal 
individualistic conception of the autonomous agent coupled with the efficient 
production of profit as the sole motivation. Based on this conception of the agent as 
self-interested, it is rational for the shareholder, through the board of directors, to 
oversee, and impose restrictions on, the agent. This governance, however, may be 
complicated by the informational asymmetry that disadvantages the principal. 
 
The closely related theory of transaction costs economics (TCE) is predicated on the 
existence of an agency problem that, because of the transaction costs involved, 
cannot be resolved contractually.857 It also relies on a self-interested and 
opportunistic conception of the agent. Rather than conceptualising the firm simply as 
a nexus of contracts, however, TCE views the firm as a governance structure, which 
may be organised to fill the gaps left by the nexus of inevitably incomplete contracts 
and reduce the transaction costs of 'misaligned actions'.858 Governance structure 
provides a 'mechanism for making decisions' that are not determined contractually 
because the transactional costs accounting for them contractually would be too 
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high.859 This reduces corporate governance to a cost-benefit analysis that is entirely 
consistent with profit as the sole goal of capitalism. 
4.3.2.2 The stakeholder model and enlightened value maximisation  
 
Alternatives to the shareholder model began to develop in the 1990s.860 Perhaps the 
main alternative is the stakeholder model, which widens the range of participants 
whose interests should be protected against the risk created by the acts of self-
interested managers. Although the interests of shareholders remain important, other 
stakeholders, such as the employees, the customers, the community and the 
government, also become relevant to the governance of corporate behaviour.861 
While this model, which is more associated with continental Europe, still reflects the 
capitalist focus on profit, it takes a more social or relational approach to the 
corporation. Instead of seeing the firm as essentially constituted in the relationship 
between the owners and the managers, it embeds the firm in a wider social context.  
 
One of the problems with the stakeholder approach is the lack of any measured 
objective to guide managers as to how to balance the interests of the various parties, 
or indeed how to distinguish stakeholders from non-stakeholders.862 Corporations 
that rely on a stakeholder model have no principled way of measuring the 
performance of their managers, who remain unaccountable. This 'plays into the hands 
of self-interested managers allowing them to pursue their own interests at the 
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expense of society and the firm's financial claimants'.863 As a solution, Jensen has 
suggested the theory of Enlightened Value Maximisation (EVM) that equates the 
collected interests of the various stakeholders with the long term market value of the 
firm.864 This addresses the problems of excessive risk taking aimed at maximising 
short term profits regardless of the risk to the long term viability of the corporation. 
It still, however, maintains an essentially capitalist focus on profit, with value 
measured entirely in financial terms. 
4.3.2.3 The stewardship model 
 
Grounded in more rounded views of human agents as imperfectly rational decision-
makers subject to a wide range of motivations and capable of unselfish action, the 
stewardship model has been developed as a further alternative.865 These motivations, 
which extend beyond the financial self-interest of agency theory, include, the 
personal satisfaction that comes from responsibility, from meeting the challenges of 
demanding work, and from peer recognition and the appreciation of superiors.866 
Thus, stewardship theory runs counter to the agency theory that grounds the classical 
approach to corporate governance. Rather than conceptualising the manager as a 
wholly self-interested agent who requires constraint through governance to guide 
him or her to act in the interests of the corporation, stewardship theory argues that 
the manager will act in the interests of the corporation if the organisational structure 
is designed to facilitate 'effective action'.867 
                                            
863 Michael C Jensen, 'Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function' (2001) 7 European Financial Management 297, 305. 
864 Michael C Jensen, 'Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function' (2001) 7 European Financial Management 297. 
865 James A McConvill, 'Reflections on the Regulation of Contemporary Corporate Governance' 
(2006) 2 The Corporate Governance Law Review 1, 28. 
866 Lex Donaldson, James H Davis, 'Stewardship  Theory  or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and 
Shareholder Returns' (1991) 16 Australian Journal of Management 49, 51. 
867 Ibid, 50. 
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Figure 12: Corporate Governance  
 
It should be noted that stewardship and agency theories provide alternative 
approaches to the way in which managers behave while shareholder, stakeholder, 
TCE and EVM models focus on whose interests matter. These are different 
regulatory axes that allow for a number of different combinations (see figure 12). 
Thus, the shareholder model, while traditionally associated with agency theory could 
alternatively be combined with stewardship theory This latter combination would 
still treat the shareholders' interests reflected through the share value as the driver for 
governance, but the governance structure would be based on stewardship theory and 
designed to facilitate effective action rather than constrain self-interested behaviour. 
A further alternative, taking a dialectic approach to the two behavioural theories, 
would be to acknowledge that there is truth in both agency and stewardship 
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theories.868 It would then follow that a combined approach might be the most 
appropriate, with governance structures organised to facilitate effective action while 
also maintaining a balance that constrains excessively self-interested behaviour that 
would harm the relevant interests, whether shareholder or stakeholder.  
 
These different combinations would be consistent with, and may reflect, differing 
ideological institutional logics. The most paradigmatic neoliberal capitalist 
combination would be the shareholder model grounded in agency theory, while the 
most social combination would be a stakeholder model grounded in stewardship or 
mixed agency-stewardship theory. As Roe suggests, liberal economies tend to favour 
diffusely owned corporations with a shareholder model of corporate governance 
while more socially oriented politics favours concentrated or family owned firms and 
stakeholder approaches.869 The purity of these distinctions. however, has been 
muddied by the isomorphic effect of global competition and the pre-financial crisis 
success of neoliberal capitalism resulting in a global trend towards a prioritisation of 
shareholder interests.870 
 
To some extent the choice of model may also be influenced by the logics of the legal 
system. Thus, it has been observed that the common law system of the UK and US, 
which afford greater protection to the minority shareholders and so encourage 
investment, tend towards a shareholder model. In contrast, civil law systems have 
tended to encourage the persistence of family owned businesses and a stakeholder 
                                            
868 Lex Donaldson, James H Davis, 'Stewardship  Theory  or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and 
Shareholder Returns' (1991) 12 Australian Journal of Management 49, 60. 
869 Mark J Roe, 'Introduction' in Mark J Roe (ed) Corporate governance: Political and Legal 
Perspectives (Elgar 2005) 1, 1-6. 
870 Paddy Ireland, 'Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth' (2005) 68 Modern Law 
Review 49, 50-51. 
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model.871 It is interesting then, that the current UK code 'has its roots in and 
resonance with agency theory ... but its logic arises and evolves through a broader 
concept of accountability'.872 Given that the main Code is also supported by the 
Stewardship Code, this suggests that the UK has, at least partly, shifted its regulatory 
approach from one grounded in the neoliberal capitalist conception of the manager as 
self-interested agent to a more social or relational conception of the manger as a 
steward. 
 
The failure of regulatory and corporate governance mechanisms that contributed to 
the 2007 global financial crisis question the rationality of governance structures 
organised on the basis of agency theory. The response to the flawed individualism of 
agency theory is to argue for a more socially situated conception of the agent. This 
conception of the manager as a socially situated agent requires a deeper 
understanding of the influence of the manager's social context than is demanded by 
agency theory.873 This highlights the relevance of the institutional logics, its norms 
and behavioural scripts that culturally embed the social agent. Thus, in determining 
the appropriate organisation of governance structures and processes, it is necessary to 
understand the main institutional influences that will affect the manager's behaviour. 
It should, however, be remembered that an established system of governance will 
itself provide institutional logics that may reinforce, conflict with, or constrain those 
other influences.874  
                                            
871 R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer, R Vishny, 'Corporate Ownership Around the World' 
(1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471; Christine A Mallin, Corporate Governance (4th ed, Oxford 
University Press 2013), 17-18. 
872 Donald Nordberg, Terry  McNulty, 'Creating better boards through codification: Possibilities and 
limitations in UK corporate governance, 1992-2010' (2013) 55 Business History 348, 356. 
873 James D Westaphal, Edward J Zajac, 'A Behavioral Theory  of Corporate Governance: Explicating 
the Mechanisms of Socially  Situated and Socially  Constituted Agency ' (2013) 7 The Academy of 
Management Annals 607, 610. 
874 Ibid, 634. 
 257 
 
Corporate governance is ideologically value laden and its effectiveness will depend 
on understanding how its logics will interact with the logics of other coexisting 
institutions. For example, a neoliberal capitalist system of corporate governance will 
only serve to reinforce the norms and scripts of the neoliberal capitalism that itself 
gave birth to the very system intended to govern it. This, however, is complicated by 
the phenomenon of 'symbolic decoupling', through which managers give the 
impression of adopting governance policies that are consistent with institutional 
logics, but then do not implement those policies on practice.875 This practice of 
symbolic governance has implications for the risk of Sharia non-compliance and 
would be consistent with the focus on compliance in form, while being less 
concerned with a lack of conformity in spirit. This issue was discussed in chapter 
three and it was suggested that it was a consequence of the competitive isomorphism 
of neoliberal capitalism interacting with the obligation to ensure that Islamic 
financial products are Sharia compliant. Given the potential for interaction between 
the institutional norms, the danger is that an inappropriate form of corporate 
governance may tend to reinforce the focus on form. 
4.3.2.5 Western corporate governance: variations on a theme 
 
The preceding analysis of western approaches to corporate governance suggests that 
they are essentially variations on a theme. The distinctions are built on different 
conceptions of agency and its social context, but all are predicated on an essentially 
capitalist notion that value is measured in financial terms.876 Consider Jensen's EVM, 
                                            
875 Ibid, 646. 
876 As Cernat notes, the concern of much research into western corporate governance is focused on the 
'competitive advantage' provided by a particular system: Lucian Cernat, 'The emerging European 
corporate governance model: Anglo Saxon, Continental, or still the century  of diversity?' (2004) 11 
Journal of European Public Policy 147. 
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which was designed to resolve the problem of measuring performance under a 
stakeholder approach. Jensen argued that it is impossible to have multiple objectives 
and expect managers to make rational decisions, but this is predicated on the view 
that each objective should be maximally determined with no guidance for how to 
trade off one value against another.877 Jensen further argued that long term market 
value can account for all the benefits and detriments that must be taken into account 
to produce a single objective that allows for rational decision-making. This treats all 
values as measurable in financial terms and it relies on the homo economicus 
conception of the agent as a perfectly rational decision maker. As discussed 
previously, however, human agents are imperfectly rational and, beyond the 
boundaries of capitalist discourse, not all values are reducible to money.  
 
If Jensen's EVM model were to be applied in the context of Islamic Finance then 
Sharia compliance would simply be a function of the long term value of the firm. 
The economically rational answer would be that, if Sharia compliant products do not 
maximise value then they should be abandoned. Given that Sharia compliance is 
non-negotiable, however,  then where compliance is financially inefficient the bank 
is under pressure to innovate more financially competitive products. This creates a 
competitive isomorphic pressure to mimic conventional financial products that 
results in financial products that are Sharia compliant in form but not spirit. EVM 
would provide a viable approach if Islamic banks were only competing with other 
Islamic banks, but it fails to account for the non-financial value of Sharia compliance 
that is exposed through competition with conventional banks. If EVM or other 
                                            
877 Michael C Jensen, 'Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function' (2001) 7 European Financial Management 297, 300-301. 
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western models of corporate governance are to be applied to Islamic finance, then 
they must be sensitive to context and in particular the Maqasid al-Sharia. 
4.4 Islamic finance, corporate governance and the risk of Sharia non-
compliance 
4.4.1 An Islamic perspective on corporate governance  
(see figure 13) 
While profit maximisation and the long term value of the firm provide the goals for 
western corporate governance, from an Islamic perspective these should, but do not 
necessarily, take second place to the 'ultimate goal' of the Maqasid al-Sharia.878 
Hasan notes that, in practice, Islamic firms tend to rely on a shareholder approach, 
but argues that a modified stakeholder model based on Tawhid, khilafah 
(vicegerency) and shura (consultation) may be more appropriate to the Islamic 
context.879 Within this approach, he highlights that stakeholders 'as vicegerent[s] of 
Allah have [a] fiduciary duty to uphold the principles of distributive justice via the 
Shuratic process'.880  
 
Abu-Tapanjeh argues that Islamic corporate governance should take a principle 
based approach characterised by the 'ethical norms and social commitments' of the 
Sharia.881 He also highlights the importance of shura engaging all affected 
stakeholders and the role of the Muslim property owner as a vicegerent for Allah 
                                            
878 Zulkifli Hasan, 'Corporate Governance: Western and Islamic Perspectives' (2009) 5 International 
Review of Business Research Papers 277, 279. 
879 Zulkifli Hasan, Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Banks (Edinburgh University Press 2012), 32-39 
880 Zulkifli Hasan, 'Corporate Governance: Western and Islamic Perspectives' (2009) 5 International 
Review of Business Research Papers 277, 284. 
881 Abdussalam Mahmoud Abu-Tapanjeh, 'Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: A 
comparative analysis with the OECD princip les' (2009) 20 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 556, 
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establishing an obligation to use the property not solely for personal gain and profit 
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Figure 13: Islamic Corporate Governance 
 
A similar approach is taken by Choudhury and Hoque, who argue that the framework 
of Islamic corporate governance should be built on four principles: implementation 
of the Tawhid through shura; the goal of 'justice as balance and fairness'; the goal of 
'productive engagement of resources in social and economic activities'; and the 
iterative interaction of the first three principles.883 The aim is to engage the 
corporation with the context of its social environment and balance the paired goals of 
profit with social justice and participation, and the productive use of resources with 
the avoidance of waste. They suggest that through an effective implementation of 
                                            
882 Ibid, 561-562. 
883 Masadul Alam Choudhury, Mohammad Ziaul Hoque, 'Corporate governance in Islamic 
perspective' (2006) 6 Corporate Governance 116, 123. 
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these principles as a system of corporate governance, Islamic financial institutions 
can approach the Islamic ideal by engaging all stakeholders in the process of shura 
that enables learning through an evolutionary process of consultation and discussion. 
This ideal is grounded in the cooperative nature of the Muslim community and sees 
social well-being and private shareholder wealth as a complementary balance of 
mutual stakeholder interests rather than as a competitive conflict of interests.884 
 
Consistent with Cadbury's definition of corporate governance (see above and chapter 
one) and in the language of western corporate governance models, the Islamic 
perspective prefers a stakeholder model that recognises a wide range of stakeholders, 
including not just the shareholders, managers, employees and depositors, but also the 
whole Muslim community.885 Central to this model is the need to actively engage all 
stakeholders, whether directly or through representation, in the process of shura.886 
The importance of shura to Islam is reflected in verse 38 of chapter 42 (Al-Shura) of 
the Holy Qu'ran, which praises those: 
... whose affairs are (decided) by counsel among themselves ... 
Although Islam acknowledges free will, albeit constrained by the commitment to 
Allah, the Islamic governance ideal relies on a stewardship, rather than on an agency, 
understanding of managerial behavioural roles.887 This approach is consistent with, 
and follows from, the Islamic approach to property, which holds that Allah is the 
                                            
884 Ibid, 125-126. 
885 Reflecting the emphasis on social justice in Islam and embedding corporate social responsibility in 
corporate governance: Issa Al Mansour, 'Corporate governance in global Islamic Financial 
Institutions' (2015) 3 International Journal of Education and Research 125,133. 
886 Mervyn K Lewis, 'Islamic Corporate Governance' (2005) 9 Review of Islamic Economics 5, 15-16. 
887 Ishaq Bhatti, Maria Bhatti, 'Development of legal issues of corporate governance for Islamic 
banking' in Mohamed Ariff, Munawar Iqbal (eds) The Foundations of Islamic Banking: Theory, 
Practice and Education (Edward Elgar 2011) 87, 90; Maliah Dulaiman, Norakma Abd Majid, Noraini 
Mohd Arifin, 'Corporate Governance of Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia (2015) 8 Asian 
Journal of Business and Accounting 65, 76. 
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ultimate owner with human beings acting as trustees.888 This trustee model of 
property ownership also explains why all members of the Islamic community are 
stakeholders in Islamic corporations. If all property is held on trust for Allah, then all 
Muslims have an interest in ensuring that the trust is not abused and that the property 
is used wisely and consistently with Sharia. While Islam allows and encourages 
private ownership and use of property, this must not infringe the rights of all 
Muslims to benefit, whether individually or collectively, from the resources provided 
by Allah.889 
 
Theoretically, then, all Muslims are stakeholders in any Islamic business, including 
Islamic financial organisations. It would, however, be wholly impractical to engage 
all such stakeholders in the process of shura, although their interests that might be 
affected by the firm's activity should nevertheless be considered by the firm's 
managers. In practice this imposes an obligation on the managers to ensure that the 
firm's activities are Sharia compliant, on the firm's owners to ensure that the 
managers fulfil their obligation, and on Islamic governments to ensure that both of 
these respective obligations are fulfilled.890 
4.4.2 Sharia governance  
(see figure 14) 
While the Islamic ideal of corporate governance may be framed in the terms used to 
define western models of corporate governance, the key feature that distinguishes it 
is the need to ensure compliance with Sharia. A failure to comply with Sharia may 
                                            
888 Holy  Qu'ran, chapter 3, verse 189, English translation of the Qu'ran by Maulana Muhammad Ali 
(2002); Siraj Sait, Hilary  Lim, Land, Law & Islam: Property & Human Rights in the Muslim World 
(Zed Books 2006), 14. 
889 Zamir Iqbal, Abbas Mirakhor, 'Stakeholders Model of Governance in Islamic Economic System' 
(2004) 11 Islamic Economic Studies 43, 50-51. 
890 Ibid, 58-59. 
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damage the relationship of trust between an Islamic bank and its investors and 
depositors. This in turn could lead to a loss of confidence and damage the reputation 
of the bank and possibly the Islamic finance industry as a whole.891 These Sharia and 
reputational risks emphasise the importance of instituting a strong system of 
corporate governance that is capable of ensuring Sharia compliance, both in form 
and particularly in spirit.892 This requires an Islamic approach to corporate 
governance that can manage both the technical requirements of Sharia and its ethical 
demands. As such it must reject the self-interested approach of agency theory and 
ground itself in the foundations of wider social interests. It should recognise that all 
property owners are Allah's stewards, holding the property in trust for the benefit of 
all Muslims.893 This raises the question of how an Islamic model of corporate 
governance could be implemented, especially in non-Muslim countries.894  
 
One option could be to base Islamic corporate governance on the institution of 
hisbah. This is a traditional form of Islamic governance, established under the 
Abbasids (750CE), that ensured 'all community affairs and market behaviour was 
conducted according to Shari'ah law'.895 Functioning along the lines of an 
ombudsman, the institution of hisbah provides a social framework for monitoring 
corporate behaviour, 'empower[ing] individual Muslims ... by giving them a platform 
                                            
891 Wafik Grais, Matteo Pellegrini, 'Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions 
Offering Islamic Financial Services' (2006) World Bank Policy  Research Working Paper 4054, 2. 
892 Hennie Van Greuning, Zamir Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (The World Bank 2008), 181. 
893 Mervyn K Lewis, 'Islamic Corporate Governance' (2005) 9 Review of Islamic Economics 5, 14. 
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for social action'.896 It affords the opportunity for the community, as stakeholders, to 
engage directly with corporate governance and accountability. As Lewis comments, 
hisbah 'is a long-standing tradition of Islamic society that can be seen to represent a 
core element of Islamic corporate governance'. He goes on, however, to note the 











Figure 14: Sharia Governance 
 
Rather than relying on hisbah, Islamic financial institutions have instead developed 
the Sharia board as a means of providing Sharia governance.898 The widespread, 
although not universal, adoption of Sharia boards structurally distinguishes Islamic 
                                            
896 Abdussalam Mahmoud Abu-Tapanjeh, 'Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: A 
comparative analysis with the OECD princip les' (2009) 20 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 556, 
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897 Mervyn K Lewis, 'Islamic Corporate Governance' (2005) 9 Review of Islamic Economics 5, 17. 
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corporate governance from conventional corporate governance, which is largely 
centred on the role of the board of directors.899 Although the AAOIFI standard is for 
Sharia boards to be independent and appointed by shareholders,900 they tend to be 
appointed by the board of directors. Usually constituted by 3-6 members, the core of 
the board will be Islamic scholars with expertise in fiqh al-muamalat (Islamic 
commercial law), but these jurists may be assisted by other members having a 
differing expertise in Islamic finance.901 Their role in ensuring Sharia compliance 
involves: pre-certification assistance with product design;902  fatwas that certify those 
products and services that, in the opinion of the board, are Sharia compliant;  fatwas 
that verify compliance (ex post); the determination of Zakat; the provision of advice 
on the disposal of earnings that were not Sharia compliant; and advising on a fair 
distribution of income and expenses amongst the bank's equity holders (shareholders 
and investment account holders).903 These functions are supplemented by Sharia 
Review Units,904 which play a secondary role monitoring the firm's activity to ensure 
compliance with the Sharia board's fatwas. Sharia boards are also expected to 
publish an annual report of their activities.905 
 
                                            
899 Sulaiman Abdullah Saif Alnasser, Joriah Muhammed, 'Introduction to corporate governance from 
Islamic perspective'  (2012) 28 Humanomics 220, 222-223. 
900 AAOIFI, Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions (1999, 2008). 
901 Bashar H Malkawi, 'A Bright Future: Towards an Enhanced Shariah Supervision in Islamic 
Finance' (Feb-March 2014) The European Financial Review 14, 14-15.  
902  Hichem Hamza, 'Sharia governance in Islamic banks: effectiveness and supervision model' (2013) 
6 International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 226, 228. 
903 Wafik Grais, Matteo Pellegrini, 'Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions 
Offering Islamic Financial Services' (2006) World Bank Policy  Research Working Paper 4054, 4. 
904 Sulaiman Abdullah Saif Alnasser, Joriah Muhammed, 'Introduction to corporate governance from 
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Finance' (Feb-March 2014) The European Financial Review 14, 16. 
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These Sharia boards, whose precise responsibilities vary from bank to bank, 
complement the internal corporate governance of Islamic banks.906 Although Sharia 
boards are part of the corporate governance structure within a firm, they also raise 
five particular governance issues,907 some of which were highlighted by the failure of 
BCCI to comply with Sharia principles by investing deposits made by Islamic 
financial firms in commodity contracts.908 First, because the boards are employed by 
the banks there is a potential conflict of interest caused by a financial dependence on 
the bank whose interest in profit may clash with the board's duty to ensure Sharia 
compliance. Profit motivated managers 'may be tempted to use their leverage to 
influence [Sharia board] members' to be generous in their assessment of Sharia 
compliance.909 This potential conflict is lessened by the high moral standard of the 
respected Islamic scholars who sit on the board. This, however, is in turn 
counteracted by the legalistic focus of Sharia scholars and the possibility that the 
board member may well have been involved in the design of the product being 
assessed.910  
 
While the potential for a conflict of interest between the individual bank and scholar 
may be further lessened by the independence of the many scholars who sit on 
multiple boards,911 this practice tends to favour the minority of top scholars and 
                                            
906 Bedj Bedj Toufik. 'The Role of Shari'ah Supervisory Board in Ensuring Good Corporate 
Governance Practice in Islamic Banks' (2015) 2 International Journal of Contemporary Applied 
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911 Ünal documents that the top 20 scholars each sit on upwards of 14 boards, with the top 2 scholars 
sitting on 85. It is hard to see how they are able to provide much beyond symbolic value to their 
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'raises serious doubts as to whether sufficient time and attention can be allocated to 
all institutions'.912 Furthermore, because a relatively small number of elite scholars 
sit on multiple boards they create a transnational network with the '"power" to set 
and influence Shari'a standards for the firms and regulatory bodies to which they lend 
their services'. This transnational network allows firms to gain an important 
advantage from a close relationship with an elite scholar who can help them to 'feel 
the pulse of the [Islamic Finance Services] industry, allowing for careful 
(re)positioning and innovation in a sector that is based on both religious credibility 
and financial efficiency'.913 Such a relationship of mutual dependence must at least 
raise questions regarding the impact of any conflict of interests. 
 
There is empirical evidence that a conflict of interests is significant in at least some 
contexts,914 suggesting that the issue is more than simply theoretical. Both the 
AAOIFI and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) standards stress that Sharia 
boards should be independent,915 but it is hard to see how this can be fully realised 
while they are appointed and remunerated by the individual banks.916 The lack of 
independence is compounded by the nature of the relationship between Sharia boards 
and the board of directors. This tends to be a relationship of advice rather than 
obligation, with the board of director's retaining ultimate responsibility for Sharia 
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compliance.917 This is not to suggest that their role regarding Sharia compliance is 
superfluous as their guidance and supervision is important, but they may be 
insufficient in the absence of central regulation. This issue will be considered further 
in chapter six. 
 
The practice of sitting on multiple boards creates the second issue, which is the 
access that Sharia board members have to confidential information from different 
competing banks. The third issue is the need for a range of competencies, including 
Islamic law, finance, commercial banking and accountancy. This has resulted in a 
relatively small bank of scholars capable of sitting on Sharia boards, with the 
consequence that they may be over stretched by their commitments and unable to 
focus on more than formal legal compliance. It should also be noted that the top 
scholars may sit not just on the Sharia boards of commercial Islamic banks, but also 
on the regulatory Central Sharia Boards, or be involved in the Islamic rating 
agencies, exacerbating the potential for a conflict of interests as discussed above.918  
 
The fourth issue, which is the central concern of this thesis, is the problem of 
ensuring consistency of Sharia rulings. Van Greuning and Iqbal comment on a 
survey that found a 90% consistency and suggest that: 
the diversity of opinion is less widespread than expected. 
Nevertheless, as the industry expands, the number of conflicting 
                                            
917 Alejandro Lopez Mejia, Suliman Aljabrin, Rachid awad, Mohamed Norat, Inwon Song, 
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rulings ... is likely to grow if no efforts are made to harmonize the 
standards.919 
More recently, a comparative survey of Malaysia with Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) countries found a higher level of disagreement with only 21.4% similarity 
between fatwas, while 54.3% of fatwas on the Islamic capital market were different 
(24.3% were unidentified).920 This may, at least partly, be due to a decentralised 
approach and regional variations on the approach to applying the Sharia. Individuals 
and regions that have a conservative approach to Islam are likely to be more rigid 
than those with a liberal attitude.921 Other commentators also point to the lack of 
standardisation of fatwas certifying financial products as Sharia compliant and the 
impact that this may have on the credibility of Islamic finance.922  
 
The final governance issue is the transparency of Sharia boards.923 This is required to 
avoid the problem of gharar and also serves to both facilitate external governance 
and maintain public confidence.924 The problem was recognised by the IFSB, which 
criticised Sharia boards for issuing opaque technical fatwas that make it difficult for 
the judgments of Sharia compliance to be assessed by others.925 
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In many countries, such as the UK and the KSA, Sharia governance is left to the 
individual organisations as a form of self-regulation.926 In other countries, including 
Malaysia, Kuwait and Pakistan, the individual Sharia boards are subject to external 
regulation. They may also be governed by a central Sharia board or authority.927 
Furthermore, international bodies such as the AAOIFI and the IFSB provide 
guidelines and standards,928 although these are not legally binding and compliance is 
a noted issue.929 Sharia governance is also supported by "Islamic rating", such as that 
carried out by the International Islamic Rating Agency. This body utilises the 
'Fiduciary Ratings concept', which takes an approach built on the two pillars of 
financial strength and governance, including a separate rating for Sharia governance 
based on the standards set down by the IFSB and the AAOIFI.930 Thus, while the 
IFSB and AAOIFI standards and guidelines are not legally binding, a failure to 
implement them may adversely affect the firm's Islamic rating, which might in turn 
make the bank a less attractive option for Muslim investors and depositors. 
 
As a final point regarding the general approach to Sharia governance, it is worth 
noting that: 'For the most part, the corporate governance arrangements of Islamic 
banks are modeled along the lines of a conventional shareholder corporation'.931 This 
may create a conflict of interest between shareholders and the PLS investment 
                                            
926 Aznan Hasan, Ruslan Sabirzyanov, 'Optimal Shari'ah Governance Model In Islamic Finance 
Regulation' (2015) 3 International Journal of Education and Research 243, 245. 
927 Hennie Van Greuning, Zamir Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (The World Bank 2008), 188. 
928 Zulkifli Hasan, Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Banks (Edinburgh University Press 2012), 67-74. 
929 Mahmood Ahmed, Makasuda Khatun, 'The Compliance with Sharia Governance System of 
AAOIFI: A Study on Islamic Banks Bangladesh' (2013) 9 Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and 
Finance 177. 
930 Sabeen Saleem, 'The Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) - A New Perspective' (2013)  Q1 
Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector Bulletin 6, 6-8. See also the Agency 's 
website: <http ://www.iirating.com/> accessed 30 July 2015. 
931  Hennie Van Greuning, Zamir Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (The World Bank 2008), 184. 
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account holders, who through their deposits acquire an equity interest in the bank.932 
More importantly for this thesis, it reflects a tendency to '[tailor] conventional 
banking regulations for [Islamic banking] activities'.933 This has resulted in a 
governance structure in which Sharia governance is implemented as a connected, but 
distinct system that operates in parallel to a western system of corporate governance. 
It is western corporate governance plus Sharia governance, rather than an integrated 
system of Islamic corporate governance. This approach creates the danger that 
having a distinct Sharia board serves to distinguish, rather than to integrate, Sharia 
issues from other corporate governance matters. As such it may widen rather than 
narrow the gap that has been identified between the motivations of managers and 
those of Sharia scholars. In other words, it may exacerbate the conflict between the 
objectives of management and the objectives of the Sharia board.934  
4.4.3 Sharia governance structure and the competing institutional logics of 
Islam and capitalism 
 
Like conventional banks, Islamic banks are profit motivated, Unlike conventional 
banks, however, they are subject to the Sharia. Although the Sharia does not lie in 
direct opposition to profit as a driving force, the message of Islam transmitted 
through the Sharia is one of moderation, a concern for others and social justice rather 
than, greed, self-interest and justice as individual entitlement. Consistent with this, 
Sharia imposes a number of technical constraints, such as the prohibition of riba, the 
emphasis on PLS and the need for financing to be connected to assets and the real 
economy (see chapter three). The problem is that the influence of capitalism and the 
                                            
932 Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, 'Corporate governance, market discip line and 
regulation if Islamic banks' (2006) 27 Company Lawyer 134, 135. 
933 Alejandro Lopez Mejia, Suliman Aljabrin, Rachid Awad, Mohamed Norat, Inwon Song, 
'Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/219, 16. 
934 Shakir Ullah, Ian A Harwood, Dima Jamali, '"Fatwa Repositioning": The Hidden Struggle for 
Shari'a Compliance Within Islamic Financial Institutions' (2016) Journal of Business Ethics, 
doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3090-1. 
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pressure of commercial competition have resulted in an approach to Sharia 
compliance that means the risk-sharing PLS products have, at least on the asset side, 
become overshadowed as Islamic financial products have tended to mimic 






























Figure 15: An Institutional View of Sharia Governance 
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Figure 16: Institutional Influences on Sharia Governance 
 
From an institutional perspective, as already noted, Islamic finance operates at the 
intersection between the two core institutions of Islam and capitalism (See figures 15 
and 16). This exposes the professionals working in the field to the competing logics 
of profit maximisation and the Maqasid al-Sharia. Sharia compliance must be 
assured within a competitive commercial environment that prioritises money as a 
value and wealth as a goal. This exerts a pressure on the Islamic finance 
professionals to create products that mimic conventional finance while being 
formally consistent with the technical requirements of Sharia. This is more likely to 
occur in environments that take a relatively liberal approach to Islam, than in more 
conservative communities, encouraging diverse and sometimes inconsistent Sharia-
compliance fatwas,936 which is facilitated by the pluralistic approach to Islamic 
                                            
936  David Bassens, Ben Derudder, Frank Witlox, 'Setting Shari'a standards: On the role, power and 
spatialities of interlocking Shari'a boards in Islamic financial services' (2011) 42 Geoforum 94, 97. 
 274 
jurisprudence and the legalistic focus of the Sharia scholars that sit on Sharia boards. 
Furthermore, the structural approach to Sharia governance simply adds an extra 
component to conventional governance rather than providing a genuinely Islamic 
model. This mirrors the development of Islamic finance more generally, in that 
Islamic finance is conventional finance modified to be Sharia consistent. Given this 
approach, in a global competitive capitalist environment, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that Sharia compliance has become a matter of form over substance, with Islamic 
financial products mimicking those of conventional finance and Sharia scholars 
acting as technical legal advisors rather than as 'guardians of business ethics'.937 
 
The primary goal of Sharia governance is to counter the risk of Sharia non-
compliance, ensuring that Islamic financial products and services are at least halal. 
Beyond this, Sharia governance should further aim for financial products and 
services that are not simply permissible, but approach the Islamic aspirational ideal. 
This requires a governance model that facilitates an appropriate stewardship of the 
resources held on trust for Allah to provide products and services that balance profit 
with social justice, while avoiding riba, gharar and maysir.  Islamic finance must 
operate in a global commercial environment dominated by a liberal capitalist 
ideology modelled on self-interested, hyper-rational, agents. The behavioural norms 
and scripts of this form of capitalism emphasise the value of money and create a 
competitive goal of profit maximisation that requires agents to strive for ever 
increasing profit margins. Successful risk-taking behaviour is legitimised through 
financial and other rewards, while the agents remain relatively shielded from 
unsuccessful risk-taking since the risks are faced by investors and bonus payments 
                                            
937 Volker Nienhaus, 'Islamic Finance Ethics and Shari'ah Law in the Aftermath of the Crisis: Concept 
and Practice of Shari'ah Compliant Finance' (2011) 18 Ethical Perspectives 591. 
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will usually still be made. As was shown by the events surrounding the US sub-prime 
mortgage crash, it is only in the face of a crisis that these logics will be revisited, and 
even then they show a remarkable resilience.  
 
In managing the risk of Sharia non-compliance, Sharia governance has tended to 
take a narrow legalistic approach that prioritises form over substance and treats the 
Sharia risk as largely independent of the financial risks,938 which tend to be managed 
by an Anglo-American shareholder model of corporate governance operating in 
parallel to the Sharia board. This approach tends to ignore, and even facilitate, the 
norms and scripts of capitalism and conventional finance. From the Islamic 
perspective, the constraint on the logics conflicting with Sharia are essentially 
technical. If, however, Islamic finance is to forge a coherent Islamic identity that is 
consistent with Sharia in both form and substance then it must go beyond the purely 
technical and counter the conflicting institutional logics of capitalism and 
conventional finance. These conflicting logics include: self-interest; wealth 
maximisation (greed and hoarding); risk-taking that resembles the gambling 
'symboli[c] of late capitalism';939 shifting risk to the investor; the acceptability of 
interest and capital creation divorced from the "real" economy. To counter these 
logics, Sharia governance should operate as part of a fully integrated system of 
Islamic corporate governance. In other words, the best way to counter the conflicting 
logics of capitalism and conventional finance is to fully embed the logics of Sharia 
as a core structural and ideological institution of Islamic finance. The aim should be 
                                            
938 The financial risks, such as credit risk, liquidity risk and displaced commercial risk, increase the 
pressure on the Islamic financial professionals to design products and services with higher profit 
margins. This encourages creative design, which has tended to rely  on mimicking conventional 
financial products so increasing the risk of Sharia non-compliance. 
939 The rise of state-sanctioned gambling accompanied the rise of neo-liberal capitalism and a move 
away from an ethic of 'hard work, thrift and savings' to one in which money is its own reward: Martin 
Young, 'Gambling, capitalism and the state: towards a new dialectic of the risk society?' (2010) 10 
Journal of Consumer Culture 1, 6. 
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to create '[strong] intra- and extraorganizational relationships ...[that] can reinforce 
the influence' of Sharia logics, accommodate the capitalist profit motivation in a 
moderate Sharia consistent form and sideline or weaken the inconsistent logics.940 
 
To realise the development of a system of Sharia governance that functions not 
merely as a technical constraint, but crucially also as an institution that appropriately 
influences behaviour through embedded scripts and norms, Islamic finance must 
address a number of issues. These have already been mentioned as part of the 
preceding discussion, but it may be helpful to summarise them here, before drawing 
this chapter to a conclusion. These issues include: 
 The structurally divided approach to corporate governance.  
 Sharia governance tends to be delivered as an addition to a parallel system 
 implementing a western capitalist shareholder governance model that 
 incorporates capitalist and conventional financial norms into Islamic finance. 
 This is facilitated by the general lack of specific regulatory requirements for 
 Islamic banks.941 It is further compounded by the status of the Sharia board 
 and its position within the structure of the firm.942 As Song et al note:  
In most cases it seems that ultimate overall responsibility for an 
Islamic bank's Shariah compliance lies with the Islamic bank's 
board of directors, which typically delegates the responsibility 
for day-to-day Shariah compliance to senior management. 
Senior management is required to ensure Shariah compliance 
                                            
940 Marya L Besharov, Wendy K Smith, 'Multip le Institutional Logics in Organizations: Explaining 
their Varied Nature and Implications' (2014) 39 Academy of Management Review 364, 368. 
941 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 16. 
942  Nawal Kasim, Sheila Nu Nu Htay, Sayed Ahmed Salman, 'Empowering the Shari'ah Committee 
towards Strengthening Shari'ah Governance Practices in Islamic Financial Institutions' (2016) 8 
Review of European Studies 142, 145-147. 
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in line with Shariah board guidance, which implies that the 
relationship of an Islamic bank's Shariah board vis-à-vis the 
Islamic bank is advisory [although] ... highly respected.943 
 The current use of Sharia scholars needs to be reviewed and addressed.  
 The issues that must be resolved include: an overly legalistic approach; the 
 potential and actual conflicts of interest that encourage a profit-driven 
 technical compliance rather than ensuring consistency with Islamic 
 philosophy; the membership of multiple boards resulting in excessive 
 workloads and limited time to fully assess compliance except in this 
 superficial legalistic way; the lack of power for banking supervisory 
 authorities to make pronouncements on whether members of the Sharia 
 Board  or Sharia Review units are 'fit and proper' persons for the role since 
 the same standards are often applied uniformly to all banks regardless of 
 whether they are conventional or Islamic.944 
 The problem of inconsistent fatwas on Sharia compliance.  
 This has a multifactorial origin, including: Islamic fiqh methodology; 
 different Madhabs; regional variations in religiosity; differing responses to 
 the pressure to certify Islamic financial products and services that can readily 
 compete with conventional finance; and a lack of standardisation of 
 regulation and governance.945 
 The failure to fully implement international standards exacerbating the 
previous issues.  
                                            
943 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 17. 
944 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 15. 
945 Frederick V Perry , 'The Corporate Governance of Islamic Banks: A Better Way of Doing 
Business?' (2011) 19 Michigan State Journal of International Law 251, 271. 
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 Nienhaus, for example, argues that the concentration of a small group of top 
 scholars holding many of the Sharia board seats across multiple companies, 
 the jurisdictional bias of Sharia board membership, the lack of transparency, 
 and the triadic roles of Sharia scholars as product developers, individual 
 Sharia board members and regulatory Sharia board members shows that:  
the actual practices of the Islamic finance industry deviate 
substantially from recommendations and best practice 
examples put forward by institutions such as AAOIFI, IFSB 
and Hawkamah.946  
 Song and Oosthuizen also found that Islamic banks may be limited to the 
 same disclosure requirements as conventional banks and not required to 
 formally disclose compliance with Sharia. While some jurisdictions required 
 a statement of Sharia Compliance, 8 of 22 respondents indicated there was no 
 such requirement.947 They comment that: 'In order to reduce reputation and 
 legal risk, there would seem to be a need to enhance transparency about the 
 role and composition of Shariah board'.948 
 A lack of global standardisation of governance and regulation, which is 
reflected in inconsistent fatwas and the risk of Sharia non-compliance.  
 As Perry explains, the IFSB has accepted the existence of a pluralistic 
 approach to corporate governance, arguing against any hastily adopted and 
 rigid rule-based approach.949 This lack of standardisation allows a 
 multiplicity of different Islamic products that depend on where one is in the 
                                            
946 Volker Nienhaus, 'Islamic Finance Ethics and Shari'ah Law in the Aftermath of the Crisis: Concept 
and Practice of Shari'ah Compliant Finance' (2011) 18 Ethical Perspectives 591, 610-611 
947 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 32. 
948 Ibid 35. 
949 IFSB, Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance For Institutions Offering Only Islamic 
Financial Services (2006), 2. 
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 world, which runs contrary to the Basel approach that sees a standardised 
 approach as crucial to a globally effective financial service.950 
 The complication of Islamic windows. 
 The governance of Islamic finance may be complicated in those countries 
 where conventional banks are permitted to offer Islamic financial services 
 through an Islamic financial window. While such windows may enhance 
 competition and may benefit Muslims in countries where the Muslim 
 population is too low to support Islamic banks, it creates a reputational risk 
 arising from the possibilities of commingling assets, it complicates the 
 supervision of IF, increases the possibility of regulatory arbitrage and 
 complicates the resolution for distressed conventional banks.951 
 
As a final point that emphasises the interaction between the capitalism of 
conventional finance and the approach to Sharia compliance in Islamic finance, it 
should be noted that outside the Gulf region, London and New York are major hubs 
and centres of influence within the global network if Sharia scholars.952 The 
importance of these cities, which are major centres of conventional finance, again 
highlights the interaction between the capitalist values of conventional finance and 
the Islamic values of Islamic finance. In New York, for example, the Dow Jones 
Islamic Market Indexes relies on Sharia scholars to produce a set of global indices 
indicating permissible financial products, but the focus is on filtering out the 
impermissible rather than highlighting products and firms that are genuinely 
                                            
950 Frederick V Perry , 'The Corporate Governance of Islamic Banks: A Better Way of Doing 
Business?' (2011) 19 Michigan State Journal of International Law 251, 269.  
951 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 12. 
952 David Bassens, Ben Derudder, Frank Witlox, 'Setting Shari'a standards: On the role, power and 
spatialities of interlocking Shari'a boards in Islamic financial services' (2011) 42 Geoforum 94, 101. 
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Islamic.953 This approach contributes to the blurring of boundaries between 
conventional and Islamic finance. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the analysis has examined Sharia governance situated against the 
background context of corporate governance, the management of risks, and the 
competing institutional discourses of Sharia and capitalism as mediated through 
conventional finance and western models of corporate governance. It was argued that 
the nature of Sharia risk was such that the impact of risk-materialisation was not 
capable of being completely reduced to a financial value. This emphasises the 
importance of ex ante risk management through Sharia governance. Following on 
from this it was argued that there were a number of issues with the current approach 
to Sharia governance. Those issues were summarised above, and it would be unduly 
repetitive to list them again here. Suffice it to say that there are a number of reasons 
why the system of Sharia governance could be significantly improved by 
restructuring the approach to corporate governance of Islamic banks and financial 
institutions. Key to that goal will be the integration of Sharia governance within a 
comprehensive and standardised Islamic system of corporate governance, which 
would be consistent with Cadbury's definition noted earlier in this chapter, and in 
chapter one. In chapter six, the options for reforming Sharia governance will be 
considered. Before that, however, in chapter five, the analysis of Sharia governance 
will be furthered by considering its implementation in practice in the three 
jurisdictions of the UK, Malaysia and the KSA. 
                                            
953 Bill Maurer, 'Uncanny exchanges: the possibilities and failures of "making change" with alternative 
monetary  forms' (2003) 21 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 317, 327. 
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Chapter five: Sharia Governance in Practice, Attitudes Towards 
Islamic Finance and Institutional Logics 
 
In the previous three chapters, both conventional and Islamic finance have been 
explored. In chapter two conventional finance was examined and the interaction 
between the institutional logics of capitalism and the conventional financial system 
was analysed. This included the impact of neoliberal capitalism on the growth of 
shadow banking and the development of risky financial products. The discussion of 
conventional finance provided the context for the subsequent analysis of Islamic 
finance in chapter three. As part of that discussion, the influence of capitalist logics 
on Islamic finance was considered and, particularly through competitive and mimetic 
isomorphism, the impact this has on the risk of Sharia non-compliance was analysed. 
Following from this, in chapter three, both Western and Islamic approaches to 
corporate governance were considered. Here it was argued that the risk of Sharia 
non-compliance cannot be fully reduced to a purely economic value, which heightens 
the importance of a strong system of governance to manage the risk effectively. It 
was also argued that the approach to Sharia governance should be restructured to 
produce a standardised and comprehensive system of regulation. 
 
In this chapter, focus will be on Sharia governance within the United Kingdom 
(UK), Malaysia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).954 The UK was chosen for 
three reasons. First, it represents those states where Muslims are a significant 
minority. Second, the UK government has been supportive of Islamic finance, 
indicating that it wants London to be seen as and important Islamic finance hub. 
                                            
954 See sections 1.3 and 1.6.2.2 for the initial justification. 
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Islamic finance has had a presence in the UK since the 1980s, and in 2012 the UK 
was ranked as the 9th largest provider of Sharia compliant assets. With six fully 
compliant banks and a total of twenty institutions offering Islamic finance, the UK 
plays a significant role in delivering Islamic finance in the West.955 Indeed, it has 
been described as 'one of the most advanced and sophisticated Islamic financial 
markets in the western world'.956 Third, the institution hosting this research is based 
in England. Malaysia was chosen because it has been involved in Islamic finance 
from its very beginnings, plays a lead role in the development and delivery of Islamic 
Finance,957 seeks to be a central hub for Islamic finance,958 and is a non-Islamic 
country with a majority Muslim population. The KSA was chosen primarily because 
it represents an Islamic country, but also because, as the researcher's home nation, 
there is an obvious personal relevance of including the KSA. This is further 
supplemented by the advantage of personal knowledge. Finally, the KSA is also an 
important provider of Islamic finance. 
 
The main methodological reason for choosing three jurisdictions is that they provide 
three different institutional settings for Islamic finance. In England, as noted above, 
the context is one of a minority Muslim population in a non-Islamic country. By 
contrast, Malaysia is a non-Islamic country, but with a majority Muslim population, 
while the KSA is a fully Islamic country. The chapter begins with an explication of 
the existing approaches to Sharia governance in each of these jurisdictions. This will 
                                            
955 Sharjil Ahmed, ‘History of Islamic Finance in the UK’ in UK Excellence in Islamic Finance 
(UKTI 2013) 10. 
956 Ahmend Belouafi, Abdelkader Chachi, 'Islamic Finance in the United Kingdom: Factors Behind its 
Development and Growth' (2014) 22 Islamic Economic Studies 37, 52. 
957  Tadashi Mizushima, 'Corporate Governance and Shariah Governance at Islamic Financial 
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958 Daromir Rudnyckyj, 'Islamic Finance and the Afterlives of Development in Malaysia' (2014) 37 
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lead into a small, qualitative series of interviews,959 carried out to identify and 
explore the attitudes towards Islamic finance and Sharia governance of a selection of 
professionals and academics working in the field of Islamic finance within one of the 
three jurisdictions. The primary reason for including academics in this discussion is 
the diversity of academic interpretations of the rules of Shariah finance; the research 
would not adequately cover the problems with standardisation if it did not address 
the fundamental disagreements on the level of academic interpretation. .  
 
The aim of this chapter is to build on the previous analysis to further understand the 
issues with Sharia governance, as discussed in chapter four. In particular, it will 
further consider the significance of the interaction between the institutional logics of 
capitalism, and those of Islam within the organizational field of Islamic finance. The 
issue is the extent to which Islamic finance been shaped by the logics of conventional 
finance and capitalism. In particular, it has been argued, over the course of the 
previous three chapters, that a consequence of this interaction is the development of 
Islamic financial products that are Sharia compliant in form, but not spirit. This is 
compounded by a lack of standardisation allowing inconsistent fatwas and increasing 
the risk of non-compliance. There are a number of different approaches that may be 
adopted to reform Sharia governance in response to these issues. The discussion in 
this chapter, including the qualitative series of interviews, will supplement the 
analysis in chapter four, and provide the basis for assessing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the possible reforms that will be considered in chapter six.  
                                            
959 See section 1.6.2.2 for the methods employed in this study. 
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5.1 Sharia governance in the UK, Malaysia and the KSA 
5.1.1 The UK 
 
The UK,960 as a western country with a well-developed conventional financial 
system and a recent history of neoliberal politics (see chapter two), is likely to 
provide a context that exposes Islamic finance to capitalist logics more overtly and 
powerfully than in either Malaysia or the KSA. This is, for example, reflected in the 
discussion of the results of a study looking at attitudes of Muslins and non-Muslims 
to Islamic finance in the UK. In this study, Woldi and Hossain found that, while 
profit was a more important motivating factor for non-Muslims in deciding whether 
to deposit money with an Islamic bank, non-Muslims would nevertheless use PLS 
based products. They conclude that: 
Islamic banks can find it profitable to offer their products to non-
Muslim clients by putting aside their religious zeal. If they target 
the Muslim population only, they will not be able to achieve their 
target in a country like the UK.961 
 
While it is not entirely clear what they mean by ‘religious zeal’, the implication is 
that, in the UK environment at least, Islamic banks must design their products to be 
financially attractive to both Muslims and non-Muslims. They should not be 
religiously dogmatic at the expense of products that can compete with conventional 
financial products. This highlights the type of competitive and mimetic isomorphic 
                                            
960 For an account of the development of Islamic finance in the UK see:  Ahmend Belouafi, 
Abdelkader Chachi, 'Islamic Finance in the United Kingdom: Factors Behind its Development and 
Growth' (2014) 22 Islamic Economic Studies 37. 
961 Atsede Woldie, Md Mahit Hossain, ‘The attitude of Muslims and Non-Muslims towards Islamic 
Products and Services in the UK’ (2011) 10 Indonesian Management & Accounting Research 1, 9. 
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pressure exerted on Islamic finance, shaping the development of its products and 
services. 
 
According to Song and Oosthuizen, in the UK: 'Islamic banking is considered to be 
an acceptable financial innovation whose presence further promotes that 
jurisdiction's standing as an international financial center'.962 This is essentially a 
capitalist motivation, with the UK government seeing Islamic finance as a 
competitive opportunity to advance its own economy.963 This is also apparent in the 
comments of Andrew Cahn, the Chief Executive of the government’s UK Trade & 
Investment body. In seeking to ‘position the UK as the global partner of choice’, 
along with the growing involvement of UK companies with providing Islamic 
finance, he emphasised the UK’s strength as a ‘leading international’ centre for 
conventional finance, the conventional financial expertise available in the UK and 
the importance of the UK’s involvement in Islamic finance provision for trade and 
investment in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.964  
 
While the UK Government’s economic motivations are understandable,965 they do 
create a capitalist context for the development of Islamic Finance that prioritises 
competition over other ethical or religious concerns.966 This is further exacerbated by 
the involvement of UK firms offering Islamic finance in addition to conventional 
                                            
962 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 7. 
963 Abdul Karim Aldohni, 'The Emergence of Islamic Banking in the UK: A Comparative Study with 
Muslim Countries' (2008) 22 Arab Law Quarterly 180, 189-90. 
964 UK Trade & Investment, The City: UK Excellence in Islamic Finance  (2007), 1. 
965 See the goals of the UK’s Islamic Finance Task Force launched in 2013:  HM Treasury, 
‘Government launches first Islamic Finance Task Force’, (Online, 11 March 2013) Press Release 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-launches-first-islamic-finance-task-force--2> 
accessed 21 November 2015. 
966 HM Treasury, The development of Islamic finance in the UK: the Government's perspective (2008),  
13, 
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financial services. A UK Trade & Industry brochure notes that ten major banks in the 
UK offer Islamic financial services.967 This is good for meeting demand and offering 
an alternative to conventional financial services, but it is Islamic finance as offered 
by conventional financial institutions. This does not necessarily mean that the 
Islamic financial services and products offered by these hybrids will be any less 
“Islamic” than those offered by dedicated Islamic banks, but it does help to maintain 
an environment in which Islamic financial professionals are subject to the same 
norms and behavioural scripts as conventional financial professionals. 
 
The UK Trade & Industry brochure also provides a case study of the Bank of London 
and the Middle East (BLME), a dedicated Islamic financial institution.968 In this case 
study, the emphasis is on the marriage of conventional finance expertise with experts 
in Islamic finance. According to Humphrey Percy, the CEO, the aim is to: 
provide business solutions using innovative Shariah-compliant 
investment and financing products to address the financial needs of 
our customers.969 
While the importance of Sharia compliance is not forgotten, the primary goal is to 
meet the financial need using innovative products, with the implication that the 
BLME offers an essentially conventional financial service, but with products 
engineered to be Sharia compliant. This approach may make commercial sense from 
a capitalist perspective, but it highlights the pressures on Islamic financial products 
and services to behave similarly to conventional products and services. 
 
                                            
967 UK Trade & Investment, The City: UK Excellence in Islamic Finance  (2007), 2. 
968 Ibid, 4. 
969 Ibid. 
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In the UK, the regulatory approach is the same regardless of whether the bank is 
conventional or Islamic.970 Although changes have been made to ensure that Islamic 
finance is not prejudiced by UK tax regulations,971 there is no legislation specifically 
aimed at the regulation or governance of Islamic Finance.972 As such, there is no 
explicit requirement for Sharia compliance or Sharia Board supervision, but Sharia 
compliance is taken indirectly into account 'when considering issues such as 
consumer protection, internal controls, governance, and reputational risk'.973 
Adequate Sharia supervision may also be relevant to the Bank’s duties, under the 
Financial Conduct Authority’s Principles for Businesses, to execute responsible 
business and risk management strategies.974 Thus, the FSA will expect banks offering 
Sharia compliant products to have a credible system, such as a Sharia board, to 
ensure the products are as described.975 As an example of this, consider the 
governance arrangements at BLME. The bank employs a Sharia Supervisory Board 
(SSB) comprised of three members. This SSB provides an additional layer of 
governance that provides Sharia oversight for bank’s activities (see figure 17).976 
Along with the other governance committees, it is  responsible to the Board of 
Directors, which consists of a balance of conventional and Islamic finance members.  
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Finance & Markets (Law Business Research Ltd, 2nd ed, 2014) 53. 
973 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 13. 
974 As required by princip le 3: Financial Conduct Authority, Principles for Businesses (2013), 2.1.1; 
John Dewar, Munib Hussain, ‘United Kingdom’ in Rafael A Morales, Bishr Shiblaq (eds) Islamic 
Finance & Markets (Law Business Research Ltd, 2nd ed, 2014), 53, 54. 
975 Rodney Wilson, Legal, Regulatory and Governance Issues in Islamic Finance (Edinburgh 
University Press 2012), 116. 
976 Figure 17 adapted from: BMLE, BMLE Holdings Corporate Governance 
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Figure 17: BMLE Governance 
 
Rather than an integrated system of Islamic Sharia Governance, the structure is, as 
explained in chapter four, Western governance, with the addition of Sharia 
governance.977 The SSB sits 2-3 times per year and has the responsibility to ensure 
Sharia compliance through issuing fatwas regarding generic products and to carry 
out an annual audit. The SSB is assisted by a Sharia Compliance Officer, who 
provides day-to-day guidance and liases between the SSB and the operational 
managers of the bank. The Sharia Compliance Officer reports any Sharia 
compliance issues to the Head of Legal, who conveys the issues to the Chief 
Executive Officer. The responsibility for implementing the fatwas and other SSB 
decisions lies with the bank’s management.978 
 
                                            
977 See the BMLE website <https://www.blme.com> accessed 20 November 2015. 
978  BMLE Holdings, BMLE Holdings Sharia’a Supervisory Board: Repsonsibilities and Terms of 
Reference (2013) <https://www.blme.com/investor-relations/corporate-governance/board-terms-of-
reference/> accessed 20 November 2015. 
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The structural arrangement of Sharia governance at the BLME is consistent with the 
approach discussed in chapter four. As explained, the structure does not seek to 
provide integrated Islamic governance. Rather, it is conventional western governance 
with the addition of Sharia constraint. This type of arrangement lends itself to a 
focus on form rather than spirit. Provided the technical constraints are met, the bank 
is free to develop products and services that mimic those developed by conventional 
finance. The approach to Sharia governance will ensure technical compliance, but is 
unlikely to provide any meaningful constraint on the institutional logics of neoliberal 
capitalism. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the current Chairman, Dr Al-
Qassar, sits on numerous SSBs as well as holding a professorial position at the 
University of Kuwait,979 raising the workload and conflict of interest issues identified 
in chapter four.980 
 
The advisory, rather than managerial, role of the SSB and its members is important. 
While it leaves the responsibility for ensuring Sharia compliance to the firm’s 
managers, it crucially means that the scholars may sit on multiple boards and do not 
have to satisfy the ‘competence and capability’ requirements imposed on a firm’s 
directors. Provided the Sharia scholars remain purely advisory, they avoid the 
regulator’s scrutiny.981 
 
                                            
979 17 according to: Bloomberg Business <http://www.bloomberg.com> accessed 20 November 2015; 
Hassan and Mahlknecht list him as holding 30 board positions, with 8 as chairman: Kabir Hassan, 
Michael Mahlknecht, Islamic Capital Markets (Wiley  2011), 121; Thomson Reuter, Zawya, ‘Dr 
Abdulaziz Khalifa Al Qassar <https://www.zawya.com/officers/biography/61712/>accessed 20 
November 2015. 
980 The other two members of the SSB also sit on numerous boards:  Kabir Hassan, Michael 
Mahlknecht, Islamic Capital Markets (Wiley  2011), 121; Brian Kettell, Introduction to Islamic 
Banking and Finance (Wiley  2011), 28.  
981 Michael Ainley , Ali Mashayekhi, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman, Ali Ravalia, Islamic Finance in 
the UK: Regulation and Challenges (FSA 2007), 13. 
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The attitude and approach of the UK to Islamic Banking, is well summed up in a few 
key sentences taken from a speech made in 2003 by Howard Davies, the Chairman of 
what was then the sole UK regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA).982 
Recognising the potential value of the development of Islamic finance in the UK, he 
said: 
London has prospered over the centuries by providing a congenial 
home for international financial institutions, and innovation has 
been its life blood. So we have a clear economic interest, as a 
nation, in trying to ensure that the conditions for a flourishing 
Islamic financial market are in place in London. The business 
opportunity is large and potentially very attractive. 
He went on to explain that Islamic banks would face the same regulatory 
requirements as other banks and emphasised that, while this regulation would deal 
with financial, legal and documentation risks: 
it would not be appropriate, or even possible, for us to check 
compliance with Sharia law … That in our view, is a matter for the 
institution itself. 
 
In other words, as long as the Islamic financial institutions are economically sound, 
and behaving lawfully under the UK regulations, the regulatory authorities are 
uninterested in whether the products and services are Sharia compliant.983 Indeed, 
                                            
982 Howard Davies, ‘Islamic Finance and the UK Financial Services Authority’ (02 March 2003) 
Conference on Islamic Banking and Finance, Bahrain 
<http ://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2003/SP118.shtml> accessed 21 
November 2015. 
983 Jonathan Ercanbrack, 'The regulation of Islamic finance in the United Kingdom' (2011) 13 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 69, 71. 
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the regulation is secular,984 involving neutral and equal supervision of all banks and 
financial institutions, with faith-based restrictions seen as a matter for the individual 
institution.985 Thus, there is no central Sharia board, and no legally required 
standards. The current regulatory authority, the Financial Conduct Authority,986 does 
not review Sharia compliance and its ‘approach is to treat IFIs [Islamic Financial 
Institutions] as it would conventional firms’.987 There is, of course, a demand from 
the Muslim customer base that the products and services should be Sharia compliant, 
but they also demand a service that is comparable to those offered by the 
conventional financial system. As Gordon Rankin, the current account director of 
Lloyds TSB Bank, commented: 
Our research shows that over three quarters of British Muslims 
want banking services that fit with their faith, but they also want all 
the benefits they have come to expect from a high street bank.988 
Nevertheless, the FCA has taken some steps towards promoting Islamic finance. For 
example, it has removed the double stamp duty previously imposed on Islamic 
mortgages. Under Chapter 6 of Part 6 of the Corporation Tax Act, 2009, changes 
have been made to ensure that certain Sharia-compliant finance arrangements 
(including certain murabaha and musharakah arrangements) are taxed in a manner 
identical to the tax treatment of the equivalents of these isntruments in conventional 
finance. Further, under section 53 of the Finance Act 2007, the sukuk (a Shariah-
                                            
984 HM Treasury, The development of Islamic finance in the UK: the Government's perspective (2008),  
19. 
985 Jonathan Ercanbrack, 'The regulation of Islamic finance in the United Kingdom' (2011) 13 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 69, 73-74 
986 Supported by the Prudential Regulatory Authority. 
987 John Dewar, Munib Hussain, ‘United Kingdom’ in Rafael A Morales, Bishr Shiblaq (eds) Islamic 
Finance & Markets (Law Business Research Ltd, 2nd ed, 2014), 53. 54. 
988 As quoted in: Anon, 'Islamic banking expands in London' (Online, 26 April 2005) BBC News 
<http ://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/4487749.stm> accessed 24 November 2015. 
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compliant bond) will also be taxed in a manner similar to the tax treatmento 
conventional bonds).989 
The dual demand for a service that is Sharia compatible, but also provides the same 
benefits as conventional finance creates a tension that underlies the isomorphic 
pressure on the Islamic financial system operating in the context of the conventional 
financial system. Indeed, a recent, albeit small, study of consumer perception found 
that, with 45% of respondents noncommittal, 37% agreed or strongly agreed that 
Islamic financial products in the UK resembled those of conventional finance (8.5 
disagreed or strongly disagreed).990 A strong, standardised system of Sharia 
governance would be likely to lessen the tension between Sharia compliance and 
profitability, reducing the temptation to mimic conventional financial products. The 
need for such a system is highlighted by the risk that previously approved products 
will be legally challenged on the basis of Sharia non-compliance,991 and the refusal 
of English courts to treat Sharia as a system of law.992 The current ad hoc approach, 
with its limited formal oversight and lack of legal enforceability, simply serves to 
exacerbate the pressure to sacrifice the Islamic quality of the products and services 
for a greater competitive edge. 
As a final point, it is worth noting the approach of Al Rayan Bank (formerly known 
as the Islamic Bank of Britain) to its legal obligation to guarantee full return of any 
                                            
989 Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP,, ‘Islamic Finance & Markets’ (2014), Getting the Deal 
Through. 
990 Saeed Akbar, Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah, Shahin Kalmadi, 'An investigation of user perceptions of 
Islamic banking practices in the United Kingdom' (2012) 5 International Journal of Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Finance and Management 353, 363. 
991 The Investment Dar Company KSCC v Blom Devleopments Bank Sal [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch) , 
[16]. See also: Nicholas HD Foster, 'Encounters between systems: recent cases concerning Islamic 
commercial law in secular courts' (November/December 2006) Issue 68 Amicus Curiae 2. 
992 Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems NV & Others [2002] 
All ER (D) 171; Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2004] 1 WLR 1784; 
[2004] EWCA Civ 19. 
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deposits paid into Mudaraba saving accounts regardless of any capital losses.993 In 
order to both comply with English law, while retaining, as far as possible, the Islamic 
character of the product, the solution designed by the SSB was to offer the customer 
the full amount accompanied by a statement explaining that accepting the payment 
would be inconsistent with Sharia. In this way, the Bank sought to meet the 
conflicting obligations through transparently shifting the onus of Sharia compliance 
on to the customer. Despite this innovative solution, the current legal regulation has 
impacted on the use of two-tier Mudarabas, which have been used infrequently with 
banks preferring more secure investments that reduce the risk of a shortfall. While 
this example shows how innovative solutions may be designed to overcome 
regulatory constraints, it also demonstrates how regulation based on conventional 
finance can shape the development of Islamic finance and restrict its use of 
characteristically Islamic financial devices. Furthermore, forcing the banks to find 
innovative solutions to such issues may exacerbate the lack of standardisation as 





The UK's approach has been to encourage the development of Islamic finance for 
primarily economic reasons, altering tax laws to remove barriers and maintaining a 
unitary system of regulation that effectively leaves Sharia governance as a matter of 
self-regulation for each individual organisation. The Malaysian government, like the 
UK government, was, and is, economically motivated to encourage the growth of 
                                            
993 For a criticism of the regulatory  approach to this issue, see: Abdul Karim Aldohni, The Legal and 
Regulatory Aspects of Islamic Banking: A comparative look at the United Kingdom and Malaysia 
(Routledge 2011), 175-179. 
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Islamic finance.994 Unlike the UK government, however, and perhaps because of its 
desire to counter the effects of its previous secular approach to the economy,995 it has 
taken the completely opposite approach, imposing specific regulations for issues that 
are specific to Islamic finance.996 Under the 'comprehensive regulatory and 
supervisory framework', which establishes a 'strong Shari'ah framework',997 Islamic 
banks are required to have an internal Sharia Committee (SC),998 which is overseen 
by a national central Sharia board.999 This central board, the Sharia Advisory 
Council (SAC) is given a formal legal status by s 51 of the Central Bank of Malaysia 
Act 2009. It is operated by the central bank of Negara Malaysia (BNM) and, along 
with the internal SC, is part of a 'two-tier Sharia governance infrastructure'.1000  
 
The SAC is responsible for resolving differences of opinions regarding Sharia 
compliance. Under s 55 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, financial 
institutions may refer to the SAC for advice or a ruling on a Sharia matter. Under s 
56, arbitrators and courts must take into account any previously published SAC 
ruling and must refer a Sharia issue to the SAC for resolution. Under s 57, any 
rulings that result from a referral to the SAC are binding on the body making the 
referral. Under s 58, any inconsistent ruling by an Islamic financial institution is 
overridden by the SAC ruling. These provisions are given further force by section 29 
                                            
994 Daromir Rudnyckyj, 'Islamic Finance and the Afterlives of Development in Malaysia' (2014) 37 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 69, 72. 
995 Ibid. 
996 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 13. 
997 Baljeet Kaur Grewal, 'Constraints on Growth in Islamic Finance' (Amman, Jordan 2011) IFSB 4th 
Public Lecture on Financial Policy  and Stability, 20-21. 
998 Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, s 30(1). 
999 BNM, Sharia Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions (2010) BNM/RH/GL 012-
3, 1.2. 
1000 Sulaiman Abdullah Saif Alnasser, Joriah Muhammed, 'Introduction to corporate governance from 
Islamic perspective'  (2012) 28 Humanomics 220, 223. 
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of the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, which allows the BNM to issue 
obligatory standards based on SAC advice or rulings.  
 
Through these provisions, and its supreme role in resolving disputes over Sharia 
compliance, the SAC plays a crucial role in developing a standardised approach to 
Sharia compliance,1001 at least on a national level. It should be noted that this 
authority is restricted to the banking and Takaful industries, with the Islamic Capital 
Market regulated by the Malaysian Securities Commission, the Bursa Malaysia and 
the Lubuan Financial Services Authority, all of which have their own Sharia 
advisors.1002 The problem caused by having multiple regulatory bodies, however, is 
addressed to a large extent by the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013. Under s 152, 
the BNM has the authority to: 
specify standards or issue codes for the purposes of developing, or 
maintaining orderly conditions or the integrity of, and ensuring 
compliance with Shariah in, the Islamic money market or the 
Islamic foreign exchange market.  
Furthermore, under s 154(1) the BNM is required to: 
enter into arrangements with relevant supervisory authorities to 
coordinate on the regulation of Islamic financial instruments traded 
in the Islamic money market which are within the purview and 
oversight of the relevant supervisory authorities. 
Both of these provisions should reduce the risk of diverse Sharia standards or 
rulings. 
                                            
1001 Amir Shaharuddin, 'Shariah Governance of Malaysian Islamic Banking Institutions'  (2011) 14 
Jurnal Ekonom 53, 55. 
1002 Rusni Hassan, Mohammad Azam Hussain, 'Scrutinizing the Malaysian Regulatory  Framework on 
Shari'ah Advisors for Islamic Financial Institutions' (2013) 2 Journal of Islamic Finance 38, 42. 
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As with SSBs in the UK, the main role of Malaysian SCs is to ensure that all 
business activity complies with the Sharia. This includes certifying new products, 
but also monitoring the marketing and information provided as part of the product 
release. The members of the internal SCs are appointed and paid by the individual 
banks, raising the issue of independence. In order to reinforce the independence of 
the internal SC, removals, appointments and re-appointments of board members must 
be approved by the central SAC.1003 Shaharuddin suggests, on the basis of interviews 
with four Sharia Scholars that, in practice, there is little need to be concerned with 
the issue of independence.1004 It is, however, unlikely that Sharia scholars, 
particularly when named, will admit that they lack independence. On the other hand, 
it could plausibly be argued that the oversight provided by the central SAC will deter 
any undue pressure on internal SCs to issue favourable fatwas. A contrary ruling by 
the SAC on the Sharia compliance of a new product may undermine confidence in 
the bank issuing the new product.1005 
 
The current BNM guidelines requires all Islamic banks 'to establish a sound and 
robust Shariah governance framework', which imposes ultimate responsibility for 
Sharia compliance on the board of directors. This responsibility is given a formal 
legal basis by s 28(1) of the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, which requires that: 
An institution shall at all times ensure that its aims and operations, 
business affairs and activities are in compliance with Shariah. 
                                            
1003 Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, ss 31, 33; BNM, Sharia Governance Framework for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (2010) BNM/RH/GL 012-3, 3.8 (Princip le 3). 
1004  Amir Shaharuddin, 'Shariah Governance of Malaysian Islamic Banking Institutions'  (2011) 14 
Jurnal Ekonom 53, 55. 
1005 This builds on the point made by the scholar Joni Tamkin in an interview as reported in: Amir 
Shaharuddin, 'Shariah Governance of Malaysian Islamic Banking Institutions'  (2011) 14 Jurnal 
Ekonom 53, 55. 
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As part of the Sharia governance framework, the BNM guidelines require an SC 
with a majority membership of 'persons with appropriate qualifications and 
experience in Shariah', and effective management to support the implementation of 
Sharia governance. The SC is required to issue and disseminate fatwas, while other 
elements of the framework, which include internal Sharia officers and auditors, must 
conduct: Sharia research; continuous Sharia review; regular Sharia audit; and Sharia 
risk management.1006 Although this framework is established in addition to the 
standard corporate governance arrangements, the guidelines emphasise that Sharia 
must be seen as the overarching principle governing all of the bank's activities.1007  
 
In the interests of efficiency, the guidelines allow smaller institutions to outsource 
Sharia governance, but only if the arrangements are approved by the BNM. For the 
same reason, financial groups may establish a single SC to serve all of the 
institutions within the group.1008 While this seems an entirely reasonable approach, it 
nevertheless highlights the tension between the need to impose rigorous standards 
and the need to ensure that Islamic banks remain competitive. Despite this, the 
guidelines impose more rigorous requirements than was previously the case. For 
example, rather than the more usual three members, the guidelines require that the 
SC has at least five members1009 and they should only sit on one SC within any 
particular industry sector.1010 Furthermore, these members, who must behave 
consistently with the requirements of professional ethics (principle 6), must be fit and 
                                            
1006 BNM, Sharia Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions (2010) BNM/RH/GL 
012-3, 1.3. 
1007 This is reinforced by the legal duties to ensure Sharia compliance under the Islamic Financial 
Services Act 2013, s 28. 
1008 BNM, Sharia Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions (2010) BNM/RH/GL 
012-3, 1.8-1.9. 
1009 Ibid, 2.3. 
1010 Ibid, 5.4. 
 298 
proper persons to serve on the SC and the majority must be qualified in Sharia.1011 
Under principle 4, the SC members, and any other person involved in the Sharia 
governance framework, which includes the board of directors, must maintain their 
knowledge of Sharia and remain up to date with developments in Islamic finance.   
 
As noted above, the internal SC is supported by suitably qualified Sharia officers, 
who are usually full-time employees of the bank and responsible for Sharia review, 
risk-management and research (principle 7). Where these functions are outsourced, 
the bank remains responsible to ensure that they are carried out effectively. The 
obligation to review Sharia practices has helped to fill a gap in Sharia governance 
that had previously focused almost exclusively on ex ante Sharia compliance.1012 In 
addition to these functions, the Sharia officers may be engaged to support the 
internal Sharia audit, which must be carried out by auditors with adequate training in 
Sharia. The guidelines require the audit to be performed at least annually for critical 
areas of bank activity. Thus, under the BNM guidelines, supported by the statutory 
obligations imposed by the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, Islamic banks must 
establish and maintain a comprehensive 'end-to-end' Sharia governance framework 
that manages the risk of Sharia non-compliance in all areas of banking activity and 
product development.1013 Despite these arrangements, a 2010 survey highlighted that 
there still remains much room for improvement of Sharia governance in practice.1014 
Consistent with the survey, it has been further noted that the internal auditors 
                                            
1011 Ibid, Appendix 2. See also Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, s 29(2). 
1012 Amir Shaharuddin, 'Shariah Governance of Malaysian Islamic Banking Institutions'  (2011) 14 
Jurnal Ekonom 53, 55-56. 
1013 Surianom Miskam, Muhammad Amrullah Nasrul, 'Shariah Governance in Islamic Finance: The 
Effects of the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013' (Langkawi, Malaysia, 25-26 November 2013) 
Proceedings of the World Conference on Integration of Knowledge 455, 455-456 
<http ://worldconferences.net/proceedings/wcik2013/toc/index.html> accessed 26 November 2015. 
1014 Mohammad Faiz Azmi, Sharia Audit: Industry Insights (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2011). 
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currently tend to have a conventional finance background and may lack sufficient 
training in Fiqh Muamalat or Usul Fiqh.1015 
 
Although Sharia governance is formalised through specific regulatory obligations, it 
remains distinct from corporate governance requirements (see figure 18). Thus, the 
relationship between corporate governance and Sharia governance is, as in the UK, 
one in which Sharia governance is implemented as an additional requirement. There 
is no attempt to construct a fully integrated system of Islamic governance and this is 
reflected in the three sets of guidelines produced by the BNM. There are corporate 
governance guidelines for conventional financial institutions,1016 corporate 
governance guidelines for Islamic financial institutions,1017 and separate Sharia 
governance guidelines.1018  
 
                                            
1015 Ahmad Faizal Abdul Aziz, 'Sharia Governance: Challenges Ahead' (2012) MPRA Paper No 4772, 
14-15. 
1016 BNM, Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions (amended, 2013) 
BNM/RH/GL 001-1. 
1017 BNM, Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Licensed Islamic Banks (amended, 2013) 
BNM/RH/GL 002-1 
1018 BNM, Sharia Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions (2010) BNM/RH/GL 
012-3. 
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Figure 18: Sharia governance, Malaysia 
 
As far as the corporate governance guidelines are concerned, the conventional and 
Islamic guidelines both rely on the same 14 principles of corporate governance. The 
key distinction lies in the references to compliance with Sharia in the guidelines for 
the Islamic financial institutions.1019 Thus, one of the Board of Directors' functions is 
to establish a Sharia Committee along with appropriate policies, processes and 
infrastructure to ensure that there is a 'comprehensive and effective Shariah 
framework'.1020 This creates a bridge between the corporate governance and Sharia 
governance arrangements, reinforced by the requirement for Sharia audit. Sharia 
                                            
1019 Tadashi Mizushima, 'Corporate Governance and Shariah Governance at Islamic Financial 
Institutions: Assessing from Current Practice in Malaysia' (2014) 22 Reitaku Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Studies 59, 70. 
1020 BNM, Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Licensed Islamic Banks (amended, 2013) 
BNM/RH/GL 002-1, 2.10(vi). 
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governance itself, however, remains an additional, but distinct obligation aimed at 
ensuring Sharia compliance.1021 
 
This approach to corporate and Sharia governance reflects the development of 
Islamic finance. As in the UK, Islamic finance in Malaysia coexists with 
conventional finance. Islamic finance is delivered by wholly Islamic banks, but also 
previously through the Islamic windows of conventional banks. To maximise the 
availability of Islamic finance, this arrangement was encouraged by tax breaks 
offered to conventional banks with these Islamic windows.1022 The Malaysian 
government's approach was to manage the growth of Islamic finance delivered by the 
private sector, with Islamic finance co-existing competitively with conventional 
finance. This is reflected in Rudnyckvj's observation that: 
The rhetoric of competition ... persists among many proponents of 
Islamic finance. Participants in my research often articulated the 
injunction that Islamic finance "must show that it can compete with 
conventional finance," a phrase reiterated by the country's leading 
officials.1023 
While the Islamic windows structure was ended in 2004, with the BNM requiring 
conventional banks to deliver Islamic finance through distinct subsidiaries,1024 
conventional and Islamic finance 'remain mutually entwined' with the subsidiaries 
                                            
1021 Tadashi Mizushima, 'Corporate Governance and Shariah Governance at Islamic Financial 
Institutions: Assessing from Current Practice in Malaysia' (2014) 22 Reitaku Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Studies 59, 72-73. 
1022 Daromir Rudnyckyj, 'Islamic Finance and the Afterlives of Development in Malaysia' (2014) 37 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 69, 77. 
1023 Daromir Rudnyckyj, 'Islamic Finance and the Afterlives of Development in Malaysia' (2014) 37 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 69, 78. 
1024 BNM, 'The Islamic Financial System' in the Annual Report (2005) 156, 157 
<http ://www.bnm.gov.my/files/publication/ar/en/2005/cp06.pdf> accessed 25 November 2015; 
Baljeet Kaur Grewal, 'Constraints on Growth in Islamic Finance' (Amman, Jordan 2011) IFSB 4th 
Public Lecture on Financial Policy  and Stability 19. 
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sometimes remaining financially dependent on their conventional "parents" to deal 
with issues of liquidity.1025  
 
In introducing the financial blueprint for Malaysia up until 2020, the governor of the 
BNM noted that: 
progressive liberalisation of the domestic financial sector has 
contributed to the further diversification of the financial system and 
its competitiveness ... The next phase of transformation ... will 
further enhance the competitiveness and dynamism of the financial 
sector.1026 
This approach, which relies on a highly competitive private sector and seeks to 
develop the global integration of the Malaysia within the international financial 
sector,1027 imposes on Islamic finance the competitive and mimetic isomorphic 
pressures faced by any relatively nascent activity developing in the context of an 
environment shaped by an already established and successful alternative. 
Recognising the potential threats to Islamic finance, which is seen as a crucial part of 
Malaysia's international financial integration, the Blueprint also highlights the need 
to continue strengthening the regulatory framework and promote 'greater 
harmonisation in Shariah interpretations'.1028 This goal may be advanced by the 
Malaysian-based Association of Sharia Advisors in Islamic Finance (ASAS), which 
was established in 2011,1029 and is seeking to establish standards for Sharia scholars 
sitting as members of Sharia boards in an attempt to reduce the problem of 
                                            
1025 Daromir Rudnyckyj, 'Islamic Finance and the Afterlives of Development in Malaysia' (2014) 37 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 69, 79. 
1026 BNM, Financial Sector Blueprint 2011-2020: Strengthening our future (2011), 6. 
1027 Ibid, 9, 19. 
1028 Ibid, 16. 
1029 ASAS website <http ://asas.my/> accessed 11 September 2016. 
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contradictory rulings and conflicts of interest.1030  Such efforts, however, may be 
hindered by the structure of the regulatory system, with different bodies responsible 
for the banking (and Takaful) and Islamic Capital Market sectors. To resolve this, it 
has been suggested that Malaysia should establish a supreme SSB that would govern 
all sectors of Malaysian Islamic financial system.1031 As noted earlier, this issue has, 
however, since been largely addressed by the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, ss 
152, 154, with the BNM and its SAC taking on the role of setting national standards.  
 
The SAC provides an additional level of Sharia governance, which should increase 
standardisation of Sharia compliance rulings within Malaysia. It does not, however, 
mean that it improves standardisation globally. This is shown by the example of the 
controversial Malaysian versions of Murabahah and Bai Bithaman Ajil Sukuk, which 
were approved by the SAC and internal Sharia Committees in Malaysia, but were 
prohibited elsewhere.1032 This divergence occurred despite some Sharia scholars 
sitting on boards in both Malaysia and in countries where the product was 
prohibited.1033 The divergence between the fatwas in Malaysia and those elsewhere 
may reflect, at least in part, the Malaysian marriage of Islam and capitalism in its 
approach to the economy.1034 The relevance of remaining competitive is further 
evidenced by the preference for debt-like financing through Murabahah and Bai 
                                            
1030 Bernardo Vizzcaino, 'Islamic finance body plans scholar accreditation, ethics code'  (online, 15 
August 2012) Al-Arabiya <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/15/232391.html> accessed 02 
August 2015. 
1031 Rusni Hassan, Mohammad Azam Hussain, 'Scrutinizing the Malaysian Regulatory  Framework on 
Shari'ah Advisors for Islamic Financial Institutions' (2013) 2 Journal of Islamic Finance 38, 42. 
1032 Hafizi ab Majid, Shahida Shahimi, Mohd Hafizuddin Syah Bangaan Abdullah, 'Sukuk defaults 
and Its Implication: A Case Study of Malaysian Capital Market' Paper Presented at 8th International 
Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance (Qatar, December 2011) 1, 10-11 
<http ://conference.qfis.edu.qa/app/media/267> accessed 25 November 2015. 
1033 Tadashi Mizushima, 'Corporate Governance and Shariah Governance at Islamic Financial 
Institutions: Assessing from Current Practice in Malaysia' (2014) 22 Reitaku Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Studies 59, 79. 
1034 Daromir Rudnyckyj, 'Islamic Finance and the Afterlives of Development in Malaysia' (2014) 37 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 69, 72, 75. 
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Bithaman Ajil rather than the more characteristically Islamic Mudarabah and 
Musharakah. For example, a study of the Bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad) showed an 
81.2% reliance on debt-like financing compared to a 0.66% reliance on Mudarabah 
and a 3.53% reliance on Musharakah.1035  
 
The relationship between conventional finance and Islamic finance is exacerbated by 
the historical lack of education and training available in Islamic finance, which 
meant that Islamic finance was an industry run on a day-to-day basis by conventional 
bankers who had converted to Islamic finance, bringing with them their conventional 
financial mindset.1036 The reliance of the Islamic finance system on the framework of 
conventional finance still persists.1037 Along with competition from conventional 
banks, this factor has been highlighted as one possible reason explaining the 
preference for debt-like products, which are more familiar to conventional 
finance.1038 Such a problem may be alleviated through comprehensive training and 
education in Islamic finance, such as that provided by the International Centre for 
Education in Islamic Finance,1039 but it is unlikely to completely divorce Islamic 
financial professionals from the influence of conventional economic theory. 
Nevertheless, the prospect of education in Islamic finance has, owing to the 
increasing demand for professionals in the area, now presented itself at elite business 
schools. The London Business School has, for example, considered introducing a 
                                            
1035 Abdus Samad, Norman D Gardner, Bradley  J Cook, 'Islamic banking and Finance in Theory  and 
Practice: The Experience of Malaysia and Bahrain' (2005) 22 The American Journal of Islamic Social 
Sciences 69, 78. 
1036 Dato' Mohd Razif Abd. Kadir, 'Responsibility Banking' (2009) 2 ISRA Bulletin 1, 2. 
1037 Ahmad Faizal Abdul Aziz, 'Sharia Governance: Challenges Ahead' (2012) MPRA Paper No 4772, 
8. 
1038 Abdus Samad, Norman D Gardner, Bradley  J Cook, 'Islamic banking and Finance in Theory  and 
Practice: The Experience of Malaysia and Bahrain' (2005) 22 The American Journal of Islamic Social 
Sciences 69, 82-83. 
1039 Daromir Rudnyckyj, 'Islamic Finance and the Afterlives of Development in Malaysia' (2014) 37 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 69, 80. 
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London-based course as an executive programme in Islamic finance 
fundamentals.1040 These moves towards formal education, examinations and, 
possibly, certified qualifications in Islamic finance principles could help standardise 
the practice of Islamic finance and resolve some of its tensions with conventional 
finance. 
 
Despite some persisting reservations, the approach adopted in Malaysia appears to 
have created a robust and comprehensive system of Sharia Governance. Reliance on 
both statutory law and regulatory guidelines, this approach balances formal 
enforceability with flexibility and responsiveness to changing circumstances. This 
should result in reliable standardised rulings on Sharia compliance, at least on a 
national basis. In marrying Islamic finance with a liberal capitalist approach to the 
economy, the Malaysian approach does, however, maintain the competitive and 
mimetic isomorphic pressure on Islamic finance to develop products that behave like 
their conventional counterparts. Consistent with this, it has been noted that the fatwas 
in Malaysia tend to be more permissive than fatwas issued in less liberal 
environments.1041 Thus, while the Malaysian approach provides a valuable model for 
the development of standardised Sharia governance, it leaves open a number of 
questions regarding: the influence of capitalism, particularly neoliberal capitalism, on 
Islamic finance; the proper goals of Islamic finance and how these may be better 
secured through regulation; the need for an integrated system of Islamic governance; 
and the need for standardisation on an international, as well as a national, level. 
                                            
1040 Jonathan Moules, ‘Demand rises for education in Islamic finance’ (2016), Financial Times. 
1041 Oliver Agha, 'Islamic Finance in the Gulf: A Practitioner's perspective' (2008) 1 Berkeley Journal 
of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law 179, 187-188. 
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5.1.3 The KSA 
 
As in the UK, in the KSA there is a single regulatory approach applying to all 
banks.1042 As such there is no formal regulatory framework governing Sharia 
compliance.1043 Since the Sharia is incorporated within the Constitution of the KSA 
and forms the supreme source of law,1044 it governs all aspects of life, including the 
commercial provision of Islamic finance. Formal governance, however, is left to the 
individual banks, operating under the influence of market pressures.1045 There is no 
central Sharia board in the KSA, with each Islamic bank having its own board, 
guided by the standards of the Islamic Fiqh Academy.1046 This is an international 
body established under the auspices of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC), which has three objectives, including that of achieving: 
theoretical and practical unity of the Islamic Ummah by striving to 
have Man conform his conduct to the principles of the Islamic 
Sharia at the individual, social as well as international levels.1047 
 
Since there is no formal Sharia governance framework, Islamic banks utilise Sharia 
boards as advisory bodies,1048 with no set requirements for qualifications, for the 
                                            
1042 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 13. 
1043 Rihab Grassa, 'Shariah supervisory systems in Islamic finance institutions across the OIC member 
countries' (2015) 23 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 135, 139; Ali Alshamrani, 'A 
Critical Evaluation of the Regulatory Framework for the Application of Islamic Financial Derivatives 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia' (2014) 2 Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance 269, 292-293. 
1044 Basic Law of Governance 1992, articles 7 and 8. 
1045 Rihab Grassa, 'Shariah supervisory systems in Islamic finance institutions across the OIC member 
countries'  (2015) 23 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 135, 140. 
1046 Hichem Hamza, 'Sharia governance in Islamic banks: effectiveness and supervision model' (2013) 
6 International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 226, 232. 
1047 OIC, 'Subsidiary ' <http ://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/page/?p_id=64&p_ref=33&lan=en> accessed 07 
December 2015. 
1048 The individual bank may have a policy  that makes decisions by the SB binding on its employees, 
with a penalty attached for any breach. See, eg, the Sharia policy  of the Al Rhaji Bank: Al Rhaji 
Bank, 'Shariah Board' (2014) <http ://www.alrajhi-capital.com/en/aboutus/Pages/shariahboard.aspx> 
accessed 08 December 2015. 
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composition of the Sharia board, for limits on multiple board membership, or for the 
duration of the appointment of Sharia board members.1049 More generally, the 
corporate governance obligations of all banks in the KSA are overseen by the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA),1050 which comprises the Central Bank and 
Supervisory Authority. Other financial institutions governed by the Capital Markets 
Authority.1051 In a speech by Hamad Al-Sayari, the Governor of the SAMA, the 
importance of good corporate governance for financial stability was discussed. It is 
interesting to note that the focus was on risk management and the efficiency needed 
for competitiveness and profitability. In this regard the speech could have been made 
almost entirely in the context of conventional finance. The sole reference to Islamic 
finance consisted of noting that SAMA participates on the Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB) and requires banks to follow the corporate governance guidelines 
issued by the IFSB.1052 It should, however, be noted that SAMA makes no formal 
requirements that Islamic banks apply IFSB guidelines other than those relating to 
the Capital Adequacy Standard.1053 The main corporate governance guidelines 
simply refer to the IFSB guidelines, but do not impose them as obligatory.1054 
Nevertheless, it appears from Al-Sayari's speech that there is an expectation that the 
IFSB guidelines will be relied upon. 
 
                                            
1049 Rihab Grassa, 'Shariah supervisory systems in Islamic finance institutions across the OIC member 
countries'  (2015) 23 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 135, 144. 
1050 Banking Control Law, Royal Decree No M/5, 11 June 1966.  
1051 Capital Market Law, Royal Decree No M/30, 31 July 2003; World Bank, Corporate Governance 
Country Assessment: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2009), 2. 
1052 Hamad Al-Sayari, 'Corporate governance for banks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia' (Institute of 
Banking, Riyadh 22-23 May 2007) Speech to the High-Level Roundtable Discussion for Bank 
Executives on Corporate Governance for Banks in Saudi Arabia.  
1053 SAMA, Basel II - SAMA's Detailed Guidance Document (2006), 160 <http ://www.sama.gov.sa/> 
accessed 07 December 2015. 
1054 SAMA, Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia (First Update 
2014), para 12 < http://www.sama.gov.sa> accessed 07 December 2015. 
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Corporate governance in the KSA is strongly influenced by the Anglo-American 
shareholder model that prioritises the maximisation of share value and the wealth of 
the owners.1055 As such, it creates a very similar governance framework to the UK. 
Corporate governance forms the central framework, with provisions for Sharia 
governance established as an additional advisory service where the bank provides 
Islamic finance. The Board of Directors bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring 
compliance with the corporate governance guidelines.1056 Under the 2006 guidelines 
issued by the IFSB, the bank, and hence the Board of Directors, must ensure that it: 
[has] in place an appropriate mechanism for obtaining rulings from 
Shari'ah scholars, applying fatawa and monitoring Shari'ah 
compliance in all aspects of their products, operations and 
activities.1057 
 
The most recent guidance from the IFSB confirm that, while banks must have a 
robust and independent system of Sharia governance, it is for the individual 
supervisory authorities to determine the precise structure and conditions of the 
framework.1058 Since SAMA is silent on the issue, it falls to the individual banks to 
determine an appropriate Sharia governance framework. Furthermore, as Lackmore 
notes, while both SAMA and the Capital Markets Authority: 
have the authority to implement the Islamic financial regulations 
proposed by the IFSB ... their responsibilities do not include 
                                            
1055 Yaser Fallatah, Denise Dickins, 'Corporate governance and firm performance and value in Saudi 
Arabia (2102) 6 African Journal of Business Management 10025, 10026. 
1056 SAMA, Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia (First Update 
2014), para 35 (princip le 3) < http ://www.sama.gov.sa> accessed 07 December 2015. 
1057 IFSB, Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance For Institutions Offering Only Islamic 
Financial Services (2006), princip le 3. 
1058 IFSB, Core Principles for Islamic Finance Regulation (Banking Segment) (2015) IFSB-17, CPIFR 
16 <http ://www.ifsb.org/published.php> accessed 07 December 2015. 
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monitoring the sharia compliance of Islamic financial services and 
products offered by domestic banks.1059  
This lack of engagement of the regulators in Sharia related activities 'allows for 
maximum innovation', but can also result in 'mixed messages' regarding Sharia 
compliance.1060 While the lack of regulation imposes no formal limits on product 
innovation, in practice the lack of a formal Sharia governance framework and central 
Sharia board, may cause a lack of confidence in the Islamic financial system and 
discourage innovation. This can lead to problems regarding specific products, such as 
sukuk and Islamic derivatives.1061 
 
While there is no formal Sharia compliance framework, all Islamic banks have their 
own Sharia boards, with members appointed by the boards of directors. The vast 
majority are Sharia scholars, but fewer have expertise in the financial side of things 
and banking experience is not required for selection. Because of this arrangement, 
there is a  lack of standardisation, with inconsistent fatwas issued by the Sharia 
boards of different banks.1062 Given that the KSA has a significant provision of 
Islamic finance through Islamic windows of conventional banks,1063 this creates an 
environment that allows the institutional influences of conventional finance and 
                                            
1059 Bedi Gunter Lackman, 'The Six Key Countries Driving Global Islamic Finance Growth' (2104) 6 
Nomura Journal of Capital Markets 1, 14. 
1060 Reem M Asaad, The Regulatory  Framework of Islamic Banking in Saudi Arabia, (2007) Paper 
Presented at the 17th Saudi Economic Association Forum, Riyadh, 02-07 June 2007, 6, 9 
<http ://www.cibafi.org/ControlPanel/documents/library/pdf/a85.pdf> accessed 08 December 2015. 
1061 Abdullah Abudllatef A Al Elshikh, Joseph Tanega, 'Sukuk structure and its regulatory  
environment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia' (2011) 5 Law and Financial Markets 183, 194; Ali 
Alshamrani, 'A Critical Evaluation of the Regulatory Framework for the Application of Islamic 
Financial Derivatives in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia' (2014) 2 Journal of Islamic Banking and 
Finance 269. 
1062 Bedi Gunter Lackman, 'The Six Key Countries Driving Global Islamic Finance Growth' (2104) 6 
Nomura Journal of Capital Markets 1, 14; See, eg, the example of the initial public offering of the 
Yanuba National Petroleum Company, which was deemed sharia compliant by some scholars, but not 
by others: Abdullah Abudllatef A Al Elshikh, Joseph Tanega, 'Sukuk structure and its regulatory  
environment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia' (2011) 5 Law and Financial Markets 183, 194. 
1063 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 11. 
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capitalism to affect the development of Islamic financial services and products. The 
impact of these institutions will nevertheless depend on the individual banks and 
their Sharia boards, which - along with the methods of Islamic fiqh  - may be a 
source of inconsistency.1064  As the Oxford Business Group noted in its 2014 Report 
on the KSA: 
SAMA has chosen to operate a relatively more relaxed regulatory 
framework with respect to Sharia compliance than many of its 
neighbours, a decision which has resulted in a diverse market in 
terms of products and services ... [this] allows Islamic financial 
institutions to assess the compatibility of their offerings with the 
precepts of sharia themselves - a process which is normally 
undertaken by an internal sharia board. The degree to which 
institutions adhere to sharia therefore varies considerably across the 
sector, with some banks marketing themselves as strictly Islamic 
and others taking a more conventional tack.1065 
It should, however, be remembered that the KSA is a conservative Islamic country, 
which will provide a counter balance to the pressures of competitive capitalism. 
5.2 The interview study exploring attitudes to Islamic finance 
5.2.1 Method 
 
The method was discussed in detail in section 1.6.2.2, but a brief summary here may 
be helpful. The study, which received ethical approval from the University of 
Westminster's Research Ethics Committee, comprised a semi-structured interview 
study of twenty participants. These participants were identified through a purposive 
                                            
1064 Ali Alshamrani, 'A Critical Evaluation of the Regulatory  Framework for the Application of 
Islamic Financial Derivatives in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia' (2014) 2 Journal of Islamic Banking 
and Finance 269, 298-299. 
1065 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Saudi Arabia (Oxford Business Group 2014), 108. 
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sampling method based on the inclusive criteria of: a professional role in Islamic 
finance; and experience of Islamic finance in the UK. the KSA or Malaysia. These 
interviews were conducted in person or by Skype, lasting for a maximum of one 
hour. The interviews were conducted in English or Arabic, recorded, translated into 
English where necessary, and transcribed. The transcripts were then subject to an 
interpretative analysis following McCracken's five stage method aimed at identifying 
'patterns of intertheme consistency and contradiction'.1066  
5.2.2 Demographic details 
 
Of the twenty interviewees, three were female and seventeen were male. Five of the 
interviewees were based in Malaysia, eight were based in the UK and seven were 
from the KSA.1067 The interviewees from Malaysia comprised: two Sharia advisors 
who hold academic posts and sit on a number of SCs, including the SAC of the 
BNM; a researcher at the International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic 
Finance (ISRA); a chief financial officer for an Islamic bank; and an academic from 
the International Islamic University. The interviewees from the UK were: three 
leading Islamic finance lawyers; four leading academics, including one with a 
background as an Islamic finance professional in the KSA and one who acted as a 
consultant to, inter alia, the IFSB and the Central Bank of Qatar; and an Islamic 
finance professional with experience working in Islamic finance for conventional and 
Islamic banks. The interviewees from the KSA were: three academics; an Islamic 
finance consultant who had previously been banking professional; a professional 
managing administrative and technical support for an Sharia board; a professional 
with a background in economics currently working for SAMA; a lawyer with a wide 
                                            
1066 Grant McCracken, The Long Interview ( Sage 1988), 42, 43-46. 
1067 The study involved 20 interviewees of whome 17 were male and 3 female. 5 interviewees were 
from Malaysia, 8 were from the UK and 7 were from the USA. 
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range of experience in Islamic finance, including acting as a member of Sharia 
boards and also as an arbitrator for Islamic finance disputes; 
5.2.3 The interpretative analysis of the interviews 
 
In analysing the interviews it became clear that, while there was not a complete 
consensus, there were nevertheless a number of common themes and associated 
tensions (figure 19) that coursed through the responses. The discussion will begin 
with a generalised description of the amalgamated themes and concepts identified 
from the analysis of the transcripts. This will be followed by a critical consideration 
of the key themes and concepts more specifically. This discussion will be structured 
around the three sections of the interview: Islamic finance and its relationship with 




Financial needs Religious needs










Figure 19: Themes and Tensions Identified from Interview Responses 
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The amalgamated thesis that may be abstracted from the interview responses is 
unsurprisingly founded on Sharia compliance as the central characteristic of Islamic 
finance, distinguishing it essentially from conventional finance. Thus, Islamic 
finance is faith based, ethical finance, subject to divine restrictions imposed by Allah. 
'Based on real economic activities',1068 'money is not a commodity', but simply a 
'medium of exchange'.1069 While profit is acceptable, it can not be made through the 
exploitation or oppression of other, which explains the characteristic prohibitions of 
riba, gharar and maysir. It is unimportant who provides Islamic finance (Muslim or 
non-Mulsim, conventional bank or dedicated Islamic bank), as long as it is Sharia 
compliant and meets people's financial needs in a way that is socially just and 
consistent with the Maqasid al-Sharia. By providing financial opportunities to both 
rich and poor, Islamic finance should be an alternative to conventional finance that 
uses money productively, benefits society and avoids making 'profit at the price of 
the people'.1070 To ensure that Islamic finance fulfils these goals it should be 
regulated by an 'end-to-end' system that has integrity, and is both trustworthy and 
transparent.1071 National regulation is important, but some attention needs to be given 
at an international level to cross-border transactions, standardised guidelines, and a 
professional association for Sharia scholars.  
 
In part one of the interview, the focus was on the nature and delivery of Islamic 
finance. Here the responses clearly indicated that the four core features of Islamic 
finance are: compliance with Sharia; 'participatory finance' based on risk sharing 
                                            
1068 Interviewee 2 (female researcher for ISRA, Malaysia). Interviewees 12 (male academic, UK), 13 
(male academic, UK) and 14 (male lawyer, UK with experience of working in Middle East) made 
similar points. 
1069 Interviewee 8 (male Islamic finance professional, UK). Interviewee 17 (male academic, KSA) 
made a similar point 
1070 Interviewee 2. 
1071 Interviewee 1 (female academic and Sharia advisor on SAC of Malaysian Central Bank); 
interviewee 2, 
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rather than risk transfer;1072 socially responsible and just investments that benefit 
society; and the productive use of money through trade in the "real" economy. It was 
seen as important to provide for Muslims an alternative to conventional finance, that 
meets both their financial and religious needs. These goals provide a crucial tension 
between profit and the constraints imposed by the need for Sharia compliance. For 
example, while interviewees 18 (male academic, KSA) and 19 (male Islamic finance 
professional, KSA) emphasised that Islamic banking is a commercial enterprise 
rather than a charity, interviewee 18 also explained that: ' banking should have moral 
side, to focus only on profit without moral view is useless'. This tension became 
something of a recurring theme, particularly in relation to the problem that Islamic 
finance has in the context of economic and regulatory frameworks designed 
specifically for conventional financial products and service.  
 
In discussing the relationship between Islamic and conventional products, for 
example, Interviewee 5 (female lawyer, UK) explained: 
When we look at what a conventional instrument offers and then 
we try and deploy Islamic principles to effectively come up with an 
Islamic economic equivalent of that and the reason for that is 
because the entire economic framework is based on conventional 
models. 
Interviewees 1, 2, 8, 14, 15 (male legally qualified Sharia scholar/advisor, KSA) and 
16 (male professional providing administrative and technical Sharia support, KSA) 
all explicitly noted the problem of Islamic finance having to operate within a 
conventional regulatory framework. Interviewee 14, for example, noted that: 
                                            
1072 Interviewee 7 (male academic, UK). Interviewees 11 (male lawyer, UK) and 17 made a similar 
point. 
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it goes back to the environment that Islamic financial sector has 
had to operate in and it is operating in a conventional economic 
space and that affects the perceptions of everyone in it, even 
subconsciously some times, so the bankers have come from 
conventional banking background. Consumers, even I would say 
Muslim consumers, I think they see what conventional banks do. 
Thus, as interviewee 2 explained, regulation designed for conventional finance has 
'forced the Islamic finance to eventually end up doing something just like 
conventional' and resulted in products that transfer risk rather than relying on the 
more characteristically Islamic model of risk sharing. Using the example of sukuk in 
Japan,1073 Interviewee 1 similarly suggested that the conventional regulatory 
framework favours debt-based financial products and services over those that are 
equity-based and can make it difficult for Islamic finance to fit standard regulatory 
classifications. 
 
Another theme that came through was that, it was generally accepted that Islamic 
financial products were modelled on conventional equivalents,1074 with Islamic 
equity financing remaining distinct. This was not necessarily seen as a bad thing, 
provided that the products remained Sharia compliant.1075 Sharia compliance is the 
                                            
1073 See, Elffie Chew, Liau Y-Sing, 'Japan Lacking Sukuk Rules Spurs Malaysia Debuts: Islamic 
Finance' (Online, 10 June 2014) Bloomberg Business 
<http ://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-09/japan-lacking-sukuk-rules-spurs-malaysia-
debuts-islamic-finance> accessed 11 September 2016. This looks likely  to change: Takahiko Wada, 
Bernardo Vizcaino, 'Japan's FSA explores opening Market to Islamic finance (Online, 26 February  
2015) Reuters <http ://www.reuters.com/article/islam-financing-japan-idUSL5N0W03Z420150226> 
accessed 11 September 2016.  
1074 The exception was interviewee 20 (male Islamic finance professional, Malaysia), who expressed 
the view that Islamic finance products did not copy conventional finance. 
1075 Interviewee 3 (male Sharia advisor and academic, Malaysia); interviewee 4 (male academic, 
Malaysia). 
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'bottom line'.1076 One particular problem, however, was noted by interviewees 4 and 
12. Interviewee 4 explained that:1077 
basically what people should be concerned about is ... the pricing of 
some of these products  --  pricing you use the conventional system 
-- the conventional system I think that is weird because they are 
still benchmarking against the interest rates. 
For interviewee 12 this was a 'major issue' and a future challenge for Islamic finance 
to: 'come up with the rent, you know, with an index, that reflects the ijara rate and 
doesn’t reflect the interest rates'. 
 
Three interconnected reasons were advanced to explain the mimicry, or 
"Islamisation" of conventional finance.1078 The first was that both Islamic and 
conventional finance had to meet similar financial needs.1079 A second explanation 
was that the regulatory and economic frameworks were based on conventional 
finance and these necessarily affected the development of Islamic financial 
products.1080 The third reason, was that the skill set of banking professionals and the 
framework of banks are conventional, which means that banking professionals are 
more comfortable with debt-based rather than equity-based financing.1081 
 
These explanations suggest three possible forces affecting the development of 
Islamic financial products. First, there is a competitive, demand-based force with the 
                                            
1076 Interviewee 3. 
1077 Interviewee 4,  
1078 The phrase 'Islamise it' was used by interviewee 3. 
1079 Interviewee 1;  interviewee 12, interviewee 13. 
1080 Interviewee2; interviewee 5; interviewee 10 (male regulatory  professional (economist), KSA); 
interviewee 14;  interviewee 15; interviewee 16. 
1081 Interviewee 6 (male academic with professional background, currently  UK, previously KSA); 
interviewee 14. 
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financial needs of customers influencing the nature of the products. As interviewee 6 
explained: 
On the demand side, there are forces also working which compel 
Islamic banks to basically offer the similar products very c lose to 
conventional because they are used to these products; 
and 
It is that people, when they go to banks, they expect services which 
are similar to conventional banks. 
 
Given its long history and well established products and services, it is likely that 
customer demand will be shaped by conventional finance and this then creates a 
pressure to provide an Islamic equivalent. As interviewee 19 commented:  
Islamic finance is only 30 years, which is in its infancy period ... It 
is in its infancy period and you want to compete with others that 
had been 200 to 300 years already?  So that they will do, they will 
just copy a contract ... And then they will just change the label and 
unfortunately they will claim that it is Islamic. 
In other words, conventional finance is far better established than Islamic finance and 
has shaped customer expectations, which then act on those providing Islamic finance 
and create a pressure to provide similar products and services. While not a direct 
influence, this is nevertheless the consequence of the institutional logics of the 
neoliberal capitalism that underlies conventional finance. 
 
Second, the regulatory and economic frameworks impose a direct pressure that 
requires products to fit into particular established categories. This direct force also 
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carries with it an ideological rationale. While the 2007 global financial crisis may 
have caused some tempering, regulatory and economic policies nevertheless remain 
essentially capitalist and neoliberal in nature. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 
three, Islamic finance grew up during the period that saw neoliberal capitalism 
ascend. Thus, during a crucial stage of its early development, Islamic finance was 
indirectly subject to the logics of neoliberal capitalism through its impact on 
conventional regulatory and economic frameworks. 
 
Third, as a young industry, Islamic finance necessarily had to rely on professionals 
educated under a conventional financial model. As interviewee 8 noted, Islamic 
finance is 'dominated by people who come from conventional backgrounds'. 
Although there may not be anything wrong with 'the industry leveraging of the 
expertise of non-Muslims and conventional bankers who may or may not be 
Muslim', it may nevertheless be a problem, since 'these people don’t necessarily have 
a very clear understanding of the end customer'. A related point was made by 
interviewee 14, who commented:1082 
Many of them come from the conventional banking background, so 
the issue is how much do they really know about Islamic finance.  I 
do not just mean the products ... but is there a real understanding of 
this Maqasid of Sharia. 
Furthermore, those professionals coming from a conventional background:1083 
don’t really care how they design a product or for whom they are 
designing a product.  They just want to make money and that I 
think is the fundamental problem with the industry.  
                                            
1082 A similar point was also made by  interviewee 19. 
1083 Interviewee 8. 
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These expressions of concern highlight the impact of a reliance on conventional 
finance, both educationally and professionally. As a consequence of this reliance, the 
norms and behavioural scripts of conventional finance, as shaped by the logics of 
neoliberal capitalism, are likely to impact on the development of Islamic finance 
frameworks, products and services. Where one's background is conventional finance 
then the starting point for innovation is likely to be conventional finance. However, 
this is not necessarily fatal to the further development of Islamic finance as, despite 
their differences in design, the starting point of many conventional investment 
banking products and Shariacompliant is their common focus on equity-linked 
financing. 
 
An additional theme expressed by a number of interviewees was the characterisation 
of Islamic finance as a young, nascent industry, which connects the development of 
Islamic financial products and services to the issue of competition. Interviewee 3, for 
example, stated: 
you have to be fair with Islamic finance because Islamic finance --  
I mean if you think Dubai Islamic bank as the first institutional 
Islamic Bank -- I mean it is just about 40 years back ... we are still 
new, we are still developing. 
Building on this theme of development in the context of an established conventional 
economic framework, Interviewee 5 commented that: 
we take something that is Islamic and we try and put it into a box 
that is conventional, because the entire external framework is 
conventional it would be too difficult to create effectively a new 
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world of -- a new economy entirely from the beginning ... There 
needs to be a process of adoption and change we can't do it in 
instantly. 
Drawing the connection between a young industry trying to grow within the 
environment of the already well established industry of conventional finance and the 
need to be competitive, Interviewee 4 explained: 
it needs to compete because it is relatively new in the financial 
environment so for you to be outstanding, you must stand out or for 
you to be able to stand out you must be outstanding, so you must 
come up with innovative products. 
 
The youth of Islamic finance has at least two consequences: the need to establish a 
foothold through competition with existing financial services; and the need to rely on 
existing expertise and knowledge. These two factors both create opportunities for the 
norms and behavioural scripts of conventional finance to influence and shape the 
development of Islamic finance.  Interviewee 19 explicitly drew a connection 
between the 'infancy' of Islamic finance and its need to compete with the more 
mature and established conventional finance, which created an incentive to: 'just 
copy a contract ... change the label and unfortunately they will claim that it is 
Islamic'. 
 
While competition with conventional finance may be the source of mimetic 
isomorphism,1084 generally, the interviewees saw competition as a good thing. 
Interviewee 1, for example, explained that it 'makes you strive to give your best' and 
                                            
1084 Interviewee 15 noted: 'The bottom line is the customer, or at least the vast majority of the 
customers will come to Islamic bank if they get the same terms and conditions, pretty much the same, 
but if there are major differences, they will just quit'. 
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interviewee 10 pointed out that competition with conventional finance drives 
innovation and creates opportunities for the two industries to learn from each other: 
that creates an incentive for scholars to go for opinions that they 
might have not gone for had there been no competition with the 
conventional Bank because they see that there is need for that and 
they want to develop this. 
This competition was seen as essentially driven by the norms of a competitive market 
environment1085 populated with 'price conscious' customers,1086 who are 'looking at 
dollars and cents'.1087 As interviewee 12 explained, Islamic finance 'has to compete at 
the same level of profitability, effic iency, and effectiveness ... Islam is an 
entrepreneurial finance'. 
 
Contrary to most of the views expressed, a minority of interviewees were not 
convinced that Islamic finance needed to compete.1088 Interviewee 19 suggested that 
Islamic and conventional finance could co-exist as co-operative partners in a 'win-
win game'. Interviewee 17 expressed the view that there was a demand from 
Muslims for Islamic finance 'to replace' rather than compete with conventional 
finance. However, this may be construed as the ultimate effect of successful 
competition with conventional finance. Interviewee 20 similarly explained that 
Islamic finance was targeting Muslims as 'people who would take the Islamic 
financing even if it is more costly'. Still, this is not to say that Islamic finance would 
nto compete with conventional finance; on the contrary, Islamic finance, here, 
competes directly with conventional finance, not on price, but on compliance with 
                                            
1085 Interviewee 3. 
1086 Interviewee 5. 
1087 Interviewee 1. 
1088 Interviewees 8, 17, 19 and 20. 
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Sharia principles. Interviewee 8 suggested that there may be no need to compete 
with conventional finance generally since the market for Islamic finance was 
different, although he accepted that there may be a need to compete in the market for 
ethical finance. It should be noted, however, that he did not claim there was no 
competition between conventional and Islamic finance, only that he was 'not sure 
they need to compete'. Both interviewees 1 and 6 also noted that IF served different 
consumer groups, which impacted on the need to compete. Interviewee 6 broke down 
the market for Islamic finance into three consumer groups: the devout Muslim; the 
pragmatic Muslim; and those for whom religion is not a factor. The devout Muslim 
will chose Islamic finance regardless, while the third group will generally opt for 
conventional finance. Pragmatic Muslims, however, will chose Islamic finance only 
if it offers the same service and returns as conventional finance. 
 
It is this group of pragmatic Muslims that drives the competition between Islamic 
and conventional finance. This competition is seen as necessary for the success of 
Islamic finance,1089 affecting the choices made by banks, who choose to develop 'less 
risky' options,1090 and prefer risk transference to risk sharing.1091 This profit driven 
competition1092 requires the banks to:1093 
look at where the cash flows are so if there is Islamic money 
available for particular types of investments, people will structure 
the deals to attract that that cash. 
                                            
1089 Interviewee 9, male, academic, KSA. 
1090 Interviewee 1, 
1091 Interviewee 2. 
1092 Interviewee 9. 
1093 Interviewee 5. 
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The pressure from customer demand encourages the banks to develop services and 
products that are 'similar to conventional' products and services.1094 Similarly, 
interviewee 3 explained that competition affects the development of Islamic financial 
products: 
because they have to provide and they have to keep up with the 
pace of the market -- you see -- what is the need of the people, what 
is the need of the market.  
 
There are, then, a number of themes that have emerged from the first part of the 
interviews, that help to explain the relationship between Islamic and conventional 
finance. These themes may be combined to form a claim about that relationship. This 
claim, which relies both on the themes identified in the interviews and the analysis of 
Islamic finance developed in the earlier chapters, is that: 
Islamic finance is a young industry that has necessarily had to rely 
on the expertise and knowledge base of conventional finance. It has 
grown up within the restrictions of regulatory and economic 
frameworks that are essentially conventional in nature. It has had 
to compete with conventional finance to establish its place in the 
market. All of these factors have combined to shape the 
development of Islamic financial services and products. These  
have inevitably been influenced by the neoliberal capitalist logics 
that have dominated conventional finance for the last 40 years, 
which spans the birth and growth of modern Islamic finance. 
Islamic finance should aspire to fulfilling the broader goals of 
                                            
1094 Interviewee 6. Interviewees 11 and 13 made similar points. 
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ethical finance though social justice and benefiting the community. 
The 'bottom line', however, remains the constraint that Islamic 
financial products and services must be at least technically Sharia-
compliant.  
This claim leads into part two of the interviews, which explores the interviewees' 
attitudes towards the current approaches to Sharia governance in the UK, Malaysia 
and the KSA. 
 
There was a general agreement that Sharia governance was a critical aspect of 
Islamic finance. It was seen as necessary or obligatory,1095 and 'the most important 
aspect of Sharia compliance'.1096 This is consistent with the idea that Sharia 
compliance 'is the very underpinning',1097 or 'heart of Islamic finance',1098 and 'the 
core of what is acceptable'.1099 Indeed, interviewee 17 explained that, without Sharia 
compliance 'there is no justification for Islamic finance'. There may, however, be a 
mismatch, since interviewee 8 complained that Sharia compliance is 'not being given 
the respect it deserves'. He explained that: 
conventional bankers dominate ... they tend to see it as a bit of a 
compliance department where you just get to tick the boxes.  
 
Where Muslims are simply seen as a potential market for financial products, and 
where Islamic finance is simply seen as a means of increasing profit by meeting the 
demand from that market, then the religious significance of Sharia compliance may 
take second place to efficiency and competitiveness. Taking a permissive approach 
                                            
1095 Interviewee 1; interviewee 4; interviewee 7. 
1096 Interviewee 10. 
1097 Interviewee 13. 
1098 Interviewee 1. 
1099 Interviewee 5. Interviewee 11 made a similar point. 
 325 
to Sharia compliance and focusing on form rather than substance may provide the 
bank with a competitive edge and leave the ordinary Muslim customer vulnerable to 
a breach of their trust that the product is genuinely Sharia compliant.1100 As 
interviewee 9 pointed out: 
even banks complain from competition aspect as some banks enjoy 
flexibility to offer more products and the client goes to these banks. 
The issue of whether Sharia governance should focus on compliance in a formal 
technical rather than a substantive spiritual sense was adverted to by Interviewee 14, 
who noted that: 
there is, I think, a debate going on, form over substance, I mean it 
is a very formalistic, legalistic in a Sharia context approach ... it 
boils down to the direction of Islamic finance, where it needs to go. 
 
For Interviewee 13, while the Islamic products may have avoided offending Islam by 
satisfying 'the letter of the law', the requirement for Sharia compliance 'hasn't gone 
far enough' with a failure to satisfy the 'substantive' requirement that the products be 
'really in keeping with Islamic principles'. According to Interviewee 15, this 
formalistic approach to Sharia compliance had burdened Islamic finance with 'a very 
serious credibility challenge'. For Interviewee 15, the problem is that:  
a little bit of manoeuvring here and there has changed that 
something which was accord of harm in Allah... has suddenly 
become a blessing from Allah and his prophet 
                                            
1100 Interviewee 17. 
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This was made possible, he explained, because in the context of Sharia governance: 
'there is no consistency, there is no basis, foundational basis'. As Interviewee 18 
explained: 
it is a big problem, If you said I’m an Islamic bank and I have 
compliance, whether weak or strong, ok, compliance with what ? 
with Sharia board, Fatwas (legal opinions)  or the principle of 
Islamic Finance (Sharia aims). 
 
Although there was a general agreement that Sharia governance was necessary, there 
were some different opinions on the most appropriate regulatory framework. Some 
form of regulation was seen as important for confidence and growth of the 
industry.1101 Interviewee 6 explained that Sharia compliance 'depend[s] on the 
regulatory regime' and, without adequate regulation 'it will be market driven and 
sometimes market driven products will be at the cost of Sharia compliance'. In 
institutional terms, this suggests that good regulation can counter the isomorphic 
pressures imposed by the need to be competitive in an otherwise liberal capitalist 
market. The influence of regulation may be both directly through the explicit rules, 
but also through its impact on the culture within the industry. As interviewee 1 noted, 
the risk of Sharia non-compliance depends on regulation and governance: 'better 
governance framework ... better culture of compliance'.  
 
Interviewee 7 also recognised the competitive pressure on banks, who are 'always 
pushing the boundaries' of what is acceptable. While interviewee 7 saw regulation as  
sovereign issue for the individual nation, he also emphasised that it was important at 
                                            
1101 Interviewee 2. Interviewee 19 made a similar point. 
 327 
both the national and organisational levels. At a national level, most of the 
interviewees identified the Malaysian model (see above) as the best example of 
Sharia governance within a national regulatory framework. Only interviewees 9 and 
10, both from the KSA, disagreed. While suggesting that Islamic finance did need 
national regulation, they were both against the Malaysian approach of a central 
Sharia board. At an international level, the problem of cross-border transactions was 
identified and associated with a lack of any international regulatory framework.1102 
Interviewee 5 pointed out that current regulation was 'ad hoc', noting that the 
AAOIFI and IFSB 'are extremely helpful', but lack 'industry wide compliance'. 
Interviewee 8 also emphasised the importance of the AAOIFI and the IFSB for 
helping to 'homogenise' rulings. 
 
While a degree of standardisation was seen as valuable, particularly in relation to the 
procedural aspect of Sharia governance, one theme that emerged from the interviews 
was the tension between standardisation and diversity. This tension was, for 
example, evident in the response of interviewee 8, who stated: 
I think that the diversity is helpful for innovation, so at this point in 
time, I am not keen on standardization because it actually stifles 
innovation ...  although I do believe that you know we do need 
regular discussion and forums and organizations like AAOIFI and 
IFSB to homogenize rulings across the world.  So we need to have 
the freedom to develop new products and also need to have a 
framework by which we are all accountable to.  So, I think it is 
helpful to have both. 
                                            
1102 Interviewee 4. 
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The tension was also expressed by interviewee 13, who explained that it: 
is a bit of a fine balance ... Enabling enough diversity, enough 
flexibility in decisions of what is Sharia compatible so that 
diversity of the law is respected, but on the other hand establishing 
enough of the framework so that in fact the industry is allowed to 
flourish by virtue of the certainty that the framework provides. 
 
In general, diversity of fatwas is seen as a permissible part of Sharia,1103 a 
characteristic part of the nature of Islamic jurisprudence, 'one of the beauties of our 
faith',1104 and something to be celebrated.1105 Diversity 'gives richness and 
options',1106 leads to debate and progress, which are signs of a healthy industry,1107 
and is good for innovation and competition.1108 Diversity is, however, an issue where 
it is deregulated or where regulation exists, but lacks the foundations of clear and 
principled standards.1109 
 
Both interviewees 9 and 6 drew the association between fatwas and law, arguing that 
both needed uniformity and certainty. Interviewee 6 explained that fatwas, like law, 
should be uniform at the national level, since they have a real impact on people's 
money and are 'not an academic exercise'.1110 Interviewee 9 suggested that diversity 
was desirable in the context of research, but 'within the organisation stage this is a 
disaster as laws are not to be legislated on probabilities or possibilities'. As both 
                                            
1103 Interviewees 3, 12, 14, 17, 19. 
1104 Interviewee 8. 
1105 Interviewee 4. 
1106 Interviewee 1. 
1107 Interviewee 7. 
1108 Interviewees 8, 16, 20. 
1109 Interviewees 12, 15. 
1110 Interviewee 18 similarly  suggested that business required the certainty of a single opinion. 
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interviewee 2 and 9 explicitly identified, too much diversity can lead to Sharia 
arbitrage and fatwa shopping.  
 
Interviewee 7 commented that:  
I do not think personally there is much of fatwa shopping ... they 
want to comply and they want a credible system, so I do not think 
in practice clients do that. 
The problem of fatwa shopping, however, was recognised by the majority of the 
interviewees.1111 A distinction was drawn between 'benign' fatwa shopping and fatwa 
shopping in the negative sense.1112 Benign fatwa shopping is where the Sharia board 
considers a range of opinions and opts for the one that best meets the needs of all the 
stakeholders, even if it is a minority view. Fatwa shopping in the negative sense, 
where the bank shops around for a Sharia scholar who will give the opinion that best 
suits its commercial need,1113 was seen as a serious issue,1114 unethical,1115 haram,1116 
and 'a dirty practice ... [that] happens amongst people who have hijacked the industry 
to make money out of it'.1117 The rationality of this was highlighted by a comment 
made by interviewee 10. This interviewee, who has a background in economics and 
works for SAMA - a conventional finance regulatory body - suggested that:  
[if I was a banker with] the opportunity to cherry pick scholars, I 
would be the happiest person on earth because I can cherry pick 
people who will provide me with the freedom of having the biggest 
suite of products that I could have. 
                                            
1111 Interviewee 13 stated that he had not seen it in practice. 
1112 Interviewees1, 4, 13. 
1113 Interviewee 16. 
1114 Interviewee 2, suggesting that the Goldman Sachs sukuk was an example. 
1115 Interviewee 9. 
1116 Interviewee 19. 
1117 Interviewee 8. 
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This rationale was given substance by the anecdotal experience of Interviewee 20, 
who explained: 
I can give you a more clear example which has came lately ... our 
HR has been called by a local bank here saying we are considering 
to recruit for our Sharia board the person who is currently serving 
in your Sharia and how conservative he is. That was a clear 
question. 
 
The general view of the interviewees was that regulation was required to limit the 
options for fatwa shopping. This included the suggestion that part of the problem was 
caused by some Sharia scholars issuing fatwas without really understanding the 
product.1118 While Sharia scholars were generally seen as trustworthy and deserving 
respect for their opinions, it was also suggested that in some cases the Sharia 
scholars were limited to understanding the legal form, but not the impact of the 
product,1119 or that they were being presented with inadequate information and were 
over-pressed.1120 This was seen as being an issue for regulation, to ensure that only 
appropriately qualified scholars are appointed to Sharia boards, but also as a 
professional issue requiring a national, or international,1121 professional association 
for Sharia scholars.1122 
Relatedly, the issue of conflicts of interest on Sharia boards arose.  Some 
interviewees felt that the commissions and salaries provided to the members of 
Sharia boards militated against the consistent application of the principles to 
                                            
1118 Interviewee 3. 
1119 Interviewee 3. 
1120 Interviewee 2. 
1121 Interviewee 4. 
1122 Interviewee 3, referring to the Malaysian Association of Sharia Advisors, which has a Code of 
Conduct. Interviewee 14 also suggested a professional body for Sharia scholars. 
 331 
instruments for which authorisation was sought. While reputational concerns of 
board members may work to reduce the likelihood of granting approvals for the sake 
of commissions, thiese concerns are unlikely to apply uniformly across the market. 
 
The suggestion that there should be an international, or at least a national, 
professional association for Sharia scholars connects to the third part of the 
interview, which was focused on how Sharia governance should be reformed or 
developed. Here there was general agreement that any formal regulation should be 
nationally based. International or regional Sharia boards were generally not seen as 
viable or feasible. Rather than attempting formal international regulation, the theme 
that emerged from the interviews was for some form of international body to issue 
guidelines and standards, but that, for reasons of sovereignty,1123 it should be for 
national regulators to implement and enforce those that are appropriate given the 
particular context of the relevant country. The AAOIFI was seen as one possibility, 
but the current framework would need to be developed to ensure standards are 
regulatory driven rather than market driven.1124 It was also acknowledged that 
currently there was an issue with the lack of implementation of guidelines and 
standards issued by the AAOIFI.1125 Indeed, as interviewee 15 noted: 'Even AAOIFI 
standards ... Are not followed by the members of the AAOIFI'. In addition to 
enhancing the role of AAOIFI, a greater role was also envisaged for the OIC Fiqh 
Academy, which could push for international regulation, or establish an influential 
international committee of Sharia Scholars. 
 
                                            
1123 Interviewee 17. 
1124 Interviewee 3; interviewee 6. 
1125 Interviewee 2. 
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On a national level, as noted earlier, the Malaysian model of specific regulation for 
Islamic finance, along with a central Sharia committee was generally seen as the best 
way forward, possibly harmonised through a Model Law.1126 The two interviewees 
from the KSA, however, were firmly against a central Sharia committee. Interviewee 
9 explained:  
We do not want a Higher Sharia Board, as we may expect an 
undesired rejection of a product as a result of difference of 
opinions. We want standards issues by Central Banks, so that 
transactions would not be delayed for months. 
On a national level, both external and self-regulation were seen as important.1127 Any 
such system should be consistent, transparent, credible and robust.1128 It should focus 
on substance rather than just the form of Islamic financial products and services.1129 
It should, furthermore, provide a clearly defined framework of responsibility and 
accountability1130 that restricts the opportunities for conflicts of interest.1131 Again 
the tension between diversity and standardisation emerged as a theme, with 
interviewees emphasising the need for general standards that contain sufficient 
flexibility to allow the diversity necessary for competition and choice.1132 In this 
regard, and again highlighting both the issue of the youth of the industry and the 
tension between diversity and compliance, interviewee 1 suggested that flexibility 
and diversity was important to allow Islamic finance to become established, but 
'when all situations become better, we should now strive for narrowing diversity'. 
                                            
1126 Interviewees 13, 16, 18. 
1127 Interviewee 1. Interviewee 11 also emphasised the need for external regulation. 
1128 Interviewees 5, 7, 12, 16. 
1129 Interviewees 12, 15. 
1130 Interviewees 12, 14, 20. 
1131 Interviewees 11, 20. 
1132 Interviewee 1; interviewee 9. 
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5.2.4 Summary of the findings from the analysis of the interviews 
 
A number of themes emerged from the interviews. These included: the tension 
between the need to make a profit and the need to ensure Sharia compliance;  the 
problem for Islamic finance in fitting into established conventional economic and 
regulatory frameworks; that customer and market demand, combined with the 
existing frameworks and the need to rely on conventional financial structures and 
expertise, created a pressure that resulted in Islamic financial products and services 
being modelled on conventional financial equivalents; that competition is an 
inevitable driving force, helping to shape the development of Islamic finance; that 
Sharia compliance was fundamental and required Sharia governance within a 
national regulatory framework; that there was a tension between the need for 
diversity and standardisation, which should be recognised by the regulatory 
framework; and that existing international bodies should be developed to improve the 
implementation of international standards and guidelines, but that any enforcement 
should be at the national level.  
 
One additional theme that should be emphasised is that Islamic finance, in its current 
form,  is a young industry in the process of establishing itself and defining its 
identity. It cannot, however, remain a ‘nascent’ industry forever. If Islamic finance is 
to mature into the industry it should be, with a strong identity as a genuine ethical 
alternative to conventional finance, then it needs to focus its attention on Sharia 
governance within a broader regulatory framework.  Islamic finance should also 
serve the wider goals of Islam, the goals of social justice and community benefit that 
may be characterised as the spirit of Sharia. How far Islamic finance succeeds in 
defining itself in these terms, as consistently both technically Sharia compliant and 
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ethically motivated, will depend to a large extent on the development of an 
appropriate regulatory structure to counter the neoliberal capitalist scripts that treat 
money as a valuable intrinsic end in itself. This, however, requires the industry to 
decide on how it should be regulated and, where relevant, to lobby for change in 
national law to support that necessary regulatory framework. 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
The chapter began with an explication of the existing approaches to Sharia 
governance in the UK, Malaysia and the KSA. This served two purposes. First, it 
built on the more theoretical discussion of Sharia governance in chapter four. 
Second, it provided the context for the interviews. These initial vignettes identified a 
generally supportive environment in all three jurisdictions, but with quite different 
regulatory approaches. While Sharia governance was left to the individual 
institutions in both the UK and the KSA, Malaysia has established a rigorous 
regulatory structure based on regulation through the Central Bank, and the 
standardisation of fatwas through the central Sharia Advisory Committee. 
 
Having provided the background context for the qualitative interview study, the 
second part of the chapter focused on the analysis of the interviews. It would perhaps 
be unduly repetitive to repeat the conclusion to that study here. Rather, it is more 
relevant to note that the themes identified in those interviews will feed into the 
discussion of regulatory reform that provides the focus for the subsequent chapter. 
That discussion will build on the analysis of the interviews presented in this chapter. 
It will integrate the themes identified into a wider debate regarding the options for 
reform, also taking into account the analyses of earlier chapters. This will allow the 
strengths and weaknesses of the options to be considered, and a recommendation 
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made for the future development of Sharia governance and the regulation of Islamic 
finance. 
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Chapter Six: Islamic Finance and the Future of Sharia Governance 
 
In this thesis, the Sharia governance of Islamic finance has been explored. From an 
analysis of the literature it is apparent that there are two essential concerns with 
Islamic finance. First there is the issue of inconsistent fatwas that results from a 
diversity of opinion and a lack of standardised and formal approach to Sharia 
governance. This can lead to Sharia arbitrage and fatwa shopping. The second, and 
related, issue is the criticism that Islamic financial products are Sharia compliant 
only in form and not in spirit. This has resulted in products that are technically 
compliant, but are not seen as characteristically "Islamic", bearing little relation to 
the Maqasid al-Sharia. Both of these concerns were also apparent in the interview 
responses discussed in chapter five.   
 
Relying on the methodological approach of new institutionalism, it was argued that, 
when combined with Islamic fiqh, which allows for a diversity of opinion, these two 
concerns resulted from the competitive, normative and mimetic isomorphic influence 
of conventional finance and the institutional logics of neoliberal capitalism. One of 
the major themes that emerged from the interviews was that Islamic finance was still 
a new industry. This characterisation of Islamic finance as a nascent industry trying 
to find its feet in a competitive and capitalist global environment dominated by 
conventional finance was presented as an apologetic explanation for the current state 
of Islamic finance and Sharia governance. This is not to suggest that the interviewees 
saw Islamic finance as being in a bad way. All of the interviewees were very positive 
about the development of Islamic finance over the 40 years of its modern 
renaissance. It was, however, clear that they all acknowledged the two Sharia 
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compliance issues noted above and saw room for improvement in the regulation and 
Sharia governance of Islamic finance. 
 
There are, then, two aspects of the current approach to Islamic financial products and 
services that may benefit from reforming Sharia Governance. These are: an increase 
in reliability through the standardisation of the process, which may also have the 
benefit of reducing human resource demands;1133 and an improvement in the Islamic 
quality of the products and services through a greater focus on compliance with the 
spirit of Sharia as well as its formal elements. In this chapter, the question of how 
Sharia governance might be reformed to achieve these goals will be addressed. This 
involves engaging with Sharia governance at three different levels: the level of the 
firm; the national level; and the international level. A complete solution that provides 
a comprehensive  and coherent framework for Sharia governance must engage with 
all of these levels. For each level there are a number of options that may be combined 
to construct just such a framework. First, the features of an ideal regulatory system of 
Sharia governance will be discussed. This will include consideration of the 
institutional relevance of regulation. Second, the options available at each of the 
three levels will be examined. The final stage will be to explore how these options 
might be combined to produce a comprehensive framework that is capable of 
providing a globally standardised approach to Sharia governance. 
 
As a final point in this introductory section it should be noted that reforming Sharia 
governance is not simply about a structural solution that standardises the process. 
While this is an important part of the reforms, it is also important to address the 
                                            
1133 Volker Nienhaus, 'Human Resource Management of Islamic Banks: Responses to Conceptual and 
Technical Challenges' in Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim (eds), Islamic Finance: The New 
Regulatory Challenge (e-book 2nd ed, Wiley  2013), § 3.2. 
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institutional influence of any regulatory system. As noted above, one of the concerns 
for Islamic finance is the ongoing influence of the institutional logics of neoliberal 
capitalism. The interaction between the logics of neoliberal capitalism with those of 
Islam and the Sharia create a number of tensions that have shaped the structures, 
products and services of Islamic finance resulting in a 'conventionalisation of Islamic 
banking and finance'.1134 As was readily apparent from the interview responses, these 
tensions include: the need to generate a profit and the need to ensure Sharia 
compliance; the need to compete with conventional finance within existing economic 
and regulatory frameworks specifically developed for conventional rather than 
Islamic finance; the need to rely on conventional finance expertise while trying to 
develop a genuinely Islamic alternative; the distinction between compliance in form 
and compliance in spirit; and the need for both diversity and standardisation.  
 
In seeking to manage these tensions, reform of Sharia governance should be 
concerned both with the structure of the framework and also with its potential for its 
institutional logics to reinforce Islamic norms as the dominant cultural force driving 
Islamic finance. Properly designed, a comprehensive and coherent Sharia 
governance framework should enhance the ability of Islamic finance to resist the 
institutional influences of conventional finance and neoliberal capitalism, with its 
very different attitudes to money, interest and social justice. As Mizushima has 
noted: 
Shariah governance is one of the cornerstones that will determine 
how successful Islamic finance will be in the years to come. It is in 
Shariah governance that we will find the issue of whether Islamic 
                                            
1134 Humayon Dar (ed), Global Islamic Finance Report 2012 (2012), 44 
<http ://gifr.net/gifr_2012.htm> accessed 01 February  2016.  
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finance is really Islamic (in terms of its achievement of social 
justice) or just a copy of Wall Street products with Islamic 
wrappings.1135 
At present, as Song et al have noted, 'there is yet no internationally generally 
accepted legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework dealing with Islamic 
banking'.1136 If Islamic Finance is to develop from a nascent to a mature alternative to 
conventional finance, it needs a coherent and comprehensive framework for Sharia 
governance to ensure public confidence in the very feature that truly distinguishes 
Islamic from conventional finance. 
6.1 The features of an ideal regulatory system of Sharia governance 
 
A prerequisite for any effective system of regulation is that the regulatory objectives 
are clear.1137 In the context of Sharia governance, the need to ensure Sharia 
compliance is, at least superficially, a clear goal that can be used to as a focus for the 
design of an appropriate system of regulation. The apparent clarity of this objective, 
however, conceals two underlying issues, both of which were apparent in the 
interview responses discussed in chapter five. First, is the tension between 
standardisation and diversity.  
 
While some degree of standardisation is seen as beneficial, diversity of fatwas is also 
considered important for the innovation necessary for the development of Islamic 
finance and its ability to survive in a competitive environment. Furthermore, the 
freedom to issue diverse fatwas is seen as entirely consistent with Islamic fiqh. 
                                            
1135 Tadashi Mizushima, 'Corporate Governance and Shariah Governance at Islamic Financial 
Institutions: Assessing from Current Practice in Malaysia' (2014) 22 Reitaku Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Studies 59, 83. 
1136 Inwon Song, Carel Oosthuizen, 'Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and 
Challenges' (2014) IMF Working Paper WP/14/220, 8. 
1137 Robert Baldwin, Julia Black, 'Really  Responsive Regulation' (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59. 
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Interviewee 8, for example, commented that 'one of the beauty of our faith ... [is the] 
freedom of flexibility'. Interviewee 5, a lawyer specialising in Islamic finance, 
explained that fatwas are: 
like legal opinions. We as a law firm can issue an opinion.  It is 
quite possible for another firm to take a different view and 
providing we can justify our view and they can justify their view. 
In a way, it's up to the client to decide what works for them.  
She went on to acknowledge that inconsistent legal opinions can be resolved by the 
judgment of the court while: 
It's very difficult with the fatwa to have a final arbitration as to 
what is acceptable or not.   
This, however, was not 'the end of the world'. Rather: 
It is OK to have a range of interpretation and values. Then the 
customer decides what is acceptable. 
 
Although interviewee 5 suggests that it is difficult to subject fatwas to a final 
arbitration, this may be a reflection of her location in the UK, which does not 
recognise Sharia law as a national legal system under the Rome Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, as implemented by the Contracts 
(Applicable Law) Act 1990.1138 As was discussed in chapter five, however, Malaysia 
has enacted the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, which provides the central SAC 
with the authority to resolve any differences of opinion regarding Sharia compliance. 
Under s 56, both courts and arbitrators must refer Sharia issues to the SAC for 
resolution, which is then binding under s 57. This suggests that there are at least two 
                                            
1138 Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 19; [2004] 1 
WLR 1784, [40]. 
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options for a regulatory system: the restriction of diversity through a central Sharia 
board with the same authority afforded to the Malaysian SAC; or the acceptance of 
diversity coupled with an obligation of transparency with regard to any fatwas 
issued, including reference to and explanation of, any differences of opinion. These 
solutions  will be returned to later. 
 
The second underlying issue that must be determined if the regulatory objectives are 
to be clear, is the question of whether Sharia governance should aim simply for 
technical compliance or for the more demanding requirement of ensuring that the 
products and services are consistent with the spirit of Sharia reflected in Islam's 
approach to the nature of money, social justice and community benefit. As was 
discussed in chapter five, it was apparent from the interview responses that technical 
compliance is the "bottom line". It was seen as better to have technically compliant 
Islamic finance to meet the basic religious needs of Muslim clients, than to provide 
no alternative to conventional finance. Imperfect Islamic finance is better than 
nothing.1139 This was particularly so given the relative youth of Islamic finance as an 
industry trying to compete for a foothold in the global world of conventional finance. 
It was also apparent, however, that it would be better for Islamic finance to aim for 
genuinely Islamic finance, which is not simply about the prohibition of interest, but 
'is about the real economy and ... the nature of money'.1140 For example, in discussing 
Islamic finance in Malaysia, interviewee 2 commented: 
when we first started the Islamic finance and banking in Malaysia it 
was very much into giving an alternative to the consumers that ... is 
not interest based banking -- you know its Islamic banking. We are 
                                            
1139 Abdul Karim Aldohni, 'The Emergence of Islamic Banking in the UK: A Comparative Study with 
Muslim Countries' (2008) 22 Arab Law Quarterly 180, 186. 
1140 Interviewee 8. 
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done with that period. Now we are moving towards -- not only we 
say that this is Halal banking but it must be halal and tayyib.1141 
It not simply a matter of technical Sharia compliance, of ticking boxes,1142 rather it is 
about the product as a whole and: 
[its] impact ... [on] the economy... [and] the environment ... 
[and]society, to this many things that is affected by this banking 
and finance ... what we are trying to push forward in Islamic 
finance is a socially responsible investment ok. Not only we 
produce product that is in Sharia compliance, but it makes sure that 
it has -- it gives benefit 
In a similar vein, interviewee 3 suggested that: 
we have to go beyond the legality of the product that we are 
proposing – into looking at the impact of the instrument that we are 
offering people that people can say, "oh yes it is different between 
the  Islamic and also the conventional". 
It is therefore important to look at what motivates moral compliance with Sharia 
principles. In Islamic theoology, the model of interest is rejected because it serves to 
objectify time as a material entity from which rents can be extracted through 
interest.1143  Thus the underlying moral concern with Islam’s prohibition of riba is 
with the conception of time as a godr from God, whose commodification would be 
seen as incompatible with  Sharia principles. 
 
More broadly, practitioners of Islamic finance seek to “align themselves morally with 
corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investing movements in the 
way they expect to receive profit on investments while at the same time improving 
upon moral imperatives, such as building community and fostering healthy business 
practices”.1144 
 
                                            
1141 While halal refers to the permitted, tayyib goes beyond this and refers to the good, wholesome, 
fair and lawful. 
1142 Interviewee 12. 
1143 Wilson, Rodney, ‘Islamic Finance’ (1997), FT Financial Publishing, London. 
1144 Karen Hunt Ahmed, Islamic banking and Finance: Moral beliefs and business practices at work 
(2009), De Paul University . 
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Beyond the need for clear objectives, a good system of regulation should be 
coordinated, coherent, efficient and effective.1145 While it is certainly important for 
regulation to be efficient and cost-effective, this does not mean that the quality of any 
Sharia compliance regulatory framework can be fully determined by its ability to 
maximise wealth. Because of its religious and moral significance, Sharia compliance 
cannot be fully reduced to an economic value. It is, therefore, important to consider 
other benchmarks of good regulation to guide the design of a suitable framework. 
Efficiency is an important factor, but wealth maximisation should be secondary to 
protecting the moral and religious integrity of Islamic finance.   
 
A significant issue for Sharia governance is, that in countries like the UK and the 
KSA, the arrangements are ad hoc and left as a matter of self-regulation for the 
individual firms with little, if any, central oversight. This lack of any coherent 
coordination is one aspect of the regulation of Sharia compliance that could be 
improved through the standardisation of national frameworks, backed by 
international coordination. The lack of any central oversight and administration also 
creates a problem of accountability. In the absence of any external regulatory 
framework, accountability is essentially a matter for the individual firm. This is 
particularly problematic given the tension between profit and Sharia compliance that 
is inherent to Islamic finance operating within the context of an environment 
dominated by conventional finance and neoliberal capitalism. 
 
Accountability is an important component of Baldwin et al's five  criteria for 
assessing the quality of the regulatory framework: 
                                            
1145 Robert Baldwin, Julia Black, 'Really  Responsive Regulation' (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59, 
59, 71. 
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 legitimisation of the regulatory framework by legislative authority; 
 appropriate system of accountability; 
 'fair, accessible, and open' procedures; 
 sufficiently expert regulators; and 
 efficiency.1146 
The need for accountability is also emphasised by the UK Better Regulation Task 
Force, which included it as one of its five key regulatory principles.1147 As already 
noted, an ad hoc system of self regulation tends to lack adequate accountability and 
this was an issue highlighted by some of the interviewees.1148 The approach taken in 
Malaysia, however, of ensuring central oversight of Sharia governance, by the 
Central Bank and the SAC (see chapter five) provides a better system of 
accountability. The strength of the Malaysian system was acknowledged by most of 
the interviewees, although two of the interviewees (9 and 10) from the KSA were 
against a central Sharia board. It should be noted that centralised external regulation 
does not require a central Sharia board. A distinction may be drawn between a 
standardised framework comprised of prescribed structures and processes, and 
standardised fatwas. While the latter may require a central Sharia board, this is not 
true of the former.  
 
Another advantage of the Malaysian approach over the UK and KSA approaches is 
that the Sharia governance framework is backed by legislative authority. Supporting 
Sharia governance through legislation legitimises the framework's structure and 
processes. This follows because the legislation carries with it the legitimacy of the 
                                            
1146 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed 2011), 27. 
1147 Better Regulation Task Force, Principles of Good Regulation (2003), 1. 
1148 Interviewees 5, 12. 
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nation's government. Furthermore, legislation can also provide for formal legal 
sanctions, which may be valuable where other less formal regulatory interventions 
fail to resolve an issue, or where the breach is particularly serious. Although 
providing legitimacy and additional sanctions, the value of putting Sharia 
governance on a statutory basis will depend on both the content of the legislation and 
on how it is implemented. Here Baldwin et al's criteria, and the five Better 
Regulation principles (proportionality; accountability; consistency; transparency; and 
targeting)1149 should be used as a guide to ensure a robust, but fair system of 
accountability, facilitating consistency and transparency, and allowing an 
appropriately targeted, proportionate response to any regulatory issues. Under this 
approach, regulation should be based on clear, consistent and coherent standards, 
with a transparent process and clearly explained, publicly accessible regulatory 
decisions made by an accountable regulatory body, with appropriately targeted 
responses that prioritise educational over punitive measures.1150 
6.2 The regulatory approach 
 
While Sharia governance should be legitimised and formalised through legislation, 
the trend has been to rely more on new forms of governance. These utilise soft law 
and less formal mechanisms, such as  benchmarking, communication and regulatory 
frameworks, with regulatory responses implemented through 'mutual learning, 
arguing and persuasion, and nonlegal sanctioning methods, such as naming and 
shaming'.1151 Responsive regulation,1152 for example, will utilise education and 
persuasion as initial tactics. It is only where these approaches fail to achieve the 
                                            
1149 Better Regulation Task Force, Principles of Good Regulation (2003), 1. 
1150 Ibid, 4-6. 
1151 Florian Saurwein, 'Regulatory  Choice for Alternative Modes of Regulation: How Context Matters' 
(2011) 22 Law & Policy 334, 336. 
1152 Ian Ayres, John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press 1992). 
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desired response that compliance strategies are replaced by increasingly punitive 
measures. This 'enforcement pyramid', which allows for both the escalation and de-
escalation of responses provides for a range of enforcement measures that can be 
used to both support and appropriately enforce self-regulation.1153 This regulatory 
process allows the regulator to move up or down a scale of enforcement measures 
depending on the response and compliance of the firm. It is, therefore, sensitive to 
the need to vary regulatory measures depending on the degree of cooperation. It may, 
however, if rigidly applied, result in a system that is unable to respond quickly 
enough to a rapidly escalating situation of risk. Furthermore, the context of a 
competitive environment and the cultural differences between firms may require a 
more targeted approach that is sensitive to the institutional logics that affect 
compliance with regulatory requirements.1154 
 
One of the central strengths of responsive regulation is that it enables a collaborative 
relationship between the regulated and the regulators.1155 This is contingent on the 
cooperation of the regulated, but where that fails it also allows for traditional 
enforcement mechanisms.  Its approach of active listening, relationship building, 
support and mutual learning is consistent with the Islamic governance principles of 
shura (consultation) and khilafah (vicegerency), which emphasises trust and 
engagement. In so doing, it supports a framework that can be effectively mediated by 
cooperation between external regulators, internal self-regulators and the other 
stakeholders, including the managers, other employees and, through representatives 
                                            
1153 Ian Ayres, 'Responsive regulation: A co-author's appreciation' (2013) 7 Regulation & Governance 
145. 
1154 Robert Baldwin, Julia Black, 'Really  Responsive Regulation' (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59, 
62-63. 
1155 John Braithwaite, 'The Essence of Responsive Regulation'  (2011) 44 UBC Law Review 475.  
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or public interest groups,1156 the Islamic community more widely. By initially relying 
on mechanisms of support and soft enforcement, such as argument and persuasion, 
the philosophy of responsive regulation begins from a position of trust that should 
help to create a positive culture that treats the managers and self-regulatory actors as 
stewards acting in the interests of all the stakeholders. It only treats the regulated as 
self-interested agents where trust has been broken and the supportive relationship has 
been damaged by the attitude and behaviour of the regulated.1157 
 
As a 'public interest orientated' system sensitive to the politics of neoliberalism, 
responsive regulation provides a nuanced approach that bridges state, non-state and 
self-regulation.1158 Based essentially in restorative justice, but willing to engage with 
the rational self-interested agent through enforceable deterrents and the incompetent 
actor through 'incapacitation',1159 responsive regulation provides a suitable initial 
basis for a comprehensive and coherent regulatory framework that can manage the 
risk of Sharia non-compliance in a way that could allow international standardisation 
that is sensitive to the national context. Its focus on public interest and community 
participation in the regulatory dynamic is consistent with the ideal of Islamic finance 
as a socially just industry that benefits the community as a whole. Furthermore, it 
could also be implemented in a way that is consistent with the institution of hisbah 
by giving ordinary Muslims 'a platform for social action'.1160 
 
                                            
1156 Christine Parker, 'Twenty  years of responsive regulation: an appreciation and appraisal' (2013) 7 
Regulation & Governance 2, 5. 
1157 John Braithwaite, 'The Essence of Responsive Regulation'  (2011) 44 UBC Law Review 475, 484-
486. 
1158 Christine Parker, 'Twenty  years of responsive regulation: an appreciation and appraisal' (2013) 7 
Regulation & Governance 2, 3,7. 
1159 John Braithwaite, 'The Essence of Responsive Regulation'  (2011) 44 UBC Law Review 475, 486. 
1160 Abdussalam Mahmoud Abu-Tapanjeh, 'Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: A 
comparative analysis with the OECD princip les' (2009) 20 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 556, 
564. 
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Although it has been suggested that responsive regulation provides a strong basis for 
international standardisation, it was originally intended as a regulatory approach at 
the national, rather than the transnational level. At a national level, domestic 
regulatory bodies backed by national law can readily provide the enforcement 
mechanisms and powers required by the enforcement pyramid of responsive 
regulation. At the international level, such enforceability is more challenging. There 
are, however, different options available for adapting responsive regulation for a 
transnational role, which may include reliance on intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs) and transnational standard setting bodies.1161 These options will be 
considered later when discussing the three levels of a comprehensive regulatory 
framework.  
 
Responsive regulation has been chosen as the foundation for a regulatory framework 
managing the risk of Sharia noncompliance because, as discussed above, it appears 
to provide a good fit with both an Islamic approach to governance (see chapter 4) and 
with the regulatory goal of securing genuine and transparent diversity that provides 
the necessary information and guidance that allows consumers to choose the most 
suitable product that range from the "Islamically acceptable" Sharia compliant to 
"Islamically good" products that are socially just, benefit the community and embody 
the spirit of Sharia and the maqasid. While not providing the core foundation, the 
framework structure may nevertheless be usefully supplemented by aspects of "smart 
regulation", particularly those that complement or reinforce the approach of 
responsive regulation.  
 
                                            
1161 Kenneth W Abbott, Duncan Snidal, 'Taking responsive regulation transnational: Strategies for 
international organizations' (2013) 7 Regulation & Governance 95. 
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Smart regulation advocates a flexible balance of market and non-market solutions, 
using a combination of strategies and relying on both public and private regulatory 
mechanisms.1162 The aim is to build on existing regulation to improve efficiency by 
utilising a full and complementary range of regulatory instruments, including 
economic, direct legal and self-regulatory, to capitalise on the strengths of each 
individual approach while minimising the weaknesses.1163 In particular, smart 
regulation usefully emphasises the need for a cooperative complementarity between 
public and private regulatory bodies, especially where there is a transnational 
element.1164 This should help to avoid unnecessary duplication and conflicting 
messages. 
6.3 Regulation and institutional logics 
 
Building further on the approach of responsive regulation is Baldwin and Black's 
"really responsive regulation", which emphasises the need for regulation to account 
for and engage with the institutional influences that guide the behaviour of 
individuals within the firm. As they explain: 
Responsive regulation presupposes that regulatees do in fact 
respond to the pressures imposed by regulators through the 
sanctioning pyramid. Corporate behaviour, however is often driven 
not by regulatory pressure but by the culture prevailing in the 
sector or by the far more pressing forces of competition.1165 
                                            
1162 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky, Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy (Clarendon Press 1998), 10. 
1163 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky, Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy (Clarendon Press 1998), 14-15. 
1164 Judith Hanebury , 'Smart Regulation - Rhetoric or Reality?' (2006) 44 Alberta Law Review 33, 58-
60. 
1165 Robert Baldwin, Julia Black, 'Really  Responsive Regulation' (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59, 
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The thinking behind "really responsive regulation" is that regulators need to 
understand the interaction between rational thought and institutional logics, which 
include the tension between Islam and neoliberal capitalism, the pressure of 
competition, and the norms and scripts of regulation itself. This means employing a 
sensitivity to the culture and context of the industry, the culture of the individual 
firm, and the tensions that may exist between the attitude of the firm and its 
employees towards the regulatory system. It also means ensuring that the 
institutional logics of the regulatory approach are coherent and consistent with the 
underlying culture and values of the industry. Furthermore, the regulators must be 
capable of varying their approach in response to the firm's attitude and compliance 
with the regulatory regime.1166 This requires a cycle of: detection, response, 
enforcement of response, assessing the effect of the response, and modifying the 
response accordingly.1167 
 
While it is important for any regulatory system to be sensitive to the institutional 
logics that help to shape the firm's attitude and response to regulation, it is also 
important to appreciate that a well established system of regulation will itself feed 
into the logics of the regulated industry. Provided the regulatory system is designed 
to provide a clear, coherent and consistent set of values then it may, in the long term, 
be used to influence the taken-for-granted norms and behavioural scripts of the 
regulated firms,1168 which should reduce the risk of Sharia non-compliance and limit 
the need for enforcement. This should, in the long term, reduce the costs of 
regulation and allow a greater focus on mechanisms of support rather than 
                                            
1166 Robert Baldwin, Julia Black, 'Really  Responsive Regulation' (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59, 
61, 69-76. 
1167 Robert Baldwin, Julia Black, A Review of Enforcement Measures (Defra 2005). 
1168 Lawrence M Friedman, 'Legal Culture and Social Development' (1969) 4 Law & Society Review 
29, 41. 
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enforcement. In other words, the regulatory system established to manage the risk of 
Sharia non-compliance should proactively aim to shape the culture of the industry.  
 
Emphasising the importance of culture, Meidinger argues that any social system 
requiring collective action 'must be based on a set of cultural understandings ... 
[which] provide the interactional basis to organize and constrain regulation '.1169 He 
goes on to explain that, within any regulatory community, 'shared understandings of 
acceptable behavior are most likely to develop where regulatory actors maintain 
ongoing, interdependent relationships'.1170 This again highlights the importance of 
"really responsive regulation", which allows for a range of interactions that goes 
beyond simple enforcement of rules and standards. The use of supportive 
mechanisms of education, argument, persuasion and the positive reinforcement of 
desirable behaviour provides a set of tools well suited to creating positive 
institutional logics to reinforce the norms and values of Sharia.  
 
Within Islamic finance, such an approach could utilise the trust and respect that 
exists for eminent Sharia scholars, which was clearly articulated by the interviewees 
in the study of attitudes toward Islamic finance discussed in the previous chapter. 
This might be facilitated by establishing a modern form of hisbah on a national or 
international level as part of a supportive international system of regulation that aims 
to reinforce the institutional norms of Islam and the Sharia, alongside oversight of 
compliance in a technical sense. This would provide a mechanism to ensure that 
Islamic financial products are technically compliant and so Islamically acceptable 
(halal), as well as providing mechanisms to encourage the development of products 
                                            
1169 Errol Meidinger, 'Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline' (1987) 9 Law & Policy 355, 369. 
1170 Ibid, 367. 
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and services that are tayyib (desirable). This possible role for hisbah will be 
considered further in subsequent sections.  
 
There remains one further insight that follows from the institutional approach of 
"really responsive regulation". As has already been discussed, Islamic finance does 
not just involve the delivery of Sharia compliant products and services by Islamic 
firms. A significant proportion of Islamic finance is delivered by conventional firms, 
through Islamic widows or subsidiary firms. From an institutional perspective, it 
might be speculated that the culture of these firms will differ from the culture of 
Islamic firms. Although it would need to be confirmed by further empirical study, 
some support for this concern is found in the responses of some for the interviewees.  
 
Interviewee 8 commented that professionals from conventional finance prioritise 
profit over the consistency with Islamic principles. Interviewee 12 emphasised that 
anyone working in Islamic finance ought to 'believe in the product' and needed to 
'embed the philosophy of the Sharia'. Interviewee 14 similarly raised doubts about 
whether conventional finance professionals working in Islamic finance had 'a real 
understanding of [the] Maqasid'. The concern behind these comments is also 
apparent  in the suggestion made by Interviewee 11 that, ' it would not be a very 
sensible thing [for a conventional firm] to' offer Islamic financial products 'without 
some involvement of Muslim people or staff'.  These comments all reflect a concern 
with the culture of conventional firms, with the consequential implication that the 
regulatory approach should be sensitive to the cultural differences. As Baldwin and 
Black note, really responsive regulation requires the regulator to be 'clear about the 
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role of different individual logics in relation to the [regulatory tasks]'.1171 In the 
present context this would, for example, require the regulator to appreciate that 
different approaches may be required where Islamic finance is provided by a 
conventional firm than where it is provided by an Islamic firm. 
 
The cultural background of the individual professionals is also important. With 
Muslims already motivated by the Sharia as part of their faith, a regulatory approach 
that focuses on clarifying any mixed messages may be more effective than a punitive 
regime. While non-Muslims may readily be taught the technical requirements of 
Islamic finance, they lack the deeper understanding of Islam that comes from being 
brought up in the faith. While those norms and values may be taken for granted by 
Muslims, they are less likely to provide a reliable institutional influence on non-
Muslims. Here the role of regulation is perhaps more complicated, to which the 
"really responsive" approach is well suited. A greater level of initial support may be 
required to encourage a commitment to the regulatory goals of Sharia governance, 
and the regulator must be aware that such commitment may be less likely for the 
non-Muslim than for the Muslim professional. This is particularly so in the context 
of a conventional firm whose goal is to exploit the Islamic finance market, where 
Sharia compliance is secondary to this primary aim.   
 
The failed attempt by Goldman Sachs to enter the sukuk market in 2011 provides a 
useful illustration.1172 This example was specifically noted by interviewees 2 and 4, 
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with interviewee 2 raising it as a problem of fatwa shopping and interviewee 4 
raising it is as an example of regulating cross-border transactions. The gist of the 
issue was that the sukuk relied on a controversial organised tawarruq structure.1173 
While some Sharia scholars were prepared to certify it as Sharia compliant, other 
Scholars argued that it was not, primarily because of the perception that Goldman 
Sachs were planning to use the issue as a way of raising money that would then be 
used for the normal business of non-compliant conventional finance, which would be 
haram. As noted by the interviewees, this raises issues of cross-border regulation as 
well as that of fatwa shopping, or 'getting the right Sharia advisor to sign off the 
product as Sharia compliant'.1174 It also highlights that non-Muslims are not guided 
by the same religious convictions as Muslims and may see their obligations very 
differently, prompting them to push the boundaries of what is acceptable. Islamic 
finance, while being open to non-Muslims, imposes the same rights and duties 
regardless of the faith of the investors.1175 In order to preserve the purity of Islamic 
finance, and the money it handles, it is important for the regulatory system to be 
sensitive to the institutional context of the regulated. This may, under a risk-based 
approach to regulation, also justify specifically targeting conventional firms entering 
the Islamic market. 
 
As a final point, the institutional approach of "really responsive" regulation suggests 
that the regulatory approach will need to be sensitive to the nature of the country.1176 
The political and religious context of the country, its economic system and the 
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existing regulatory structures will combine to provide the taken-for-granted norms 
and scripts that influence the behaviour and decisions taken by the managers of a 
firm based in that country. This may be complicated where the firm's employees 
come from different backgrounds and where the firm is a subsidiary of a company 
based in a different country. The cultural context of the country may, nevertheless, 
provide different logics of legitimacy and illegitimacy that influence the response to 
regulation,1177 requiring an understanding of the influences that shape the response 
and the most appropriate approach to managing the risk of Sharia non-compliance.  
6.4 The three levels of regulation: the firm; national; and international 
 
In the preceding sections, the features of good regulation were considered and it was 
argued that a suitable regulatory system for Sharia compliance should be smart, 
responsive and sensitive to the institutional logics that influence the behaviour of the 
regulated. If this "really responsive" regulatory approach is to be effectively 
implemented it requires an appropriate structural framework that enables and 
facilitates Sharia governance. As previously discussed, one of the main goals is to 
standardise the governance structures and processes while still permitting innovation 
and diversity. While diversity and innovation are important, so too is the need for 
Islamic finance to establish itself as a genuinely Islamic alternative to conventional 
finance rather than just a variation on the theme. Technical compliance with Sharia 
remains the "bottom-line", but the aim of Islamic finance should be the maqasid as 
the spirit of Sharia. In order to prevent the permitted diversity from being 
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manipulated to serve conventional financial interests, these governance structures 
must be capable of managing the possibility of fatwa shopping.1178 
 
There are three structural levels that may be engaged, to a greater or lesser extent, in 
constructing a regulator framework. These are: the level of the individual firms; the 
level of the nation state; and the international level. While regulatory initiatives 
already exist at each of these levels, they are inconsistent and, at the international 
level at least, lacking the coherence of a unified, authoritative, voice. In order to 
instil maximum confidence in Islamic finance, its products and services, these 
inconsistent and patchy regulatory systems should be reformed into an 
internationally standardised approach. This requires an framework that connects and 
coordinates the regulatory and governance initiatives at each level.  
6.4.1 Sharia governance at the level of the firm 
 
At the level of firm, it is clear from both the literature and the interviews that Sharia 
boards or committees  provide the gold standard for Sharia governance and a good 
starting place for developing a comprehensive standardised framework. As discussed 
in chapter four, however, there are a number of criticisms that need to be addressed. 
These include the problem of a lack of suitably qualified Sharia scholars, with some 
scholars sitting on multiple boards increasing the likelihood that their workload 
affects their ability to perform their governance role.1179 As interviewee 14 noted,  in 
the context of expanding the regulatory framework: 'if you are going to have another 
parallel set of people, I suppose then the question is if there is enough human capital 
available'. Further to the problem of a lack of suitably qualified Sharia scholars, there 
                                            
1178 Umar A Oseni, Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad, M Kabir Hassan, 'The Legal Implications of 'Fatwa 
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are three conflicts of interest that potentially threaten the credibility of Sharia 
governance. These are; the conflict arising from multiple board memberships, 
especially where the Sharia scholar sits on bank Sharia boards while also 
participating in national or international regulation;1180 the employment relationship 
between banks and the Sharia scholars that sit on their boards, especially where 
bonus payments are offered for fatwas;1181 and, as interviewee 11 observed:  
a ... less obvious conflict ... is that the same people are involved in 
the structuring of the products at their setup stage and then further 
down the line, they are also the people who are signing off and if 
you like, auditing them, so in a sense they are marking their own 
work.  
 
These types of issues are best managed through governance at a national or 
international level, which will be considered in due course. There is however, one 
further issue that should be addressed at firm level, although it may be supported by 
appropriate national governance. In chapter four, it was noted that Sharia governance 
tended to be managed as an additional type of governance, distinct from the 
structures and processes of the governance of other risks. There are two problems 
with this. First, there is a need for Sharia governance to engage with, and constrain, 
the institutional influences of conventional finance and neoliberal capitalism. This is 
likely to be more easily achieved if Sharia governance is not treated as an issue 
distinct from the other financial risks and concerns managed through the 
conventional governance structures and processes. Second, the risk of Sharia non-
compliance might be affected by the approach of the firm to the other risks that face 
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the bank in its financial dealings. Equally, the management of Sharia compliance is 
also likely to impact on those other risks. Both of these may addressed by integrating 
Sharia governance with the general governance structures and processes. 
 
An additional concern with the current approach to governance at the level of the 
firm, which was raised in chapter four, is the reliance on western approaches to 
governance. This is not a criticism of those approaches per se. Rather, the point is 
that the governance of Islamic finance should be consistent with Islamic values, 
which is better achieved through an Islamic model of governance rather than one, 
such as the shareholder model, that reflects conventional finance and neoliberal 
capitalism. As discussed in chapter four, an Islamic approach to governance should 
engage with all stakeholders, including a representative engagement with the Muslim 
community or Ummah, through the process of shura. This process, based on the 
conception of stakeholders as Allah's vicegerents, should aim to ensure that the 
bank's operations serve the Maqasid al-Sharia.1182 In other words, its products and 
services should be designed to serve the goals of community benefit and social 
justice, albeit in a way that generates sufficient profit for the firm to remain 
competitively viable in its particular economic environment. Such an approach has 
the additional benefit, not of preventing fatwa shopping, but reducing the motivation 
to engage in the practice. 
6.4.2 Sharia governance at the national level 
 
A general theme that emerged from the interviews discussed in chapter five, was that 
some form of national regulatory oversight was necessary. Most of the interviewees 
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considered the Malaysian model to be the best approach. As explained in chapter 
five, Malaysia provides a 'proactive',1183 comprehensive national framework for 
Sharia governance, managed by the central bank of Negara Malaysia (BNM) and 
backed by statutes. The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, for example, imposes 
formal legal duties and conditions to ensure compliance with the Sharia,1184 and 
provides for a range of regulatory powers allowing investigation, enforcement and 
sanction of breaches of those duties.1185 Enforcement measures include a range of 
administrative powers allowing the BNM to issue orders or directions requiring 
compliance, to require the person in breach to make a public statement, to mitigate 
any loss or to pay a monetary penalty.1186 Where such measures fail, or are 
considered inappropriate, then the BNM may initiate civil proceedings.1187 A failure, 
to comply with a court order that results from the civil action will have committed a 
criminal offence and, if convicted, may be imprisoned for up to 8 years and/or 
fined.1188 Criminal offences are also directly available for breaches of the individual 
obligations such as the duty to comply with  the Sharia under s 28. The regulatory 
framework provided for by this statute enables a range of responses to breaches of 
the Act, from administrative orders and fines, through civil court orders to criminal 
sanction. This establishes a pyramid of responses consistent with a responsive 
regulatory approach. 
 
In addition to central oversight by the BNM, and the regulatory framework provided 
by statute, Malaysia has also established, under the auspices of the BNM, the central 
                                            
1183 Zulkifli Hasan, 'Regulatory Framework of Shari'ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC 
Countries and the UK' (2010) 3 Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 82, 84. 
1184 Sections 28-38. 
1185 Sections 229-266. 
1186 Section 245. 
1187 Section 250. 
1188 Section 254. 
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Sharia Advisory Committee (SAC). While all of the interviewees were in favour of 
some form of central regulation of Sharia governance, two of the interviewees from 
the KSA were opposed to a central Sharia board. The reason for this opposition was 
the perception that a central Sharia board would stifle diversity and innovation, both 
of which were considered important by all of the interviewees. The likelihood of this 
will depend on the constitution of the board and, perhaps, the political context of the 
country. In particular, a central Sharia board could provide the national government 
with too much influence and the opportunity to advance their own particular agenda 
by appointing scholars for political reasons, rather than because of their expertise. 1189  
 
The tension between the possible advantages of a central Sharia board and the risk of 
government interference was recognised by interviewee 8, who commented: 
in general, I oppose the idea of government imposing the view of 
Islam on others because it is a decentralized religion, it does not 
have a pope. It does not have a, you know, central authority.  We 
have scholars who can give us opinions and guide us, so I like the 
idea of having centralized Sharia boards in order to, let us say, 
move the industry forward quickly, but I don’t know if the idea of 
dictating at a government level what is and is not Islam. 
While these are potential dangers, the Malaysian experience shows that a central 
Sharia board can operate effectively without stifling diversity or triggering 
complaints of political interference. Indeed, despite his expressed concern, 
interviewee 8 subsequently stated: 'Malaysia has shown an excellent model and I 
think that is a good model to follow'. 
                                            
1189 A similar point was made by interviewee 7 in relation to the remuneration of Sharia scholars.  
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An additional national option is a professional regulatory body for Sharia scholars, 
responsible for the education, registration and professional regulation of Sharia 
scholars. While not precluding fatwa shopping, a professional body with disciplinary 
powers may reduce the opportunity for the practice. Such a body could be 
established and provided with authority by statute, along the lines of the General 
Medical Council, which provides such a service for doctors in the UK, 1190 or the 
Legal Service Board, which oversees the regulation of lawyers in England and 
Wales.1191 While a national regulatory structure is necessary to effectively monitor 
and enforce standards, some of the bodies might operate more efficiently and 
effectively at an international level. Given the shortage of Sharia scholars and their 
global identity and transnational activity, it may be better to manage professional 
regulatory issues at an international rather than a national level. This would prevent 
the need for scholars to be registered in a number of different countries, with all of 
the issues of coordination that multiple registration requires. An international 
professional regulatory body would provide a single point of registration, harmonise 
professional standards and coordinate both the education and career structure for 
Sharia scholars working in the field of Islamic finance.  
 
By maintaining a professional register of scholars as well as a code of professional 
ethics, a professional regulatory body would be able to assist the national regulatory 
bodies in managing those potential conflicts of interest noted previously. This could 
be achieved primarily through guidelines or regulations, the substantive details of 
which are beyond the scope of this thesis. One option worth noting however, would 
                                            
1190 The Medical Act 1983. 
1191 Legal Services Act 2007, ss 2-7. 
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be to follow the Malaysian lead and impose limits on board membership. This could 
be supported by also ensuring an adequate training programme to increase the human 
capital and reduce the need for multiple board membership. Furthermore, an 
appropriate code of professional ethics, monitored by the professional regulatory 
body, may encourage the development of a culture in which the potential for 
conflicts of interest will be more readily recognised and managed, rather than 
exploited. 
 
 A further option is a modernised hisbah body, providing a national ombudsman 
service, which could also be created by statute. In the UK, for example, the Financial 
Ombudsman service is a public body established under ss 225-227 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000. A modernised hisbah office could be established as 
part of the general Financial Ombudsman scheme or as a separate service. 
Combining the schemes would be more administratively efficient and would provide 
a single point of consumer contact. It may, however, be better from an institutional 
perspective to establish a hisbah office as a distinct service, which would help to 
maintain the distinction between conventional and Islamic finance. Although not 
impossible, instituting hisbah at the national level is likely to be problematic in non-
Islamic countries such as the UK. The inherently religious nature of hisbah may be 
seen as inappropriate for Christian countries with secular politics. This would not 
preclude such an institution being set up privately as a non-profit organisation, but it 
would lack the authority of a statutory basis. Such an approach may lead to patchy 
and inconsistent regulation. This could be resolved by managing hisbah at an 
international level. 
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6.4.3 Sharia governance at international level 
 
The international level of regulation is crucial to goal of a coordinated standardised 
regulatory framework. Specifically, there are two main reasons for establishing an 
international framework, rather than simply leaving the regulation and governance of 
Sharia compliance to the individual nations. First, a global approach will help to 
harmonise the regulatory structures and process.1192 This will increase consistency 
and predictability, which should facilitate product innovation. Second, this increased 
consistency and predictability of regulatory approaches should also increase 
confidence in the Islamic finance products and services. 
 
The structures that may be established at international level include: a standards 
setting body; an international Sharia board; an international professional body 
responsible for the education, registration and professional regulation of Sharia 
scholars; and an international hisbah body to maintain a network of ombudsmen. 
These are not mutually exclusive, but may be established in combination to create a 
deep, but coordinated, regulatory framework. Such a framework could either be 
established and legitimised by an international regulatory structure backed by treaty 
or a private international regulatory structure, enabled by an industry-wide voluntary 
agreement. International harmonisation and standardisation could be further 
enhanced by the drafting of a Model Law, which may then be used to establish a 
national framework that would be consistent with national frameworks in all 
countries adopting such a Model Law. Implementing these options, whether alone or 
in combination, would require a cooperation between governments and also between 
                                            
1192 Anton Eberhard, 'Matching regulatory design to country circumstances' (2007) Gridlines, Note No 
23, 3. 
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public and private initiatives. This may be a difficult political process, but remains 
possible. 
 
While there are no international treaties dealing specifically with Sharia governance, 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is an IGO that has, through its 
Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA) been involved in Islamic finance and Sharia 
compliance. The OIC, which was established in 1969, provides the 'collective voice 
of the Muslim world ... [and has the mandate to safeguard and protect the interests of 
the Muslin world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony'.1193 As 
an IGO with a uniquely Islamic identity,1194 the OIC could act as an international 
Sharia governance standards setter,1195 either through the IFA or through a newly 
established Academy. 
 
Although the OIC is mandated to speak collectively for Muslims, it generally only 
allows Muslim majority states to join, which perhaps limits its role in states where 
Muslims are in a minority.1196 This would not prevent the Muslim community in 
those states from voluntarily accepting the IFA as a standard setter for Sharia 
governance of Islamic finance. If the IFA is to become the sole international 
authority, however, this would require the voluntary acceptance of a critical mass of 
                                            
1193 M Ishan Qadir, M Salfur Rehman, 'Organization of Islamic Co-operation (OIC) and Prospects of 
Yemenia Conflict Resolution: Delusion or Plausible Reality' (2015) 22 Journal of Political Studies 
367. 
1194 Victor Luis Gutierrez Catillo, Jonatan Cruz Angeles, 'Islam and International Organizations: The 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation' in Roberto Virzo, Ivan Ingravallo (eds), Evolutions in the Law of 
International Organizations (Brill Nijhoff 2015) 171, 176. 
1195 Christine Chinkin, 'International Organizations' in Peter Cane, Joanne Conaghan (eds), The New 
Oxford Companion to Law  (Online ed, Oxford University Press 2009) <www.oxfordreference.com> 
accessed 01 February  2016. 
1196 Abdullah al-Ahsan, 'Political Discourse of the Organization of the Islamic Conference' in Ibrahim 
M Abu-Rabi (ed), The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought (Online ed, Blackwell 
2006) <www.blackwellreference.com> accessed 01 February  2016. 
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Islamic finance firms in non-Muslim countries to exert commercial pressure on other 
firms to also submit to any standards issued. 
 
Regarding the possible role for the IFA, it is pertinent to note its Resolution 190 
(20/5) on the Role of the Fiqh (jurisprudence) Academies in Rationalizing the 
Progress of Islamic Financial Institutions: Mechanisms and Formulas.1197 In this 
Resolution, the IFA noted: the need for cooperation and coordination between the 
IFA and Sharia boards, and between the individual Sharia boards themselves; the 
need for the IFA to conduct research; and the need for the IFA to produce a 
comprehensive Islamic finance law. It also called on all Islamic financial institutions 
to adopt IFA resolutions, which should be communicated to them and made fully 
accessible to the public. This aspect of the resolution was not limited to Muslim 
countries, but non-Muslim countries were excluded when it called for 'continued 
dialogue with central banks and supervisory authorities'. Restricting such dialogue to 
Islamic countries is inadequate for global standardisation and raises concerns that the 
IFA, as part of the OIC, may not be the appropriate body to oversee a globally 
standardised governance framework. Rather, it may be better for it to remain a body 
that provides guidance on specific Sharia issues.  
 
Apart from the IFA, two other international standards setting bodies warrant 
mention. These are the IFSB, established in Malaysia in 2002;1198 and the AAOIFI, 
an independent not-for-profit organisation established in 1991 and based in 
                                            
1197 Anon, 'Resolution of OIC Fiqh Academy (related to Islamic Economic and Finance)' (2014) 22 
Islamic Economic Studies 265, 269.  
1198 IFSB, 'Background' Islamic Financial Services Board <http ://www.ifsb.org/background.php> 
accessed 01 February  2016. 
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Bahrain.1199 While both organisations are engaged in standards setting, the AAOIFI 
takes more of a business perspective and the IFSB adopts more of a regulator's 
perspective of governance issues.1200 The AAOIFI has the advantage that it includes 
most Islamic finance institutions as members, and many already adhere to its 
standards,1201 but this adherence may be patchy or incomplete.1202 Although a 
relatively new body, the IFSB has an international remit to provide guidelines on 
governance and risk management. Its role is recognised by both the IMF and the 
Bank for International Settlements.1203 Both the IFSB and the AAOIFI produce 
guidelines for Sharia governance, although it is not the exclusive concern of either 
body. The AAOIFI, however, does have a dedicated Sharia board, which issues 
recognised standards.1204  
 
While it is possible for the current situation to continue, with standards being set by 
the IFA, the IFSB and the AAOIFI. it would be better to establish a regulatory 
framework that relies on a single international standard setter.1205 This would be 
more efficient, cheaper to maintain, and, because it would eliminate the risk of 
inconsistent or even contradictory standards, it would also provide a more coherent 
solution. Having said that, these bodies have already built up significant experience 
                                            
1199 AAOIFI, 'What We Do' Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
<http ://aaoifi.com/?lang=en> accessed 03 July 2016. 
1200 Volker Nienhaus, 'Human Resource Management of Islamic Banks: Responses to Conceptual and 
Technical Challenges' in Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim (eds), Islamic Finance: The New 
Regulatory Challenge (e-book 2nd ed, Wiley  2013), § 3.2. 
1201 Rodney Wilson, Legal, Regulatory and Governance Issues in Islamic Finance (Edinburgh 
University Press 2012), 134. 
1202 Mahmood Ahmed, Maksuda Khatun, 'The Compliance with Shariah Governance System of 
AAOIFI: A Study on Islamic Banks Bangladesh' (2013) 9 Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and 
Finance 177. 
1203 Rodney Wilson, Legal, Regulatory and Governance Issues in Islamic Finance (Edinburgh 
University Press 2012), 123. 
1204 Ibid, 228. 
1205 Nawal Kasim, Sheila Nu Nu Htay, Syed Ahmed Salman, 'Comparative Analysis on AAOIFI, 
IFSB and BNM Shari'ah Governance Guidelines' (2013) 4 International Journal of Business and 
Social Science 220, 227. 
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of standard setting, as well as a reputation. It would be wasteful if all three bodies 
were not, in some way, involved in the production of standards in the future. This 
could be achieved through a new body, established with the agreement and support 
of each of the existing standard setters, and including representatives from them on 
the board. Alternatively, with the agreement of the other two bodies, one of the 
existing bodies could take on the role. Based on the responses to the interviews 
discussed in chapter five, and the emphasis on its standard setting role found in the 
literature,1206 the AAOIFI appears to be the favoured body to take on such a role.   
 
The benefits for harmonisation and standardisation of international standard setting 
bodies is relatively clear. The value of an international Sharia board is, however, 
more controversial. Interviewee 10, for example, raised the problem of achieving a 
unanimous agreement on the compliance of particular products. While an 
international Sharia board could rely on majority decisions, such decisions could be 
rejected where the majority view conflicts with the view taken within a particular  
jurisdiction.1207 An international Sharia board may be too great an infringement of 
the national sovereignty of Muslim countries. As such, it would be better to deal with 
the issue of a centralised, higher Sharia board at national level. 
 
It was noted in chapter five, that there is currently a Malaysian-based Association of 
Sharia Advisors in Islamic Finance (ASAS), which already has the goal of gaining 
international recognition.1208 The role of this association could be expanded so that it 
becomes part of an international regulatory framework as the professional body for 
                                            
1206 See, eg, Abdul Aziz Farid Saymeh, Harbi M Orieqat, 'The Global Financial Crisis: Is Islamic 
System a  Possible Solution?'  (2014) 5 Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in 
Business 44, 46. 
1207 Interviewee 10. 
1208 ASAS website <http ://asas.my/> accessed 13 February  2016. 
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Sharia scholars, with obligatory registration enforceable at a national level. It has 
already accepted a responsibility for education and professional development, for 
promoting professionalism and maintaining public confidence in Islamic finance. 
Along with a compulsory system of registration, it could also take on a disciplinary 
role, that would allow it to respond to lack of professionalism, breaches of trust and 
other unacceptable behaviour through a range of enforcement measures. These could 
include educational measures, supervisory measures, suspension, or even expulsion 
from the register. 
 
Since there is no existing international hisbah institution, a new body would need to 
be established. This could be completely distinct to the already existing international 
bodies, or it could be set up under the auspices of a body such as the IFA. It may, 
however, be better to establish a new body that functions in a coordinated and 
cooperative way with the existing Sharia governance bodies. This would ensure that 
the new body was clear of any political baggage associated with existing bodies. 
Traditionally, hisbah has been a national concern, established to encourage good 
behaviour and discourage bad behaviour consistent with the religious duty imposed 
by Sharia.1209 Over time, the institution has been fragmented, with the secular 
functions assigned to relevant government departments. With the notable exception 
of the KSA, the religious aspect of hisbah has largely been relegated to a secondary 
concern.1210 
 
                                            
1209 Ssuna Salim, Syahrul Faizaz Binti Abdullah, Kamarudin bin Ahmad, 'Wilayat Al-Hisba; A Means 
to Achieve Justice and Maintain High Ethical Standards in Societies' (2015) 6 Mediterranean Journal 
of Social Sciences 201, 202; Azrin Ibrahim, 'Accountability (Hisbah) in Islamic Management: The 
Philosophy and Ethics behind its implementation' (2015) 5 International Journal of Humanities and 
Social Science 184, 184-185. 
1210 Ssuna Salim, Syahrul Faizaz Binti Abdullah, Kamarudin bin Ahmad, 'Wilayat Al-Hisba; A Means 
to Achieve Justice and Maintain High Ethical Standards in Societies' (2015) 6 Mediterranean Journal 
of Social Sciences 201, 204. 
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In the context of the international regulation of Sharia governance, the holistic 
approach of traditional hisbah would need to be re-established if it is to fulfil its 
potential for providing a powerful reinforcement of the institutional logics of Islam 
and the maqasid. The aim behind such a body would be, through the provision of a 
network of national Islamic ombudsmen, to create bridge between the Muslim 
community and the organisations that provide Islamic finance. Grounded in Islamic 
values, the institution of hisbah, administered through a modern proactive 
ombudsman (muhtasib), could provide a valuable moral compass, reinforcing Islamic 
norms while also countering the institutional logics of neoliberal capitalism.1211 
Through a proactive approach, it may also investigate and deal with suspicions or 
complaints of fatwa shopping. It would, however, need to be funded and would also 
face problems of limited human capital. In order to fulfil the goals of hisbah, it 
would be necessary to engage the authority of Sharia scholars, who would need to 
play a significant role. This does not mean that the individual ombudsmen need to be 
Sharia scholars, but they do need to be of good character, well educated and 
proficient in both Islamic finance and Sharia.1212 The need to involve both Sharia 
scholars and suitably qualified professionals may create staffing problems, which 
may be managed by initially establishing an international ombudsman service with a 
view to subsequently developing an internationally coordinated network of national 
ombudsmen.  
 
                                            
1211 Mohd Ab Malek bin Md Shah, Mohd Harun bin Shahudin, Sulaiman bin Mahzan, Rani Diana 
Othman, Jeniwaty Mohd Jody, 'The Institution of Hisbah: In the Purview of Its Significances and 
Development' (2015) 1 Global Journal of Business and Social Science Review 386, 394. 
1212 Ssuna Salim, Syahrul Faizaz Binti Abdullah, Kamarudin bin Ahmad, 'Wilayat Al-Hisba; A Means 
to Achieve Justice and Maintain High Ethical Standards in Societies' (2015) 6 Mediterranean Journal 
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Before turning to consider more specific details of a comprehensive Sharia 
governance framework, there is one further possible international initiative that 
warrants mention. In addition to establishing international bodies to harmonise and 
standardise the structures and process of Sharia governance, Islamic finance could 
follow the lead of international commercial arbitration and produce a Model Law.1213 
The advantage of a Model Law on Sharia Governance, which could be produced as 
part of an IFA project to create a comprehensive law on Islamic finance transactions 
(see Resolution 190), is that it provides a common point of reference while not 
encroaching on national sovereignty. A Model Law would allow individual nations 
to implement a Sharia governance framework that is sensitive to the political, 
constitutional, legal and social context of the particular country.1214 Furthermore, 
even if not actually implemented, a Model Law would still provide a valuable 
resource for the development and review of a national Sharia governance system. 
6.5 Towards a comprehensive Sharia governance framework 
 
According to interviewee 5: 
one of the most fundamental questions that Islamic finance has to 
decide is, are there going to be one set of rules that apply to 
everybody so do we have a single governing body that decides 
what is acceptable or do we allow, as the Chinese a 1000 blooms to 
flower and let the customers decide what is acceptable to them. I 
think both options are a possibility but at the moment where we 
have effectively no single – we have no single approach. We 
haven't decided which one we want to go down. 
                                            
1213 See the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (amended 2006) 
<http ://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html> accessed 
1214 Anton Eberhard, 'Matching regulatory design to country circumstances' (2007) Gridlines, Note No 
23, 3. 
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In this section, it will be explained how a deep, but coordinated, comprehensive 
regulatory framework could be established for Sharia governance that charts a path 
between those two alternatives. The aims behind this framework are; to ensure 
Sharia compliance and maintain confidence in Islamic finance as a distinctly Islamic 
alternative to conventional finance; to maintain diversity and innovation while 
standardising governance structures and processes to prevent fatwa shopping and 
ensure consumer confidence; to help shape the identity of Islamic finance by actively 
reinforcing the institutional logics of Islam; and to create a framework that will 
improve and sustain Sharia governance into the future.  
 
The goal is to produce a standardised approach that emphasises the substantive 
values of Islam and the Sharia,1215 ensuring that any concern with the form of 
Islamic financial products is understood and assessed within the wider context of the 
maqasid. This is an ambitious proposal and one that will need further research to 
provide more detailed proposals for each of the individual components. Nevertheless, 
the framework suggested here is a plausible way to build on already existing 
structures to standardise Sharia governance, reduce the risk of fatwa shopping and 
shape a clear and distinct identity for Islamic finance. 
 
The basic idea is to create a comprehensive, coherent and comprehensive regulatory 
framework that engages all three levels: the level of the firm; the national level; and 
the international level. Although these levels are distinct, they are connected, and 
should be organised, through the ' irreplaceable' role of the Sharia scholars, who 'do 
not simply embody, perform and mobilize Islamic values and expertise but also 
                                            
1215 See, Volker Nienhaus, 'Human Resource Management of Islamic Banks: Responses to Conceptual 
and Technical Challenges' in Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim (eds), Islamic Finance: The 
New Regulatory Challenge (e-book 2nd ed, Wiley  2013), § 2.3. 
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wield formidable and often unquestionable religious authority'.1216 Through that 
external authority, these scholars bring legitimacy to the firm and, as 'elite subaltern 
cosmopolitans ... [they are capable of] mobilizing wider geographies of faith that 
shape the governance of financial markets and the formation of Islamic financial 
consumers'.1217 This means that the significance of their authority extends far beyond 
simply legitimising individual firms and their products and services. It also helps to 
form and reinforce the institutional logics that influence agency within the 
organisational field of Islamic finance. If Sharia governance is to effectively counter 
the undesirable elements of neoliberal capitalism it must mediate this though the 
Sharia scholars, who should be engaged at all levels of the framework.  
 
At the level of the firm, Sharia scholars should retain their role as part of the Sharia 
board or committee. The constitution of these Sharia boards should be standardised, 
with some flexibility allowed to the individual banks. They should also be more fully 
integrated within the corporate governance structure of the firm. This is important to 
facilitate the reinforcement of Islamic norms and values within the firm. One way to 
ensure this integration would be to require managers from other parts of the firm to 
sit on the Sharia board. While they would not be engaged directly in issuing fatwas, 
they should be involved in discussing Sharia compliance and its monitoring within 
the firm. In particular, at least one member of the risk management committee should 
sit on the Sharia board. This integration should not, however, be one sided, and a 
Sharia scholar should also sit on the general risk management committee. By 
overlapping memberships, the institutional logics of Islam may be more readily 
                                            
1216 Jane Pollard, Michael Samers, 'Governing Islamic Finance: Territory Agency, and the making of 
Cosmopolitan Financial Geographies' (2013) 103 Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
710, 712-713. 
1217 Ibid, 714. 
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disseminated throughout the firm, becoming part of the firm's culture. Furthermore, 
such an approach recognises the relationship between the risk of Sharia compliance 
and the other risks faced by the bank, which may facilitate a coordinated approach to 
governance. 
 
As a minimum, each Sharia board should have two Sharia scholars and one 
apprentice Sharia scholar. The apprentice Sharia scholar would be a new role created 
to ensure that the number of suitable Sharia scholars will be maintained at a level 
adequate to meet the regulatory needs of the profession. They would be employed by 
the bank as a permanent member of staff with professional responsibilities as Sharia 
officers, but they would also be provided with professional training and postgraduate 
education in Sharia as applied to economics and finance. As the name suggests, this 
would be in part through an apprenticeship with one of the Sharia scholars and in 
part through attendance of recognised postgraduate courses. 
 
The importance of the role of Sharia scholars, and the trust placed in their judgment, 
highlights the need to ensure that they are a fit and proper person. This means that 
they should be a person of good character, a devout Muslim of unquestionable faith 
and suitably qualified in both Sharia and Islamic finance and economics. 
Furthermore, there should be some active regulation limiting the number of Sharia 
boards that any single scholar may sit on. This could be a fixed number, as per the 
approach in Malaysia, or it could be managed less rigidly by requiring approval of all 
appointments by an international regulatory body, which would most appropriately 
be an international professional regulatory body that maintains a register of all 
Sharia scholars. As noted above, this could be taken on by ASAS.  
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The existence, composition, staffing and activity of Sharia boards should be 
proactively regulated at national level. The importance of national regulation was a 
clear theme that emerged from the interviews discussed in chapter five, with the 
Malaysian approach identified as a good model. This model includes a regulatory 
framework, backed by legislation and overseen by the central bank and the central 
SAC. Legislation provides regulation with both legitimacy and robust mechanisms 
for enforcement.1218 As such, it would be helpful if all national regulatory oversight 
was formally established through legislation, which could be based on an 
internationally agreed Model Law (see above). This could be managed through 
existing financial regulatory structures, although the regulators would need a 
sufficient understanding of both Sharia and Islamic finance.  
 
Whether there should be a central Sharia board, as in the Malaysian model, is a 
matter that may best be decided on a national basis. The main issue, as expressed by 
interviewees 9 and 10, is the restrictive impact that a central board might have on 
innovation and diversity. This could be minimised by a central board with a remit 
restricted to 'that of the final instance for the clarification of doubtful cases and in 
dispute settlement'.1219 While there is value in this role, such a structure has a limited 
role in standardisation and harmonisation of the structures and processes of Sharia 
governance.  
 
                                            
1218 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed 2011), 27. 
1219 Volker Nienhaus, 'Human Resource Management of Islamic Banks: Responses to Conceptual and 
Technical Challenges' in Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim (eds), Islamic Finance: The New 
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Rather than risk restricting diversity and innovation through a central Sharia board, 
an alternative option would be to require transparency regarding the Sharia 
compliance of a product, or service. Ensuring the accessibility and transparency of 
Sharia compliance certification, which is consistent with the requirements of good 
regulation, may also help to further the goals of balancing the tension between 
diversification and standardisation, and shaping the identity of Islamic finance. If 
effectively implemented, an accessible and transparent system of Sharia governance 
would reduce the risk of fatwa shopping, empower consumers and facilitate 
diversity, while ensuring that all products are, at least, technically compliant with 
Sharia. It is important to remember that Islam and the Sharia are not simply about 
the permissible (halal) and the forbidden (haram). While the obligations of Islam are 
important, the devout should aspire to live a life that is good, pure and ethical 
(tayyib) rather than simply permissible. Consistent with this, Sharia governance 
should be aimed not just at the halal financial products and services, but also towards 
identifying and promoting tayyib products and services, which are those that account 
for social justice and generally benefit the community rather than simply the profit 
margins of the bank. In publishing fatwas, the Sharia scholars should make use of 
both of these labels. Providing these judgments are clear and accessible, backed by 
reasons and relevant evidence supporting the label, then consumers can choose how 
"Islamic" their investment should be, balancing their own beliefs with their financial 
needs.  
 
This framework, of Sharia boards at the level of the firm, subject to central 
regulation at national level should be backed by a standard setting body, a 
professional regulatory body for Sharia scholars, and a specialised international 
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hisbah organisation specific to Islamic finance. This should create a multi-layered, 
coordinated framework that facilitates the standardisation and harmonisation of 
Sharia governance while not precluding fully transparent diversity and innovation. 
Although it will take time to fully develop, an international network of national 
hisbah ombudsmen should help to provide a bridge across all three levels as well as a 
conduit to engage the Muslim community in shaping the future development of 
Islamic finance.  
 
Connecting these different elements of regulation into a coherent, cooperative 
framework should enable the development of an appropriate regulatory culture that 
will serve to reinforce the institutional logics of Islam and counter any conflicting 
messages that derive from conventional finance and neoliberal capitalism. Because 
regulatory culture is influenced by the background institutional logics that derive 
from the country's culture, social structure, law and regulatory tradition,1220 the 
regulatory framework supporting Sharia governance must facilitate a proactive, 
institutionally sensitive approach that serves to reinforce Islamic norms and values. 
As has already been argued, this will be enabled by an integrated and Islamic 
approach to governance that  counters the 'hidden struggle for Shari'a compliance 
between scholars and managers',1221 and encourages a convergence of objectives to 
facilitate a more cooperative relationship. Under this Islamic approach, which relies 
on a modified stakeholder model, the managers should be seen as stewards, fulfilling 
their role as Allah's vicegerents (khilafah).  
 
                                            
1220 Errol Meidinger, 'Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline' (1987) 9 Law & Policy 355, 369-
374. 
1221 Shakir Ullah, Ian A Harwood, Dima Jamali, '"Fatwa Repositioning": The Hidden Struggle for 
Shari'a Compliance Within Islamic Financial Institutions' (2016) Journal of Business Ethics, 
doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3090-1. 
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Consistent with the obligations of khilafah, the firm's managers should be trusted to 
act in the interests of all stakeholders, which include not just the shareholders, 
employers and customers, but also the whole Muslim community. Similarly, the 
Sharia scholars should be trusted to safeguard the faith-based interests of the Ummah 
by ensuring Sharia compliance. Recognising, however, the imperfections of human 
agents and the profit-based objectives motivating the managers,1222 that trust must be 
supported by smart and "really responsive" regulation. Highlighting the importance 
of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated, this style of regulation 
varies its approach depending on the both the institutional logics influencing the 
regulated actors and their attitude towards the regulatory intervention. The ideal 
relationship is one of trust and cooperation, with both the regulated and the regulator 
appreciating the shared goal of Sharia compliance as a minimum. This relationship 
can be supported by regulatory mechanisms that rely on shura and effect the hisbah 
approach to responsibility and self-development. 
 
Hisbah is aimed at safeguarding the faith-based interests of the Ummah, which 
includes the welfare of the community, the fulfilment of religious, obligations, the 
encouragement of good moral behaviour and the discouragement of bad 
behaviour.1223 It involves both the monitoring of behaviour and responding to 
transgression in a way that involves both internal (self) and external regulation and is 
based on five underlying principles, which are: the watchful eye of Allah; 
trustworthiness; personal responsibility; abstaining from bad behaviour; and 
                                            
1222 Ibid. 
1223 Fauzan Saleh, 'The Institution of Hisbah: Its Roles in Nurturing Fair and Just Economic System In 
Islam' (2009) Paper presented at National Conference on Islamic Economics, University Malaya, 10-
11 February  2009. 
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proportionality in response to any transgressions.1224 Although the idea that we are 
all monitored by Allah is a non-secular principle and so inappropriate for an 
international body engaging with the delivery of Islamic finance in secular 
jurisdictions, the emphasis on trust, responsibility, and proportionality are all 
consistent with responsive regulation. Furthermore, the aim of hisbah to encourage 
sincerity,1225 commitment to the values of Islam and self-discipline through self-
regulation and development reinforces that consistency. 
                                            
1224 Azrin Ibrahim, 'Accountability (Hisbah) in Islamic Management: The Philosophy and Ethics 
behind its implementation' (2015) 5 International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 184, 188-
189. 




This chapter responds to the arguments developed in the preceding chapters. Those 
chapters were devoted to analysing the need for reform of Sharia governance. 
Specifically they addressed the question of whether Sharia governance should be 
standardised. The analysis suggested that reform was indeed necessary to address 
two particular issues: the risk of Sharia non-compliance; and the limited focus of 
Sharia governance on technical compliance rather than on the maqasid and the spirit 
of Sharia. In this chapter, a regulatory framework has been developed (figure 20). 
This framework should both reduce the risk of Sharia non compliance and help to 
refocus Islamic finance on the goal of providing an Islamic alternative to 
conventional finance that embodies the spirit of Islam and provides products and 
services that are not only halal, but are also tayyib. With appropriate substantive 
standards, the framework should also reduce the risk of fatwa shopping that is the 
downside of allowing diversity.  
 
The framework presented here relies on the coordination of multi-layered structures 
and processes as part of a coherent, comprehensive and standardised regulatory 
approach to Sharia governance. This standardisation is limited to the regulatory 
structures and processes that support the certification of products and services as 
Sharia compliant. The aim is to achieve a balance between the reliability of 
standardisation and the value of diversity. Lying behind this balance is the obligation 
to make Sharia compliance information comprehensive, transparent and accessible, 
which allows consumers to decide on whether they are comfortable with halal 
products or would prefer to invest in the tayyib.  
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Figure 20: Multi-layered Regulatory Framework for Sharia Governance 
 
While an approach that favours technical compliance is not eliminated, the proposed 
framework and regulatory approach should help to encourage the development of 
tayyib products and services that should shape a more distinctly Islamic identity for 
Islamic finance. To that end, it has been argued that Sharia governance should be 
integrated as part of an Islamic approach to governance generally. This Islamic 
approach relies on a modified stakeholder model that emphasises the both the faith-
based and other interests of the Muslim community. Rather than treating the 
managers as self-regarding agents, the Islamic approach relies on stewardship theory 
that recognises the managers as Allah's vicegerents. This model utilises shura as the 
primary governance and regulatory mechanism and, through the hisbah methodology 
of encouraging trustworthy personal responsibility and the development of self-
discipline, engages with "really responsive" regulation.  
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The standardised structure proposed here is built on the integral role of Sharia 
scholars. It relies on self regulation through the Sharia board as part of an integrated 
Islamic system of governance. At national level, legislation, which may be based on 
an internationally agreed Model Law, should provide for the rules that ensure that 
firms take a standard approach to Sharia governance, and this should be enforced by 
national regulators. A central Sharia board was seen as something that should be left 
to the discretion of the individual nation. At international level, there should be a 
single, authoritative body that sets the standards for Sharia governance. There should 
also be a single international professional regulatory body that maintains a registry of 
Sharia scholars, manages their professional education and deals with any disciplinary 
issues. Both of these could be implemented through existing bodies such as the 
AAOIFI and ASAS. While the option of an international Sharia board was rejected, 
there should additionally be an international hisbah body that should ultimately 
coordinate a network of national ombudsmen.  
 
This framework should provide a system of regulation that achieves the 
standardisation of the structures and process of Sharia governance. It should also 
enhance the institutional influence of Sharia governance as part of a regulatory 
process. This in turn will encourage the development of products and services that 
are tayyib, enhancing the Islamic nature of Islamic finance. It will, however, require 
international cooperation, motivation and funding. As Archer and Karim comment: 
One major challenge to governments and legislative authorities is 
... to equip the supervisory and regulatory bodies concerned with 
 382 
Islamic finance with the authority and the means to perform their 
functions effectively.1226 
 
Beyond the need to involve governments, the framework proposed here requires 
Islamic finance to build on existing bodies and establish a new hisbah body. Pressure 
should also be put on governments to support these international initiates by 
increasing their legitimacy and authority through treaty. The need for national and 
international cooperation between private and public bodies provides a very practical 
barrier to the implementation of the framework, but it at least provides a starting 
place for the process of standardising Sharia governance in a way that will enhance 
the Islamic nature of Islamic finance as a distinct alternative to conventional finance. 
                                            
1226 Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, 'Concluding Remarks' in Simon Archer, Rifaat 
Ahmed Abdel Karim (eds), Islamic Finance: The New Regulatory Challenge (e-book 2nd ed, Wiley  
2013), § 4. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
As defined in Section 1.5, Islamic finance is a system of finance offering products 
and services that are consistent with the Islamic Sharia. Importantly, it provides an 
alternative to conventional finance, which is based on the secular ideology of 
capitalism. Conventional finance values money as an end in itself and is built on the 
foundations of debt and interest allowing the creation of money through credit 
(Section 2.2.1.3). By comparison, Islamic finance values money as a means to an 
end, as a commercial tool that cannot be divorced from the resources and services 
that exist in the real world, rather than in the virtual world of credit, debt and interest 
(Section 3.3.1.1). The need for all Islamic financial transactions to be visibly 
connected to real assets is reflected in the principle that money cannot be used to 
make money. This principle, which derives from the prohibition of riba required by 
the Sharia, precludes Islamic finance from charging interest. As per Chapter 3 
Section 3 The prohibition of riba is perhaps the most well known feature of Islamic 
finance, but also important are the prohibitions of maysir and gharar. Islamic finance 
is also prohibited from involvement with goods or services, such as alcohol and 
pornography, that are haram. Alongside these prohibitions, the other defining feature 
of Islamic finance is the obligation to pay zakat. 
 
As a bare minimum, Islamic banks must respect these obligations and ensure that its 
products and services comply with the Sharia. The importance of compliance is 
twofold. First, and foremost, it is an obligation owed to Allah by the providers of 
Islamic finance. Following the Sharia is a condition of Islam and governs all aspects 
of Muslim life, including the commercial provision of finance. Humans, as the 
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vicegerents of Allah, are entrusted with all the resources of earth, but this trust 
imposes a duty to use those resources wisely and consistently with Sharia. This 
reason for compliance is, of course, most relevant where Islamic finance is provided 
by Muslims. Islamic finance may, however, be provided by conventional financial 
institutions. This creates a potential disconnection between Islamic finance and 
Islamic values, which was adverted to by a number of those interviewed as part of 
the study discussed in chapter five. It was generally accepted that, provided Islamic 
and conventional funds were properly segregated, there was no fundamental issue 
with Islamic finance being delivered by non-Islamic conventional firms. As 
disscused in Cahpter 6 section 3,  Interviewee 11, however, cautioned that 'it would 
not be ... very sensible' for a conventional firm to offer Islamic finance without 
involving Muslim staff. Furthermore, interviewees 8, 9, 12, 14, and 19 all 
emphasised the need for non-Muslims to understand and believe in the philosophy 
behind Islamic finance. 
 
The impact of this potential disconnection between those providing Islamic finance 
and the Islamic values embodied by the Sharia may be limited to some extent by the 
second reason for ensuring compliance. This reason emphasises the need for 
compliance, not because the providers have a duty to act consistently with the 
Sharia, but because it is important for consumer confidence. Muslims constitute the 
primary market for Islamic finance and, while the principle of necessity allows them 
to use non-Islamic finance where there is no viable alternative, devout Muslim 
consumers would prefer to utilise Sharia compliant Islamic finance. This creates the 
demand for Islamic finance and the expectation that any financial products and 
services will be consistent with Sharia. The failure to meet that expectation will 
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breach the trust that the Muslim consumer invests when using Islamic finance and 
risks undermining confidence in the provider and possibly the industry as a whole.  
 
The importance of ensuring Sharia compliance, which derives both from the 
obligations imposed on the providers and the demand and expectations of the 
consumer, means that the risk of non-compliance is a serious issue. The need to 
manage the risk has been clearly recognised by the industry, which has created a 
risk-management strategy centred on Sharia governance (Section 4.4.2). The system 
of Sharia governance is paradigmatically based on the use of Sharia boards or 
committees comprised of Sharia scholars. These scholars, usually assisted by Sharia 
officers, advise the banks on Sharia compliance, issue fatwas certifying Islamic 
financial products as Sharia compliant, and provide some degree of oversight of the 
development and delivery of the products and services. Given that Sharia 
compliance is essential to the nature of Islamic finance and provides the 'justification 
for the Islamic finance',1227 it is no surprise that an effective Sharia governance 
framework is also seen as fundamental.1228 This raises the question of whether the 
current system of Sharia governance is sufficiently effective. 
 
The question of the effectiveness of Sharia governance lies behind the specific 
research question addressed by this thesis. That question asked how should the 
system be reformed to improve Sharia governance through standardisation, so 
ensuring that Islamic finance provides a genuinely Islamic alternative to 
conventional finance. It was prompted by the recognition that the existing 
approaches varied from country to country, resulting in diverse and inconsistent 
                                            
1227 Interviewee 17. 
1228 Interviewees 1, 2, 4, 7, 11, 13, 17. 
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fatwas. While the issue of standardisation is not new, the existing debate on the issue 
lacks sufficient depth and has yet to be resolved by the development of plausible 
approach to reforming the system of Sharia governance. As noted in chapter one, the 
need for a workable scheme or model of standardisation that might be pragmatically 
applied to improve global Sharia governance provided the motivation behind this 
research.  
 
The question of how Sharia governance should be reformed through standardisation 
comprises three constituent elements. They are: the existing problems affecting the 
current delivery of Sharia governance; the possible solutions; and the preferred 
solution. These three elements provided the framework for the main part of the 
argument that was constructed to address the research question. Before the research 
question could be addressed directly, however, it was important to provide some 
necessary context for the issues facing Islamic finance and Sharia governance. This 
thesis has, therefore, also considered the socio-political context of delivering Islamic 
finance in a global financial environment dominated by capitalism and conventional 
finance. A limitation of study is the sample used which includes only three countries 
out of 75 Muslims countries. The study findings maybe only relevant to the sample 
countries as other countries may have different set of financial and sharia regulations. 
The research methodology used is also a limitation to this study. This is because 
interviewees only provide the views or opinions of the questions asked as part of the 




The structure of the thesis was organised around the need to consider how best to 
reform Sharia governance given that Islamic finance must be delivered in the global 
context of the capitalist structures and processes of conventional finance. In order to 
provide a solution that is sensitive to this context, it was considered important to 
appreciate the social, cultural and ideological tensions facing Islamic finance, its 
provision and its regulation. In order to meet that need and address those tensions, 
new institutional theory was used as the foundations for the research methodology. 
The theoretical commitments of this methodological approach were discussed in 
section 1.6.1. While accepting the relevance of individual agency to the possibility of 
change, new institutional theory provides two crucial insights that are particularly 
useful for understanding the issues facing Islamic finance and Sharia governance. 
First, it highlights the importance of the taken-for-granted cultural and ideological 
scripts and norms that constitute an institution and guide behaviour. Second, it 
emphasises the relevance of legitimacy as a motivational force, driving the processes 
of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism.  Along with the isomorphism 
driven by the force of competition, these processes serve to explain why firms within 
particular organisational fields develop in a way that means they tend to resemble 
each other. 
 
For this thesis, the importance of appreciating the institutional isomorphic forces that 
guide behaviour, and so shape the development of firms and other organised groups, 
is twofold. First, it provides insights into why Islamic finance has developed in the 
particular way that it has to become the industry in its current state. The insights 
gained from an institutional perspective allow the identification and characterisation 
of the institutional influences operating on Islamic finance. Second, if the present 
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state of the industry and its regulation is the result of the institutional influences 
affecting its development, then any future change must reinforce the institutions that 
will help to effect the desired change, while also countering the influence of 
institutions that are likely to cause resistance to the desired change. From a 
regulatory perspective, the relevance of institutions to Sharia governance and 
standardisation is that the governance must be sensitive to the conflicting 
institutional logics that affect the behaviour of firms and the individuals working 
within the industry. By reinforcing the norms and scripts of desired institutions and 
by countering the norms and scripts of undesired competing institutions, an 
enlightened system of regulation can utilise the process of isomorphism to further the 
goal of standardisation, without the need to coercively enforce standards. 
 
While new institutional theory provides the dominant theory, chapter one also 
discussed the relevance of other methodological approaches that were utilised to 
supplement and enhance the institutional approach. In particular, the relevance of 
risk in the context of a risk society was considered, with the conclusion that risks not 
constrained by national borders required a cosmopolitan analysis engaging with the 
issue on multiple levels, including the sub-national, national, regional and global 
levels.1229 This is particularly important for systemic risks, where the threat extends 
beyond individual firms to create a danger for the system as whole and justifies 
multi-layered systemic regulation engaging with each level of the system.1230 The 
relevance of risk to this thesis lies both in its role as a discourse that intersects with 
institutions and an institutional analysis, and in its role as a motivational factor for 
establishing regulation. 
                                            
1229 See section 1.6.1.3. 
1230 See the text at n 146. 
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Given that the focus of this thesis is on Sharia governance, engaging with regulatory 
theory and paradigms is unavoidable.. For the purposes of the thesis, regulation has 
been defined as: ' the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes'.1231  
 
New governance was adopted as a term to refer to a specific approach to regulation 
that focuses on transparency, iterative participation, incentivisation, and the 
integration of private and public regulatory elements.1232  
 
The relevance of this understanding of both regulation and governance is that, by 
emphasising the need for regulation that goes beyond the traditional "command and 
control" state-based regulation to provide a more nuanced approach, it complements 
the insights of both new institutional theory and the risk society. 
 
Apart from explicating the methodological commitments of the research presented in 
this thesis, chapter one also provided some background context, setting out the 
historical context of Islamic finance. It explained that, although the modern interest 
in Islamic finance originated in the 1940s, it was not really until the latter half of the 
1970s that Islamic finance took off. Its development accompanied the creation of 
new Muslim states and was driven by a dissatisfaction with conventional finance and 
a desire for an Islamic alternative that would provide financial products and services 
consistent with the principles and rules of Sharia. The industry, then, is still 
comparatively young when contrasted to the more firmly established conventional 
                                            
1231 Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation (Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, 
London School of Economics 2002), 20. See text at n 170 for full definition. 
1232 See text at n 176. 
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finance. The relative youth of Islamic finance is an important feature when trying to 
understand the way the industry has developed. Indeed, as discussed in chapter five, 
a number of the interviewees raised this point as an apologetic explanation for the 
current issues facing Islamic finance. For them, Islamic finance was still a nascent 
industry, struggling to find its feet within an economic framework predicated on the 
goals and principles of conventional finance. Given this constraint, it is 
understandable that the identity of Islamic finance remains unsettled. 
 
As was discussed in chapter one, one of the issues facing Islamic finance in its search 
for a settled identity, is the competing motivations that drive the development of the 
industry.1233 In particular, the question of whether the goal of Islamic finance should 
simply be to provide a financial service that complies with the technical requirements 
of the Sharia, or whether it should more fully embrace the spirit of Sharia and its 
ethical goals expressed by the maqasid al-Sharia. Compounded by the need to build 
the industry in the competitive arena of conventional finance, the tension between 
these two motivations is reflected in the criticism that Islamic finance has focused 
too much on technical compliance, resulting in products that are Islamic in name and 
form, but are conventional in spirit. Again, this issue was apparent in the 
interviewees' responses discussed in section 5.2.3. The mirroring of conventional 
financial products and services raises questions about the nature and goals of Islamic 
finance that highlights the role of Sharia governance.   
 
One of the major issues facing Islamic finance and its governance is the diversity and 
inconsistency of the fatwas certifying products and services as Sharia compliant. 
                                            
1233 See section 1.5.2 
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How far this is a real problem for the industry depends on the cause of that diversity 
and inconsistency. There are perhaps three main causal factors that contribute to this: 
the competitive pressure to satisfy the demand for products and services that provide 
the same economic advantages as those provided by conventional finance; the 
diversity of interpretation of Sharia allowed by Islamic fiqh and reflected in the 
existence of different schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Madhhabs);1234 and the lack 
of standardisation of Sharia governance. The problem, particularly with 
inconsistency, is the risk of Sharia non-compliance. Apart from the implications that 
it has from the faith-based perspective of the devout Muslim, the risk of Sharia non-
compliance, where it materialises or is seen as particularly high, may undermine 
confidence in Islamic finance. This is particularly problematic because of the risk 
that a loss of confidence in a particular product or firm may spread to infect the 
whole system highlighting the systemic nature of the risk of Sharia non-compliance. 
 
It is the risk of Sharia non-compliance, and the consequential danger that Islamic 
finance will suffer from a systemic loss of confidence in its ability to deliver a 
"genuinely" Islamic alternative to conventional finance, that provides the motivation 
for the research question addressed by this thesis. The research question, as noted 
above, asks how best to standardise Sharia governance so as to minimise the risk of 
Sharia non-compliance and deliver genuinely Islamic products and services. In order 
to answer that question, it was first important to elucidate and explicate the extent of 
any problem caused by a lack of standardisation. This in turn required an analysis of 
Islamic finance, the risk of Sharia non-compliance and the limitations of the current 
approach to Sharia governance.  
                                            
1234 See section 3.2.4. 
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From this methodological perspective of new institutional theory, the starting point 
was to identify the institutional influences shaping the development of Islamic 
finance. Given that Islamic finance developed in an already established economic 
environment dominated by conventional finance, it was first necessary to understand 
the institutional context of that environment. That context was explored in chapter 
two, which had three aims. The first of these was to examine the concept of a 
financial system, allowing the construction of the core model concept through the 
elucidation of an underlying theory and the core attribute-values. That model is set 
out in chapter two and it would be unduly repetitious to set it out in full again 
here.1235 For present purposes it is sufficient to note the underlying theory that 
explains the core attributes of the concept. It was argued, then, that the theory of the 
concept of a financial system is: 
A complex socio-cultural system comprising a relational network 
of interdependent roles coordinated to facilitate the flow of money 
within the community served by that system. 
 
It should be noted that the core concept of a financial system does not include 
regulation. Since a financial system is capable of existing without it, regulation is a 
peripheral attribute. Although not a core attribute, regulation nevertheless plays an 
important role in ensuring that the financial system meets the needs of the economy. 
Similarly, central banks were not characterised as part of a core concept, but it was 
noted that they play important roles as financial policy makers and regulators, 
helping to preserve financial stability and manage liquidity. 
                                            
1235 See section 2.1.5. 
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The second aim of the chapter two was to briefly examine the nature of conventional 
banking. The point was to provide an understanding of conventional banking both as 
a context for, and as a contrast to, Islamic banking. To more fully understand 
conventional finance, the third aim of the chapter was to explicate the institutional 
influences that shaped the recent development of conventional financial systems. 
This examination of the institutional influences that shape conventional finance is 
important because Islamic finance did not develop as a fully independent system, 
isolated from any external influences. Rather, Islamic finance was situated within the 
financial environment dominated by conventional finance. The consequence of this is 
that Islamic finance was necessarily exposed both to conventional finance as an 
institution in its own right, and to the societal institutions that act on conventional 
finance as an organisational field. 
 
The institutional analysis that comprised the second half of chapter two focused 
particularly on neoliberal capitalism. This dominant ideology grew out of Anglo-
American politics from the 1970s onwards, encouraged by the policies of Thatcher's 
government in the UK and Reagan's presidency in the US. These policies encouraged 
deregulation and aggressively competitive financial innovation in a relentless pursuit 
of profit and growth. This innovation resulted in ever more risky products such as 
subprime mortgages bundled into CDOs, over-the-counter derivatives, and synthetic-
CDOs. Along with the growth of the shadow banking system which is relatively 
untouched by financial regulation, these innovations destabilised the financial 




The behavioural scripts and norms legitimised by neoliberal capitalism characterise 
money as an intrinsically valuable end in itself and the primary goal of conventional 
finance.1236  
 
For the banks, the implication of neoliberal capitalism is emphasised by Milton 
Friedman's claim that increasing profit is '[the] only ... social responsibility of 
business'.1237 This view of money and the role of business became increasingly 
embedded as institutional norms as neoliberalism became more firmly established. 
Importantly, the growth of Islamic finance from the mid 1970s onwards, broadly 
coincided with the growth of neoliberalism, which created the backdrop for Islamic 
banks as they strove to establish themselves in the global environment of 
conventional finance. 
 
In chapter three, the discussion focuses on the nature of Islamic finance. This chapter 
had three main aims. The first aim was to explicate the theoretical nature of Islamic 
finance and its dependence on Sharia. The second aim was to explain Islamic finance 
in practice, considering both Islamic banks and the financial products and services 
they offer. The third aim was to explore the institutional influences that have affected 
the development of Islamic finance, and in particular the interaction between the 
institutions of Islam and neoliberal capitalism. 
 
                                            
1236 See section 2.2.1.3. 
1237 Quoting from his own book, Capitalism and freedom: Milton Friedman, 'The Social 
Responsibility of Business to Increase its Profits' (13 September 1970) The New York Times Magazine 
32-33, 122-124. 
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Relying on the concept of a financial system characterised in chapter two, the 
underlying explanatory theory of Islamic finance was identified as: 
A complex socio-cultural system comprising a relational network 
of interdependent roles, guided by the tenets of Islam and 
coordinated to facilitate the flow of money in a way that is 
consistent with Sharia.  
This theory recognises Islam as the dominant institution shaping Islamic finance. In 
theory, since Sharia is a pervasive guide for life as a Muslim, Islam should be the 
sole institution. Given, however, that it must exist within the global economic 
context of conventional finance and neoliberal capitalism, Islamic finance in practice 
must contend with the inevitable impact of those institutions on its norms and 
behavioural scripts. This means that behaviours of Islamic banks and those working 
in them will be influenced by the logics of both Islam and neoliberal capitalism. 
Where these conflict, this will muddy the purity of the Islamic discourse.   
 
Perhaps the key distinction between the institutions of Islam and neoliberal 
capitalism is their contrasting view of money. While neoliberal capitalism uses 
money as a measure of success, Islam measures success through falah.1238  
Measuring success through the accumulation of money means that neoliberal 
capitalism affords money an inherent value that makes it an end in itself. By contrast, 
Islam characterises money as a means to an end.1239 All Muslims are Allah's 
vicegerents, with an obligation to make effective use of the resources made available 
on earth. Money is simply a tool, whose instrumental value lies in its ability to 
maximise the efficient use of those resources, but, divorced from the tangible assets 
                                            
1238 See section 3.2.3. 
1239 See section 3.3.1.1. 
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of the real economy, money loses its worth. For Islam, money cannot be used to 
make money,1240 which means that interest is prohibited as riba. 
 
The problem that the prohibition of riba creates for Islamic finance derives from its 
need to establish itself as nascent industry and to develop within the competitive 
environment of a global economic framework designed around conventional finance 
and its essential reliance on interest as the main source of profit and growth. There 
are then, a number of pressures on Islamic finance.1241 To begin with, Islamic finance 
is a relatively young industry that must find its way within an environment shaped by 
conventional finance and neoliberal capitalism. The regulatory framework is 
designed for conventional finance, consumer demand is for products and services 
that perform like conventional finance, and the development and delivery of Islamic 
finance must rely on professionals with a background in conventional finance. This 
exposes Islamic finance to the conflicting institutional influences of neoliberal 
capitalism while requiring it to compete against conventional financial firms and 
forcing it to stand on the uneven ground of conventional financial regulation. 
 
The conflict between Islam and neoliberal capitalism, then, is also subject to the 
pressures of competition, which may act to resolve any tension in favour of the 
norms of conventional finance. While Sharia compliance is the bottom line, the 
influence of neoliberal capitalism within the context of a competitive financial 
environment results in a mimetic and competitive isomorphism that encourages the 
development of financial products that use Islamic components, but which are 
fundamentally based on conventional products. These products may be technically 
                                            
1240 See the discussion of the interview responses in section 5.2.3. 
1241 Ibid. 
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compliant with the formal requirements of Sharia, but they are inconsistent with its 
spirit and the maqasid al-Sharia.  
 
The opportunity for developing technically compliant products that mimic 
conventional financial products is exacerbated by the diversity of interpretation 
inherent to Sharia and Islamic fiqh. In the absence of a single authoritative ruling on 
the Sharia compliance of Islamic financial products and services, banks are free to 
"shop" for the most favourable fatwa. While the practice of fatwa shopping will not 
necessarily result in products that are not Sharia compliant, when coupled with the 
financial rewards for scholars willing to issue a favourable fatwa, it does increase the 
likelihood that compliance will focus on the formal, technical aspects of Sharia 
rather its spirit. The competitive pressure on Islamic banks, combined with the 
legitimising influence of neoliberal norms and the focus on technical Sharia 
compliance, may encourage the banks to develop products that test the boundaries of 
Sharia compliance, increasing the risk that a favourable fatwa will be issued only to 
be later challenged by other scholars. Given that Sharia compliance is the 
justification for, and foundation of, Islamic finance,1242 the marketing of products as 
Islamic that are subsequently determined to be non-compliant may result in a loss of 
confidence in Islamic finance as a genuinely Islamic alternative to conventional 
finance. This risk may be compounded by any dissatisfaction with the focus on 
technical compliance rather than on the spirit of Sharia expressed through the 
maqasid al-Sharia. 
 
                                            
1242 See the discussion of the interview responses in section 5.2.3. 
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In an less regulated industry, the task of ensuring Sharia compliance would be the 
responsibility of the board of directors, who would be subject only to their own 
conscience and market forces. Given the fundamental importance of Sharia 
compliance, the invisible hand approach has been rejected in favour of a more formal 
approach to Sharia governance. Following the examination of the nature of Islamic 
finance and its institutional tensions in chapter three, the governance of Sharia 
compliance was addressed in chapter four. The focus of this chapter was to analyse 
Sharia governance as a type of corporate governance situated in the context of risk 
management and the competing institutional logics of Islam and neoliberal 
capitalism. 
 
Through an initial analysis of risk as an institutionalised discourse, it was argued 
that, from a conventional non-secular approach, all risks can be reduced to an 
economic value. From an Islamic perspective, however, the risk of Sharia non 
compliance cannot be treated simply as a financial risk, emphasising the importance 
of prevention and making an effective system of Sharia governance essential to 
Islamic finance.1243 The standard approach to Sharia governance is through the 
employment of Sharia scholars who sit on a Sharia supervisory board or committee 
as part of a bank's corporate governance system. While some countries, such as 
Malaysia, provide central regulatory oversight, in many cases Sharia governance is a 
matter for the bank and its board of directors.  
 
One of the problems with this approach is it treats Sharia governance simply as an 
additional component of a value-laden system of corporate governance, based on a 
                                            
1243 See section 4.1.1. 
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secular conventional approach that carries with it the institutional norms and scripts 
of neoliberal capitalism. Rather than utilising western corporate governance with the 
addition of Sharia governance, it was argued that Islamic banks should develop a 
more integrated approach that incorporates Sharia governance within an holistic 
system of Islamic corporate governance. This Islamic corporate governance might 
employ a modified stakeholder model based on Islamic principles of tawhid, khilafah 
and shura, engaging, through a system of representation, all Muslims as 
stakeholders.1244 
 
Other problems faced by the current approach to Sharia governance include:1245 the 
potential conflicts of interest created by the direct employment relationship between 
the banks and the Sharia scholars sitting on the Sharia board; the problem caused by 
Sharia scholars sitting on multiple boards, which creates a power base of elite 
scholars, again raising concerns of the potential for conflicts of interest caused by the 
mutual dependence of the banks and the scholars; the issue of scholars sitting on 
multiple boards may also, through pressure of time, prevent the scholars from 
affording sufficient attention to their duties owed to each of the individual boards; 
the issue of multiple board membership also highlights the potential for conflict of 
interest caused by elite Sharia scholars sitting on both the Sharia boards of 
individual banks and on central regulatory Sharia boards, standard setting bodies or 
Islamic rating agencies. These problems are exacerbated by a global shortage of 
Sharia scholars who possess sufficient expertise in both the disciplines of Sharia and 
economics. All of these problems encourage an approach that focuses on formal 
                                            
1244 See section 4.4.1. 
1245 See section 4.4.2. 
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technical compliance rather than the deeper level of engagement required to assess 
compliance with the maqasid al-Sharia. 
 
Beyond the problems caused by a shortage of adequately qualified scholars, multiple 
board membership and the mutually dependent relationship between the banks and 
the Sharia scholars, Sharia governance faces two further problems. First, is the 
problem of the lack of transparency caused by opaquely technical fatwas that make it 
difficult for those fatwas to be subject to external assessment. Second, there is the 
problem of inconsistent fatwas, which threatens to undermine the credibility of 
Islamic finance. As already noted, this latter problem provides the central motivation 
behind the argument presented in this thesis, which is that Sharia governance should 
be standardised. 
 
All of these problems are exacerbated by the context of Islamic finance as a young 
industry exposed to the competing institutional influences of Islam and neoliberal 
capitalism.1246 To counter the logics of neoliberal capitalism it is argued that Sharia 
governance should be part of an integrated system of Islamic corporate governance. 
If such an approach is to be successful on a global scale then it needs to be 
standardised in order to avoid fatwa shopping as a way of avoiding the scrutiny of a 
more rigorous system of Sharia governance. A lack of standardisation permits the 
coexistence of Sharia boards operating at different levels of Sharia supervision. This 
provides banks with the opportunity to seek to obtain a competitive financial 
advantage by utilising a less rigorous standard of Sharia governance. As such, a 
standardised approach is necessary, both to ensure a high standard of Sharia 
                                            
1246 See section 4.4.3. 
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governance is implemented across the board, as well as to ensure that firms face a 
level regulatory playing field.1247 
 
Establishing a rigorous standardised system of Sharia compliance governance, 
especially for cross border transactions,1248 is crucial to the long term growth and 
stability of the industry.1249 The question is, how best to achieve that goal. Before 
considering any proposal for standardisation, it is first important to clarify precisely 
what is being standardised. The two main options are standardisation of Sharia 
governance and standardisation of fatwas. Direct standardisation of fatwas may be 
advantageous for the industry through a reduction in transactional and information 
costs. There is, however, a tension between the benefits of standardisation and 
diversity inherent to Sharia and Islamic fiqh. This tension was apparent in the 
interview responses discussed in section 5.2.3. Although not of a unanimous voice, 
the general impression gained from the responses is that such diversity should not be 
stifled, which reflects the counterargument that standardisation of Islamic finance 
'would detract from the development of its principles'.1250 
 
While most of the interviewees regarded the diversity allowed by Sharia as an 
important Islamic aspect of Islamic finance, interviewee 18 stated that: 
I have a certain view regarding the diversity of Sharia, there is a 
mercy on that, but in business, there should be no mercy, there 
should be one opinion. 
                                            
1247 Interviewee 20 expressed a preference for central regulation to enable 'the regulations that gives a 
fair p laying field to everybody'. 
1248 Rahmat Hakim, 'Harmonization of Shariah Rulings in Islamic Finance: An Analysis' (2013) 7 
Ijtihad 267, 276. 
1249 Bedi Gunter Lackman, 'The Six Key Countries Driving Global Islamic Finance Growth' (2104) 6 
Nomura Journal of Capital Markets 1, 14. 
1250 Rahail Ali, Mustafa Kamal, 'Standardising Islamic Financing: Possibility or Pipe Dream?' (2009) 
10 Business Law International 19. 
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This view forcefully emphasises the importance of the business context1251. This 
context was also recognised by interviewee 6 who observed that the issue of diversity 
and standardisation was 'not an academic exercise', but concerned people's money. 
Interviewee 13, however, reflecting the tension apparent in most of the interview 
responses, stated that: 
[it] is a bit of a fine balance ... Enabling enough diversity, enough 
flexibility in decisions of what is Sharia compatible so that 
diversity of the law is respected, but on the other hand establishing 
enough of the framework so that in fact the industry is allowed to 
flourish by virtue of the certainty that the framework provides. 
 
Rather than stifling diversity through the direct standardisation of fatwas, a balance 
between diversity and standardisation may best be achieved by standardisation of 
Sharia governance. Provided it is applied across the whole industry, a sufficiently 
rigorous system of Sharia governance can permit diversity, while restricting the 
opportunity for the undue testing of the boundaries of Sharia compliance. This 
should allow choice and innovation while maintaining confidence in Islamic finance 
as an industry that provides a genuinely Islamic alternative to conventional finance. 
A standardised approach that implements Sharia governance as part of an integrated 
system of Islamic corporate governance will also help to counter the influence of 
neoliberal capitalism, which should reduce the pressure to copy conventional 
financial products. Over time, the reinforcement of Islamic norms through 
governance and regulation should, though the normative isomorphism of 
professionalism and the coercive isomorphism of legitimacy, indirectly encourage 
                                            
1251 See section 1.6.2.2. 
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harmonisation of fatwas. Furthermore, as noted above, a standardised approach to 
Sharia governance will provide a relatively level playing field for all providers of 
Islamic finance and avoid the exploitation of inconsistency to achieve a competitive 
advantage. 
 
The proposed approach to Sharia governance was developed in chapter six of the 
thesis and built on both the theoretical analysis presented in chapters three and four 
and on the qualitative empirical study discussed in chapter five. In the qualitative 
study, 20 experts in Islamic finance from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and the UK were 
interviewed with the aim of identifying their attitudes regarding Islamic finance and 
Sharia governance. An analysis of their responses was able to identify a number of 
relevant themes that usefully complemented the earlier theoretical analysis and 
provided insights that influenced the subsequent proposal.  
In short, the relevant themes are: 
1. the youth of the industry as an apology for any issues with Islamic financial 
products and Sharia governance;  
2. the tension between making a profit and Sharia compliance;  
4. the difficulties faced by Islamic finance in trying to operate within established 
conventional economic and regulatory frameworks; 
6. the competitive, normative and mimetic isomorphic pressure on Islamic 
finance to mirror conventional financial products and services; 
7.  the fundamental nature of Sharia compliance, which required at least a 
national regulatory framework, with the Malaysian approach identified as the 
best current model; the tension between the value of diversity and the need 
 404 
for standardisation, which should be recognised and accounted for by any 
regulatory framework; and  
8. that international bodies should be further developed to enhance the 
implementation of global standards, but that any enforcement should remain a 
national issue. 
 
7.1 Implicative Futures  
 
While it may be reasonable to characterise Islamic finance as a young industry  by 
comparison to conventional finance, it is now some forty years since the industry 
began expanding to become a significant provider of financial services on the global 
stage. The problems of becoming firmly established and the need to provide a 
competitive service, compounded by the lack of suitably qualified professionals and 
Sharia scholars, explains and arguably excuses the reliance on conventional finance 
for the development of Islamic products and services. If, however, Islamic finance is 
to provide a genuinely Islamic alternative to conventional finance, and to retain the 
confidence of the Muslim consumer, then it needs to look to the future. First, the 
industry needs to settle on a clear identity by deciding on whether Islamic finance 
simply means formal technical Sharia compliance, with the emphasis on the 
prohibition of riba, gharar, maysir, or whether it means compliance with the wider 
goals of the maqasid al-Sharia. A third alternative would be to transparently provide 
both types of products and services, allowing the consumer to choose. Second, the 
industry needs to develop a coherent comprehensive system of regulation that allows 
Sharia governance to be standardised without completely precluding diversity. 
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In chapter six the regulatory options were explored, allowing a proposal to be 
developed for a standardised approach to Sharia governance. The proposed 
regulatory framework addresses both the risk of Sharia non-compliance and the 
problem of the undue focus on technical compliance, rather than compliance with the 
spirit of Sharia. The aim is to preserve diversity by transparently offering both halal 
and tayyib products and services, while enhancing confidence in Islamic finance 
through a standardised, robust system of governance. Such an approach recognises 
the value in diversity. It also acknowledges that firms delivering Islamic finance do 
not all operate in identical cultural, political and legal contexts. In some contexts, it 
may not be feasible for Islamic finance firms to operate as commercial ventures 
unless they provide products and services that go no further than satisfying a 
technical Sharia compliance. As Aldhoni notes, the Holy Qur'an (64:16) allows that 
a limited consistency with Sharia is better than nothing.1252 The important condition 
is that Sharia compliance is transparent, making it clear to the consumer whether the 
product is tayyib, or simply halal. 
 
The proposed framework is multi-layered, engaging with Sharia governance at the 
level of the firm, the national level and the international level. At the level of the 
firm, the proposal maintains the current reliance on Sharia supervisory boards or 
committees, but argues that their role should be more fully integrated within the 
corporate governance of the firm rather than provided as an additional, distinct 
element. Furthermore, governance of Islamic banks should be based on an Islamic, 
modified stakeholder conception of governance, which should help to reinforce the 
norms and scripts of Islam. This approach, which relies on both shura and the hisbah 
                                            
1252 Abdul Karim Aldohni, 'The Emergence of Islamic Banking in the UK: A Comparative Study with 
Muslim Countries' (2008) 22 Arab Law Quarterly 180, 186. 
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methodology of encouraging trustworthy personal responsibility and the 
development of self-discipline, engages with a "really responsive" regulatory 
framework established at the national level. 
 
At the national level, the proposal suggested that national law, which might usefully 
be harmonised through an internationally agreed Model Law, should require a 
standardised approach to Sharia governance enforced by national regulators. The 
national framework could, as in the Malaysian system, include a central Sharia 
board, but this was not seen as an essential element and should be left to the 
individual nations to decide.  
 
At the international level, the proposal recommends that a single, authoritative body 
should set standards for Sharia governance. There should also be an international 
professional regulatory body to maintain a registry of Sharia scholars, manage the 
professional education of Sharia scholars and deal with disciplinary issues. It was 
acknowledged that both of these could be implemented through existing bodies, but 
would require greater coordination and the cooperation of the industry. To support 
these bodies, the proposal further recommended the establishment of an international 
hisbah body, which, in the long term, would be responsible for coordinating a 
network of national ombudsmen. 
 
While the proposed framework should enhance both the standardisation of Sharia 
governance and the Islamic identity of Islamic finance, there are a number of issues 
that would need to be resolved in order to implement it effectively. This includes the 
cost of such a system, both in terms of the financial expense and in terms of the 
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additional demands on human resources. The lack of suitably qualified individuals 
for Sharia governance is already a recognised issue and is something that can only be 
dealt with through the establishment of adequate educational programmes and time.  
This may require the proposed framework to be implemented gradually, in stages, 
but should not prevent it from eventually being established.  
 
Implementing the framework will also require the cooperation of the industry and 
national governments. Islamic finance is, however, a valuable industry. While it has 
a clear economic value, Islamic finance also has an immeasurable religious and 
ethical value, providing Muslims with financial services that enhance their lives as 
Allah's vicegerents on earth, and offering non-Muslims an ethical alternative to 
conventional finance. Although securing the cooperation necessary to implement the 
proposed framework is unlikely to be straightforward, the advantages of a 
standardised approach to governance that enhances the Islamic quality of Islamic 
finance, increases consumer choice, and reinforces consumer confidence in Islamic 
finance, make implementation worthwhile. Additional research is required into the 
practicalities of implementing such a framework, including its costs. The proposal, 
however, provides a good starting point and could be taken forward by an 
international committee of influential and authoritative experts in Islamic finance and 
Sharia governance.   
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Appendix: The Semi-Structured Interview 
 
Section 1: The development of Islamic finance 
1. Briefly, What is Islamic Finance? And how different it is from 
Conventional Finance? 
2. What do you think are the goals of Islamic finance (try to name up to five)? 
3. Why do you think these goals  are identifiable with Islamic finance? 
a. What do you think are the most important goals for organisations 
that provide Islamic finance (up to 5)? 
b. Are these goals affected by the nature of the organisation, for 
example are the goals different for Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks that offer Islamic finance alongside a conventional service?  
4. Do any issues arise from conventional and Islamic finance being offered by 
the same organisations? What are these issues? 
5. Do any issues arise from Islamic finance being offered by non-Muslim 
organisations? What are these issues? 
6. What differences, if any, are there between Islamic finance as offered in 
Muslim countries when compared to non-Muslim countries? (Reference the 
three countries of interest: Saudi Arabia; Malaysia; and the UK). 
a. What, if any, are the particular issues that face organisations 
delivering Islamic finance in: Muslim countries such as the KSA; 
Countries with a majority Muslim population (Malaysia); Countries 
with a minority Muslim population (UK)? 
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7. Do you think Islamic financial instruments have tended to be modelled on 
conventional financial instruments? If yes, why has this happened? 
a. How would you describe the relationship between Islamic and 
conventional finance? 
8. Does Islamic finance need to compete with conventional finance? If yes: 
How far does that competition influence the development of Islamic financial 
instruments? 
9. Are there any differences in the Islamic financial instruments developed in 
Muslim countries from those developed in non-Muslim countries? (Reference 
the three countries of interest: Saudi Arabia; Malaysia; and the UK). If yes: 
Would you explain the nature of any differences and why you think they 
arose. 
a. Who are the target clients for Islamic finance? Has this changed 
over time as Islamic finance has developed? How has it changed? 
b. How do you think the 2007 global financial crisis has affected 
Islamic finance, both on its own terms and with regard to its 
relationship with conventional finance? 
 
Section 2: The current challenges facing Islamic finance regarding Sharia 
governance 
10. Do you think Sharia compliance is a particular issue for Islamic finance? 
Would you explain why you think that? 
a. What are the current arrangements for Sharia governance? 
11. What do you think of the current  governance arrangements for managing 
the risk of Sharia non-compliance? 
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a. What issues do you think are particularly relevant to Sharia board 
members? 
b. How far are these issues affected by the country in which the 
board is situated? 
12. Do you think the risk of Sharia non-compliance is affected by the nature of 
the country in which the financial instruments are innovated and developed? 
(Suggest Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and UK as countries for 
comparison). If yes: Would you explain why you think that? 
a. What do you think are the most important factors that influence 
the risk of Sharia non-compliance?  
13. What are your views on the issue of the diversity of Sharia rulings 
regarding Sharia compliance? 
a. What do you think is the legal status of the Fatwas issued in 
regard to Islamic financial products? 
b. In your opinion, what sort of issues arise from this legal status 
14. Do you know what is meant by Fatwa shopping?Have you ever come 
across Fatwa shopping, either in theory or in practice? What are your views 
on this issue  (of Fatwa shopping)? 
a. Are there any financial instruments that you feel are problematic 
with regard to Sharia compliance? Would you name the ones that you 
believe are most problematic? Why do you think they are 
problematic? 
b. What do you think are the possible consequences of a product 
initially passed as Sharia compliant subsequently being ruled as non-
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compliant? Which of these consequences do you think are most 
likely? 
 
Section 3:  The possible solutions to those challenges 
15. How do you think Sharia compliance should be regulated? Why do you 
think that? 
16. Is there a need for reform of the current approach to Sharia governance? 
What reform is required? Why do you think that? 
17. What do you think of specific possible solutions? International Sharia 
board (Backed by treaty; Backed by voluntary co-operation); Regional Sharia 
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